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Tile general distinction between uses of the term ’’idea" whicn we draw is 
between occurrences in the mind anu dispositions for them as opposed to con­
cepts. Locke uses ”iuea’' in the first way, Maiebranche uses- it in the second. 
Leibniz allows that the mind is infinite and that dispositions in the body 
correspond to dispositions in the mind; thus he is able to maintain that ideas 
are both concepts and dispositions in the mind.
We explain concepts in terms of conventional rules, for the most part lin­
guistic and especially mathematical. We call a system of conventional rules 
an objective structure and, as tnose who took ideas to be concepts held that 
they are concepts of divine science, we treat God as the unique objective 
structure. The question in seventeenth century tneories of ideas is' how that 
body of knowledge comprising ideas and their relations is applicable to things.
In the first four chapters, we consider concepts and the Cartesian pro­
gramme to reduce the description of everything but that which applies con­
cepts to mathematical descriptions. Descartes, Maiebranche, and Leibniz held 
that tne lack of simplicity and exactness in human knowledge arises from the 
correspondence between microscopic activities in the body and mental occur­
rences. With occurrences in the body explained mechanically, it was held, 
the world can be described with maximum simplicity and exactness. Extended 
things are law-obeying configurations to which concepts are applied; think­
ing things are rule-following things by virtue of applying these concepts.
But the parts played by convention and behaviour are left out of their ac­
counts and, omitting these, the world canuot be shown to be anything more 
than a diagram, perhaps portrayed only in the mind of the investigator. In 
the antepenultimate chapter, we discuss two related views which led the 
rationalists to maintain that all rational beings naturally'follow a unique 
objective structure: their position on the correspondence between the ac­
tivity of the body and occurrences in the mind (illustrated in their tneories 
of vision) and the view tuat divine science is tne standard for all scien­
tific formulations. In the penultimate chapter, we present evidence ths c ra­
tionalist accounts of cognition were in fact modelled on rule-governed ac­
tivity, Plato’s tneory of knowledge and Ideas is compared with rationalist 
accounts and is found to have less relevance to rule-governed activity. Kant, 
we admit, saw the relevance of rules, but no more than the rationalists. In 
the ninth chapter, we discuss Kaiebranche’s vision in God (which most clearly 
presents ideas as concepts), its relation to Descartes’ and Leibniz’s posi­
tions ann its dependenc on occasionalism.
In the fifth chapter, we argue against Chomsxy’s innatist position and, 
more generally, claims in the behavioural and social sciences to explain hu­
man knowledge in terms of internalized components and covert activities. It 
is also maintained that Chomsky’s innatism bears little resemblance to that 
of seventeenth century rationalism.
We discuss in the sixth through the eighth chapters the Scholastic back­
ground to the use of the term ‘’idea" and theories of ideas. In the sixth chap­
ter, the pervasive influence of Suarez is established, as is the prevalence of 
nominalism in the seventeenth century and its connection with Gassendism and 
eventually Locke. Suarez combined aspects of Thomism and nominalism. Thom-
ism was concerned with so-called spiritual objects of knowledge, wiiich rough­
ly act as standards and are the contribution of the know an to what is known; 
rationalism’s account of knowledge maintained these aspects of Thomism. nom­
inalism, on the other hand, presented what we shall call a causal or genetic 
account of knowledge (according to which our knowledge arises from causal re­
lations and operations of the intellect) and was concerned with so-called 
material objects got from sensation (wnile allowing for spiritual operations).
The distinction between spiritual and material objects and faculties is in­
troduced in the sixth chapter. In the seventh chapter, we discuss the bridge 
between these faculties, the intellectus agens,'which served“as an objective 
structure in Thomist accounts. In the eighth chapter, we discuss uses of 
'’spiritual”, ’’idea”, and ’’mind”, beginning with Scholastic uses, but con­
centrating on the differences between Descartes and Gassendi.
Locke’s causal account is discussed in the'final chapter. We emphasise his 
divergence from Cartesianism, such as his view on the narrow compass of the 
understanding, his treatment of mathematical ideas as signs and his-reliance 
on mental dispositions. Locke’s position suffers from the omission of concepts.
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i.
INTRODUCTION i
The term "idea” became prominent in philosophical literature largely 
through the writings of Descartes. Descartes’ conception of ideas and their 
objective realities is central to his programme, which was a revolution in 
the account not only of our knowledge and its exercise, but also of the 
mathematical and medical sciences. A salient aspect of Descartes’ programme 
is the quest for certainty and dissatisfaction with only probable knowledge. 
Descartes’ novelty, however, does not rest on his concern with a priori 
knowledge, for Scholasticism considered a body of a priori truths the ideal 
of human knowledge. Cartesians and Scholastics shared a notion of science 
as a body of necessary truths, which is how we shall use "science”. Descartes 
novelty is in what he considered this science to be, our relation to it and, 
above all, its relation to things.
The Scholastics thought of logic as an art to arrive at science in 
beginning with our? every-day observations. They thought of the exercise 
and inception of our knowledge as dependent on species received in sensation, 
which exhibit only the superficial nature of things and establish dispositions 
in us to be exercised in a gradual process of articulating our science. For 
Descartes, science is mathematics, suitably universalised and complemented by 
certain adjuncts. Mathematics for Descartes is perspicuous: by attending to 
mathematical concepts, one grasps truths as if by seeing them, without a 
formal arrangement of propositions or a refinement of terms. Some art or 
method is called for, but this is to remove the cobwebs which we have acquired 
since infancy through our continual concern with our biological needs and 
the upbringing imposed on us. Descartes not only eliminates the need for 
Scholastic logic, but also the need for species. Mathematics is not only 
the paradigm of science, but also constitutes the nature of all things but 
rational beings. Extended things are perspicuous; extended substances do 
not support accidents, but reveal mathematical properties to us with no need 
to refine the data of sensation. Extension is the essence of body for the
11
Cartesians. Likewise, the soul or mind which applies this science is pers­
picuous to itself, for that by which we know things - objective realities - 
need no refining and all that is in the mind is thought, which is its 
essence. These occurrences, however, are not due-to the mind’s grasp of 
science and to that extent are opaque and veil extended substances, as they . 
relate to configurations too small to be revealed. These are due to the 
union of the soul with the body and include qualities we naturally attribute
to bodies.
The human body itself reveals mathematical properties and can be 
investigated as well as the rest of the corporeal world in an endeavour 
to explain mechanically all extended things. By the examination of micro­
scopic parts of the body, their relations with each other and with micro­
scopic systems in their environment, it was thought, the dependence of our 
knowledge of the world and ourselves on opaque occurrences in the mind can 
be minimised. A large portion of Descartes’ writings and much of Malebranche’s 
magnum opus, the Recherche de la Verit/, were devoted to physiological 
descriptions of the minute parts of the human body, particularly the braine 
Cartesianism first spread in scientific circles, especially medical circles, 
and Cartesian mechanical physiology was regarded as integral to the endeavour 
to give a perspicuous description of all things, extended and thinking.
On the Cartesian position that the essence of all things is either 
extension or thought, species received by rational beings from bodies were 
ruled out. The Cartesian account of our grasp of the natures of things was 
not primarily concerned with dispositions - knowledge - but with acts - 
cognition - whether these are inceptions or exercises of dispositions. Their 
major concern was with the application of our science to things. It is 
important to realise that much of the discussion in the seventeenth century 
was about cognition, rather than knowledge. The Latin "cognitio” and some­
times the French "connaissance” refer to acts. Sometimes (as with Locke)
iii
even the English "knowledge" referred to an act. "Cognoscere", for want of 
a better word, can be rendered as "cognise". The dominant Scholastic 
account in the seventeenth century, on the other hand, put more emphasis 
on knowledge and held that cognition which is inceptive of knowledge, as 
it is not the application of science, is different from that which is the 
exercise of knowledge. The inception of knowledge was held to be a causal 
relation between the thing cognised and the cogniser. Knowledge thus caused, 
it was held, is developed by the individual to arrive at science,-which is 
then exercised in cognition. We shall call such accounts causal or genetic 
accounts. Locke’s account is very much a causal account.
The major distinction we wish to draw between the uses of "idea", is 
as it was used for an occurrence in the mind or a disposition for such 
occurrences and as it was used for a concept. We shall explain concepts 
in terms of conventional rules. Concepts are largely the meanings of words 
and a science as a body of a priori truths is purely conceptual. The 
seventeenth century, however, did not think of science as conventional.
Those who held a causal account thought of it as due to the operations of 
the individual on what is caused in him. Descartes identified divine science, 
by which things are made, with human science, which we apply in cognition.
This identification is achieved in his causal proofs of the existence of God. 
The causal proofs rely on the objective realities of ideas, which are concepts. 
With the identification of divine and human science, Descartes has a guarantee 
that the concepts we have are all from the same conceptual structure, which is 
complete for any investigation we should undertake. As we interpret Descartes 
and Malebranche, the latter is faithful to the former on the part given to 
objective realities (which he calls ideas). Malebranche held that our ideas 
or concepts are not in the mind, but in God. We shall speak of the objective 
structure rather than God whenever possible, for the relevance of God in
iv
Malebranche’s account of knowledge is that He contains the science which
we follow and which is revealed in things. Leibniz, although critical of 
the Cartesians on some points, is in agreement with them on the relation
between our science and God’s.
Both Malebranche and Locke characterise ideas as the immediate objects 
of thought. What is intended is that by which we know something and corres­
ponds to the Scholastic objectum quo. The problem with seventeenth century 
theories of ideas is not that objects are placed between us and things. The 
question, rather, was what sorts of objects of thought or cognition must be 
primary to account for human science and its application to things. Malebranche 
calls ideas spiritual. Similarly, Leibniz calls monads spiritual automata. 
Spiritual, as. concerned with knowledge, distinguishes what is conceptual, 
for what is conventional is replaced by something held to be natural.
The Scholastic distinction between material or sensitive faculties
and spiritual faculties, with objects peculiar to each, was disrupted by 
the mechanisation of matter. Descartes, with his mechanical physiology, 
excluded the Scholastic sensitive faculties from the thing which thinks and 
held that sensation and imagination are occurrences in the mind due to its 
union with the body. There are no occurrences in the mind, Descartes maintained, 
which are indifferent to judgement. Judgement, a function of the will, is 
especially important for the application of science and is not to be separated 
from consciousness-. Locke, who rejected Cartesian mechanical physiology, 
retains the Scholastic sensitive faculties in the mind. "Mind” has a different
sense for Locke-, as does "conscious" and judgement plays a minor part. Further­
more, Locke lacks any equivalent of the notion of objective reality. For him, 
ideas are only occurrences in the mind or dispositions for such occurrences.
Locke accepted only part of the Cartesian revolution.
1Chapter I
Knowledge, Cognition and
Non-Descriptive Concepts.
The major distinction we wish to draw between uses of ’’idea') '
by our philosophers is between what we shall call occurrences in the 
mind and dispositions to have such occurrences on the one hand and 
concepts on the other. Concepts are best explained as that which 
governs our utterances of verbal tokens so that they have a use. 
Occurrences in the mind will be explained in analogy with utterances. 
Only beings governed by rules have concepts and any account of the 
knowledge we have which is peculiar to us as beings governed by rules 
and its application to things must assign a principal part to concepts. 
We can allow that occurrences in the mind and dispositions for them 
are due to our causal relations with our environment. But concepts 
are conventional and are imposed on us by our culture. Locke’s 
account of our knowledge suffers from the lack of a notion of concepts, 
as it must, for it is a causal or genetic account. ’’Idea” for Locke 
means either an occurrence in the mind or a disposition for such 
occurrences. ’’Concept” corresponds to Descartes’ ’’objective reality” 
and Malebranche ’ s and Leibniz’ ’’idea”. The accounts these philosophers 
give of the application of the knowledge we have which is peculiar 
to us as rational beings or beings governed by rules, though attenuated 
and idealised, is basically sound. However, they maintain that all 
rational beings naturally have the same set of concepts in all stages 
of their history and apply them in their natural interaction with 
their environment. A major reason for this position is their view
2on the correspondence between thought and. the mechanical disposition 
of the body and the mechanical description of all bodies in terms 
of a scientific ideal, which is the supposedly unique set of concepts. 
Another^ related3reason is the view that there is one set of rules 
by which God evaluates our actions - including verbal behaviour and 
thought - and governs the course of nature.
The general problem is an account of how someone, or other 
knows and what he knows. We begin this section by distinguishing 
three sorts of knowledge, each paradigmatically (but not always) 
associated with a grammatical form: practical knowledge, corresponding 
to ’’know how”} essential knowledge, corresponding to ’’know what...is”} 
and propositional knowledge, corresponding to ’’know that”. To each 
sort of knowledge, which is dispositional, corresponds a sort of 
cognition, i.e., the exercise or inception of the disposition. The 
first three chapters are largely concerned with what is usually called 
a, priori knowledge and its application to the world} we shall construe 
this somewhat differently. We begin by concentrating on one of two 
general ways in which one can reply to ”How does he know?”, viz. by 
stating his competences. We are particularly concerned with the 
competence one has by virtue of following the rules of culture, which 
are conventional. In particular, there are certain rules one follows 
which do not directly depend on how the world is or what those who 
follow them are like. We shall call these purely conventional rules 
”non-descriptive rules”} they could in principle be learned by per­
forming acts, (which we shall call ”intransitive acts”, as opposed 
to ’’transitive acts”) whose purpose is not to pick out natural things. 
As rules are known in this sort of propositional knowledge, we shall 
say that concepts are known in the corresponding essential knowledge.
5These rules and. concepts largely govern our verbal behaviour, but 
”to know” even here is not to be conflated, with "to be able to say", 
for we cannot always say what we know. Non-descriptive rules and. 
concepts are most notably grammatical, logical, mathematical and. 
moral and. those governing speech acts. The totality of the non- 
de script-ive- rules and. concepts of a culture we shall call the 
"objective structure" of that culture.
We are particularly interested, here in the Cartesians (i.e. 
Descartes and. Malebranche) and. Leibniz, who maintained, that there is 
only one objective structure., which is either an aspect of God. or that 
which God. followed, in creating the world.. This is contrary to . the fact 
that an objective structure is peculiar to a culture. It is also 
contrary to the fact that a person comes to follow non-descriptive 
rules and. concepts by performing acts which can be evaluated, by 
others - "transient acts"; only once he knows the rules and. concepts’ 
can he perform acts which could, be evaluated. onlyKiimself - "immanent 
acts". (We shall say that the objective structure specifies the 
roles - uses - of transient and. immanent acts.) But according to 
the Cartesian and. Leibnizian position, before performing any transient 
act;we follow the objective structure, which is independent of any 
culture. A consequence of this is that all non-descriptive rules 
and concepts we should ever follow are already in force with regard 
to us. The Cartesians and Leibniz expressed this by saying that 
we know what is infinite - the objective structure (God) - before 
what is finite, i.e. its applications. One thing implied by this 
position is the view that one concept or rule Zs applicable to an 
infinite number of cases. This runs into problems because there are
not always methods to evaluate whether the application of a rule or
4concept in a particular case is correct or incorrect; rather new 
rules or concepts must he agreed, upon. For the same reason, an 
objective structure cannot he infinite in a second, way, viz. given 
a rule or a set of rules, an infinite number of concepts are to he 
thereby given. We shall discuss the formation of non-descriptive 
rules, concepts and disciplines. We shall he particularly con­
cerned with the criteria of simplicity and exactness, so important 
to the Cartesians and Leibniz, which are determined by the cultural 
endeavour in which one is engaged, its rules and concepts.
’’Know” has a very versatile grammar. We can be said to know
how to do something, know that such-and-such, know about something,
know what something is, or know of something. Furthermore, ’’know”
is often followed directly by a noun-phrase. Certain constructions
are not of interest to us, as when we speak of knowing pain or
misery, where ’’know” is used like ’’suffer", or when "to know" is
used like "to be familiar with", where the familiarity in question
carries some social implication (,as in most cases in which we are
said to know a person, town or landmark). Vendlerclaims that all
other grammatical constructions containing "know" are reducible to 
1
constructions of the form "know that..." Consider the following.
(l) Joe lost his watch.
_ (2) I found what he lost.
(3) I know what he lost.
Together, (l) and (2) entail that I found Joe’s watch; but (l) and 
(3) do not entail that I know his watch. The difference is accounted 
for by the different functions of "what" (a purely grammatical word) 
in (2) and (3). "What" in (2) amounts to "that which" - a demonstrative
pronoun followed by a relative pronoun introducing a relative clause
5noun-sharing.
Relative clauses always depend, on . * between two ingredient sen­
tences: e.g. "I found that (pointing to the watch), which he lost#”
But ’’what he lost” in (3) has nothing to do with a relative clause. 
Rather, it is a sentence nominalisation formed by replacing a noun­
phrase or adverbial phrase in the original sentence. Thus (3) could 
be expanded as:
(4) I know what he lost, namely a watch.
Restoring the underlying sentence gives:
(5) I know what he lost, namely (I. know 
that he lost) a watch.
So the ”what” - clause after ’’know” derives from:
(6) that he lost a watch
Vendler suggests that the ’’what” clause should be called an 
indirect or indefinite claim, not an indirect question, under which 
it is usually classed by grammarians. An instance of an indirect
question is:
(7) I wonder what he lost.
Restoring the underlying sentence gives:
(8) I wonder what he lost, namely (i wonder 
whether he lost) a watch, or a ring, or ...
So the ”what” clause after ’’wonder” comes from an earlier nominal isat ion, 
viz •:
(9) whether he lost a watch
and not directly from a "that” clause. However, ”wh..” clauses
("who...”, "when...", ’’why...”, "how...", etc.,) after the negation 
of "know" are proper indirect questions, coming through "whether”, 
not "that”. A similar ambiguity occurs for other "wh..." clauses: 
they are indefinite claims when following "know” (without a negation) 
and indirect questions after, e.g., "wonder”.
However, although sometimes the construction "know how” can be 
analysed as "know” followed by an indirect claim (e.g. "He knows
6how the tree fell.”), when it is followed, by an infinitive clause it
cannot. For most values of ” (p " in ”1 know how to tj>", there are
any number of ways in which I can (j) , (The most notable uses
for which there is only one way are those which concern decorum.)
What one knows in these cases is indefinite in a way in which "He 
' 2knows how the tree fell” is not. Vendler suggests that:
(10) I know how to solve the problem.
is to. be analysed in the same'way as: -
(11) 1 persuaded him to go.
(12) I know where to go.
These, he maintains, are contractions of:
(13) I persuaded him that he should go.
(14) I know where I should go.
Thus (lO) is held to be a contraction of:
(15) I know how I can solve the problem, 
which is a contraction of:
(16) I know that I can solve the problem in this way:...
But unless ’’can” in (l6) has the sense of ’’know how to” (which it 
must if Vendler*s analysis is to work), (l6) is true if and only if 
the following is true:
(17) 1 know that one can solve the problem in this way:*...
Yet one could describe what someone does, could do, or the correct
way of doing it without being able to do it, i.e. without knowing
how to do it. ”How" (it must be pointed out), when it follows ’’know”, 
□
does not always have the sense of "in what way”. It is suggested 
that, in place of a description of in "I know how to ”, one 
could give a demonstration of ^*ing. There are two reasons one 
would give a demonstration of 0**ing: to exhibit that one knows how 
to <f> or (which is relevant to Vendler*s position) to show another 
that <j) *;ing can be done in this way. In the latter case, demonstration 
does perform a linguistic function, but for that very reason the
7.
person who understands the statement does not necessarily know
how to <fi , although he must know what ^’ing is.
For some values of however, if one shows or tells another
how one ^’s and the person understands, then he will know how to (p . 
Such things as playing chess, adding fractions and conjugating 
Latin verbs can be learned in this way. We shall call them ’’rational 
activities”, as there is no particular physical training involved. 
Knowing how to perform them may presuppose that one knows how to 
perform other rational activities. Still, there is no reason why 
one should prefer a propositional analysis of even these, for one 
could learn how to play chess without being able to formulate the
rules.
In general we shall call the sort of knowledge we are said to 
have when we know how to do something ’’practical knowledge”. Practical 
knowledge is to do with competences and is not always expressed by 
the grammatical construction ’’know how”. We sometimes use ’’know” 
followed directly by a noun-phrase when speaking of someone’s com­
petences, as when we say that someone knows a language, skill,
discipline or game. We also use ’’can” to express competences.
We distinguish practical knowledge from propositional know­
ledge (i.e. that knowledge we have when we are said to know that...) 
although most, if not all, cases of practical knowledge presuppose 
propositional knowledge and vice versa. From these, we distinguish 
a third sort of knowledge, essential knowledge, which one is said to 
have when one knows what (.an) A. is, where ”A” is a noun phrase. 
Sometimes the construction ’’know what - is” can be analysed as ’’know” 
followed by an indefinite claims e.g. in ”He knows what the capital 
of Albania is”, the ”wh”-clause derives from ’’that the capital of
8Albania is Tirana”. But other times "know what - is” constructions, 
as "know how” constructions are indefinite in a way in which con­
structions in which "know" is followed, by an indefinite claim are not. 
There is only one correct answer to the question "What is the capital 
of Albania?"' But there are any number of answers to the questions 
"What is a square?", "What is a group of two things?", "What is a 
mongoose?" or "What is iron?" Indeed, to know what, e.g., a mon­
goose is, one need not be able to say what a mongoose is; it suffices 
that one can tell a mongoose from, e.g., a mink, that one can pick 
it out from a significantly 'large sample of other sorts of animals. 
Vendlerf to analyse the "whH clause in "know what (an) A is" as an 
indefinite claim, considers samples as playing linguistic rules, 
supplementing language. For example, "what coffee tastes like"
(i.e. "what the taste of coffee is") is taken as a contraction of 
"that coffee tastes like this (offering a sample)". Now a sample 
can be given, as an activity can be demonstrated, for different 
reasons: to exhibit that one has the competence to pick out the 
thing in question or to show someone, e.g., what coffee tastes like.
In the latter case, something extra-linguistic is involved, viz. the
person to whom the sample is given acquires the competence to pick 
5
out (the taste of) coffee.
Still, most cases of essential knowledge can be acquired by 
being told about A (*s). There are two classes here, the first of 
which includes that essential knowledge which can be acquired because 
one can pick out things similar to A-, (’s). Here knowing what (an) A. 
is is similar to knowing about A (rs). When one can state what one 
knows and one knows what (an) A is, then one can give a description 
of A (’s) so that an interlocutor. could pick out A (*s). The second
9.
class of essential knowledge which can he acquired by being told 
about A (*'s) is that for which what is known need not involve picking ' 
something out. We can have essential knowledge of certain geometrical 
figures (e.g. a chiliagon) and groups of a certain number (e.g. 1,000) 
without being able to pick them out from other geometrical figures 
(e.g. a 999-sid.ed, figure) or groups of another number (e.g. 999)*
This is where essential knowledge amounts in a large part to being 
able to say (i.e. give a definition). Yet despite the prejudice 
due to the importance of pedagogical cases, uttering, e.g., ’’nine” .. 
when the sum of four and five is demanded is not on its own a
criterion that the utterer knows what (a group of) nine. is. Nor is
declaring, e.g., that 101 is the successor of 100 necessarily an
exercise of essential knowledge of (a group of) 101. He who utters
’’nine” or ”101” at the appropriate time must demonstrate that his 
6utterance obeys certain restrictions, i.e. that he has not just 
uttered something, but also said something.
Essential and propositional knowledge are not capable of 
degrees as is knowing about (which we can consider a grammatical 
variant of either essential or propositional knowledge) and prac­
tical knowledge. E.g., we can know more or less about coffee, but 
we either do or do not know what coffee is. However, there are not
clear criteria in all cases for when someone has essential know­
ledge of something. Usually, but not always, pointing to a geo­
metrical figure on being asked to pick it out counts as showing 
that one knows what . that figure is. There is an ob­
vious criterion for propositional knowledge, viz. saying that...
But again, the utterance must obey certain restrictions. Further­
more propositional knowledge cannot always be stated. Essential,
10
practical and. propositional knowledge are intertwined. To know 
that a square has four sides counts to knowing what a square is, 
as does knowing how to construct a right angle. Involved in 
knowing that an angle cannot he trisected with straight-edge and 
compass is knowing what an angle is and knowing how to generate 
figures, lines and curves. The exercises of these three sorts of 
knowledge, which are dispositional, we shall call cognition, corres­
ponding to the verb ’’cognise”. All three sorts of knowledge may 
he involved in any one sort of cognition.
Now there are two general sorts of answers to the question 
”How does he know?*”, of which we shall initially he concerned with 
one, viz. stating .what he knows how to do or can (when this has the 
sense of ’’know how to”) do, i.e. stating his competences. There are 
cases of each use of "know” for which this question could be ans­
wered by stating the person’s competence.^
When asked how someone knows how to (f? , we reply either by 
stating another (either related or more general) competence or. by 
stating how he learned how to (ft • In the first case, if repeatedly 
asked how he knows how to do whatever activity is mentioned, we 
must eventually reply by stating how he learned how to do some 
activity. We can distinguish two sorts of competences, the first 
of which are those acquired because we must get by in our environ­
ment in ways similar to those in which certain other higher organisms 
do. These include such things as knowing how to swim and knowing 
how to climb trees. What interests us here, however, are those 
competences which are peculiarly human and not so closely connected 
with our biological functioning. By virtue of these, only homo sapiens 
is able to control his environment as he does, engage in disinterested
11.
inquiry and. form diverse sorts of societies with others of his 
species; by these, cultural evolution takes over from biological 
evolution and. an individual can be inventive in a way in which an
animal cannot.
These peculiarly human activities are rule-governed activities, 
(in particular, rules supply the restrictions whereby uttering is 
saying.) Rules are cultural, the conventions of a culture, and, 
at least initially for anndividual who (we shall say) is inducted 
into the culture, are enforced by someone other than the individual 
who follows them and they can always be enforced. By these rules, 
the performance of an individual is evaluated for its correctness 
or incorrectness. We might allow th'ah an isolated infant could 
become self-evaluating; but what is important is that his self­
evaluation is in principle no different from his evaluation of
another nor from another’s evaluation of him. The rules of the
culture furnish the standards of success and give a point for the 
individual who (we shall say) is subject to them or on whom they 
are imposed to act in a certain way. (This is not to say, how­
ever, that the rules themselves have no point on a biological level, 
for they might be conducive to the individual's success in his non­
cult ural environment.)
By virtue of being subject to these rules, we know how to do 
things which have a point only within the system of rules of the 
culture, i.e. we know how to follow the rules. Sometimes what is
done is what we shall ^call "transient”s something public is pro­
duced, a,g- when we construct something, or say something. Sometimes 
what is done is what we shall call "immanent": nothing public is 
produced, as when, having essential knowledge of A ('s) (where the
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distinction between A (’s) and, e.g., B (*s) only has a point in 
the culture) one cognises (an) A. Oh© must perform (at least
initially) transient acts, which are open to the evaluation of 
others, before one can perform the corresponding immanent acts.
Now the utterances of some verbal tokens (e.g. ’’cat”) pick
out things; the utterances of other verbal tokens (e.g. "(a)
promise”, "(a) command”) pick out conventional acts. Again, the
utterance of certain verbal tokens (e.g. ”2”), although they can
apply to (but do not therefore pick out) things, still have some
function when they do not apply to things, as when one intransitively
counts, i.e. recites the number series without numbering things.
Both utterances which apply to things and those which do not are
evaluated according to rules which are not directly concerned with
how the world is, and so are purely conventional. These we shall
call ”non-descriptive rules"; they set the limits to what can and
cannot be, said, constructed, diagrammed or evaluated .tl fter&ice? whick 
&Pply t° ’things io rales which sre. dir&eily
sohcerfyed vyiih how i h & tvov'ld our bio /ogic-dl e ncleoofaeiii. These rule?
shall call "descriptive rules”. Finally, some utterances, such as 
cries, babblings, etc., not being or being part of rule-governed 
activities, are not evaluated at all.
We draw a distinction for both transient and immanent acts
between transitive and intransitive acts. Transitive acts are those
which involve descriptive rules or are cognitions which involve 
in. some essential way the history of the cognising thing in its 
environment. Transitive acts, when they are essential cognitions 
(e.g. uttering "cat”' correctly) pick out things, sorts of things, 
properties of things, etc. which are independent of convention.
When transitive acts are propositional or practical cognitions, they
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do not involve transitive essential cognitions. But if a person’s 
utterance, writing or diagramming is transitive and. we cognise the 
utterance, writing or diagramming, then our own act is transitive, 
picking out what the other person picks out.
Cognition can he a transient act and he evaluated. Thus one 
becomes subject to rules by performing both transitive and intransitive 
transient acts. By the latter, one becomes subject only to the non­
descriptive rules of the culture, while by the former, (since neft-des- 
criptive rules are followed in making and evaluating both transitive 
and intransitive acts) one becomes subject to both the descriptive 
and the non-descriptive rules. The non-descriptive rules governing 
speech acts are perhaps the most important non-descriptive rules for 
the enforcement of the rules of a culture, and so for an individual’s 
induction into that culture and his being subject to the rules. For 
example, cognising a promise leads to advantages and not cognising a 
command leads to inconveniences. By performing only intransitive 
acts, one could in principle become subject to all grammatical, 
logical, arithmetical and geometrical rules, which are those non­
descript ive rules with which we shall be concerned.
Non-descriptive rules, as are all rules, are formulated as 
complete sentences; ’’The successor of 2 is 3” or ”2+1=3” ,’Red* 
and ’green’ cannot be applied to the same spatio-temporal expanse”, 
”*Bbmo’, if modified by an adjective, must be modified by one which 
is masculine nominative singular”, ’’From ’p’ and ’If p, then q.’, 
one can infer ’q.’1”, "From ’p^p’ one can infer anything”, and 
”’pv p*' can be inferred from anything”.. The statements of rules 
involve terms which appear in a number of rules and statements of
non-descriptive rules in particular involve certain terms, call them
U"non-descriptive terms”, which appear in a number of them. These 
are terms which have a use independent^ <3$ th® nature. h>pfh dpptes
/•h&iM and vkzt Hey are. plied • Examples of such terms are :
"successor of”, "two", "square", "equilateral", "incompatibly 
applicable", "(grammatically) agree", "•", ’’infer" and
variables of different kinds. • •
Non-descriptive rules are for the most part followed by an
individual inducted into the culture before he can formulate them.
The only exceptions are mathematical rules, and even here transitive 
uses may in some sense be mors "natural" than the intransitive uses. 
Indeed, formulating a rule is itself a rule-following activity, which 
can be correct or incorrect. Sometimes, when we ask whether someone 
knows that, e.g., ’homo1, if modified by an adjective, must be 
modified by a masculine singular nominative adjective, we would not 
say that he does unless he could formulate the rule. This is using 
"know" like "can say". But sometimes, even when the person can 
state the rule, we would not say that he knows the rule unless he 
could follow the rule in other ways than formulating it; indeed 
parroting the formulation does not count as formulating it. This 
exhibits "know" as it relates to "know how (to)" or simply "can", 
which is the more fundamental sense than "can say"; the conflation 
with "can say" is due to the fact that formulating (even parroting) 
is a more convenient, thus more common, transient act for evaluating.
The intransitive acts which are the formulations of the rules are
not what is known. Rather, the rules to which one is subject are 
known and by being subject to these rules one can evaluate others* .
and one’s own formulations of the rules for correctness and incorrect­
ness - in this case truth aad falsity - and one’s formulations can be
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evaluated, by another. The rules themselves, being the criteria of 
truth, are not themselves true.
Propositional and. practical knowledge, when this concerns 
conventional activities, involve a number of rules. These rules, 
like their formulations, converge. We shall say that they converge 
on concepts, or their formulations converge on terms. Knowing a 
rule is a case of propositional knowledge; likewise knowing a con­
cept or having a concept is a case of essential knowledge. There are 
non-descriptive and descriptive concepts. One knows or has a con­
cept of (an) A when one is subject to the rules in question, i.e. 
when one knows what (an) A. is, i.e. when one has essential know­
ledge of A (’s).
Non-descriptive rules and concepts intertwine: there could not 
be mathematical concepts and rules in isolation from one another; 
likewise, grammatical rules and concepts are determined by their 
relation to one another, as are logical rules and concepts. Further­
more, grammar applies to logical terms and logical rules apply to 
mathematical terms. We shall speak of the totality of non-descriptive 
rules and concepts which are followed in a culture (but not by any 
one individual, even adult, in it) as the ’’objective structure” of that 
culture. We shall take the phrase ’’present to” from Malebranche and
say that the objective structure of a culture"is present to an indiv­
idual when he is inducted into that culture.
Behaving (including uttering) in a certain way jand whatever 
occurrence corresponds to this for immanent acts) is performing a 
conventional act only in so far as one’s behaviour (or the corres­
ponding occurrence) fulfils a role specified by the rules of one’s
culture. In particular, non-descriptive rules, or the objective
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structure as a whole specify certain roles by virtue of which certain 
sorts of behaviour (and. the corresponding occurrences) are fit to 
apply to or pick out things. Thus the role of the utterance of a 
vocal token is specified, by non-descriptive (viz. grammatical) rules 
by which the utterance is fit to pick out something. Again, the role 
of a mathematical diagram is specified by non-descriptive rules, 
whereby it could be used as a blue-print for a construction(which 
again - ignoring the materials - could have the same role, specified 
only by the non-descriptive rules), it could thereby also be used 
as a written work specifying .which verbal tokens are to be uttered and 
in what order (the totality of which tokens then has the same role 
as the diagram); and it could thereby be fit to pick out something.
Once an individual has an objective structure present to him, 
the acts fulfilling roles specified by this structure need not be 
transient, but could be immanent. In fact, there are rules which 
require that one not make a transient act. This gives a hint as to 
what these immanent acts might be. If someone is trained to say 
’’Five" every time someone asks "what is two plus three?" the reply 
is automatic. Further training is required for him to not- reply 
"Five". Now if he has learned to recite the number series, etc., 
he has a handle on elementary rules and the uttering of "Five" 
need no longer be that which fulfils the role marked out by the con­
cept of five5 the commencement (which is not transient) of this act 
suffices. The commencement is perhaps a muscular reflex or an occur­
rence in the nervous system; we shall call it "an occurrence in the 
soul (or. intellect or mind)" leaving this unspecified. We shall say 
that there are such occurrences whether the immanent act be transitive
or intransitive
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"Objective" might he used, in three senses. Firstly, it could, 
he used, for what is publicly observable, in which sense transient 
acts would, be objective, immanent acts not. Secondly, it could be 
used for what is natural, as opposed to what i£ conventional. Finally, 
"objective" could be used to distinguish the rules or what the rules
determine from the application of the rules or that to which the rules 
are applied. In this sense, the relations of a figure on a diagram 
are objective, but the paper and ink are not. "Objective" in 
"objective structure" is used in this sense.
The Cartesians (Descart.es and Malebranche)' and Leibniz alone 
of the philosophers we shall treat were concerned with rules. However, 
the rules are not thought of as conventional, but as those by which 
God (who becomes much like the objective structure itself) created 
and conserves the world. What we have ailed the objective structure 
is what Malebranche calls the divine substance as inimitable by 
creatures and that in which we see all things? for Leibniz, God was 
the regio idearum, which, along with restrictions, is repeated in 
every simple substance and is known by reflection to those which are
conscious; for Descartes it was the eternal truths and immutable 
essences which, though created, are the rules to which all things and 
occurrences in the world (in so far as they can represent things) 
conform. Bach of the three considered the objective structure as in­
volving -somewhat different things. For Descartes it comprised two 
super-concepts: that of res oogitans or of thought and that of res 
extensa or of extension, better thought of as all mathematical rules 
and concepts. The concept of thought was for the most part simply 
that of following mathematical rules, but it included in common with 
that of res extensa, numerical concepts and certain "common notions"
and in addition the concepts of two different faculties, i.e. two
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ways of employing rules? one is the understanding, which involves 
only exercises of essential knowledge. The other is the will, whose 
activities are willing and (in his later works) judging. Willing 
involves the mental equivalent of commanding, hut also assenting to 
commands. This involves responsibility and is placed in a moral 
sphere. Judging takes the place of stating, hut viewed as assenting, 
and is in fact taken as only a species of willing, involving res­
ponsibility and moral assessment. Malebranche does not admit a 
concept of thought, but retains the super-concept of mathematics and 
adds what he calls 1^rdre, the supposedly eternal system of moral 
rules. Leibniz admits an equivalent of 1*ordre and a concept of 
thought (again for the most part simply that of rule following), 
but does not sharply distinguish between understanding and will. There 
is no distinction for Leibnia between the super-concepts of res 
extensa and res cogitans, as nojh-arithmet ical portions of mathematics, 
indeed all. concepts^ are held to be reducible to those of arithmetic, 
logic and grammar. The grammar here in question is not a discipline 
descriptive of the use of words in one language rather than another, 
which we might call particular grammar; rather it is looked on as a 
subject more general than logic, which is an adjoint to it. Inferences 
are held to be licensed not only because of the use of recognised 
logical words, but also because of the use of what might be called 
purely grammatical words, such as prepositions, conjunctions, and 
even case endings. Grammar regarded in this fashion we shall call 
universal grammar. Only if there were just one language or, perhaps, 
only if there were just one possible language for all possible rational
beings could particular and universal grammar be identified.
All three maintained that the objective structure is infinite
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This can mean that any one concept or rule is applicable to a
potentially infinite number of cases. This we can allow to an extent, 
yet the application of a rule or concept is not something automatic, 
for then there could, be no evaluation. Furthermore, conventions are 
not determined, by how things are; thus conventions do not cover 
every foreseeable case. It suffices here to consider diagrams of 
geometrical figures which are intransitive and a person’s transient 
essential cognition of them, e.g., picking them out by uttering a word 
e.g., ’’square” for ”0”. If one person were to pick out ”£7” by 
’’square”, another evaluating'this act might evaluate it as incorrect. 
It is then up to the first person to justify his act. The only way 
of doing so is to invoke the rules. Now the notions of exactness and 
simplicity can be brought in only because a certain set of rules are 
followed in some conventional endeavour. The first person might reply 
that a square is a regular polygon with four equal sides, which, he 
claims, is true of the diagram. The second person in reply might 
put a straight-edge to the left side of the diagram and find a 
deviation. If they agree that this procedure evaluates whether a 
side is regular, then the first person, if he is to follow the 
rules, must agree that the diagram in question is not a square. Thus 
in determining the application of the concept of a square in one 
instance, a new rule is invoked. We shall call such invocations of 
new rules ’’coordinations of conventions”. Though the outcomes of 
coordinations of conventions are not predetermined, they are not
arbitrary, for it is presupposed that other rules are followed in
*
common and that both are engaged in the same conventional endeavour. 
Thus after the coordination, both are said to know the new rule.
Such coordinations are common practice in the endeavours of specialists,
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who ex professo follow rules and. concepts peculiar to their endeavour, 
i.e. disciplines. One specialist could indeed coordinate conventions 
on his own, but he then must be able to justify the coordinations 
in accordance with the rules and criteria of exactness and simplicity 
of his discipline. We shall call one-man coordinations of non-descriptive 
rules and concepts "intransitive self-teaching". Coordinating of 
conventions is like the initial learning process, except the latter 
involves, not agreement, but enforcement^for the evaluation cannot 
be questioned by the person evaluated.
An objective structure 'might also be thought to be infinite in 
that given a rule or set of rules, an infinite number of concepts is 
generated. Thus it might be thought that given the concept of 
successor of•..of counting, or of a unit in general, the whole 
number series is generated. It suffices here to consider written 
numerals, for the only way the following of a rule can be evaluated 
is by transient acts. Non-descriptive rules can in fact be learned 
intransitively, e.g., by writing numerals. In the case of generating 
concepts, the concepts generated must be pinned down to something 
which can be picked out independently of the rule according to which 
they are generated$ otherwise there would be no way to evaluate 
whether the rule is applied to a further instance. Thus there are 
conventions for the formation of numerals and knowing the series 
of counting numbers, which are concepts (taking, e.g.^ three as the 
concept of a group of three things in general) is (at least initially) 
knowing how to generate the series of numerals (spoken or written).
In learning how to generate the series of numerals, one learns an 
order of conventional marks: "1, 2, 3, ..."' If this were all there were
to learning a series of numerals, one could never go beyond the
particular numerals which one has learned, in a particular order. But 
in fact there are other rules or conventions, by being subject to which 
we can generate numerals we have not used nor been presented with in
an order which would be evaluated as correct. Such rules are that
according to which the units are repeated in each series of ten
numerals and the second digit from the right is increased in the same 
order as the counting numerals in the last numeral in each series of 
ten numerals. We then have a rule governing the construction of a
number series. The situation is similar to that in which a rule is
applied to, e.g., diagrams of* geometrical figures, as above. Suppose 
someone counts ”...20, 22, ...”. A second person evaluates this as 
incorrect. In justification, the first person .replies, e.g., that 
as "11” is after ”10”, so ”22" is after "20”, ”33" after ”30” etc.
The second retorts by giving examples in accordance with the rule 
we have given above. In fact, we could get by with the rule the 
first person proposes. We follow the second because it agrees more 
nearly with the criterion of simplicity of the description of (very 
basic) arithmetic. Unlike the application of a concept, there is 
here no new rule agreed on after the concept is applied; rather, 
the coordination of conventions is the agreement on rules and only 
then are there the concepts, in this case of numbers greater than ten.
But the criterion of simplicity itself is not as evident as 
one would think. Why should the sequence ”...10, 11, ... 20, 21,...
30, 31,... 40, 41,...” be more simple than the sequence "...10, 11,... 
20, 21,... 30, 31, ...40, 42..."? One wants to say because in the first 
we follow the same rule. But then simplicity is dependant on what
are taken to be the rules and what are taken to be the rules are
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dependant on the criteria of simplicity
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One can justify the rules and. their simplicity by considering, 
other operations which we can perform because we have these concepts, 
such as addition. But these already presuppose that some beginning 
has been made in coordinating conventions and thus to determining 
simplicity.
As a discipline becomes more developed, the original concepts 
do as well and further concepts are agreed upon. The criteria of 
simplicity and exactness and also of consistency become more defined.
In mathematical disciplines, intransitive self-teaching becomes 
identifiable with calculating. Different operations and rules are 
agreed on, but they are pinned down by the same concepts. However, 
sometimes additional rules and operations introduce new concepts,-in 
addition to the concepts of these operations. E.g...with subtraction, 
concepts of negative numbers are introduced and^with division, concepts 
of fractions. With the introduction of new terms and the distinctions 
they high -light, new concepts, in addition to those of the operations^ 
are introduced. Such concepts are those of a negative number (in general) 
or of a rational number (as opposed to an irrational number). Even 
new disciplines^, such as algebra, are developed, around which new 
clusters of operations, concepts or rules are centred. Yet these 
new operations, rules and concepts are arrived at only by coordinating 
the old conventions. One has the new concepts when one becomes subject 
to a particular rule or set of rules which gives a point to dis­
tinguishing the concept. Introducing a new term does not always 
introduce a new concept: one can promise and pick out others* 
promises without having ’’promise” in. one's vocabulary, which adds 
little, if anything, to the concept.
Still, one might codify the rules governing promising to have
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exact, enforceable standards for settling disputes. Here the term 
pins down the concept, which is changed, although we should want to 
say that it is the same concept. On the other hand, we should want 
to say that, new concepts are introduced with terms for numbers and
their classifications.
The distinction between forming a new concept and altering 
(e.g. making more ex&ct) an old is not always clear. One to some 
extent has a concept of the agreement of adjectives with nouns 
before one learns how to use '’agreement”in these contexts. But there 
might be alternative ways of 'dividing the grammar, thus the fact
that this term is used in this context indicates that further rules
are agreed upon other than those followed in the activities to which 
these terms refer. Using these terms is something like describing 
the activities and the rules governing them; yet the rules "described" 
are non-descriptive and giving their"description", like using "promise", 
depends on following the rules involved. This "describing" can be 
thought of as a form of intransitive self-teaching. Similarly, in 
making and evaluating inferences, one examines what is to some extent 
the same concept as one does when speaking about inferences. Still, 
using a language is not engaging in the discipline of linguistics, nor 
is validly inferring necessarily doing logic. Once linguistic and 
logical terms are introduced, one can develop further concepts (e.g. 
of competences) which are totally foreign to the activities which 
furnish the initial rules of these disciplines.
Thus the objective structure present to us owes its extent, 
both of application aid of the concepts involved, to the conventional 
activities in which we engage. Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz,
on the other hand , held that its extent is due to ifche fact that it
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is the divine science, using ’’science” in the seventeenth century 
sense of which any human science is a variant.
Before we quit this topic, there is one further point about the 
formation of concepts which we must discuss. Sometimes there are two 
non-descriptive disciplines such that an operation in one can he 
translated into the other , t.he operation performed and the result 
translated hack into the first, in which it holds good. Such trans­
lations are the basis of coordinate geometry, in which the operations 
of geometry (i.e. the discipline about what is constructed using, 
e.g.ja straight-edge and compass) and the rules governing them are 
translated into arithmetical operations and rules. The concepts are 
likewise translated. E.g. the geometrical concept of a circle involves 
the rules governing measuring and relations of measurements and their 
relations in general and in particular the rules governing the con­
struction of a circle and its relation to other constructible curves
and systems of curves. The algebraic notion of a circle involves the
arithmetical operations, numerical relations and rules involved in 
2 2 2the expression ”x +y = r **• The translations are themselves rules, 
but neither geometrical nor algebraic. Typically such translations 
rely not on doing the disciplines, but on investigating the disciplines, 
especially when one operates with an explicite criterion of simplicity. 
One looks for basic concepts (e.g. highest genera and. differentia ) 
operations (e.g. iterations of units, as in geometry and algebra) 
or rules (i.e. axioms) from which the others can be developed. Invest­
igating a discipline is like describing it, but one must already follow 
the rules which are ’’described”. The translation rules are ’’discovered”, 
but these rules presuppose that one already knows how to follow two 
complex systems of rules with their criteria of simplicity, exactness,
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and. consistency; thus these ’’discoveries” are coordinations of con­
ventions for which there is little leeway in the evaluation. When 
there is a translation between two non-descriptive concepts, we shall 
say that there are in fact two concepts, but that they are intensionally 
identical: one could discover the translation by intransitive self­
teaching alone. The two concepts,in fact, need not be from different 
disciplines. (Consider an algebraic formula which can be transposed 
by a number of operations into a formula cf the form x +y =r .)
When the various rules are learned as pinned to a concept, we shall 
say that this is the same concept, despite what rules may be involved. 
Whether there are two intensionally identical concepts or only one is 
often a matter of more-or-less. Furthermore, it is to some extent 
a matter of historical accident: we could imagine that someone is 
initially taught basic arithmetical operations as applied to geo­
metrical figures. Finally, when there is a complete translation between 
one (iscipline and part of another, we shall say that the first is
reduced to the second
26.
Chapter II.
The Application of Concepts and
Reductionism in the Cartesian Fashion.
In this chapter we shall consider how an objective structure, comprising 
only non-descriptive rules and concepts, applies to things which are 
independent of convention. The majority of this section will be concerned 
with the extreme reductionism accepted by the Cartesians and Leibniz, 
resulting from their endeavour to. describe everything and its operations 
with maximum simplicity and exactness, and to maximise our power to predict 
and to explain; only rule-following activities are excepted. One is to 
minimise the conventional elements in our descriptions and what is due to
how the world is and what we are like. The world is to be described with
maximum perspicuity, in terms which would apply to any world and by means 
of those rules and concepts which anyone who gives the simplest and most 
exact descriptions must follow. This ideal is taken to be the limit set 
by the objective structure which every rational being tacitly follows and 
in accordance with which everything, if it were made, would have been 
made. The catch is that this endeavour is itself a cultural endeavour.
The programme relies on specifying certain purely conventional sortals - 
metrical units - which are the most simple and exact sortals possible, 
giving the most perspicuous descriptions possible. Yet one still must 
rely on transitive acts and something other than non-de scriptive rules for 
determining which descriptions actually apply and giving the description 
is itself a very sophisticated conventional activity.
Certain sorts of behaviour and occurrences corresponding to them are 
fit to pick out things because they fulfill roles specified by the objective
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structure. Grammatical rules govern the use of all words, specifying 
the roles of utterances by virtue of which they are fit to pick things 
out. But by exercises of grammatical essential knowledge alone one under­
stands and evaluates others1 exercises of grammatical knowledge. 
Mathematical rules govern the use of only some words and we are apt to 
think that certain words, the use of which is governed only by mathematical 
(grammatical and logical) rules, are used for picking out configurations. 
Thus ’’three” (or "group of three”) and "a circle" might be thought to
pick out, respectively:‘ *
/ *
o
-1
We must distinguish what we shall call "a law" from a rule so that 
we can distinguish between the applicability of a rule to something and 
something obeying a law. "Law" as here taken refers to something common 
to the natural activities of things (hence "law" as used in the legal 
sense does not refer to a law in our sense, but to a rule.) How assume 
that all members of a culture act in accordance with a particular formula­
tion which is enforced, i.e, they are all subject to a certain rule. Then, 
if a member of this culture acts contrary to this rule on a particular 
occasion, the rule still applies and the person’s act, if evaluated, is 
evaluated as incorrect. On- the other hand, assume that someone presents 
a formulation which he claims fits all cases of, e.g., freely falling 
bodies. Then, if a particular case of' a freely falling body does not 
accord with this purported law, then the purported law is rejected. Rules 
admit of exceptions, laws do not. In the case of conditional rules (as 
perhaps all rules are), if the antecedent is satisfied, the consequent 
might not be. In the case of conditional laws (as perhaps all laws are), 
if the antecedent is satisfied, the consequent must be. Transitive acts?
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which must consider things independent of convention, are involved in 
the evaluation of formulations of purported laws.
We shall say, when the term for a concept applies to a thing, that 
the thing instantiates the concept. Thus if we point at or otherwise 
indicate something and truly say ’’This is (an) A”, then the thing indicated 
instantiates the concept of (an) A. Now non-descriptive rules are applied 
to the conventional behaviour of others; rule following instantiates 
concepts. We pick out, e.g.,concatenations of vocal tokens by following 
the same rules as he who uttered them, as is also the case with vocal tokens 
or concatenations of them whose roles are specified by logical rules.
Some rules - those governing commands, promises, etc. and moral injunctions 
are such that the instantiations of the concepts they involve occur only 
within conventional, rule-following activities. The instantiations of 
concepts involved in other rules - logical and grammatical rules - must 
be conventional acts, but they play a part in our relation to things 
outside our culture. Finally, geometrical concepts are instantiated in 
diagrams. Diagrams are the enduring effects of conventional acts; but 
things or configurations of things can be used as diagrams, the point of 
which is to instantiate non-descriptive concepts alone. Diagrams are not 
samples, which are concerned only with descriptive rules. Things used as 
diagrams are like enduring effects of intransitive transient acts, although 
the acts do not change the things, but only give them roles. In this way, 
natural things instantiate non-descriptive concepts.
We shall also speak of things founding non-descriptive concepts. The 
evaluation of statements involving descriptive essential cognition as 
correct or incorrect (true or false in this case) takes into account not 
only the things picked out by these cognitions, but also the non-descriptive 
concepts which specify the roles of the vocal or written tokens by virtue
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of which they are fit to pick out things. Some of these non-de scriptive 
concepts are instantiated in the utterances (e.g., those of conjunction, 
inference, addition and certain uses of relational terms), while others 
(geometrical ones) are instantiated in the things. Given that the 
descriptive and geometrical concepts involved are instantiated in the 
things, there must be some relation between these and the other non­
descriptive concepts, the knowledge of which is exercised in the statement 
when it is true. We shall generally say that these other non-de scriptive 
concepts are founded in the system of things which is picked out by the 
descriptive essential cognitions. However, in the discussion here, we 
shall be concerned more particularly with concepts of numbers, which are 
most evidently founded in things. Other sorts of concepts, which are less 
evidently founded in things, are those of certain relations corresponding 
to certain relational predicates (e.g., ’’longer than”), or prepositions 
(e.g,, ’’above”) or inflections (e.g,, those indicating motion towards inI
certain languages). When a concept is founded in things, one thing in 
particular is not said to be whatever the concept is of.
We shall say that non-descriptive concepts instantiated or founded in 
things are formal features instantiated or founded in those things. Thus
o
instantiates the formal feature of a circle and
founds the formal feature of (a group of) three and also the formal feature 
of a triangle. Depending on the criteria of exactness and simplicity of 
the endeavour in which one is engaged,o
50
might count as instantiating the formal feature of a circle,
. *
as founding the formal feature of a square and.
as founding the formal feature of (a group of) three. Of two intensionally 
identical concepts, one might he a formal feature instantiated in a thing 
and the other a formal feature founded in the corresponding system of 
things, (Such is the case with the geometrical and algebraic concepts 
of a circle.)
We shall say that formal features are constitutive of things or of 
systems of things and that formal features are displayed by these things 
and systems. Law-obeying things or system of things display formal features 
because of the laws they obey. But the formal features displayed also 
depend on the culture of him who picks them out, the discipline in which 
he is engaged and what is being done within the discipline.
In fact, however, in picking out formal features, descriptive essential
cognition must play the principal role if natural things are not to conflate
with diagrams and transitive acts with intransitive acts. This cognition
involves rules which are not purely conventional and the evaluation of it
must take account of things independent of convention. Corresponding to 
2
formal features, we shall speak of material features, restricted to qualities 
which are the same whatever their expanse or duration or the thing which 
is said, to have them. We can have samples of material features (e.g., one 
could extract the chlorophyll from a leaf and present it as a sample of 
green), but we cannot have diagrams of them. These restrictions would 
include bulks (e.g., water, gold and wood) under "material feature"; but
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we shall restrict the term to what is picked, out by only one sense, as 
was traditionally held to he the case for the so-called ’’proper sensihles”. 
However, we shall distinguish determinahles which are peculiar to one 
sense (e.g., colour) and refer to the determinates under them (e.g,, yellow, 
red and green) as material features, Furthermore, a number of determinahles 
may be peculiar to one sense (e.g,, colour and intensity of light), and 
thus classfied under one common sensible. Finally, all material features 
can be picked out by adjectival phrases.
Material features involve natural aspects, but they are not independent 
of convention, for there are non-descriptive rules specifying the role 
of e.g., "green” so that it is fit to pick out things. Consider the 
relations of coloui>-words and taste-words, both among themselves and as 
used with each, other. We imagine that someone being inducted into the 
culture can utter tokens o.f "this", "is" and "and" (all of which are purely 
grammatical words) and "black", "white", "colourless", "sour", "sweet" and 
"tasteless". By merely reciting combinations, he utters:
(1) is and yellow
which is evaluated as incorrect; but so are:
(2) This -is green and red.
(3) This is sour and tasteless.
He also utters:
(4) This is green - •
(5) This is sour,
(6) This is green and sour.
all of which are evaluated as correct. All of the evaluations in (1) - (6) 
are intransitive (thus we are not concerned with truth and falsity in 
these cases). Still, learning whatever is possible intransitively, one 
could not be said to know what green is; nor could one be said to be able
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to say what green is, other than by specifying the grammar of "green”
(e.g., in the material mode, by saying that green is a colour). One would 
4
not know how to tell something green from something red. Learning what 
green is must involve transitive ’learning, as when one utters "green" with 
the appropriate demonstrative devices, (Descriptive rules need not be 
learned by uttering vocal tokens; it suffices that the acts by which 
material features are picked out are transient aad transitive.) These 
utterances are evaluated in accordance with descriptive rules, which specify 
the roles in which verbal tokens and mental occurrences corresponding to 
them do in fact pick out and describe things. These rules depend directly
on how the world is and attach our conventional activities and our culture
to the world, .
We shall not say that descriptive rules form part of the objective 
structure; for one thing, the philosophers we treat did not consider such 
rules (with the exception of Leibniz, who, however, wished to analyse them 
into non-descriptive rules). Still, the application of the objective 
structure to things depends on such rules. Only by the application of 
these rules can figured and numbered things be treated as more than diagrams; 
only by their application do the criteria of simplicity, exactness and 
success attach to something which is non-conventional, and only by virtue
of them can our transitive acts be evaluated for correctness and incorrectness, 
Furthermore, we could not have an objective structure present to us unless 
and until we are subject to descriptive rules. We cannot use diagrams 
unless we can pick out that on which the diagram is constructed. In fact, 
to learn intransitively in any way, we must pick out things - people and 
their behaviour, including utterances of vocal tokens.
One group of words whose use is specified in part by descriptive rules
are words for sortals. Things under sortals found numerical features,
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for without these there could, be no transitive counting, The purely
grammatical term "thing" and. the numerical "one" cannot be used, on their 
5
own to pick out things or individuals , Some sortal terms pick out 
conventional acts and activities (e.g,, "a statement" or "an inference"). 
Of sortal concepts which apply to things, some could be called concepts 
of conventional sortals because they pick out things only as they relate 
to a cultural endeavour: e.g,, the concepts of a table, a building, a 
work of art, a sacred object and a chess set. Some of these concepts - 
e.g,, that of a chess set - are not of spatio-temporally continuous law- 
obeying things, but are of sys'tems of things which need not obey any laws 
in particular. Some of these concepts could perhaps be included as formal 
features: it is conceivable that someone could learn chess and play chess 
verbally and at least some works of art and sacred objects are .much like 
diagrams. Other concepts of conventional sortals could not be formal 
features: a blue-print does not take the place of a building and one 
cannot sit in a chair verbally.
We distinguish concepts of natural sortals from those of conventional 
sortals. Concepts of natural sortals, like concepts of material features, 
involve something conventional, some more, some less, (What we say of 
sortal terms also applies to bulk terms. Things under sortals are of 
particular interest because they found numerical features.) Concepts of 
sorts of living things might be thought to be minimally conventional. Yet 
the classifications of things is according to cultural activities; thus 
the concepts of, e.g., a weed and a totem animal contain a considerable 
conventional element. The conventional element is not necessarily due to 
the inclusion of a formal feature. Indeed, the conventional element in 
at least some cases is decreased when a concept of a material feature is
replaced, For example, the concept of a raven might include the concept
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of black. There might be some purpose for this? perhaps all black birds 
are injurious to the main crop of the culture which has the concept or 
perhaps they are taken as portents of disaster. Yet ravens, on this count, 
gradually come to be from pink featherless animals and are similar in all 
other respects to a rare sort of white bird. Now there might be a point 
in investigating the origin of black birds of this particular sort and 
their relations to one another. In such a case, its history might become 
part of the concept of a raven and the concept of black restricted to a 
part of this history (with allowance for exceptions), This is still the 
same concept, for the concept of a raven as it was initially focuses on 
a recurrent sort of animal, a number of whose characteristics are known, 
i.e, there are descriptive rules other than that governing the use of 
"black" converging on this concept.
The purpose of the modification of the concept could arise from within 
the cultural endeavour in which the concept originally had a place. As, 
e.g,, it is desirable (from the culture’s point of view) to avert damage 
to one’s main crop or disaster in general, it is desirable to foresee what 
brings these about. A prediction rests (in a formulation of a purported 
law, Making such formulations are conventional acts and have purposes 
within a cultural endeavour. But they allow one to decrease the cultural 
element in that the predictions which are made by means of them can be 
tested. If the formulations are rejected, other formulations are presented 
and tested. Eventually, one arrives at a formulation which is successful 
as a guide to, e.g., averting crop damages, the criteria of success being 
determined by the rules of the culture. The formulation as acceptable is 
similar to the concept of a material feature in that it is dependent on 
how the world is. Accepting such tested formulations, certain unmodified 
concepts of sortals appear arbitrary in that they now appear to apply to
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stages of that to which the formulations apply or to exclude or include
things in a way different from the way in which one predicts things.
Thus the concepts of sortals are modified, their conventional element
decreases and they come to apply to differently characterised spatio— 
continuous
temporally/law-obeying things,
With the testing and acceptance of further formulations of purported 
laws, not only is the conventional element of the original concepts of 
natural sortals decreased, but there also come about new endeavours - 
disciplines - with new purposes and new concepts of natural sortals.
Prediction might itself become' the purpose. The desideranda of exactness 
and simplicity come into their own. In this case, the conventional element
in the distinctions between material features under a determinable is to
be decreased and there is to be some method by which the newly distinguished 
material features under one determinable are related to one another.
Eventually, the concepts of natural sortals become secondary and natural 
sortals become explained in terms of sortals which have a use only within 
a discipline. Minimising the conventional element of our concepts is itself 
a conventional endeavour in which the desideranda of predictive and explanatory 
power operate and in which those of exactness and simplicity come into their 
own, The goal is to translate concepts of natural sortals into concepts 
which are the convergences of rules presupposing only purely conventional 
sortals, viz. units of measure. These purely conventional sortals are 
called upon to minimise the conventional element in distinctions and
relations.
By iterated applications of a unit, concepts of (groups of a certain) 
number are founded in ’’things” whether or not these ’’things” are under some 
sortal concept. As the term ’’thing” suggests that something is already 
under a sortal concept, we shall ( using seventeenth century terminology)
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say that these concepts are founded in re. Specifying1 a unit specifies 
a dimension: that quantity which the unit measures, such as length, weight 
or radial degrees. Some of these dimensions (e.g., weight) are determin- 
ahles under which material features are ranked; others (e.g,, length) are 
formal features. Although the selection of the unit is purely conventional, 
the dimension itself is founded in re, for in applying the unit, one relates 
something instantiating the unit according to the non-descriptive
rules of the discipline. When the dimension is a determinable under which 
formal features are ranked (such as length), the thing instantiating the 
unit applied in measuring can be thought of as a diagram, applying the 
unit as constructing a diagram; yet the ’’diagram” which is constructed is
founded in re.
Of particular interest is the dimension of length. Any particular 
value got by measuring length depends on the unit, and so is conventional. 
But the ratios of these values are relations independent of the unit (e.g., 
something being twice as long as something else), but not independent of 
the convention of relating. The same unit of length is applicable in 
three orthogonal dimensions. The product of the value of two orthogonal 
measurements gives the value of an area; that of three gives the value of 
a volume. We shall indiscriminately call area and volume "size”. The 
value of the size as thus derived is conventional, but again ratios of 
sizes are relations independent of the unit, but dependent on the convention 
of relating. The rules governing the measurement of lengths specify that 
the unit is to be placed end to end; this specifies what is taken as 
straight, which in this context is what is most simple. Measuring x units 
in this way generates a straight line x units in length. Measuring x units 
of a straight line segment, then measuring x units of a straight line 
segment in an orthogonal direction, then x units parallel to, but in the
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direction opposite to the original line segment, etc, generates a square 
2of x square units. Other geometrical figures and their areas are specified 
by more complex operations. The values of the ratios of their sizes are 
independent of the unit, likewise their shapes, being relations of line 
segments, are independent of the unit. Thus in relating values got by 
applying a purely conventional sortal and applying it in accordance with 
conventional rules, one gets translations of formal features which are 
instantiated (e.g., geometrical figures) or founded (e.g., relations of 
lengths and sizes) in re.
Things display the relations they found and the values of measurements 
are relations. We usually distinguish between distance and length, distance 
being between things, length of things. But this distinction cannot be 
drawn when there are no sortal concepts applied in re previous to that of 
a unit of length. There are concepts of length and size previous to and 
presupposed by the sophisticated metrical concepts of length and size 
because concepts of sortals include relations in the dimension of length 
and hence size. When these concepts are pre-metrical, the criterion of 
exactness is not strict and thus we speak of a large or small horse or a 
tall or short man. When we speak of lengths and sizes of things without 
relation to other things under the same sortal term, the relation can only 
be to ourselves. But in the programme to reduce concepts of natural sortals 
to concepts arising from purely conventional sortals, the relation to 
ourselves drops out in minimising the conventional element. We use instru­
ments to measure what we do hot naturally pick out and the applications of 
units in using these are related by non-descriptive rules to the applications 
of units made when not using them. In this way, what is natural in relation 
to us is by-passed by conventional activities and rules.
Time as well is founded in re and a pre-metrical concept of it becomes
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metrical with the addition of further non-descriptive rules. One might 
consider that there are initially two concepts of time which became fused 
as one develops a metrical concept. On the one hand, there is the concept 
of time pinned to counting the recurrence of natural states which offer 
natural units. On the other hand, there is the concept of time allied 
to the concept of motion, which itself is pre-metrical and can be
metricised.
Suppose, in accordance with the endeavour to maximise simplicity, 
exactness and predictive and explanatory power, all our concepts of things 
under sortals were reduced to or replaced by concepts arising from concepts 
of units and the non-descriptive rules governing their application. A 
description of a spatio-temporal expanse could in principle be given in 
purely numerical terms by specifying the values of certain variables at 
different times and places. But the measurements by which one arrives 
at these values and spatio-temporal positions must involve descriptive 
rules and the dimensions themselves are refinements of pre-metrical 
concepts. Furthermore, one can have these pre-metrical concepts only 
because one follows descriptive rules in picking out things.
Part of the programme to maximise the simplicity and exactness of 
our descriptions and our predictive and explanatory power is the transla­
tion of concepts of material features into concepts involving formal 
features. This involves minimising what is due to convention in the 
distinction between material features and eventually the elimination of 
descriptive rules. It also involves minimising what is due to how the 
world is and what we are like. The translation of concepts of material 
features into concepts involving formal features is part of the goal of 
Cartesian mechanical physiology. This translation (unlike the translation 
of the geometrical concept of a circle into the algebraic concept of a
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circle) cannot even in principle be arrived at by intransitive self­
teaching; we shall say that such concepts are "extensionally identical”
- they apply to the same things, features, etc. Essential knowledge of 
material features depends on how the world is and what we are like.
Concepts of material features are not just instantiated in things, for 
they are in part due to things. Still, they are in part conventional: 
e.g., there is more than one way to divide the colour chart.
The programme is to minimise the conventional element in the distinc­
tion between material features under any one determinable by formulating 
and testing purported laws. As the criteria of exactness and simplicity 
are furnished by non-descriptive rules and concepts, the programme includes 
the correlation of concepts of material features with non-descriptive 
concepts; this again is done by specifying a metric unit, a purely conven­
tional sortal. Ratios of pitches are correlated with ratios of lengths 
and tensions of the vibrating source, which also shows how heterogeneous 
pitches can be analysed into homogeneous pitches. Colours are correlated 
with their relative positions in the spectrum, thereby showing how 
hetergeneous colours can be analysed. Both of these ranges of features 
are transmitted, i.e, they are sensed somewhere other than where they are 
produced or located. Other ranges of material features (smells and tastes
— we leave feelings to the side as a special case) are not transmitted,
(The smell is said to be where it is smelled; things give off smells.)
These can be analysed into homogeneous features by isolating bulks until 
we have those which can be combined in various amounts to produce the 
desired smell or taste; a unit of weight is then the metric unit and the 
combinations are expressible numerically.
Having metrics for material features, and a method for analysing 
them into homogeneous features so they can be serially arranged under a
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determinable, the next thing desired is an explanation of their production.
In the case of pitches, each homogeneous pitch is correlated with the 
macroscopic values of the tension and length of the source, We do not 
pick out tensions; rather, tension can be correlated with a weight producing 
that tension and weight is metricised by, e.g., the number of unit weights 
which balance a given weight equidistant from the centre of a balance.
The point is to eventually correlate the ranges of material features with 
concepts arising from metric formal features which are displayed to us. 
Colours, smells and tastes are microscopically produced and instruments 
are required to display metric formal features, (Consider a calibrated 
meter.) The macroscopic display is associated with a microscopic quantity. 
Some macroscopic displays are discrete and are correlated with discrete 
microscopic quantities. In some cases, the microscopic quantity is the 
number of certain things under a sortal, the concept of which involves 
formal features which are not displayed in our natural environment.
Invoking microscopic things, we not only minimise what is conventional, 
but also what is biological - what is due to the way we are. Eventually, 
carrying through with this programme, one desires to explain even the 
constants, by which the expressions of formal features are related. To do 
this, it is sometimes necessary to take into account systems of such size 
that instruments are required for their measurement; indeed, the whole 
universe might have to be considered. In this we go beyond what the world 
is like to what any world must be like, to any world which could in principle 
be diagrammed. The concepts involved could be learned intransitively and 
one could describe any number of such worlds. Still, as measuring is an 
application to things in re, determining which description is in fact 
founded involves transitive acts; there must be something which obeys 
laws and does not simply display formal features.
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Even when one has eliminated the conventional aspect in the distinction 
between material features under a variable, material features still depend 
not only on what the world is like, but also what we are like. To explain 
what material features are, then, one must take into account the biological 
elements. To do this, the same programme is applied to the human body as i.t 
is applied'to other things. The procedure is most evident for pitches.
Pitch is correlated with vibrations per second or frequency. Take two 
strings, a and b, of the same material, length and tension.” When struck, 
they produce waves in the air of the same frequency. When they are 
sufficiently close and a is struck,it produces a wave which is received 
by b, which then vibrates at the same frequency. In the physiological 
explanation of pitch, the first string is taken as that which produces 
the pitch, which is transmitted and received by a fibre in the ear, which
plays the part of the second string. For colours, the state
of that which produces (emits) the feature is like the state of that which 
receives (absorbs) the feature, although there are no similar states in 
the transmission. Smells and tastes are not transmitted; their production 
and reception are explained by the chemical interaction of what produces 
and what receives the features. The parts of the body sensitive to these 
features can be analysed to give a ratio of bulks (i.e. chemical substances) 
which interact with the bulks in that which produces the feature. We.shall 
in future identify the material feature with some part or all of what is 
described by the mechanical description of the production, transmission 
and reception.
Not all changes on the periphery of the body count as receiving material 
features, for there must be a connection between the reception and the rest 
of the organism and what it can do, at least a connection with its motor
activity. To explain material features in this programme, one must give
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a mechanical description of the production, transmission and reception of 
the physical activity and also the neural impulses arising from its 
reception and any resultant motor activity. Only material features need 
be explained in this programme, for we have essential knowledge of formal 
features simply from the fact that we' follow the non-descriptive rules 
which give a point to this endeavour (although why a formal feature is 
founded at a certain time and place needs explanation), Now the material 
feature might be held to be extensionally identical with the concept of 
what is mechanically described; but what is explained by this concept
involves something much more e'xtensive spatially than what is picked out
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Chapter III.
Dualism and Monads
In this chapter we shall he concerned with dualism, which postulates 
that there are two sorts of physical existents: what is physically in re 
and occurrences in the mind (which we shall say are physically in the mind). 
We begin by identifying the input and output in the physiological explana­
tion of the reception of material features. These correspond to occurrences 
in the mind and are already in roles. As material features, we shall say 
they are founded in the mind and projected onto what is outside the body.
So occurrences in the mind correspond to occurrences in re, both in the 
body and (because mechanical activity is transmitted) beyond the body. We 
shall divide the objective structure into two, not mutually exclusive, 
concepts: that of res cogitans, founded in what is physically in the 
mind, and that of res extensa, founded in what is physically in re. This 
is Cartesian dualism, although we shall here eschew talk of substance as 
much as possible for ’’substance” was used in a number of ways in the 
seventeenth century and always as a technical term. There were different 
degrees of physiological reductionism in the seventeenth century, of which 
the Cartesian form was the most extreme, and there were different sorts 
of dualism. The Cartesians speak of two substances, but have cognitive 
dispositions secured in the body. The Scholastics held that a person is 
a single substance, Yet they accepted a form of dualism in distinguishing 
a sensitive soul, said to be ’’material” and largely open to physiological 
investigation (but not of the mechanical sort), and a rational soul or 
intellect, said to be ’’spiritual” and unextended; both sorts of souls were
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held to secure dispositions. For Locke, dispositions are secured in 
the soul, a substance distinct from the body. The sort of dualism 
accepted reflected the relation between the roles of occurrences in 
the mind and things in re, For the Cartesians, the roles of occurrences 
in the mind or soul are specified by the objective structure, which 
comprises concepts displayed in re. For the Scholastics and Locke, 
the roles of occurrences in the mind or soul are specified by what in re 
causes them or dispositions to have them; furthermore, they hold that we 
are not subject to rules until we have formulated them. All three positions 
suffer from the problems of Holding that occurrences naturally have roles, 
ignoring the fact that convention is responsible for these roles. The 
Scholastic and Lockean positions have the further complication that 
occurrences in the mind or intellect are in roles specified by what in re 
causes them. Now any form of dualism introduces problems regarding the 
relation between the two basics which it distinguishes, Leibniz, who 
accepted Cartesian reductionism, introduced monads to overcome these 
problems. Each monad is held to instantiate the concept of res cogitans 
and aggregates of monads found concepts comprised in the concept of res 
extensa. Further, all the concepts comprised in that of res extensa are 
held to be analysable into concepts comprised in the concept of res 
cogitans. Thus (it is held) only what is physically in the mind physically 
exists. In addition to exhibiting its own problems, the theory of monads 
exhibits what is inherently wrong with looking for one or two basic sorts 
of physical existents. It also exhibits the problems inherent in locating 
cognition in something unextended, for the part played by behaviour in 
cognition is excluded.
Making an utterance is a sort of motor activity. An utterance picks 
out a formal feature by fulfillingJhole specified by the same rules as
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those which specify the role of a diagram; an utterance picks out a material 
feature by fulfilling roles specified by not only non-descriptive rules, but 
also by descriptive rules. But the programme minimises what is due to
’ convention in picking out material features, hence, within the programme, 
descriptive rules drop out and their place is taken by non-descriptive rules 
and mechanical descriptions. We can distinguish two parts to the mechanical 
description: the input, from the production of the material feature to the 
neural impulse, and the output, which is natural (including acquired) motor 
behaviour. Both the input and the output can fulfil conventional roles: 
the input, as when we pick out a formal feature, and the output, as when an 
utterance is made in a role. Within the programme we are now considering, 
the aspect of descriptive rules not taken over by non-descriptive rules 
is described by a mechanical description - what is thus described is law- 
obeying, not rule-following. Thus if an utterance picks out a material 
feature, it is because it is the output of a law-obeying, mechanical process.
A mechanical description of some system can be given only by applying 
purely conventional units in accordance with non-descriptive rules. Thus 
the input already occurs in a role, in particular, in that which places it 
in the range of material features under a metricised determinable. Like­
wise, if there were a natural output, it would be in the same role.
In this picture, the natural utterances of only certain sentient beings 
- persons - occur in roles because only persons are rule-following and are 
evaluated. For instance, an hallucinating person’s claim to pick out 
certain features is evaluated as incorrect. But he need not claim this; 
he could state what he was led to claim (i.e, how things appeared to him), 
which is an exercise of his knowledge of the concepts which would be .
exercised in picking out things if things were as he hallucinated. The 
statement can be evaluated intransitively and, in principle, physiologically
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in so far as the same physiological occurrences take place when we are 
led to claim something as when we do in fact pick out something in re.
The Cartesians consider a person under a double description: as 
something physiological and law-obeying and as something which performs 
conventional acts, follows rules and evaluates. For them, the input in 
its roles is like a provisional statement with which one is presented.
As the shadows of utterances are held to be occurrences in the mind, so 
there are held to be occurrences in the mind corresponding to the physio­
logical input. Both these occur in the same roles. But, further, the 
Cartesians maintain they are the same occurrences, for the utterence is 
held to be an optional transient act and parts of the brain are held to 
supply the input corresponding to all occurrences in the mind, whether or 
not the input originates beyond the body. We shall say that these 
occurrences are physically in the mind; they correspond to what we shall 
say is physically in re, which founds or instantiates the formal features 
of mechanical descriptions and includes not only what is beyond the body, 
but also what is in the body. Material features according to the Cartesians 
are in the mind. As the mind cannot be said to be, e.g,, red, we shall say 
that material features are founded, no^instantiated, in what is physically 
in the mind. We shall not say that the material feature is displayed by 
that which originates the activity which is transmitted; rather, we shall 
say that the material feature is projected onto it.
This analysis supposes a mature adult who has been so well trained 
that he is immediately led to utter, e.g,, different names for all the 
discernable compositions of heterogeneous light. In fact, almost universally 
in the seventeenth century these features were held not to be concepts at 
all because (it was held) we do not know what they are in the way that we 
could generate them; projecting material features, unlike having formal
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features displayed to one, does not involve knowing1 how to do something.
They were treated as natural rather than conventional and descriptive rules 
drop out. Occurrences in the mind (it was held) are needed for picking 
out anything in re; thus (as descriptive essential cognition) these 
occurrences were held to be necessary for the application of non-de scriptive 
concepts,
Descartes in fact maintained only in his later works (published during 
his lifetime) that material features are founded in the mind. In the . 
Regulae, the input and output are not held to correspond to an occurrence 
in the mind; rather, occurrences in the brain - which, it was thought, 
included faculties responsible for imagination and memory - were held to 
suffice for the application of non-de scriptive rules to things and their 
imagined and remembered applications. In this account, which is shared 
with certain other modems (such as Hobbes and Gassendi, who later severely 
criticised his account in the Meditations), the mechanical description is 
not complete, for material features are founded in what is law-obeying and 
not rule-following. The mechanical description is even less developed in 
the general Scholastic account of the seventeenth century: the transmitted 
activity was held to found the material feature - e.g., red - throughout 
the input course, from the thing in which it is produced, to its conservation 
and exercise in those parts of the brain held to be responsible for imagina­
tion and memory, and its exercise was held to lead us to call what produces 
it "red”. Material features are for the Scholastics, among other things, 
occurrences in a soul, via. the sensitive soul, which was held to include 
the faculties of external sense, imagination, memory, etc. But only for
some Scholastics are they occurrences in the rational soul, which corresponds 
1
to the Cartesian mind.
A distinction was drawn in the seventeenth century between those sorts
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of things which know and those sorts of things which' are only known. The 
distinction is not always sharp for those who maintain that there are 
different sorts of souls or that animals think; but the important distinc­
tion is between that which knows and is not extended and that which is
only known and is extended. These were sometimes styled two different 
sorts of substances. "Substance”, however, was a technical term and we 
shall not be concerned with it here. We have distinguished two descriptions 
under which the Cartesians consider a person: as something physiological 
and law-obeying and as something which performs conventional acts, follows 
rules and evaluates. We have also distinguished what is physically in re, 
which occurs in all things, from what is physically in the mind, which 
occurs only in rule-following things. We now distinguish two parts of 
the objective structure: that containing concepts instantiated in law- 
obeying things (i.e, in re) and that containing concepts instantiated in 
rule-governed acts (i.e. in the mind),
Wow some concepts of sortals are instantiated in rule-governed utter­
ances and, we shall say, they are constitutive of them. They are not, 
it is to be noted, instantiated in the persons who make these utterances.
The same rules are followed by him who makes these utterances as by him 
who picks out the concept instantiated in the utterances. These are concepts 
of speech acts and of what we have called rational operations, including 
grammatical operations (e.g., predicating), logical operations (e.g., 
inferring) and mathematical operations (e.g,, adding). Not all concepts 
of rational operations, however, are instantiated in utterances, for 
geometrical operations (e.g., bisecting angles) are instantiated in diagrams 
or things. Generally, restricting ourselves to mathematical operations, 
concepts of arithmetical operations are instantiated in utterances and 
arithmetical formal features are founded in utterances (since there are
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sortal concepts instantiated in utterances); concepts of geometrical 
operations are founded in things and geometrical formal features are 
instantiated in things. Now if numerical features are founded in things, 
concepts of numerical operations are as well. If the diagram
III III
twice founds the concept of (a group of) three, it also founds the concept 
of (a group of) six. It could also be said to found the rule that three 
plus three equals six and so this particular addition, and hence the 
concept of addition. (One might say that diagrams display rules; making 
diagrams, after all, is an intransitive act, like writing or saying.)
That portion of the objective structure comprising concepts instan­
tiated in utterances we shall call the concept of res cogitans. That 
portion comprising concepts instantiated in re we shall call res extensa. 
This is not to suggest that there is no overlap, for, e.g., concepts of 
numbers are founded equally in both. Concepts of res extensa are instan­
tiated and displayed in what is physically in re, i.e. in what is law- 
obeying and mechanically or physiologically described. Concepts of res 
cogitans are instantiated in what is physically in the mind, those acts 
which are following rules; but when the acts founding them are immanent, 
they are displayed only to that rule-following thing in which they are 
instantiated. No geometrical concepts are instantiated in the mind, 
i.e. the mind is unextended, while what is physically in re instantiates 
only geometrical concepts, so everything in re is extended.
This distinction between res cogitans and res extensa is taken from
Descartes. The distinction is somewhat different for Malebranche, who 
held that the objective structure is above all geometrical, although there
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is a translation between geometrical and. arithmetical concepts. Geometry
•1
and. algebra take the place of logic and. grammar. The mind, for Malebranche 
instantiates none of the objective structure, but is rather that which follows 
it. If one were to say that there is for Malebranche a concept of res 
cogitans, it would, be only of that which performs geometrical operations ..
and. their arithmetical analogues. ?
There were few philosophers in the seventeenth century who did. not 
hold one form or another of dualism. Dualism, by and large, but by no 
means always, was of the form which maintained that there are two sorts 
of substances, one extended an'd one not. Still, there are significant S
differences between even those positions maintaining that there are two 
substances, For the Cartesians, there are no dispositions in the mind. "
Dispositions are secured only in the body. An occurrence in the brain 
leaves a trace in the brain, but the corresponding occurrence in the mind 
does not have a trace in the mind. Rather, a second occurrence of the same 
type in the mind (but not associated with the reception of a material i
feature) is due to the exercise of the disposition in the brain. This 
occurrence is of the same type as that which corresponded to the first
occurrence.
Seventeenth century Scholastics did not generally hold that a person 
is a composite of two sorts of substances. They did not accept the 
physiological reductionism; rather, substances (taken in a sense different 
from the Cartesian), they held, are composites of form, which specifies the 
properties, and matter, which is undifferentiated. Matter and certain 
fozms - substantial forms - suffice for all the properties and activities 
of different sorts of substances, Dorms are said to inform matter. If 
more than one form informs the same matter, there is only one substance.
The composites of some substantial forms and matter a<re inanimate extended
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things. Substantial forms whose composites with matter are animat© things 
are called, souls. Plants have only vegetative souls, which account for 
their nutritive faculties (e.g., growth and. assimilation). Animals have 
both vegetative souls and. sensitive souls, which account for their sensitive 
faculties; as these inform the same matter, each animal is only one 
substance. Men have, in addition to vegetative and sensitive souls, 
rational souls, accounting for their faculties of reasoning and understand­
ing and moral faculties (such as will). Still, each man is a single 
substance (although, for religious reasons, it was held that the rational
soul could be conserved supezhaturally on its own),
2Even though the Scholastics held that man is a single substance, they 
held that different dispositions are secured in different souls. The 
exercises of those dispositions (cognitions) occur in the soul in which 
the dispositions are secured. As the Scholastics did not reduce everything 
which is not tule-following to instantiations of mechanical descriptions, 
the Scholastics admitted that animals cognise; in particular, animals have 
essential cognitions of material features and their configurations. Thus, 
as men as well as animals have sensitive souls, cognitions and dispositions 
for cognitions of material features were held to be functions of the sensi­
tive soul. Still, neither animals nor the sensitive souls of men were held 
to be "spiritual”, which we take here to mean that their activities are not 
spatial. Accordingly, for something to be or occur in the sensitive soul 
is for it to occur in the brain or the organs of sense. On the other hand, 
the rational soul was held to be spiritual, its activities non-spatial.
In addition, dispositions for these occurrences including non-descriptive 
essential and proposition knowledge - are in the rational soul. There are 
thus two levels of knowledge and cognition. The sensitive level is natural, 
not involving non-descriptive rules; the rules of occurrences in the sensitive
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soul are determined by things in re which produce material features.
The rational level involves among other things non-descriptive rules 
and concepts, but not descriptive rules concerning material features.
Thus descriptive rules concerning material features drop out in
Scholasticism as well as in Cartesianism.
Locke maintained a form of dualism: a person is a composite of a 
spiritual substance - a soul - and material substance. Cognitive disposi­
tions are secured in the soul, characterized by being called ’’spiritual”. 
There is an implicit distinction in Locke between soul and mind. Like 
the Cartesians, he was concerned with occurrences in the mind, which 
we can evaluate, i.e, of which we are conscious. What is in the mind, 
not the soul, is important in his account of what we know. But ”in the 
mind” is taken in a dispositional sense: that is in the mind which occurs 
in it or which again (independently of what occurs in re, including the 
body) could occur in it. And the relation between what is in the mind and 
the soul is only that the latter secures the dispositions. (Locke, unlike 
the Cartesians, admitted that animals think and he had doubts about the 
value of physiological explanations5 but there is no indication that he 
considered that there are sensitive as opposed to rational souls, for souls 
are said to be spiritual.) Since cognitive dispositions are secured in the 
soul, not the body, not only the application of non-descriptive rules and 
concepts to things in re, but also the relation between occurrences in the 
mind and occurrences in re (whether in or beyond the body) is not clear, 
Locke’s answer is to specify, but not explain, this relation as causality: 
the initial occurrence in the mind of one type is caused by an occurrence 
in re of a corresponding type; the occurrence in the mind establishes a ' 
disposition which is exercised in other occurrences in the mind of the 
same type, whether or not there is something corresponding in re. These
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occurrences are in roles and, in so far as we are subject to non-descriptive 
rules according to Locke, we are so subject because of the dispositions 
established by these occurrences and their relations.
On the Cartesian position, we could not be subject to non-de scriptive 
rules and concepts because there are occurrences in the mind, for the roles 
of these occurrences are specified by non-descriptive rules. Even though 
there are no dispositions in the mind according to the Cartesians, there 
are concepts instantiated or founded in the mind. In addition to the concepts 
we have mentioned above which are instantiated in the mind, geometrical 
concepts in particular could be said to be founded in occurrences in the 
mind. There is a translation between geometrical and arithmetical concepts 
and res cogitans and res extensa as parts of the objective structure are 
not mutually exclusive. Again, the Cartesians could maintain that occurrences 
in the mind are projected into what is physically in re only because they 
held that these occurrences are already in roles specified by geometrical 
rules, i.e. we or, rather, our minds already know how to perform geometrical 
operations, even though we cannot perform the operations in re nor formulate 
any of the rules.
The Cartesian position reverses Suarez’s position. The rational 
soul is responsible not only for reasoning, but also for understanding, 
i.e. essential cognition not dependent on material features, which is not 
just of mathematical, features, for it is the cognition of forms in general 
independent of particular conditions imposed on them by their information 
of matter, When one has essential knowledge of a form, the form is said 
to inform the intellect, the faculty of the rational soul responsible for 
understanding, judging and reasoning. Since the intellect is non-material, 
the forms in it are independent of the conditions imposed on them by their
information of matter. Essential cognition of these sorts of forms is
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not initially dependent on our following rules; rather, they are extracted 
from their material conditions, in a sense caused by the things in re 
which are cognised. (We shall later discuss how this extraction (^abstrac­
tion”) is meant to take place). Forms extracted in this way; it was 
held, found rational (including non-descriptive) concepts and rules, 
which are made explicit by the intellect reasoning on the forms. We are 
not subject to these rules and concepts, it was held, until they are 
made explicit, a process which must be done by or for each individual,
Locke is just as removed from Cartesianism on this point. The 
important distinction is between simple and complex ideas, both of which 
can be either occurrences or dispositions for occurrences. The former
are caused in roles and the latter are founded in them in the sense that
they are formed from them, their roles being specified by those of the 
ideas from which they are formed. Some simple ideas are of mathematical 
features and some are acquired by ’reflecting on’ the operations(taking 
’operation’ broadly, to include exercises of attitudes) of our minds.
Other simple ideas are of material features. From the point of view we 
have presented, this is a confusion between that which specifies the roles 
of occurrences and the occurrences themselves. But on Locke’s position 
the roles of the occurrences do not need to be specified by anything other 
than what causes them and we are not subject to the rules, which are 
founded on ideas, until we have formulated them. Both Suarez’s position, 
and Locke’s position, like the Cartesian position, suffer from the problems 
of holding that occurrences naturally have roles, ignoring the fact that 
convention is responsible for these roles. Suarez’s and Locke’s positions 
have the' further complication that occurrences in the mind or intellect 
are in roles specified by what in re causes them or that from which they
are formed.
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Leibniz was one philosopher who did. not hold a dualist position; 
rather, he maintained that what is real (and we shall see what the force 
of ’’real” is) is unextended founding concepts comprised in res extensa.
The Scholastics also maintained that man is but one substance, but 
Leibniz’s position develops from the Cartesian position by identifying what 
is physically in re with what is physically in some unextending- soul or 
some equivalent thereof and by analysis the super-concept of res extensa 
(i.e, geometry) into that of res cogitans (i.e. arithmetic, logic and 
grammar),
Res cogitans on the Carte’sian position is instantiated by what is 
physically in the mind. There is a correspondence (which Descartes 
usually, but not always, Malebranche never, took to be a causal corres- 
pondance) between this and what is physically in re, the latter instantiating 
the concept of res extensa. x But this correspondence is arbitrary in that
only certain occurrences physically in re correspond to what is physically
i
in the mind. Prom this it might be thought that only what is physically 
in re is needed, for the postulation of two sorts of physical existents 
is arbitrary to the extent that their distinction relies on the concepts 
they instantiate. Whether one or two physical existents are admitted, since 
the concepts of res cogitans and res extensa are features, they do not 
individuate things; furthermore, what physically exists is not individuated, 
as it is held not to be a sortal. >
Leibniz asserted that only by introducing monads could these 
Spinozistic tendencies of Cartesianism be averted. Only one sort of 
physical existent is admitted. These correspond to the Cartesian occur2>- 
ences in the mind, but ar.e held to occur even in non—sentient beings.
Leibniz maintained that all geometrical features and operations can be
analysed in terms of algebraic or arithmetical, logical and grammatical
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features and. operations. Thus geometrical features, he held., are founded 
in features of unextended things - simple unities, simple substances, or 
monads, Geometrical features are picked out by simple substances because 
they perform the operations and exercise the concepts which are the transla­
tions of geometrical operations and concepts.
The individuation of things is guaranteed (he held) because each monad 
instantiates the whole super-concept of res cogitans. But each instantiates 
it in a different way for two reasons. First, each monad is related to 
others in a different way. The relational concept can be analysed. But 
simply because monads are rela'ted, they not only instantiate the objective 
structure, but also a restriction of the objective structure for each 
relation. These restrictions can be thought of in terms of the infinitely 
iterated application of a unit for some dimension. The objective structure 
is meant to contain the resultant series, which can be restricted to a 
finite segment by specifying two values as end points. What is called an 
individual concept comprises the objective structure plus these restrictions 
peculiar to each monad. Still, the individual concept itself must be 
instantiated.
The second reason each monad instantiates the objective structure in 
its own way is due to the nature of what physically exists - primitive 
forces, which instantiate individual concepts. Each primitive force is 
held to act on its own, though in a way corresponding to all others. 
Primitive forces, as they uniquely instantiate individual concepts, are 
individuated by these concepts. "Monad”, "simple substance” or "simple 
units” is applied indifferently to either the individuated primitive force 
or to the instantiated individual concept. Indeed, these are not distin­
guished. The primitive force is sometimes viewed as the serial performance 
of rational activities, which is the concept instantiated serially. The
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movement from one state in the series to another is identified, with a
conatus or appetition, corresponding to what in the unanalysed spatial 
display is described according to the desideranda of simplicity and 
exactness by g mV^.
Given that all which physically exists is held to instantiate only 
res cogitans, spatial features (relations) are held to be founded on 
monads. Material features are treated as formal features, and hence are
held to be founded on monads. There is no need to introduce some further
rule-following sort of thing as a locus for one of two sorts of physical
occurrences and there is no need for occurrences in the mind distinct
from the analysis in non-spatial terms of the physiological description.
The purpose of some of these monads, one could say, is only to found
spatial features, while other monads instantiate certain concepts which
(so it is held, wrongly, which is important, as we shall see) are non- 
/
spatial, such as pain and others to which we make reference in describing 
natural and conventional behaviour. Although instantiated in something 
unextended, these features are picked out in operations which are extended. 
The operations are instantiated in a monad which ’’dominates” an aggregate 
of monads which do not perform the operations, but found the spatial 
display, (in picking out some displays, one is not picking out concepts 
instantiated in a single monad; these are merely aggregates, without a 
dominant monad,^) The dominant monad - called ’’the (sensitive) soul” - 
is said to express the display - called ’’the body” - which is founded in 
the monads which it dominates.
The description of the spatial display is a mechanical description 
of the world. Thus regarded, the universe could be given a mechanical 
description and nothing be left out. In particular, those displays corres­
ponding to dominant monads would be given what we have styled a physiological
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description. Because of conservation laws, particularly the conservation 
of energy (-J- mV and potential energy), dispositions are included. As 
Leibniz holds that there are no perfectly closed systems, the dynamical 
states of all things in the mechanical display are related to each other 
to a greater or less degree. At any one time, different dynamical configura­
tions are related to one another the closer they are spatially. One 
dynamical state of the universe develops from previous ones, which are 
more similar to it as they are closer in time to it; likewise, a given 
mechanical state of the universe develops into later states, which are 
more similar to it as they are' closer to it in time. One could say that 
the present state of the universe is a consequence of its past states and 
is pregnant with its future states.
Corresponding to the description of the universe as a mechanical 
display is a description of the universe in terms of what physically 
exists - instantiated concepts or monads, which found the mechanical display. 
These do not interact mechanically; in fact, they do not interact at all, 
being primitive forces. As the mechanical displays are related to each 
other, more or less, according to their distance, the monads which found 
them mirror each other from their own ’’point of view”, more or less, as 
the displays they found do; indeed, each monad mirrors the universe from 
its own point of view. As states of the mechanical display of the universe 
are consequences of one another, the present state of a monad is a .
consequence of its past states and is pregnant with its future states.
Since all states of the universe to some extent are founded in part in 
any one monad, every monad is infinitely complex, as it must be if it 
instantiates the concept of res cogitans. Every monad expresses an 
infinitely complex display, which must be founded in other monads, which 
in turn express infinitely complex displays; so any portion of space is
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infinitely divisible. Since all that physically exists instantiates res 
cogitans — cum - restrictions and only souls dominate other monads and 
so express displays, there is said to be life throughout. The restrictions 
are analyses of the spatial limits of the display as it is generated 
through time.
Certain monads instantiating behaviour - dependent concepts also 
instantiate rational operations in a way in which others do not: some 
of their operations or acts are evaluated, either by themselves or by 
something else which performs acts which can be evaluated or are evalua­
tions themselves. These acts 'are said to be conscious acts and the monads
in question are said to be minds. The acts which are evaluated are held 
to be resultants from those which are not. Thus, there is a perfect 
correspondence between the mind and the display founded by those monads 
which it dominates, i.e, the body. Like any other monad, the present 
state of a mind is a consequence of its past states and is pregnant with 
its future states. Thus dispositions are secured in the mind itself, but 
only by virtue of its ;performance of operations of which it is not 
conscious (i.e, which it itself cannot evaluate) and which correspond to 
physiological operations which are not properly behavioural. The behaviour-
related acts of minds and not those of other sensitive souls can be
evaluated because their complexity on the level of what is behaviour- 
related instantiates rules of the objective structure, i.e. minds reflect 
res cogitans, which they also instantiate#
It is to be noted that, on the outlines of this account, one monad 
could, e.g., see another: the states of the one, displayed by what is 
founded on the monads it dominates, correspond from its point of view to 
the states of the other from its point of view. The colours and formal 
features displayed correspond to an analysis in both monads. Furthermore,
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one mind can pick out and evaluate the conventional acts of another if 
it, e,g,, hears with sufficient clarity the rule-governed utterance of 
another. When the display or body as well as the dominant monad is referred 
to, Leibniz prefers to refer to the two together, which are only one 
substance, as an animal (when only sensing is involved) or as a person 
(when the dominant monad is a mind).
The displays are called ’’phenomena” by Leibniz. This is misleading 
to twentieth-century readers because it seems to imply that they are 
imaginary or are to be by-passed in an account of how we know. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. Yet Leibniz calls only minds real. The 
furniture of the universe is divided in an odd way; or, rather, the 
furniture of the universe is split apart in a way which rests on subtle - 
and fallacious - moves. Phenomena are the public half, but are treated 
as relational and founded on monads dominated by the monads which express 
the phenomena and alone are held to be ’’real”, i.e. physically existent.
The problem with Leibniz’s position is not that relations are not 
admitted, (he expressly includes relational inferences among those 
inferences which cannot be reduced to other forms.) Rather, every relation 
is held to be founded on what physically exists in unextended substances, 
Leibniz maintained that all natural qualities of things are analysable 
in terms of mensurable., hence tacitly relational qualities, thus needing 
a foundation. All, even conventional relations, he maintained, need a 
foundation in what physically exists. He once wrote that if a man’s wife 
dies in India, then there must be a physical change in him.
Following a rule and obeying a law are conflated by Leibniz, Simple 
substances, even those which do not sense, are held to count; e.g,, when 
the phenomena expressed by a monad receives an audible vibration, the 
monad ’counts’ the peaks and ’divides’ by the time elapsed. But this
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counting is law-obeying, for all monads, including minds, are said to be 
spiritual automata. To allow for the fact that certain acts of persons 
are evaluated, Leibniz has recourse to mathematical methods: evaluated 
(i.e, free) acts are said to be inclined, but not necessitated by the 
series of those which are not evaluated. The series of the latter is said
to be infinite, but does..not include the former; rather, the series of 
acts, one necessitating the other, is said to approach a necessitating 
condition of a free act as an asymptote approaches a limit. An analysis 
of responsibility, rational knowledge and operations and related notions 
in terms of the conventions to’ which one is subject is eschewed in this 
way.
Following a rule and obeying a law are conflated because one looks 
for one or two ultimate kinds which are independent of convention. But 
all that is independent of convention has been given a conventional role 
because of the concepts involved in the cultural endeavour to explain 
everything with maximum simplicity and exactness. What by means of this 
endeavour is found by minimising the conventional element is identified 
with what performs rational, hence conventional, operations. And the 
practical knowledge exercised in these operations is not held to be acquired 
by one's induction into a culture.
We have already criticised the approach which assumes that what is 
physically in the mind naturally occurs in roles. In particular, we mention 
here that the part played by behaviour is ignored. We distinguish two sorts 
(or, perhaps better, aspects) of behaviour: natural and conventional or 
role fulfilling behaviour. The point of the latter (including vocal) is 
determined by the culture whose rules specify the roles. If we are to 
allow immanent acts of any kind, their roles are determined by the roles 
of the transient acts of which they are shadows, for only behaviour can
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be evaluated, by another.
But why should one look for simple substances which found spatial 
displays? In addition to simple substances, Leibniz also held that there 
are simple concepts, What is not conceived by itself, he argues, must 
be conceived by means of others. But nothing could be conceived by means 
of others unless something were conceived by itself. Conception is what 
we have called rational essential cognition, an exercise of knowledge of 
ncn-descriptive concepts. But these concepts are determined by their 
position in the objective structure; knowing them involves knowing some 
of the propositions involved, which involves knowing other concepts. The 
dichotomy between conceived by itself and conceived by means of others 
most be rejected; rather, all concepts are conceived in relation to
y*5
others. The status of simple substances is comparable. We pick out 
things with diverse spatial parts, which Leibniz takes to be aggregates.
To do so, we must (but not consciously) pick out simple substances. These 
substances, it is maintained, must be without parts, i.e. unextended, 
because extension is infinitely divisible. But if each simple substance’s 
part in founding an aggregate is written into it, how are the simple 
substances more simple than the supposed aggregates?^
The position we have considered maintains that the behaviour of sentient 
beings can be analysed in arithmetical, logical and grammatical terms. This 
applies not just to conventional behaviour, but also to natural behaviour 
because picking out the roles presupposes picking out what fulfills the 
roles. Thus, to maintain that behaviour can be analysed into concepts 
instantiated in something unextended, one must maintain, as a first step, 
that behaviour can be completely described mechanically. Now in picking 
out behaviour of sentient beings, as in picking out material features,
descriptive rules are involved. For knowing certain behavioural features,
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non-descriptive rales might be necessary for knowing the constitutive formal 
features. These features most notably include modes of locomotion, E.g,, 
if one has learned geometrical rules and concepts including those involving 
a temporal development, one might develop a concept which is instantiated 
in a horse galloping. These sorts of concepts are those which are the 
best candidates for reduction to arithmetical, etc. concepts. However, 
simply because such concepts are assimilated to formal features, they are 
not properly behavioural features.
64
Chapter IV. 
Empirical Knowledge,
Behaviour and Keeling,
In this chapter we shall produce a model which will allow us to speak 
intelligibly about (while keeping in mind the problems with) cognition of 
material features as occurrences in the mind. We shall be concerned with
the second way "How does he know?'* can be answered, i.e. by stating the 
position he is or was in. Thi's determines, according to our philosophers, 
what occurs in the mind, if not the roles it occurs in, for the material 
features we receive depend on the position we are in. As the authors with 
whom we are concerned largely ignored descriptive rules, in their accounts 
one easily segregates that knowledge we have by being subject to non­
descriptive rules - which we shall call rational knowledge - from that 
knowledge which we have by virtue of being or having been in a certain 
position - which we shall call empirical knowledge. We begin this section 
with a discussion of what is displayed in behaviour, including cognition.
We are particularly concerned with pain-displaying behaviour since we 
could be said to have a natural concept of pain. We shall manufacture
an artificial material feature in the sense of what is received to be the
object of pain-displaying behaviour. To correspond to natural pain-displaying" 
behaviour, we shall imagine that we naturally utter tokens corresponding 
to features received. As pain is felt, we shall also say these features 
are felt and identify the feeling with the occurrence in the mind, ’Cognise’, 
when it is used for the inception of empirical knowledge, corresponds to 
certain English verbs - some uses of ’see*,’hear’, etc. - which we shall
distinguish by a grammatical criterion
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We must distinguish two ways we use ’’behaviour”. First, we speak of, 
e.g,, the behaviour of a particle in a field. In this sense, any motion 
counts as behaviour. Secondly, which presupposes the first, we usually 
restrict ’’behaviour” to sentient beings. Distinctions between sorts of 
behaviour in the second sense are not determined by distinctions between 
sorts of behaviour in the first sense: an animal going through the same 
motions might or might not be correctly describable as fleeing. For some 
sorts of behaviour in the second sense, unlike any sorts of behaviour in 
the first sense, one can ask for a point, knowing which depends on knowing 
the sort of animal which behaves in this way. But some concepts of 
behaviour are independent of a point, most typically those which are 
expressions of emotions or feelings and are referred to by what they 
express, such as fear, pain or pride.
As emotions and feelings are exhibited only by the behaviour which 
expresses them, to learn concepts of emotions or feelings, one must perform 
transient acts which are evaluated. These transient acts may be transitive, 
as when we pick out the fear-expressing behaviour of an animal. However, 
unlike concepts of material features, concepts of emotions or feelings 
may be learned by the evaluation of our intransitive acts by others.
When these acts are performed, the evaluation is made with reference both 
to the act and the behaviour of the person performing the act, which need
not be distinct.
A natural sort of behaviour-expressin^-a-feeling is that which expresses 
pain: cries, writhing, etc. To those who have learned how to use "pain” 
to pick out pain-behaviour, hence pain, this behaviour displays pain, 
even in animals (atleast in those whose normal behaviour we know something 
about). But the response to pain is natural, not requiring that we have a 
concept of pain. It is important that the use of ’’pain”, which is
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conventional, should, reflect this; Now pain-behaviour is holistic. One 
of the elements can be a natural utterance (e.g,, a cry) or utterances 
which fulfil conventional roles (e.g,, ”1 am in pain” or "It hurts"). 
Having learned, the rules governing the use of "I am in pain", one can 
substitute the utterance of this in the place of a cry in pain-displaying 
behaviour. This intransitive use can be evaluated by its agreement with 
the rest of. the behaviour of which it forms a part.
Now for someone who can be supposed to know how to use the words he 
in fact utters, statements of emotions and feelings are criteria for the 
occurrence of the emotions and feelings involved. I.e. the stating 
displays the emotion or feeling involved. (Consider, e.g,, statements 
of affection.) Still, they can be evaluated, for, as stating is a rule- 
governed activity, statements of emotions and feelings can be used wrongly 
i.e. be inappropriate - and can be used for other purposes (e.g,, to 
mislead when insincere, but also neither to mislead nor to display, as 
in drama). Similarly, other sorts of behaviour can be wrongly employed 
or employed for purposes other than the standard. Nevertheless, these 
presuppose that one has learned the rules for displaying the emotion or 
feeling.
Most, but not all, feelings and emotions are displayed and evaluated 
in conventional roles and are evaluated accordingly, E.g., a claim that 
one is offended or offence-displaying behaviour is evaluated as appropriate 
or inappropriate according to what counts as an offence in one’s culture. 
Evaluations of these displays also depend on one’s cultural relations, 
e.g,, the "position" one bears to the purportedly offending "object", 
and they may depend on one’s evaluation of one’s own behaviour (as with 
pride) and other things which are not part of the behaviour displaying
the emotion or feeling. These feelings and emotions may also be displayed
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to someone in a certain culture by a sentient being, man or beast, not 
in the culture? e.g,, a roaster may display pride.
Some natural behaviour - such as fear-displaying behaviour - is 
apparently evaluated as appropriate or inappropriate with" regard to its 
object, E.g., an animal’s fear of a tiger is apparently inappropriate 
when the tiger is behind bars. However, fear, whether displayed conven­
tionally or naturally, has a biological point when the object fulfils,- no 
conventional role (at least as far as the fear is concerned). The fear 
of something which a sentient being displays under normal conditions
involves avoidance behaviour, "Under normal conditions" here has the
force of a conceptual "must", for if such behaviour is not involved, one 
looks for an explanation of why it is not. Evasion or protection is 
similarly connected with fear when the object (perhaps a state of affairs) 
fulfils'- a conventional role.
Now displays of pain, though they could be insincere or made in an
uncalled-for fashion, are not appropriate or inappropriate nor do they
have a point; in fact, natural displays of pain are not evaluated at all,
"Pain" has a use because there is a family of reactions which have an
important biological function. Any higher animal which displays certain
abnormal behaviour - e.g,, contortions - displays pain to us. The display
of pain is like a sign, important socie>lly, for any culture and signalling
an abnormal physiological change. In particular, when the physiological
change is due to the position an animal is in, a display of pain signals
that the position is detrimental to other organisms more or less like it,
(Thus the first step in checking the sincerity of a person’s display of
pain is to investigate his contact with his environment.) A display of
fear is like a sign that the animal’s own pain is displayed to it in the 
the
object feared, A display of fear for another is like a sign that/other’s
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pain is displayed in the object of the fear to the one displaying* the fear.
The concept of pain could be called a natural concept since "I am in 
pain” replaces cries. It thus approximates Cartesian occurrences in the 
mind which take over the parts played by concepts of material features 
and are projected onto things in re. We shall take feeling pain as a 
model of Cartesian cognition (i.e, perception)of material features. Both 
are due to our interaction with our environment.
The question ”How does he know?” can be answered in two general ways. 
One way, which we have already treated, is by stating the intellectual 
competences a person has, due to being subject to conventional rules.
The other way is by stating the position a person or animal is or was in. 
These two ways of answering the question ”How does he know?” correspond 
to two different sorts of knowledge. We shall call the first ’’rational 
knowledge” and the second ’’empirical knowledge”. Empirical knowledge as 
well can be essential, propositional and pxactical and the exercises of it 
are also called ’’cognition”. Rational knowledge is not independent of the 
positions one has been in, for one must be in positions to learn; nor is 
empirical knowledge independent of one’s intellectual competences, which 
give one a greater facility with one’s environment. This division, however, 
was followed by the Cartesians since the objective structure was taken to 
specify the roles in which all occurrences in the mind take place and 
descriptive rules, the learning of which is particularly tied to our 
positions in our environment, drop out. This division, making allowances 
for the differences indicated above, holds for the other authors with
whom we are concerned.
Unlike rational knowledge, which depends on conventional rules, 
empirical knowledge is had by animals. Thus, with regard to empirical 
knowledge, only in some cases can we say what we know. The Cartesians,
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who deny that animals think, allow that animals and men are similar with 
respect to the physiological occurrences which correspond to occurrences 
in the mind, dispositions for these, and interactions with the environment 
which bring them about. Animals are not held to have occurrences in the 
mind only because they are not rule-following.
However, there are differences between sensitive cognition and feeling 
pain. One’s display of pain is related to the position one is in. But 
cognition, like fear, involves an object and cognition is different from 
fear in that it is a success, i.e. there would be no cognition without 
the object cognised, whereas one can fear X and be mistaken in holding 
that X exists, is in one’s vicinity, etc.
The criterion of success for rule-governed behaviour is furnished 
by the rules, but what we want is a criterion of success for natural 
behaviour. What behaviour displays to us the cognition of something by 
a sentient being depends on our familiarity with that sort of being and 
particularly its usual relations to different sorts of things in its 
environment, A display of pain is an indication of failure, although we 
should want to say that some pain is unavoidable. We can think of the'pain 
fear mechanism as a disapproval or evaluation, (indeed, enforcement of 
conventional rules relies heavily on this initially.) This is learning 
by experience, using '’experience" in the sense of acquiring a facility.
The facility is a disposition to succeed in certain circumstances, and 
cognition is the exercise of this disposition. Facilities can be for more 
or less general things. With enough facility in something general, a more 
particular disposition might be acquired with a single cognition. Having 
a disposition or facility to cognise is knowing. Its exercise, when one 
emphasises that the present cognition is facilitated by this disposition,
is remembering in the occurrence sense. When something has the disposition
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and. we wish to emphasise that it was previously established., we say the 
thing remembers, here in the dispositional sense, Memory, whether as an 
occurrence or as a disposition can be essential, propositional or practical. 
Propositional, essential and practical knowledge and cognition are inter­
related, but essential cognition (e.g., of a cat) is particularly related 
to the sort of thing or feature cognised and propositional cognition 
(e.g., that the cat is on the mat) is particularly related to the particular 
situation, although there is general propositional empirical knowledge 
(e.g., that all house cats are wont to sleep on mats). Knowing what 
practical cognition is wont to' be displayed by a sort of animal is that in 
particular which contributes to our familiarity with the behaviour of that
sort of animal, .
What the thing is said to cognise is dependent on the concepts of 
him who picks out the cognising thing and what it is said to cognise.
Animals can display conventional emotions or feelings to us; likewise, 
what is said to be displayed to an animal can be a descriptive or non­
descriptive concept. It is perhaps most natural to-say that sentient 
beings cognise things under sortals or perhaps bulks. However, in the 
seventeenth century some sort of physiological explanation was looked for, 
if not as extreme as the Cartesian,
Thus material features as received are obvious candidates for what is
cognised in empirical cognition. We have suggested taking pain as the
model of a material feature, but encountered the objections that feeling
pain is not related to an object nor is it a success. Nevertheless, we
shall manufacture an artificial feature as the object for which feeling
pain is a success. Call this feature "painfulness", A thing is painful
or has painfulness if, when it is in contact with a higher animal, the 
2animal displays pain. We could think of certain chemicals as having
71.
painfulness and of painfullness as being cognised only when the particular 
bulk comes in contact with the periphery of the body, as one might say * 
that the tastes of things are cognised when the bulk which is said to have 
them comes in contact with parts of the mouth.
To correspond to natural pain disposing behaviour, we shall imagine 
that we naturally utter, e.g., ’’yellow” (not in a role) when our eyes are 
focused on something yellow. Thus here, as before, we shall consider 
material features, not as descriptive concepts, but as what is produced 
in a thing and transmitted to the periphery of a sentient being. Conflating 
feeling pain with picking out'features, we shall consider the features, 
when received, to be felt and the cognition by an observer of the natural 
expressions to be the picking out of the sentient being’s cognition of 
the material feature. As pain-displaying behaviour is a sign that the 
position the animal is in is detrimental to similar animals, we suppose 
that cognition-displaying behaviour is a sign of the cognised material 
feature (including painfulness) to him who picks it out. This sort of 
physical account again is conducive to taking that which cognises as 
unextended, or, at least,that which is rule-following. On the part of 
the thing which cognises, the display of the cognition of painfulness is 
a display of pain, expressing pain, which is a feeling. On the same count, 
other features received on the periphery of the body should correspond to 
other sorts of natural feelings. Again, practical and propositional 
empirical knowledge, which depended on how the world is, become dependent
on the transmission of features.
Whether or not these feelings are held to be physically in the mind 
or intellect, the important point is that in the seventeenth century one 
did not take account of the behaviour displayed, which is replaced with 
a private occurrence. The Scholastics did in fact distinguish between
72
the reception or feeling of received features (i.e. intensional species) 
and feeling pain, which they considered to depend on this reception.
’’Feeling”, as in the reception of the species, is a gerund. But for the 
Cartesians, feelings ("sentiment”) in both cases is an occurrence in the 
mind and "feeling” is to be taken as a noun.
These cognitions, the Cartesians hold, are displayed by man and beast 
alike and in both cases are for the good of the body. But men have means 
to evaluate their own cognitions as they have an objective structure present 
to them and perform rational acts, such as judging. We judge automatically 
and as a matter of course, they maintain, about the things in our environment 
according to what is conducive or detrimental to the body, i.e, we are led 
by prejudice of *the senses. Malebranche introduces the Recherche with an 
account of how our use of the senses was perverted by the Fall. This account
is like that of the Coimkrians whose commentaries on Aristotle were known
to Descartes at la FISche and were perhaps as widely known in the seventeenth 
century as Suarez’s works. According to this account, there were not 
different occurrencesathe mind; rather, since the Fall these occurrences 
lead us to judge precipitously for the good of the body. The goal of 
following a method in the endeavour to describe things with maximal simplicity 
and exactness and hence to correct the judgements one is naturally led to 
make is thus put into a moral setting by Malebranche, The tale itself is 
not of interest to us; rather, the responsibility men are placed under 
in their cognition of the relations of material features differentiates 
human natural cognition from animal and supports the view that these feelings 
are occurrences physically in the mind,
"Cognise", at least in English, is an artificial verb for the inception 
and exercise of knowledge. There are a number of verbs in English which do 
the job of "cognise" when the cognition in question is inceptive. There
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are a number of ways we are affected physiologically by material features, 
some depending on particular organs in which the features are received.
These material features are determinates under determinables associated
with a common sensible, For example, pitches and audible amplitudes are 
associated with the common sensible of sound and are said to be heard, the 
organ of hearing being the ears. We shall call those verbs which are 
associated with the reception of features ’’sense verbs”. Some uses of 
’’see”, ’’hear”, ’’taste” and ’’smell” count as sense verbs, corresponding to 
the proper sensibles of colour, sound, taste and' smell respectively. The 
presentation we give here of these verbs is attenuated, for we use them 
only for the inception of essential empirical cognition of material features.
It is a peculiarity of these verbs and a few others that a statement 
containing the verb alone has much the same force as a statement formed from 
it by introducing the appropriate grammatical form of ’can’ immediately 
before the verb, which is inflected accordingly. Thus
(1) He sees the building,
and
(2) He hears the car,
and used to convey much the same information as
(11) He can see the building,
and •
(21) He can hear the car.
The same is true for ’’smell” and ’’taste” and for other persons, numbers
and tenses of these verbs.
When a verb has uses other than as a sense verb, this grammatical 
property distinguishes its use as a sense verb. For example, ’’see” is 
sometimes used as an equivalent to "read”, but when, as. it were, the 
narrative is read out or otherwise presented. Accordingly, we read a
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novel and see the film version, read the script, hut see the production,
’’Can” operates differently for this use of ’’see”, for:
(3) He sees the film.
and
(5 ) He can see the film
do not convey the same information — (3) is in the habitual present tense 
and (31) carries a conversational implication that he has not seen and is 
not seeing the film. Indeed, in some cases the primary usage of a verb 
followed by a ’’that” - clause, wh©/r it is a sense verb, is when it is 
preceded by ’’can”. For example:
(4) He feels that the building is shaking,
usually indicates that he believes that the building is shaking, while
(4 ) He can feel that the building is shaking, 
is to do with sensing. The difference between ’hear that,,,’ and ’can hear
that...’ is to be noted*as well.
Prefixing . ’’can” to sense verbs results in something like a continuous 
tense, otherwise generally lacking for these verbs because of their success 
nature. Thus we do not say
(111) He was seeing the building for five minutes.
and
0iii) could see the building for five minutes, 
is preferred over
(11V) He saw the building for five minutes, 
where the use of ’’saw” is similar to ’’looked at” or ’’watched”, ’’Can” is not 
used here for a competence (e.g., ’He can add fractions’), faculty (e.g.,
’He can see’) or power (e.g., ’He can lift the chair’). Rather, it is 
related to the positions one is in. We say of someone that he can hear 
the train if he concentrates because he is appropriately situated; we also
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say, e.g., that someone could have heard the train if he had been on the 
platform. The fact that prefixing ’can* results in something like a 
continuous tense is associated with the fact that in these contexts its
use is related to the position one is in,
Features are received because of the position one is in and a claim to 
know which concerns empirical knowledge is justified by stating the position 
one is or was in. But more is required than being in a position, far from 
the fact that one is in a position, e.g,, to see the train, it does not 
follow that one does see the train. There must be some cognition-behaviour 
displayed or a shadow of it. As the philosophers with whom we are concerned 
considered cognition to be an occurrence in the mind, we shall say that 
the thing which cognises a feature must be ’alive to’ that feature, i.e. 
it feels the material feature. If there were a material feature correspond­
ing to pain, it would be felt as material features which are seen, heard,
tasted or smelled are held to be felt.
We shall thus take ’feel’ as a general sense verb. One of the tradi­
tional five senses is the sense of touch, but ’touch’ is not properly a 
sense verb: two bodies touch one another whether or not they are animate, 
’Feel’, however, is not associated with a proper sensible: we feel weights, 
motions which are transmitted (such as the shaking of a building), heat 
and cold and textures as well as pain. It is the general nature of what 
is felt which makes ’feel’ particularly apt as a general sense verb.
However, there are uses of ’feel’ in which it is not a sense verb. Emotions 
and feelings which one can have only because one has been inducted into a 
culture are felt; but they do not depend on the position one is in (unless 
one takes ’position’ in a social sense), ’Feel’ is also used in the sense 
of ’believe’ and for an activity, most commonly associated with one’s hands.
With these qualifications, we shall take feeling a feature to be
16
cognising that feature. We shall take rto be alive to’ more generally 
than ’to feel*, allowing that one can be alive to things which produce
features.
This account, which is modelled on the Cartesian account, but applies 
with minor variations to the other accounts we shall consider, is very 
restricted. For one thing, it does not recognise the conceptual connection 
between various sense verbs and the faculties and organs of sense. For 
example, the grammar of ’see* is such that one is said to see only with 
one’s eyes. Nor does this account consider what is peculiar to rule­
following beings, for the rule-following aspect is minimised. If we consider 
the behaviour which displays cognition of material features as natural 
utterances expressing these feelings, the conventional element, though 
minimised, is not eliminated. Natural utterances could be classified into 
groups: ’’yellow”, "blue”, etc., "sweet”, "sour”, etc,, and so on. These 
already exhibit a grammar, as is shown by what we have already said about 
the mutual incompatibility of material features under one determinable and 
the co-instantiability of material features under different determinables. 
Finally, the part played in empirical cognition by acquired facilities is 
largely ignored. Indeed, modelling this on feeling, the account one gives 
best fits a lower form of life, lacking distinguished organs of sense.
There are two more verbs which we must mention before, completing this 
discussion of empirical cognition. Empirical essential cognition occurs 
not only in the inception of empirical essential knowledge, but also in 
its exercise. One verb which we have already mentioned in this context 
is "remember”, as used in the occurrence sense, ’Remember*, however, is 
not a sense verb. We do say that someone can remember something, but 
’can’ here indicates a faculty,
Another verb which one might think has a place here is ’imagine’;
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but this, unlike ’remember’, is generally not a success verb. Still, we 
say that one can imagine something and. in the seventeenth century the 
ability to imagine something was taken to depend, on prior cognition.
We could think of imagining as the exercise of a number of dispositions 
to remember. But for imagining, unlike remembering, there is 'nothing 
which obviously counts as a display. One might consider as imagining 
the repetition of an habitual form of behaviour, but in an unwarranted
situation
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Chapter V
Chomsky
Recently, Noam Chomsky has maintained that the facts of language 
acquisition can be accounted for only by assuming that an important compo­
nent of this competence is innate. He suggests that this, though an 
empirical position, supports the theory of mind presented by seventeenth 
century rationalism. Furthermore, Chomsky’s notion of a (grammatical) 
rule is central to his position. And he attempts to mathematically 
analyse behaviour; this is in the spirit of seventeenth century rationalism, 
but is differently conceived and gives different results.
Chomsky extends his innatist position generally to cover what he 
calls complex behaviour; it is this general psychological position which 
is of greatest interest. To give a description of complex behaviour,
Chomsky calls upon mathematical theories which generally ignore metric 
properties (such as length, time and angular measure). In this respect, 
Chomsky’s work is one aspect of mathematics’ colonization of new.subjects, 
especially in the social and behavioural sciences, which has been a signi­
ficant feature of mathematics this century. But much of the activity and 
structure postulated by the mathematical theory is not apparent in gross, 
overt behaviour. So these are postulated as theoretical entities (or, 
more exactly, unobservable activities and structures), in a way similar to 
the way in which the physical sciences refer to unobservable entities whose 
properties explain observable properties. These activities and structures 
must be instantiated in something; the obvious candidate is the central 
nervous system - hereafter referred to as the CNS.
Now verbal behaviour is rule governed. Indeed, a look at a grammar 
for any natural language will convince one that there are a large number
■
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of rules admitting of few exceptions; and these exceptions can largely be 
accounted for by increasing the number of rules. Rules - both formation 
rules and rules of inference - are explicitly presented for artificial 
languages. For all artificial languages of any interest, we could specify 
a machine which could generate only well-formed strings formed from the 
vocabulary according to the formation rules. This suggests the project of 
specifying natural languages by explicitly listing all the rules and 
identifying grammaticalness with well-formedness. This would give auto­
mat on models of users of natural languages. This - and the accompanying 
application of explicit systems of rules to natural languages - is Chomsky’s
contribution to mathematics’ colonisation of the behavioural sciences
(including linguistics).
Such models are far removed from our ordinary concept of a person.
And, since cognitive concepts depend on the concept of what instantiates 
them, this involves a considerable change in - or, perhaps, addition to - 
our ordinary concepts of human knowledge, cognition, etc. Theories of 
complex behaviour which characterise it in terms of systems cf explicit 
rules intend to get behind gross behaviour and explain it in terms of 
internal activities and structures; "competence" is held to be internal 
and to result in "performance". On an innatist position, some rules or 
other aspects of competence are held to be "internalized"; but a component 
of competence is held to be internal from birth (or through development). 
These notions of internal and internalization are similar in many ways to 
seventeenth century notions of ideas, especially Locke’s. And these 
notions are more fundamental than that of innate competence.
It is difficult in Chomsky’s theory to draw a significant distinction 
between what is mechanical, what is biological (in the sense of displaying 
gross behaviour appropriate or inappropriate to its circumstances described 
in ways relevant to the behaviour), and what is cultural. This is
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surprising, given that Chomsky makes such a point of the creative aspect of 
human language, which he contrasts with mechanical activity. But the truth 
is that this is a contrast between two sorts of ’’behaviour" corresponding 
to two sorts of automata. Chomsky's sense of "creative" is odd; his notion 
of a rule is from the study of artificial languages; and a competence for 
Chomsky is less like practical knowledge than it is like a programme in a 
computer. A child’s supposed innate linguistic competence is sometimes 
characterised in terms of hypotheses - Chomsky calls them beliefs - 
weighted according to an innate metric. In general, belief and internal 
cognitive structures take over from practical knowledge.
However, there is a general way of arguing against internal structures 
objects, etc. which are posited to explain cognition^. For we can always
ask how we know or know how to use the internal structures, objects, etc.
If we can answer this without introducing further internal structures, 
objects, etc., then we could have just as well answered how we, e.g., can
pick out a physical object or know how to use words without appealing to
internal structures, objects, etc. If we cannot answer how we know or 
know how to use the internal structures, objects, etc. without appealing 
to further structures, objects, etc., then we are involved in an infinite 
regress. We shall use arguments of this sort frequently in the sequel.
Chomsky and others neglect persons and their gross behaviour. This 
is hardly surprising, given their automaton models and the part they give
to the CNS. Their notion of what a rule is cuts out consideration of
behaviour in a proper sense, allows nothing to be said about the application 
of rules and concepts, and makes a mystery of the fact that we make
decisions.
Our alternative involves considering the rules as cultural. Following 
a rule is not performing a well-defined procedure, but involves picking out 
relevant aspects and sometimes deciding. The rules are always capable of
8]
further specification. Persons and their behaviour are subject to rules. 
Our internal machinery is not the locus of cognition, but rather is 
exploited in cognition. Chomsky makes a great deal out of the fact that 
tacit knowledge must be attributed to language users. This is meant to be 
evidence for internal rules which have never been explicitly presented to 
the language user. But tacit knowledge is at least as easily accounted 
for by the fact that a language user is subject to an objective structure, 
any rules of which cannot be stated or understood without supposing other
rules of the same structure.
The positions we shall criticise take their theoretical terms and 
models too seriously. They ape the methods of the physical sciences; 
cognition, however, is not the sort of activity which can be explained in 
terms of dimensions, limiting cases, or distributions giving rise to 
observable properties. Chomsky in particular applies a sophisticated 
discipline with its own criteria of simplicity and exactness to the whole 
range of language use. He is able to formulate specific hypotheses within 
this discipline as four-dimensional diagrams - automata functioning to 
accept or generate well-formed strings in an artificial language. The 
formal features of the diagram are held to be instantiated in the most 
important physiological part of the person.
Chomsky supports his position against three competitors, all of which 
are held to be instances of the empiricist hypothesis (opposed to Chomsky’s 
innatism). Firstly, Claude Shannon’s cybernetic interpretation of
linguistic competence in terms of probabilities calculated from received 
strings is shown to be untenable. Chomsky interprets Shannon's suggestion 
in terms of an automaton model using a particular sort of language; his 
alternative is another such model. We shall spend some time considering 
the alternative automata and grammars, in the course of which we shall 
present the generative grammar Chomsky accepts. Transformations have
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probably received the most general acclaim, but in many respects the
generative component is more basic. Secondly, Chomsky showed that
Skinner’s behaviourism with its operational definitions was insufficient 
for human languages. Operationalism is also the feature of the third 
competitor - inspecifically referred to as structuralist linguistics - 
which Chomsky finds objectionable. Rejecting operational definitions leads 
Chomsky to posit theoretical entities.
We shall move beyond Chomsky’s own work to discuss points which are 
presented in more detail by others. The weak component of transformational 
grammar is semantics. Semantics is called upon at least to account for 
valid inferences and has allowed transformational grammar to be incorporated 
in attempts to systematise the logic of natural languages. If transforma­
tional grammar adds anything to this project, I argue, then there is reason 
to deny Chomsky’s innatist hypothesis. We shall then consider positions 
developed by D. M. Armstrong and J. A. Fodor which set in relief the 
neglect of ordinary concepts of persons and their cognition, the position 
of the CNS as the locus of cognitive dispositions causing overt behaviour, 
and the reliance on belief at the expense of practical knowledge. Then we 
concentrate on internalization as instanced in our ability to negotiate 
towns. A consequence of Chomsky’s notion that linguistic competence is a 
species-specific - i.e. biological - trait is that there could be possible 
fields of knowledge inaccessible to us; I shall argue against this. Finally, 
since we shift the emphasis to cultural aspects, we shall show what is wrong 
with the part assigned to internalization in sociology.
I spend some time showing the extent to which Chomsky’s historical 
claims are false. The grammatical tradition Chomsky finds of interest 
derives from pre-Cartesian sources and was ignored by Descartes; in the 
eighteenth century it sought a foundation in Locke. Another tradition, 
making use of generative notions, culminated in work by Leibniz; but this
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is ignored by Chomsky, as is Leibniz's theory of monads, described as 
spiritual automata. The rationalists held onto shreds of our concept of 
a person and his behaviour; Chomsky leaves this concept behind. Chomsky's 
own position, being empirical and seeking biological foundation, is poles 
apart from the conceptual position of the rationalists. Indeed, biological 
faculties were ousted from the mind as the first step in Descartes’ 
exorcism of the evil demon, who still haunts Chomsky’s biological/mechanical
man.
In Chomsky’s view, the problem the child has in acquiring the rules 
of its first language is similar to the problem the linguist faces in
determining the rules which specify the competence of the native speaker
. 2 . .of a given language . Both are presented with a comparatively small corpus, 
or set of sentences, grammatical or otherwise, of the language. Both must 
come to select those rules which not only discriminate what is grammatical
from what is ungrammatical in the corpus, but also allow the formulation of
. 3
any number of grammatical sentences not given in the corpus . An additional 
requirement, which requires special consideration, is that both the child 
and the linguist must acquire the ability to grasp the grammatical
structure of sentences in the given language.
Neither the child nor the linguist confronts the corpus without some
principles of arrangement. In the case of the linguist, this is quite 
clear, for he will always have some methodological standards, not to mention 
tacitly held assumptions and even his own linguistic competence (albeit in 
a different language). It might at first be thought that there are hypo­
theses about the child’s development as due to its exposure to the corpus 
which suppose: no principles on the part of the child; rather, the child 
simply associates verbal types because of the co-occurrence of their tokens 
in various parts of the corpus. But even this - which Chomsky takes to be
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the empiricist hypothesis - supposes a principle of arrangement - viz. a 
principle of association^.
Chomsky insists that internal states should be considered in the
. 5 . ...study of behaviour , for psychology in general (and linguistics in parti­
cular) must be concerned with internal mechanisms which, when the organism 
is in certain stimulus conditions, give rise to certain sorts of behaviour 
He states^ that it is hopeless to study the purported mechanism which 
"determines what the organism does (perhaps probabilistically) given its 
past experience and its present stimulus conditions". This can be 
represented as
f.
Experience
(1) Stimulus
conditions
What is needed is a characterisation of the competence of the organism, 0, 
how it is gained from experience, and how, given certain stimulus condi­
tions, it gives rise to behaviour. What is missing in (1) is the relevant 
cognitive state. Chomsky’s position is that behaviour cannot be properly 
studied as the output of a black box, whose input is a set of stimuli; he 
proposes to describe the internal states. Yet in some respects 0 is still 
treated as a black box, for it remains for physiology to locate the states 
(under a different description) which are postulated by psychology.
What he suggests? as a reasonable task is the joint investigation of 
a mechanism called a learning theory (LT) which "relates experience to 
cognitive states"
(2) Experience LT •——Cognitive state (CS)
and a mechanism which "relates stimulus conditions to behaviour, given the 
cognitive state CS"
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(3) Stimulusconditions Behaviour
(4) Signal
The situation depicted in (3) must be analysed further to account for the 
discrepancy between performance and competence or cognitive state; e.g., in 
the linguistic case, we produce false starts, interrupted fragments, and 
inappropriate or simply ungrammatical sentences, which do not reflect our
g
competence . Hence Chomsky introduces a perceptual (or performance) model,
. . . 9represented m the linguistic case as
Syntactic representation
^Semantic representation 
—^Phonetic representation 
where the representations are due to the incorporated competence model.
This represents the device accepting signals; when it generates signals, 
the input and output labels are reversed. (4), the corresponding generating 
situation, plus the competence or cognitive state incorporated in PM 
together represent the situation depicted in (3).
The learning theory, LT, in (2) is a theoretical construct. In
general, for each (sort of) organism 0 in each of its cognitive domains D
(e.g. language), there will be a different LT (D,0). Each is "a system
of principles, a mechanism, a function”, having as input (domain) an
analysis of the data of D by 0 and as output (range) an internally
represented cognitive structure, one element of the cognitive state
attained by 0 This construct involves two theoretical assumptions:
that 0 and other members of its species "are essentially identical with
respect to their ability to learn over the domain D"^; and that learning 
. . 12 . .is instantaneous . The study of a given LT(O,D) involves, among other
13 . .steps , the determination of "what is learned by 0 in the domain D".
. 14 ..... . . .This step, he adds , is missing in many formulations of psychological
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theory, much to their detriment”. For there is little plausibility in 
the contention of "the odd variant of empiricism known as ’behaviourism”’,
that, for disparate domains and , LT(O,D^) is similar to LT(O,Dj) in
. . 15an interesting way .
An LT(O,D) is innate competence which 0 brings to bear on the data in 
domain D and which gives rise to its competence in D. When D is language, 
the data is the linguistic corpus with which the child is presented and
the competence is the internalized grammar. So, as a special case of (2),
, 16 we have
(5) Corpus ......Grammar
The mechanism represented by "I” is characterised in a number of ways, 
other than as a learning theory. It is said to be "the property of the 
mind" enabling a child "to acquire the grammar of the language spoken under" 
the abstraction from observed variety within given societies to a uniform 
speech community^. It is also said to be something biological, a "specific 
adaptieh0-: to acquire a grammar, and is compared to the adaption to walk . 
More fundamentally, with the child in the position of the linguist, it is 
called the "innate linguistic theory that provides the basis for language 
learning"19.
The way this innate mechanism is specified is indicated by Chomsky 
in Aspects. He here thinks of
the theorist as given an empirical pairing of collections of primary 
linguistic data (i.e. a corpus) associated with grammars that are 
constructed by (a hypothetical language-acquisition device) on the 
basis of such data. ... the theorist has the problem of determining 
the intrinsic properties of a device capable of mediating this 
input-output relation^.
Chomsky lists conditions on the "explanatory adequacy" of a linguistic
theory21 We shall later discuss the notion of the explanatory adequacy
of a theory; suffice it here to say that this is attributed to a theory
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if that theory has that power and only that power required to formulate - or
explain - any known grammar. He gives a corresponding list of what must be
. . 22 attributed to a child for him to be capable of language learning. He
23 ..... .then adds that a "language-acquisition device" meeting these conditions 
can select, from the hypothetical grammars possible under these requirements, 
grammars that are compatible with these conditions; one grammar in 
particular can be selected because the device is held to have an "evaluation 
measure". We shall return to this evaluation measure of "simplicity metric" 
later. Suffice it to note that, in accordance with the child taken as a 
linguist, there are two aspects to the simplicity metric. Firstly, it is 
the most basic innate component, corresponding to "universal grammar" in 
that any possible grammar must conform with it. Secondly, among formulated 
theories attributed with explanatory adequacy, the simplicity metric favours 
that which, very roughly, "says the most with the fewest expressions".
(Note that it presupposes that the general features of the class of possible 
grammars has already been determined.)
Given all this, the alternative between innatism ("rationalism") and 
empiricism is clearly formulated and purportedly empirically decidable.
The empiricist hypothesis, he holds,
assumes that the device has certain analytical data-processing 
mechanisms or inductive principles of a very elementary sort, for 
example, certain principles of association, weak principles of 
"generalization" ..., or, in our case, taxanomic principles of 
segmentation and classification ... 24
The rationalist hypothesis, on the other hand,
holds that ... there are innate ideas and principles of various 
kinds that determine the form of the acquired knowledge in what 
may be a rdsher restricted and highly organized way.25
To decide between these hypotheses (and others), what is sought is 
a device which can "use" langugaes similar to natural languages in the relevant
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respects# In fact, to take account of both performance and competence, 
two devices are sought, and can be represented as follows, combining (4), 
the corresponding generating situation, (5), and other considerations.
(6)
Input 
signal 
Output 
signal"^ *
The performance or perceptual model is said to be "a system of information 
2 6processing" which "operates under constraints of memory, time, and
. . . 27organization of perceptual strategies that are not matters of grammar".
Its outputs "converge on those predicted in terms of the grammar" only 
when "given time and computation space under contrived experimental
j. . i, 28conditions .
Verbal behaviour is only one case in which an LT(O,D) can be sought. 
Something similar to (6) could be sought for many different D’s. In each
case, a supposedly biologically determined form of behaviour would be
. . 29explicated in terms of automata. Chomsky holds that psychology will 
study the performance mechanisms and, regarding competence, he states that
... psychology is that part of human biology that is concerned at 
its deepest level with the second-order capacity to construct 
cognitive structures that enter into first-order capacities to 
act and to interpret experience.30
G.A. Miller, one of Chomsky’s collaborators, has succinctly defended the
. . . . . 31validity of the biological application of automaton models. Miller feels 
that there is no objection to considering the class of all possible systems, 
mechanical or biological, that might perform functions biological systems 
are known to perform. This would bring the procedure of biology, so far 
concerned with actual organisms, into line with that of physics. It would
involve concentrating on one function at the expense of others. The ideal
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would be to establish that, if any device performs a certain function, then
it must be limited by a certain set of principles which apply to any 
32possible device performing that function. Chomsky’s characterization 
of human linguistic competence is a perfect example of this mechanical 
taxonomy. Note, however, that the functions, and not the organisms,
are classified.
What makes language peculiarly suitable for such an investigation is 
not only the fact that the input and output in (6) are from the same family 
of phenomena, but also that they can be described with a great deal of 
precision in terms of items and rules which are not unmanageably large in 
number. This gives a precise way of determining what competence must 
be attributed to the native speaker. Syntax is ileal for such a study, 
for not only are the largest and most easily analysed structural units 
syntactic, but also syntax (unlike semantics) need make no reference beyond 
the components described in (6).
The approach used to determine the innate structure in (6) is to 
find an upper and a lower bound on the sorts of automata which could take 
as input or give as output sentences having a syntactic structure similar 
to those of natural languages; Chomsky then proceeds to move the upper 
and lower bounds together by finding what adaptations must be made at the
two bounds to extend or restrict the sorts of languages which could be "used’ 
33by the automata. "Linguistic universals", common to all natural languages,
are of interest in an empirical inquiry only if we can show what a language 
not conforming to them would be like. We want automata which function 
according to principles other than those of innate human linguistic competence. 
Chomsky satisfies this requirement by considering artificial languages which 
an automaton could be instructed to accept or generate.
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It is essential to get some notion of the nature of these languages.
Their rules are explicit and a useful criterion of explicitness is whether 
a rule can be followed by an automaton; this will do as a definition of 
"algorithm". The rules in the automaton model relate to states of the 
automaton and to the symbols of the vocabulary of the language. One imagines 
that the symbols are written on consecutive squares of a tape which is fed 
through the device. The rules apply to "situations" - i.e. a symbol and 
a state of the machine - and specify subsequent situations. Certain strings 
of symbols can pass square-by-square through a given automaton only if the 
automaton has the states and the instructions (or rules) which allow the
passage from one symbol-state to another. In such a case, the string is
. . 34 .sard to be accepted by the device. The same formal relations hold for 
generating a string; only the temporal relations need be changed.
These are quite a number of considerations to keep in mind; so let 
us get clear on what is of primary importance. Neither the states of the 
machine nor the vocabulary are essential to the sort of machine or the 
sort of language it can use. What is important is their relation to each 
other as specified by the rules. But, again, particular rules can be 
substituted one for another without affecting the sort of automaton or the 
sort of language it uses. What this depends on, rather, is the sort of 
rules of* instructions: whether they can specify movement of the tape in 
both or only one direction, whether they can specify that a symbol be 
replaced by another, whetherthey allow the machine to use the whole tape 
or only the part occupied by the string of symbols, etc. Conversely, of 
course, we could say that different sorts of automata specify different 
forms of rules or instructions. Different sorts of automata and instructions 
in turn use, i.e., specify different sorts of languages; and, given a sort 
of language, one is restricted to a certain sort of automaton or set of 
rules. What is meant by different sorts of languages are languages that differ in
some systematically describable structural - that is, syntactic - property.
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For example, languages whose well-formed strings are of the form anbn
differ in an important syntactic way from those whose strings are of the 
form (ab)n, even though the string ab is in both languages.
Chomsky has reported that his first work of acclaim, Syntactic
'■
L
Structures (1957), was "a rather watered-down version of earlier work (at 
36the time unpublished)’’. The enduring value of Chomsky’s work has been
seen in ’’the mathematical rigour and precision with which he formalized
. . 37the properties of alternative systems cf grammatical description". This 
concerns syntax. In the work in which he most thoroughly presents his
automata models, he mentions two departures he makes from Saussure’s 
38distinction between langue - competence - and parole - performance.'
Firstly, he says nothing about the semantic side of langue. Secondly, 
Saussure regarded langue as a storehouse of signs and their grammatical 
properties and had no way to deal with sentence structure; this led to 
what Chomsky describes as the ’’bizarre consequence” that parole, not langue,
39is involved in the formation of sentences. Linguists have reported that 
Structures made such an impact because it justified intuitions on such matters 
as the relation between active andpassive forms (which are unrelated in 
phrase structure analysis, leaving the intuition unaccounted for by the 
immediate-constituent phrase-structure-grammar of the day); and, further,
a technical treatment would have made the results inaccessible to most 
40linguists. But Chomsky’s treatment of syntax depended in the first place 
on making explicit the way in which syntactic structures are due to 
explicit rules and their application, which is the essence of the technical
treatment.
To see this, let us return to the notions of a machine generating 
a string of symbols and of rules as algorithms. Specifying a set of rules 
and a vocabulary specifies a ’’grammar”; it also, given the states of an
automaton, specifies an automaton. As the automaton is said to generate 
(or accept) a language, so the grammar is said to generate a language - in
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a completely explicit way, i.e. there is an effective procedure for generating 
any sentence in a language, given a grammar for it.
Notice that ’’generate" refers to a formally defined relation between 
a grammar and a set of sentences. There is no suggestion of a temporal 
process. In the same sense, the set of natural numbers, considered in 
terms of their relations with regard to the operation of addition, is 
said to be generated by the set {!}.
A grammar generates a language in a special way. To see this, consider 
how {1} generates the set of natural numbers by addition, viz. one is added 
to one (giving two), then added to this sum (giving three), etc. That is, 
the unique non-null element of the set {1} is recursively applied (added). 
Similarly, when the set of generators are syntactic rules, these are 
applied recursively to generate syntactic structures. Any given rule can 
be applied as often as needed. (Of course, when there is more than one 
generator in the set, it might make a difference in what order they are 
applied.)
41
Chomsky holds that "langue must be represented as a generative 
process based on recursive rules". The insight that "infinite sets with 
certain types of internal structure ... can be characterised by a finite 
recursive generative process" was not available to Saussure, and it allows 
Chomsky to avoid the "bizarre consequence" that sentence formation is a 
matter of parole.
The rules of grammars corresponding to automata are "rewriting rules" 
and the grammars are "rewriting grammars". To take an example, let the 
grammar contain the vocabulary {a,b} and the rules
Rule 1. S aSb
Rule 2. SaA
Rule 3. A->a
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A "derivation" is a sequence of strings, each of which is formed from the
preceding one by applying some rules of the grammar, e.g.
aSb by Rule 1
aaSbb by Rule 1
aaaAbb by Rule 2
aaaabb by Rule 3
In general, this grammar generates the language whose sentences are of the
S
and correspond to the states of the automaton. In many cases, the instr­
uctions of the automaton must be rewritten to includ.e rules which allow
for changes of state without changes of the input tape to correspond to 
rules generating languages like natural lnaguages. But the divergence is 
only notational: it remains true that a set of rules or instructions for 
an automaton specifies a set of rules of a rewriting grammar and vice 
Versa. Furthermore, as restrictions are added to the automata to approach 
a device which represents a native speaker’s competence, so restrictions 
are added to grammars to approach those which generate natural languages.
However, it is not sufficient that the grammar merely generate strings 
corresponding to sentences in a natural language. Consider the sentence 
"They are flying planes". The ambiguity of this sentence can be shown with 
parentheses: "They (are (flying planes) )" and "They ((are flying) planes)". 
What is called the weak generative capacity of an automaton or grammar 
concerns the set of strings that it generates. Its strong generative 
capacity refers to the structural descriptions it assigns to strings. It 
turns out that only one class of rewriting grammars allows us to consistently 
assign structural descriptions to sentences. The grammars are "phrase 
structure grammars" and the structure is represented by a "phrase-marker"
or "P-marker".
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Consider the example above. The two interpretations can be generated
by the rules:
Rule 1. S-> Pro VP
Rule 2. VP V NP
Rule 3. VP-> V N
Rule 4. NP-^.Adj N
Rule 5. Pro —> they
Rule 6. V-£ are
Rule 7. V -> are flying
Rule 8. N planes
Rule 9. Adj->flying,
where the following abbreviations for the auxiliary symbols are used:
"S" for "sentence", "Pro" for ''pronoun”, "VP” for "verb phrase", "V" for 
"verb", "NP" for "noun phrase", "N" for "noun", and "Adj" for "adjective". 
Rules 1—4 are subcategorization rules and introduce nonterminal symbols; 
the corresponding instructions for an automaton specify a change of state 
without a change of the input tape. Rules 5-9 are lexical insertion rules 
and correspond to instructions changing the input tape. Roughly, the 
subcategorization rules are responsible for syntactic structure; the 
lexical insertion rules, for the symbols in the string.
The P-marker for the first interpretation is derived by applying the
. 42 . .rules in the order: 1, 5, 2, 6, 4, 9, 8. This gives (where the edges • 
between X and Y and X and Z are labelled with the number of the rule X-> Y(Z))
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A different order gives the P-marker for the second interpretation.
P-markers are an instance of tree graphs. Graph theory in general
is one of the major forces in mathematics’ colonization of new disciplines.
The '’nodes” or "vertices” (here occupied by symbols) are connected by
"edges" (here labelled with the numbers of rules). A graph, G, is specified
by giving its set of vertices, V(G), and the set of pairs of vertices
connected by edges, E(G). The distinguishing mark of a tree graph is that
none of the series of edges or "paths" connecting edges forms a "circuit",
i.e. a path in which all the vertices are distinct but the first and the
last, which are identical - the path is "closed". A major factor in the
wide application of graph theory is the fact that graphs need not involve
any metric properties. Further, the vertices can represent any sort of
"thing" and the edges any relation between them. Yet graph theory is a
rigorous mathematical theory with a number of important results. One of
the early applications of graph theory was Cayley’s use of tree graphs to
determine the number of non-isomorphic stuctural formulae corresponding
to each (empirical) chemical formula of the form C HL Tree graphs can, n 2n+2 ° r
also represent power structures in societies. In fact, Leibniz's
description of the hierarchy of monads describes a tree structure. The 
relation between states of automata such as we have been discussing can be 
represented by Eulerian graphs, i.e. graphs in which there is a closed path 
including each edge. Here, however, one must give a direction to the edges 
(now called arcs), i.e. these are "digraphs" known as state descriptions 
in automaton theory. The following is a very simple example.
a
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Here the vertices represent states and the edges are labelled with the
symbol accepted at each state transition permitted by a particular
. . . . n 44instruction. This automaton accepts strings of the form ab c. Another 
application of digraphs is in computer flow-charts, representing the 
order in which tasks are performed. Again, digraphs represent the 
communication of information, however "information" might be interpreted.
Now on Chomsky’s position, the P-marker - the tree graph repres­
enting syntactic structure - must represent something within the language 
user. For the language user is held to syntactically interpret phonetic
signals by matching them with structural descriptions generated by the 
. . . 45grammar it internalizes. One could, equivalently, think of the inter­
pretation of syntactic structure in terms of the application of the rules 
of grammar to the phonetic strings. The characterizations are equivalent
because the P-marker portrays the application of the rules in particular
46cases.
The first sort of automata considered as models of human linguistic 
competence are finite automata; these turn out to give a lower bound. In 
showing that these cannot be models of linguistic competence, Chomsky also 
shows that linguistic competence cannot be represented in terms of inform”' 
ation (or communication) theory, or cybernetics, alone. In the late 1940’s 
and early 1950’s, when cybernetics was a new field, a number of American
linguists not unnaturally sought to explicate natural languages with
. 47concepts derived from the mathematical theory of communication. Chomsky 
sometimes gives the impression that in rejecting information theory as a
model of linguistic competence, he rejects all artificial devices as such 
48 . . .
models. But, in fact, information theory, as embodied in finite automata, 
is construed as one among a number of hypotheses about innate human ling­
uistic competence. The finite-automaton hypothesis, postulating the least 
syntactic structure in language, so the least innate structure in the user,
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is taken as the empiricist hypothesis. There is no particular initial 
plausibility to this hypothesis, for, as the alternatives are presented 
here, there would be no more reason to assume that this hypohtesis is 
true than to assume that an untested die will land ace-up.
There are two different, yet equivalent, presentations of information 
theory. They are best considered in terms of the components postulated 
by this theory
Information is sent across the communication channel. This imposes 
restrictions - channel capacity - on the amount of information. Indeed, 
information theory is concerned with the amount of information; it says
nothing at all about what information is or the meaning of the symbols
. . 49or events making up the signal. The unit is called a bit. Each bit 
corresponds to a yes-no decision - a decision between two alternatives.
If the number of the alternatives is, e.g., eight, the decision at each 
"epoch” can be thought of as involving a decision between two sets of four 
alternatives, then a decision between two sets of two alternatives, and 
finally a decision between two alternatives; thus there are three r: 
bits of information at each epoch.Notice that this relates to channel 
capacity; the significant unit is bits per epoch. Often one wishes to 
characterise the amount of information in the signal independently of the
channel. Then one must consider overall properties of the signal or the
. . . 51set of signals to which it belongs.
The fact that the amount of information at any one epoch is determined 
by the number of alternatives allows the alternatives to be construed as 
linguistic items. The fundamental structuralist insight is that linguistic
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items are determined by their mutual differences, and so form a self-
contained system; this characteristic can be referred to as linguistic 
holism. At each position in the formation of a sentence, one can choose 
from a set of alternatives. In fact, however, one does not choose from 
the whole set, since the set of items which can occur in a given position - 
those which are in "paradigmatic opposition" - is restricted by those items 
which form its context - those items which are in "syntagmatic opposition"
with the items in question. There are different levels at which one can
. . . . 52 . .distinguish items. A clear example is furnished by phonemes, roughly
. 53corresponding to speech sounds, although more abstract. Phonemes are 
functional units - they are in paradigmatic opposition to one another - and 
differ from language to language; and their realization often depends on 
syntagmatic oppositions. At the level of speech sounds proper, one talks 
of distinctive (phonetic) features, any particular sound being specified 
by whether it has or lacks certain distinctive features. (Note that each 
distinctive feature corresponds to a yes-no decision.) These form a 
holistic system for human languages in general; not all distinctive features 
need occur in any one language. Within individual languages, the various 
holistic systems (phonemes, morphemes, etc.) can be construed in cybernetic
terms.
The second interpretation of the amount of information concerns more 
directly the components of the communication system in addition to the 
channel. A channel will randomly introduce items from the set of alternatives 
from which we choose in forming a message; that is, a channel has some degree 
of noise. The noise will almost certainly be in a very probable distribution 
of the items. We can usurp the thermodynamic term "entropy" and say that 
the channel, in so far as it contains only noise, has very high entropy. We 
want some indication that what is received is a message and not simply noise.
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The "authenticity factor" does this; it is the negative of entropy or
"negentropy" and is set equal to the amount of information in a received 
54sequence.
The authenticity factor relates the source with the receiver. Now
the amount of information the source can transmit or the receiver receive
depends on the number of alternatives there are to choose from in the 
vocabulary V. But if these items are chosen at random, the information 
(negentropy) will be almost zero. The amount of information in the 
source (analogous comments apply to the receiver ) is taken to be the 
difference between the maximum entropy possible with the items of V (viz. 
when they are chosen at random) and the entropy of messages actually 
transmitted by the source. If the maximum entropy is taken to be zero, then 
the amount of information in the source is again negentropy.
For the receiver, this information can be thought of as a priori or 
internal information about messages received in the language. For the 
source, it would supply constraints on the formation of messages. "A 
priori'" is used here in the sense of a priori probability ~ the probability 
assigned to events before the trial(s) in question. From another point 
of view, the information shared by the source and. the receiver can be tought 
of as a posteriori information, and the state of maximum entropy - when 
all symbols are equiprobable - can be thought of as the a priori information. 
Thus a child begins life with no information about the frequency of words 
in its mother language, but gradually acquires internal information from 
the messages it receives.
55 56On the vew sketched here, redundancy is the statistical structure 
of a message which is beyond our choice in the selection of the message.
It does the job of syntax in an odd sort of way.
, . 56Information theory has furnished a new tool for cognitive psychology. 
The general approach is to find the channel capacity of the human 
observer by correlating the information in the stimuli with the information
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in the responses* This has an advantage over previous attempts at quantit­
ative data about the observer, which purportedly measure the strength of 
sensations, in that it is expressly concerned with the correlation between
two observable phenomena. The man-as-communication-channel view is also
. . 57suggestive of new experiments and techniques.
There is no doubt that the findings of such experiments are empirically 
significant. But a great deal of care must be taken in how they are 
interpreted. The term ’'information” suggests that what receives or 
communicates it cognises something. But information theory is a mathematical 
theory of very wide application. The application of the statistical 
thermodynamic concept of entropy is restricted to systems in which one 
can already say something about the distribution of a certain sort of thing 
and its states - e.g. molecules and their energy states or electrons and 
t^heir energy levels. But any such restrictions are indirect for the app­
lication of the concept of negentropy. Essentially the same cybernetic 
system could be realized with any number of materials by exploiting any 
number of physical laws. In the end, the only restrictions on the applic­
ation of information theory are those of human ingenuity, both in technical 
realizations and in discovering how to exploit physical systems which are 
already given.
In the experimental examples referred to, the language-dependent 
skills of the experimenter are involved at both ends of the human channel. 
They are involved at the input end because he designs the experiment and 
manipulates the stimuli to different values along the dimension. They are 
involved at the output end because he communicates with the subject or, 
failing this, interprets the subject’s behaviour in his own terms.
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Experiments on channel capacity, since they relate to the maximum number 
of discernable features, might indicate the foundations for linguistic
holism in certain dimensions - colour is the most obvious candidate. But
’'.1 g
any such foundation must be exploited to be linguistic.
In the early years of information theory, there was much talk about
the CNS and the sensory systems as cybernetic systems accounting for human 
. . 59 .cognition. But, as mentioned above, almost any system could be a 
communication channel. It even seems that one physical structure of nerve 
and various other tissues could be two different sorts of cybernetic 
systems, depending on how it is used. For example, if physiology and 
communication technology were sufficiently advanced, we might be able to 
incorporate the visual system into an audiocommunication network.
We must keep in mind whose information and whose concepts are 
involved; and also whose behaviour is the acting on the information 
received. I am not criticising the application of information theory. 
Rather, I am criticising taking ’’information” seriously, attributing 
knowledge to components, and circumventing accounts of why someone 0’d 
when he found out that p by tracing physiological pathways. There is a 
certain appeal to "explain” knowledge and cognition in the way one would 
explain the size of a crystal by stating the average distance between 
atoms and the number of atoms. But cognition is not a joint affair.
The effect of arranging tasks and presenting information in different 
ways^ suggests that Gestalt effects^ must be considered. Gestalt theory 
suggests that the hypothesis of minimum innate competence is false, at 
least concerning perception, and that statistical experimentation and 
explanation must begin by taking the structures it finds into account. 
Chomsky’s position on language is similar to the Gestalt position on
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perception. Indeed, the perception of phonetic sequences is an example 
of a Gestalt effect, as is evident from intonation patterns.^
Now for Chomsky information theory is embodied in finite automata as
the empiricist, minimum-structure hypothesis of innate linguistic 
6 2competence. These automata correspond to regular languages, which can be 
generated by recursive rewriting rules of the form S->aS, with terminal
rules of the form S->a. The instructions or rules for a finite automaton
allow for the tape to move in only one direction (to the right, say) and
do not allow for the machine to print symbols on the tape. The most
plausible sort of finite automaton is a particular sort of what is called 
63a k-limited automaton suggested by Shannon. The states of such automata 
are determined by the last k symbols accepted on the tape. In terms of 
rewriting rules, this means that the applicability of a rule depends on the 
last k symbols to the left of the auxiliary symbol to which the rule applies. 
The particular sort of k-limited automata are probabilistic ones. Assoc­
iated with each state of a probabilistic k-limited automaton are probab­
ilities for each of the D symbols of the vocabulary. Each of these gives 
the probability that the next transition will be into a state determined 
by the last k symbols on the string followed by the symbol with which the 
probability is associated. Equivalently, each value gives the probability 
that, given the string of k symbols determining the state, the next symbol
on the tape will be the symbol associated with the probability value. A
..... k 64probabilistic k-limited automaton has D different states.
There are thus different probabilities to be calculated: one for
each state transition, or one for each concatenation of a symbol to each
possible string of k symbols. The transition probabilities can be estimated
by counting the (k+l)-letter (or -word) strings of each type; these
probabilities can be used to produce ”(k+1)-order approximations" of the
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corpus. As k increases, the strings take on a more familiar look. An 
example of a fifth-order word approximation is
Road in the country was insane especially in dreary rooms where 
they have some books to buy for studying Greek.
However, such devices cannot represent linguistic competence or even
allow for language acquisition. Chomsky gives three reasons why they 
66cannot. Firstly, there are many grammatical sentences which have never 
been uttered and so could not be represented in any estimation of trans­
itional probabilities. Secondly,by the time k and D have grown large 
enough to give a reasonable fit to ordinary usage, the number of probab­
ilities to be calculated is astronomical. On the most conservative estimates
. 9
of k and D the child would be called upon to learn 10 parameters in a
g
childhood lasting 10 seconds.
Chomsky refers to these two reasons throughout his less technical 
writings as reasons the empiricist hypothesis cannot account for language 
acquisition. The first reason is restated as the fact that languages have
finite means (phonemes, lexical entries, rules, etc.), yet there are an
. . . . . 69infinite number of grammatical sentences m every natural language. The 
second is restated as the purported fact that a child could not internalize 
the grammar of a natural language, given a minimum of innate structure and 
the poverty of the corpus with which he is presented.^
The third reason Chomsky gives why a probabilistic k-limited automaton 
cannot represent linguistic competence applies generally to all finite 
automata. Furthermore, it is a syntactic reason, so applies more directly 
to the supposedly innate component of linguistic competence. The reason 
basically is that natural languages are not regular languages.Consider 
the following sentence
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(8) The people who called and wanted to rent your house when you 
go away next year are from California.
The clause from "who” to ’’year" is a relative clause and is derived by a 
grammatical transformation called Relitivization from the sentence
(9) The people called and wanted to rent your house when you
go away next year.
Sentence (9) occurs in "deep" (as opposed to "surface”) structure. The 
P-marker in deep structure "underlying" thesurface structure P-marker for 
(8) is
people
year
VP
PrepP
V Prep N
are from California
that the sentence dominated by thisThe symbol flanking "S" indicates
node must undergo a transformation for the whole sentence to be grammatical 
What is significant for us is not that transformations are involved, but 
that an instance of a grammatical categoy occurs within the context of 
another occurrence of the same category. Languages with constructions of 
the sort XYZ, where both the string as a whole and Y are instances of the 
same grammatical category) are "self-embedding" languages. The automaton 
which accepts (generates) sentences with self-embedding must interrupt its 
accepting of the principal sentence, accept the embedded sentence, then
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continue accepting the principal sentence. We can think of the nodes 
and their relations in the P-marker acting as memory. This can be so 
because the instructions determining the automaton can be stated in such 
a way that they refer to a state previously entered and specify a change 
of state without a change of symbol scanned on the input tape. The 
instructions can be so because the rules of the grammar generating the 
language have certain sorts of subcategorization rules and lexical insertion 
rules. A finite automaton, corresponding to rules of the form S->aS, lacks 
the required sort of memory: a symbol is scanned with each change of state.
The lower bound, finite automata, embodying the empiricist hypothesis, 
is thus eliminated as a model of linguistic competence. An upper bound is 
given by Turing machines in general. A Turing machine differs from a
finite automaton in th&t
a) the tape can move in either direction
b) the machine can print on the tape as well as scan it, and
c) the whole tape (thought of as infinite in extent) is available.
Now a language generated by a set of recursive rules is ’’recursively
enumerable” - any string in it results from a definite number of applic­
ations of the rules. Given a language L whose strings are formed from
members of the vocabulary V, the complement of L,L , is defined as the set 
c
of strings formed from the members of V which are not strings of L.
might or might not be recursively enumerable when L is. If both L and Lc
are recursively enumerable, L (and L ) is ’’decidable": given any string
formed from members of V, one can determine in a definite number of steps
whether or not this string is a member of L (or L ). Now if L is undecidable c
(even if it is recursively enumerable), then a speaker of L would have no way
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of knowing that a given string is not in his language. This is sufficient 
reason to reject the automaton corresponding to L as a model of linguistic
competence.
Turing machines can represent any formal system. More explicitly, an 
unrestricted rewriting system or grammar is any grammar with rules of the 
form $ , where and are strings formed from members of the vocabulary
All these can be directly represented by Turing machines and vice versa.
But some languages generated by unrestricted rewriting grammars or Turing 
machines are Undecidable. Therefore, this sort of grammar or automaton 
cannot represent human linguistic competence. Furthermore, these grammars 
or automata are too unstructured; one need only consider the lack of 
constraints on the memory, that is, the print-out of Turing machines to 
see this. In particular, they give no uniform assignment of p-markers.
We now have an upper bound, and we can move this down by adding 
conditions to unrestricted rewriting grammars.
Condition If V is a rule of the grammar, thenV*' is not 
shorter than.
Since each line of the deivation must be at least as long as the preceding 
line, languages generated by grammars satisfying this condition are 
decidable. But this condition is not strong enough to allow uniform 
assignment of P-markers.
Condition II:^ Each rule must be of the f orm 9^A^_> >
i.e. A can be rewritten Cd’when in the context 
%l“X2 (whereXi and'X2 may be null).
Grammars meeting Conditions I and II are called context sensitive grammars.
• . . 75Again, these grammars do not allow the uniform assignment of P-markers.
This suggests:
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7 6Condition III: No symbol can be rewritten as a single nonterminal
symbol in any context.
Exceptions are made in natural languages for lexcial insertion rules. By 
moving the upper bound down, we are now very close to grammars which will 
assign P-markers to natural languages in a natural way, and so are close 
to the automata which are acceptable models of linguistic competence.
We can also move the lower bound up. We can modify a finite automaton
. . . . . 77by allowing the tape to move in either direction; but it still accepts
(generates) only regular languages. We can modify it further by allowing 
7 8the machine to print symbols on the tape as it changes state. This
defines a linear-bound automaton. To simplify matters, we can think of such
aut .omata as having two infinite tapes, one solely for input and one solely
for output. If the output tape (generally referred to as the storage tape)
can move in both,directions, It can be thought of as memory. Usually such
automata use two vocabularies, one -VT - for the input tape and one - V - I s
for the storage tape. Requiring that the storage tape move in only one 
. . . 79direction determines a transducer. The storage tape is then an output 
tape and the automaton effects a mapping - a transduction - of the input
t • i -i 80 ,language into the output language. Transducers cannot represent human 
linguistic competence, for their storage tape acts simply as a counter and 
not as memory, which would put constraints on the strings accepted or 
generated.
But if we allow the storage tape ofthe linear-bound automaton to 
81move in either direction, we have a pushdown storage automaton and 
such automata do represent, according to Chomsky, human linguistic comp­
etence. The storage tape acts as memory allowing the automaton to
82remember how "deep” it is in the P-marker. The languages accepted
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(generated) by pushdown storage automata are generated by grammars which 
satisfy Conditions I-II plus
83Condition IV: A certain nonterminal symbol can be rewritten as
a string of symbols, irrespective of the context
• • • * m which it occurs.
Such grammars are called context-free grammars. In practice, this 
class of grammars is usually restricted by adding condition III. Also, 
lexical items are subject to co-occurrence constraints (e.g. ’’water” cannot 
be preceded by an indefinite article); this reintroduces contextual 
constraints while avoiding the undesirable results of context-sensitive 
grammars. These grammars are the phrase-structure grammars referred to
above.
We now have a model of human linguistic competence corresponding to 
the component on the right in (6); we thereby have an outline of what 
learning theory or innate structure must be posited. It remains to find 
a performance or perceptual model, indicated on the left of (6), which 
relates performance to the competence model. Now utterances are strings 
of sounds; there is no interruption between grammatical dependencies 
while a nested component is accepted or generated. The performance of the 
speaker or hearer is thus represented by some sort of finite automaton.
To relate the string of symbols to competence, we need some way of mapping
. . . 84a structural description, or P-marker, into the string. This is done 
by introducing a bracketed notation in which the left-hand bracket is 
labelled with the label of the node which it and its corresponding right­
hand bracket represent. Indided between the brackets are all the brackets 
and terminal symbols corresponding to the nodes dominated by the node 
represented by the pair of brackets in question. Thus (10) corresponds to
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[s [np {(Def)Det The] [n People]#^ The people ... year]#)
"J California^ J J/- r are] p r from
|VP ly J [PrepP (Prep
It is easily seen that this contains all the grammatical information
contained in (10).
Now for any context-free rewriting grammar, G, there is a mechanical
procedure for constructing a transducer whose V is the terminal vocabulary
of G and whose V in addition contains a pair of labelled brackets for 
85every member of the nonterminal vocabulary of G. Such a transducer is 
the perceptual model on the left of (6); it assigns to arbitrary sentences 
their structural description with respect to G. By increasing its memory, 
it can relabel self-embedded symbols up to any bounded degree of self-
embedding.^
Chomsky has to account for the discrepancy between context-free 
grammars or pushdown storage automata as descriptions of human linguistic 
competence and linguistic performance as actually observed. The transduction 
is part of the account, but calls for further comment. Within competence, 
he introduces transformation rules. The P-r-markers of a large proportion 
of sentences of any natural language cannot be derived from any one context- 
free grammar. Transformation rules account for this. A transformation is 
defined by stating a grammatical structure to which it applies, the grammatical 
structure which it produces, and the relative positions of the items in 
the initial ("deep") and resulting ("surface") structures. We have already 
mentioned Relativization. Other familiar examples are those which transform 
active into passive sentences and declaratives into questions. The lexical 
insertion and subcategorization rules together make up the base component 
of the grammar. The base and transformational components make up the 
syntactic, i.e. (usually) the generative component, the component which 
generally figures in discussions of competence and performance. However, 
the "interpretive" components - the phonological and (usually) semantic
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components - are closely connected with the syntactic component in their 
functioning.
Transformation rules help to bring competence into line with performance, 
87for the surface structures are more easily accepted by the transducer. A 
88large discrepancy remains, however. Chomsky suggests that the transducer 
generates an internal signal to match the input signal; if this guess does 
not match, further guesses are made (now having the additional information 
from the mismatch) until the match is accepted or the input is dismissed 
as unintelligible. He also identifies the transducer with short-term 
memory, which transmits the imperfect structural description of the surface 
structure to the long-term memory, which embodies the grammar and gives a
structural description of the deep structure.
In any case, there remains a great number - in fact, an infinite 
number - of grammatical sentences which the transducer, and so the human
device cannot accept. To account for this, Chomsky drew a distinction in
90 . . .Aspects between acceptability and grammaticality. Some have rejected 
this distinction and have pointed out that sentences with degree of
embedding greater than one are largely unintelligible to humans without
. . 91 .calculating aids. But Chomsky’s proof that finite automata cannot 
represent linguistic competence requires examples of self-embedding to any 
arbitrary depth. It has been suggested instead that this competence can
be represented by a finite device protrayed (roughly) by a graph having
. . . 92a number of circuits with one or more common vertices.
It is difficult to see how discrepancies, perhaps very serious ones,
such as this can fail to arise with the sort of idealizations which portray
human competences by automata. Furthermore, a practical distinction between
short-term and long-term memory is magnified into a distinction between
components. Recently, Chomsky has denied that the deep-surface distinction
implies anything superficial about the latter; he has dropped ’’deep” in
Ill
.... 93 .favour of "initial”. Yet a good deal of the activity involved in language 
use can no longer be described as behaviour and Chomsky is essentially in 
the same position as those cognitive psychologists who theorise about 
sensations and other mental events which are in principle unobservable.
Chomsky has proposed his treatment of language as a model for other 
. 94forms of behaviour. He refers to the model of complicated behaviour in
terms of "tote" ("test-operate-test-exit") units presented by Miller,
. 95 .Galanter, and Pribram. These units comprise two parts: a test to 
determine whether some situation matches an internally generated criterion; 
and an operation reducing the difference between the external situation 
and the internal criterion either by revising the criterion in the light 
of thenew evidence or by changing the organism’s internal and/or external 
environment. These parts are linked by a feedback loop permitting iterated 
adjustments until the criterion is reached
Carrying out the operation may involve further tests. In that case, the
box labelled "Operate" is analysed into a sequence of tote units, creating
. . 96 . . .a self-embedding hierarchy. In programming language, this hierarchy is
called a plan and its postponed parts are called its intentions. As plans 
97are closely analogous to P-markers, Chomsky suggests that transformational 
grammars indicate how plans could be combined and rearranged. As a grammar 
is the source of a P-marker and a programming language is the source of a 
particular programme, Chomsky adds that there might be many diverse sets 
of rules as sources of plans in diverse enterprises.
Ulrich Neisser has recently presented a theory of perception incorp­
orating structures similar to tote units and which are said to be embedded
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in units of the same sort. (Neisser is perhaps the most influential 
contemporary cognitive psychologist and his Cognitive Psychology (1967) 98
was influential, though cautious, in publicising computer models.) These
. . . 99cognitive structures, or "schemata”, are said to prepare the perceiver 
to accept certain kinds of information rather than others and so control
the activity of, e.g., looking. 100 Neisser uses the term "cognitive map",
which has come to be used in all disciplines concerned with spatial 
101orientation. Cognitive maps are often thought of as mental pictures
but Neisser refers to them as orienting schemata, which (like other schemata)
. . . . 102 . accept information and direct action. Cognitive psychologists have
assumed that there are successive stages or levels of information processing
from the specific to the general. But, e.g., a person’s object schema
. . . . . 103accepting information about a lamp m his office is (according to Neisser ) 
embedded in his cognitive map of his office. The orienting schema and the 
schema for the lamp are simultaneously active and support one another.
Actions are hierarchically embedded in more extensive actions and 
are motivated by anticipated consequences at various levels of 
schematic organization.^^
Neisser compares cognitive maps with what Miller, Galanter, and Pribram 
called "plans for speaking".'*'0^ Embedded shcemata, like syntactic subunits 
in P-markers to which transformations are applied, can be detached from 
the cognitive map in which they occur.
The general influence of automaton models in psychology and the 
emphasis on the organism’s competence owes a great deal to Chomsky’s review 
article (1959) of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, an attempt to introduce 
well formulated behaviourist principles into the study of language. 
Behaviourism explicitly seeks to make psychology scientific by eliminating 
from its vocabulary terms such as "sensation", "will", etc. which refer to
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no directly testable parameters. The general form of this dogma -
"operationalism" - was once widely supported in the philosophy of science
and characteristically maintains, in the words of the physicist P.W.
Bridgman, that "the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of
operations".IO? Stated another way, operationalism holds that the meaning
of every scientific term must be specified by a definite testing operation
thatprovides a criterion for its application; such operations are 
108"operational definitions".
The point of such definitions is to insure objective testability 
for all scientific statements. Operational tests, whether or not they are
linked with the ontological austerity of behaviourism, have been widely
. 109 . . .used m psychology. Bridgman had to maintain that, when we find that
two measuring operations give the same results in their range of applicability, 
it is not safe to regard them as determining the same concept, for their 
concurrence gives only an empirical generalisation. It is obvious, then, 
that the theoretical requirement of operationalism has substantive implications
Skinner’s basic vocabulary is operationally defined. 110 But, as
. Ill . . .Chomsky points out, if Skinner maintains (as he does in his earlier works 
(e.g. Behavior of Organisms (L938)) that only those physical events to which 
the organism in fact reacts are stimuli and only those parts of its behaviour 
which are connected with stimuli in lawful ways are responses, then behaviour 
is lawful by definition.
We can think of the stimulus-response correlation, as previously, in 
terms of the animal as a communication channel. Those things that are 
classed as stimuli and the behaviour classed as responses are picked out 
in the experimenter's own language. The referring expressions of the 
experimental language, to meet the theoretical requirements, must all be 
operationally defined. Apparently intelligent tasks which animals are
114
taught to perform (e.g. fetching newspapers) are accounted for as lingua­
morphic, i.e. they derive from the language-dependent abilities of the
trainer. Organisms in stimulus response experiments essentially perform 5
linguamorphic tafeks; even when the stimuli occur naturally, they could >
always have been the result of manipulation. i
At the level of operants, the subject must be thought of, not as a 
communication channel, but as a source. Skinner’s position in Verbal 
Behavior and elsewhere is that the contribution of the organism is trivial; 
interesting recurrent behaviour is to be accounted for in terms of 
environmental factors. Furthermore, the basic dependent variable in 
learning processes, response strength, is defined as ’’probability of ,
emission” and Skinner writes: "our evidence for the contribution of each
variable (to response strength) is based on observation of frequencies alone”. ? 
So a model of an organism on this count would be a probabilistic finite i
automaton. The refutation of Skinner now ties in with the refutation of
Shannon and both constitute a refutation of the empiricist hypothesis on
innate structure. Further, Skinner’s position on language complements 1
113Shannon’s cybernetic model, for Skinner states that the relation of
reference for a given term in the vocabulary of the speaker is ’’simply the
probability that the speaker will emit a response of a given form in the
presence of a stimulus having specified properties". That is, Skinner is
concerned with semantics.
Of course, the terms of English or any other natural language are 
not operationally defined. So Skinner cannot give the semantics of 
English. Instead, he illicitly extends the terms in which his theory is 
stated so that a so-called stimulus is referred to by a technical trans­
lation of the English term which is the response to be explained. A
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similar move is made for syntax, where the so-called stimuli are tokens
of English morphemes having (roughly) a descriptive function.
. . . , . . . 114This is essentially Chomsky s criticism. He states that the
experimental psychologist is faced with a dilemma. Either he accepts the 
narrow definition of "stimulus" and "response", making behaviour lawful 
by definition; or he counts any physical event to which the organism can 
react as a stimulus and any part of its behaviour as a response, in which
case his theoretical claims are not borne out. In Verbal Behavior,
. . . 115neither course is consistently followed. As Chomsky writes
He utilizes the experimental results as evidence for the scientific 
character of his system of behavior, and analogical guessses (form­
ulated in terms of a metaphoric extension of the technical vocabulary 
of the laboratory) as evidence for its scope.
Skinner states that responses are "under the control of extremely subtle
properties" of thephysical object or event as stimulus. 117 Chomsky points
out that the word "control" is merely a misleading paraphrase for the 
118traditional "denote" or "refer". Skinner, for example, claims that
"This is war" may be a response to a "confusing international situation".
In general, nouns are evoked by objects, verbs by actions, etc. Similarly,
-_s in "the boy’s gain" is said to be under the control of the "relational
„ , . . 120 aspect of the situation .
Other implausible accounts are given when Skinner ventures to treat 
certain "autoclitics" which cover Chomsky's home ground, syntax. This class 
includes the operants involved in assertion, negation, quantification, 
qualification of response (e.g. "I imagine ..."), construction of sentences 
(e.g. order and inflection), such units as "let x equal ...", etc. - i.e. 
all morphemes other than nouns, verbs, and adjectives, as well as grammatical
order and arrangement'. 121 Sentence construction is explained as an internal
116
process of composition, in which the nouns, verbs, and adjectives are
chosen first and then arranged, qualified, etc. by autoclitic responses
. . . . 122 . . to these internal activities. (Notice that Skinner must now rely on
internal responses.) But, since the grammar accounts for well-formedness 
we should expect it to contain information about admissable contexts for 
the lexical items; that is, it should state "selectional restrictions” 
for these items. Thus lexical items are represented in generative grammar
by complex sybmols which not only list phonological features, but also
. . . . . . 123indicate the syntactic context in vtich the item can occur. It is the
fact that lexical items must contain some information relevant to their
admissible contexts which makes suggestions such as Skinner’s so implausible 
Finally, a central notion for any "empiricist" theory of language
acquisition is that of generalization: the range of stimuli which
"control" various verbal operants is extended as the child’s acquisition
of the language progresses. The insufficiency of such an account is a 
124recurrent theme in Chomsky’s wiritngs. The linguistic fact which
generalization cannot account for is the ability of the language user to 
utter and understand sentences which are not similar in any simple, 
physical sense to any he has uttered or heard before. This is largely a
syntactic fact, but, in his review of Skinner, Chomsky suggests that
. . . 125generalization conceals complexities in semantics as well. Analogy 
has been suggested as a mechanism to explain generalization, but Chomsky 
rightly insists that such a suggestion is far too vague to shoulder any 
explanatory weight.
The inadequacy of Skinner’s analysis of language acuiqistion and
use follows from the fact that terms in natural lnaguages, unlike those in
behavioural psychology, are not operationally defined. Chomsky shows
thoroughly how Skinner smuggles in our ordinary concepts to prop up the
extensions of his terminology in his account of language. Chomsky rightly 
126maintains that we must first understand the structure of grammar before
117
we investigate the speaker’s performance, the listener’s performance, and 
127the child’s "construction” of the grammar. This follows from the general
point, not mentioned by Chomsky, that to pick out successful performance 
or adjustment one must know the standard of success. This point should 
be a truism, but is regularly ignored.
From the inadequacies of Skinner’s operationalism and Shannon’s
probabilistic interpretation of competence, Chomsky derives the very
important truth that language is "underdetermined by any fixed association
of utterances to external stimuli or physiological states (identifiable in 
W128any non-circular fashion) . This is the ess£i)tial point behind the
theme which, together with his nativism, dominates his work that has gained
philosophical attention (beginning with Cartesian Linguistics) - viz. the
. 129creative use of language.
It is imperative to keep in mind that Chomsky has his own hypothesis, 
presented as a hypothesis in the empirical sciences in competition with 
other hypotheses. Tis range of hypotheses is embodied in a range of 
language-accepting devices. But one could consider these hypotheses as all 
subsumed under a more general hypotheses - viz. that human linguistic 
competence can be represented by an automaton. This is simply assumed by 
Chomsky; yet the assumption involves a very inadequate notion of rule in 
a natural language. When he refers to physiological states in the passage 
quoted in the last paragraph, what he has in mind are physiological states 
that correlate with strings of formatives and which store received information 
Though underdetermined by environmental factors, language use for Chomsky
is to a large extent determined by what he calls the contributions of the
. 130 . . .organism. Chomsky is looking for functions shared by organisms and
automata. After rejecting generalization, he suggests that the brain is
adapted to produce the rules of a particular language, given as input
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sentences generated by that grammar. Concluding his review of Skinner,
he suggests that a properly formulated grammar will indicate the integrated
processes and patterns "imposed on the specific acts that constitute an
utterance", and so will "be of independent interest for psychology and 
132neurology".
Neurology is acting as a middle-man between what must be granted to 
have peculiar cultural significance and the operations of an automaton. 
Recently, Chomsky has distinguished two kinds of issues in the study of 
language and mind. There are "problems" - those issues "that appear to be 
within the reach of appraoches and concepts that are moderately well 
understood", such as arise when "we deal with cognitive structures".
Secondly, there are "mysteries" - those issues "that remain as obscure to 
us today as w^n they were originally formulated". We are faced with 
mysteries, he adds, "when we ask how humans make use of these cognitive
structures, how and why they make choices and behave as they do". "The
. 133creative aspect of language use" is classed as a mystery. It is inevitable
that such aspects should appear mysterious, for what is not determined by 
the contributions of the device are the variabilities of use, which are of 
minor importance for generative grammar. Since, in one interpretation, 
these devices - automata - are cultural products, we can think of the
linguist’s task as an attempt to translate all of natural language into 
a small part of itself which has an exaggeidzed formal structure. A language- 
accepting automaton is a four-dimensional diagram exhibiting certain series 
of applications of the rules of a rewriting grammar in much the same way 
that a two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system drawn on a blackboard
can be used to exhibit the functional relationship between two algebraic
. . 134variables. This suggests, as has been suggested by others, that generative 
grammarians take their theoretical terms too seriously.
119
. . . . . 135The best illustration of this is in the domain of phonology. As
phonology is the least abstract grammatical component, we can expect any 
real referants of theoretical terms to show up here. Phonology is a step 
nearer the data than is syntax. Still, it does not deal directly with 
observables - this is done by phonetics. But linguistics usually accepts 
a condition of bi-uniqueness: the phonemic make-up of a word (the subject 
of phonology) uniquely determines its phonetic form and vice versa. Now 
it is a well-established fact that what we intuitively take to be a single 
sort of sound, roughly corresponding to a letter of the alphabet, varies 
considerably according to its position in different utterance forms and 
from speaker to speaker. This gives the theorist leeway in what is to 
count as a phoneme, which must relate both to paradigmatic oppositions 
and to the physical sounds.
Chomsky often attacks the method of "segmentation and classification
attributed to structuralist linguistics. 136 His target is actually the
indigenous American species of structuralist linguistics derived from 
. 137 .L. Bloomfield (1887-1949). Bloomfield was an extreme behaviouralist 
T38
(at least for his day ) and insisted on operational definitions of
phonemes, which means segmentation of utterances into minimum sound units
and the classification of these according to their differentiation of
meaning. But not all structuralists advance operational definitions 
139of phonemes. "Abstract" views, under which generative grammar is
sometimes classed, generally rely on non-phonetic criteria for defining
, 140phonemes.
The Copenhagen School, which maintained an abstract view, appealed
to the practices of physics in its rejection of operationalism and held a 
psychologically real theory of speech production. Operationalism has been 
attacked in physics for the unmanageable multiplication of concepts it
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introduces. This unhappy consequence is obvious once one considers the 
number of ways we can measure distance: with a unit-length rod, by 
triangulation, by reflecting radio waves off a distant object and recording 
the time between emission and reception, etc. Most importantly, finding 
two or more operational tests for the same concept establishes empirically 
significant generalizations and, conversely, empirical laws allow new 
measurements - e.g. Charles' law allows one to measure the temperature of 
a gas in terms of its pressure, given a constant volume. Bridgman argues 
that linking operational definitions in this way is unsafe. But boldness 
is a virtue in a scientific theory, fcr it is correlated with its empirical 
content. The procedure of the physical sciences is to formulate hypotheses 
and (given the requisite initial conditions) deduce predictions which are
tested.
Chomsky and his followers repeatedly endorse the hypothetico-deductive
. . . . 141 . . .method m linguistics. Bloomfieldian linguistics, on the other hand,
followed so-called discovery procedures in formulating a grammar. In the
early 1950s a number thought it was only a matter of time before an effective 
142 . .procedure would be found. But Chomsky maintains that the corpus is
intelligible only once the grammar is given; this is conjectured, then 
tested against an extended version of the corpus. The opposition can be 
depicted as follows, where phonology, the least abstract component of the
grammar, is depicted as distinct from the rest
Bloomf ieldians !-
Discovery -' 
procedures^
Generative grammarians
“ -Validation
--procedures
Similarly, generative grammarians hold that the child must be born with means 
to form hypotheses about the grammar of its speech community.
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Chomsky is concerned above all else with syntactic structures. Thus
he has attacked even the methods of the Copenhagen School because they
. . . . 143involve the segmentation of a sentence into smaller units. He puts
further requirements on a grammer. A ’’descriptively adequate” grammar, 
in addition to generating the correct strings, assigns the correct syntactic
structural descriptions to sentences of the language; it thereby captures
. . . n 144"the linguistic intuitions of the native speaker . Furthermore, the
linguist - or (in Chomsky’s view) the child - formulates a grammar within 
a theory. And this theory should be applicable to any natural language,
resulting in a descriptively adequate grammar for that language. Such a
. . . . . . 145linguistic theory is attributed with "explanatory adequacy". Since
such a theory should be able to account for the intuitions of the native 
speaker of any natural language, a linguistic theory satisfying the
conditions of explanatory adequacy is held to be a hypothesis about the
. . . ... 146 .child’s innate linguistic competence. This is held to be an empirical
hypothesis, for generalizations are to be abstracted from particular
descriptively adequate grammars and incorporated into the linguistic theory
. . . 147meeting the conditions of explanatory adequacy.
The term "linguistically significant generalization" is frequently 
used by generative grammarians. The best known of such generalizations 
are transformations. If two sentences of different surface sturctutre are
paraphrases of each other, then we look for a transformation or set of 
transformations which would allow the two sentences to be assigned the 
same P-marker. Notice that transformations allow not only for an economy 
of particular P-markers, but also for an economy in the rules generating 
P-markers, and thus also in the symbols by which these rules are expressed. 
Again, transformations allow us to economise in stating co-occurrence
relations between lexical items. 148 In general, a principle of economy is
in force throughout a linguistic theory.
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Here again we can think of a lower bound - a linguistic theory which
does not capture the relevant linguistic data - and an upper bound - a
linguistic theory which presents as two different linguistic facts what
in another theory could be presented as a single linguistically significant 
. . 149 . .generalization. The more generalizations of this sort a theory contains,
the more it discriminates between acceptable and unacceptable forms. Again, 
these generalizations, although they reduce the number of symbols in the 
grammar, allow more information to be given in complex symbols for lexical
items.
The connection between linguistically significant generalizations and
. . . . 150the simplicity of the theory gives Chomsky a method of evaluating theories.
His suggestion is that alternative theories be evaluated by a "simplicity 
(or evaluation) metric" which gives greater value to a theory as that theory
requires fewer symbols (while still accounting for descriptively adequate 
, 151grammars) .
. 152Chomsky’s clearest presentation of a simplicity metric is in phonology.
But he also holds
that syntactic interpretation of an utterance may be a prerequisite 
to "hearing" its phonetic representation in detail, (and) rejects 
the assumption that speech perception requires a full analysis of 
phonetic form followed by a dull analysis of syntactic structure followed 
by a semantic interpretation, as well as the assumption that perceived
phonetic form is an accurate point-by-point representation of the
. , 153signal.
This makes manifest the extent to which Chomsky’s phonology is abstract.
A simplicity metric is supposed to be an empirical hypothesis about 
154the constraints on any possible human language - i.e. it concerns linguistic
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. . . 155umversals. So it formulates the competence of the child. It supplies
restrictions weighting the hypotheses the child presents about the language 
of its community.
However, the criteria of explanatory adequacy which go under the 
label "simplicity metric" involve the assumptions which were made to show 
the inadequacy of the cybernetic model of linguistic competence, i.e. 
that human linguistic competence can be portrayed by some sort of automaton 
and captured by some sort of rewriting grammar (augmented with other formal 
components). When competing hypotheses are formulated in these terms, some 
can be falsified, and one can converge on a pushdown storage automaton as 
a model of linguistic competence. But the assumption itself cannot be 
falsified - it is a suggestion to look at human language in a particular 
sort of way.
Chomsky, in fact, admist that to his knowledge structuralist linguistics
was never intended as a learning theory1^ (and he admits his debt to
. 157 . . .structuralism ). And he questions whether most behaviourist tendencies
can be regarded as varieties of empiricism, since th^eschew the mental 
158and explanatory adequacy. Indeed, Chomsky carries on the formal
159approach of the Bloomfieldians. This became linked with automaton
models conjectured to be instantiated in the C./MS; Chomsky strengthens
this link.
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On Chomsky’s view, there are two general sorts of restrictions on the 
formulation of a linguistic theory, and so on a grammar for a natural 
language formulated within that theory. Firstly, there is the simplicity 
metric and, secondly, there are the "intuitions of the native speaker" and, 
at a lower level, the linguistic corpus, both of which are said to be 
evidence which a grammar, formulated within the theory, "explains". We can 
get some notion of th^status of the simplicity metric by considering how 
a generative grammar "explains" the other constraint on it, viz. the evidence.
Now a linguist, if he is to formulate a grammar for a natural language, 
must understand that language to the extent that his grammar captures 
aspects of that langauge. With the condition that the grammar be descriptively 
adequate and capture the intuitions of the native speaker, the demands on 
the linguist’s competence in the language are very high indeed. But, then, 
in what sense are the intuitions and the supposed corpus gating as (empirical) 
evidence which demands explanation, or the further sentences in the language 
(in which the linguist is fluent) being predicted? (Generative grammarians 
invariably speak of the "predictions" which follow from rules they propose.)
We can compare the position of a linguist who formulates a descriptively 
adequate grammar with that of a mathematician who formalizes a branch of 
mathematics which has developed informally from the investigations of a 
number of other mathematicians. The mathematician in question must be 
competent in the field; he must be able to derive a significant number of 
the results for himself and he must share most of the intuitions of others 
working in the field. Yet we would hardly say that the results published 
in the field are (empirical) evidence for the formalized system; nor would 
we say that the results derivable from the system are predictions.
The analogy breaks down on one point. If what is derivable from the 
formalized mathematical system is a new result or disagrees with a previous 
result, the result is nonetheless of mathematical interest, for it shows 
what consequences there are of the axioms and rules of inference of the
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system. This might indicate that the system does not capture the field it 
was intended to capture; but, then, mathematics is creative. On the other 
hand, if the grammar counts as grammatical (ungrammatical) what by general 
use (including the linguist’s) is ungrammatical (grammatical), the grammar 
is of little interest. But this is because the whole intent of formulating 
the grammar was to capture the natural language. Linguists, when concerned 
with natural languages, are not meant to be creative in the way mathematicians
are.
The point I wish to emphasise has been made by Cave11: native, e.g., 
English speakers, "do not, in general, need evidence for what is said in the 
language; they are the source of the evidence".^0 v/e on occasion do need 
to be reminded of what we already know - Cavell makes this point in defence of 
the method of "Oxford philosophy". We can add that the average speaker must 
be taught specialist subjects (such as linguistics) to be able to use the 
terms of these subjects. Cavell points out the complementarity between 
statements and rules: what in one context is a statement conveying 
information about a state of affairs can be, in a context where no such 
information is called for, a way of showing how a word is to be used; 
ordinary use is normative.
If the linguist goes beyond a language in which he is fluent, he is
like a social scientist studying a culture or an aspect of a culture which
is beyond his normal sphere of activity, and so beyond his intuitive grasp.
In such a case, the linguist who is out to capture the native speaker's
intuitions' must develop those intuitions himself; so generative grammar 
6 2remains a non-empirical endeavour. Peter Winch has argued that the goal
of a social science (which linguistics is in many ways) is to understand, 
while that of a natural science is to explain. A natural science is a 
cultural endeavour with its own set of rules which a practitioner comes to 
follow on learning the discipline. Tls is true of a social science as well,
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but, in addition, its object of study is rule-governed. The objective of 
a social science is achieved when and only when it has made the activity 
governed by this further set of rules intelligible.
Granted that the linguist formulating a descriptively adequate grammar 
is like the mathematician systematizing a branch of mathematics, the only 
constraint added by generative grammar beyond the appeal for comprehensiveness 
and explicitness is supplied by the simplicity metric. Because of Chomsky’s 
abstract, syntax-oriented position on phonology, the only thing diirectly 
measured in a descriptively adequate grammar is the notational basis of the 
theory. The grammar translates, e.g., English into a language differing 
from it most notably in that it has auxiliary symbols and satisfies these 
artificial demands of simplicity.
Furthermore, the child and the linguist are on a par simply because 
the linguist translates the child’s linguistic feats into his own theoretical 
terms. Indeed, some generative grammarians speak of the intuitions of the 
native speaker of linguistics.163 In short, innatism is a methodological 
artifact of this approach. A reply of the sort that the psychological
164aspects of the thoery are testable externally, in the context of psychology, 
is unconvincing, because the same assumptions infect the relevant areas of 
psychology.
Generative grammarians’ talk about the hypothetico-deductive method, 
theoretical entities, and prediction adds the aura of the respectability of 
empirical science to a theory which cannot be empirical or explanatory or 
tell us about what is too small, large, or rapid to observe. The ridicule 
of operational tests is misplaced. Physics relies heavily on such tests, 
even though they do not define its more spectacular terms. The conventional 
(not conjectural) part of physics is at the level of operational tests, 
for the sortals involved in measurement are conventional. The equivalent
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sortals in generative grammar are what is measured by the simplicity metric. 
The methodology of physics allows the purely conventional element to be 
eliminated, since, e.g., ratios are independent of the unit of measurement. 
Generative grammar, on the other hand, seeks to capture the conventions of 
natural languages; it makes no sense to speak of measuring conventions, 
for the standards of exactness and simplicity are conventional. Generative 
grammar exaggerates these in translating languages into its own conventional
notation.
The component of generative or transformational grammar which has 
caused the most difficulty within the theory is semantics. On the other 
hand, a generally acceptable semantics would be the most desirable result 
from transformational grammar. For semantics is called upon, among other 
things, to account for valid inferences. Furthermore, the syntactic . 
component is closely connected with the semantic component, since the meanings 
of items depend on syntactic relations between their constituents and, 
conversely, the identification of syntactic constituents depends on semantic 
relations between sentences. If transformational grammar does reveal the
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structure of natural languages, then there is reason to think it would at 
least aid in revealing the logical form of natural languages. There is a 
further reason for considering the semantic component. This is because 
innatist claims are least reasonable with regard to semantics, since 
utterances relate to things beyond the speaker by virtue of being meaningful. 
Finally, a connection between transformational grammar and logic could 
jeopardize two important claims of the former. Firstly, if logic must 
rely on its own resources to capture the logical form of natural languages, 
then transformational grammar’s claim to present the semantics and, to a 
large extent, syntax of natural languages would be suspect. Secondly, if 
there is no reason to claim that a logical analysis uncovers innate structure,
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then any connection transformational grammar has with it would argue against
its own claims to reveal innate structure.
Quine sees logic and transformational grammar as two distinct specialist 
endeavours. He holds that "logical paraphrase" (avoiding the phrase "logical
analysis", which gives the misleading impression "that we are exposing a
. . . 165logical structure that lay hidden in the sentence all along". ) "may go 
one way or the other depending on one’s specific logical purpose".
Regarding grammars, "extensionally equivalent" ones are those which "determine,
. . . 167recursively, the same infinite set of well-formed (e.g.) English sentences". 
Quine maintains that the members of two linguistic communities who learn, 
e.g. English, from two extensionally equivalent but different (i.e. differing 
in structural analyses of strings) grammars would end up sounding the same.
I.e., their verbal behaviour would "fit" - conform to - both systems. Such 
168a fit, he continues, is all the linguist can be expected to attain. He
. . . . 169suggests that linguistic universals are imposed by translation and that
both deep structure and logical structure "are paraphrases that we resort
. . . 170 . .to for certain purposes of technical convenience" and differ "in 
detail and purpose".
Quine and Chomsky differ greatly in approach. Chomsky’s strength is
syntax, while Quine wishes to question semantic notions such as those of
synonymy and meaning. For Quine, thefacts end with "stimulus meaning" -
the circumstances evoking a characteristic utterance - while for Chomsky
meaning has bidlogical foundations. It is not apparent to me, however,
how Quine could answer Chomsky’s reply, pointing out that transformations 
172are structure-dependent. For, even if we disallow the notions of
synonymy and meaning, entailment relations - which any logical appraoch must 
take into account - are preserved systematically by certain transformations 
in specified circumstances.
Most philosophers have not been satisfied with Quine’s logical
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conservatism and transformational grammar was welcomed as an analytic tool 
to expose the logical structure of natural languages. However, transform­
ational grammar on its own has proven incapable of capturing the semantics
of natural languages, in particular, their inference patterns, hence logical 
173 .form. The Katz-Postal hypothesis, the ’’standard theory”, held that deep
structure (as described in Aspects) is the basis for semantic interpretation. 
But, for one thing, a context-free grammar is insufficient as a set of 
formation rules for the predicate calculus; in particular, it cannot give 
the required restrictions on the positioning of quantifiers. Again, the 
standard theory would allow the first of the following sentences to be
derived from the second.
Every man voted for'himself.
Every man voted for every man.
In response, the semantics has been modified in two ways. Firstly,
174"interpretive semantics", developed by Chomsky and others, does the
semantics on the surface and holds that there is no syntactic basis for
rejecting meaning-changing derivations, for they do not change grammaticality
Whether deviance is attributed to syntactic or semantic apsects cannot
be decided by the speaker’s intuitions, this position holds; it will,
rather, be determined by whatever theory is the simplest overall. The
second response is "generative semantics", which takes the semantic
component as generative and the syntactic component as interpretive. This
leaves the theory basically unchanged, for semantic representations are
labelled trees, and Chomsky claims it is imply equvalent to a grammar with 
, 175a generative syntax.
When transformational grammar is incorporated into a logical analysis 
of natural language, its semantics is replaced by or heavily supplemented 
by semantics developed in the tradition of Tarski for artificial languages.
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Semantics or theories of truth on the Tarskian model, since they are
explicitly concerned with inference or truth promulgation, on which logical
form depends, assign semantic structures to sentences which are identical 
17 6with their logical forms. It is maintained by Davidson and others
that transformation rules assign logical form or syntactic structure to
each sentence, for they allow cases previously intractable because of their
grammar to be rewritten in a form analysable in terms of the logic at hand.
But transformation rules, Davidson continues, belong to the domain of
grammar; so logic, grammar, and the theory of truth belong to a single 
177 178discipline, called the logic of grammar. Davidson adds that a logic
of natural language is verified primarily by deciding whether the arguments
it declares to be valid are all and only the arguments we deem to be valid.
179 . . . ...But, since a logic requires a grammar for its application and a theory 
of truth for its justification, we may also ask whether it satisfies 
intuition by using a suitable grammar and an acceptable theory of truth.
That is, what must agree with intuition is a total theory of truth, logic,
J 180 and grammar.
Tarski felt that his theory of truth was applicable to artificial 
languages alone. For he held that we cannot structurally specify sentences 
in natural languages. Again, he held that the possibility of the consistent 
use of the phrase ’’true sentence” in natural languages is questionable, because, 
if anything can be said, it can be said in a natural language, which suggests 
that the paradoxes of self-reference would arise.
The worry about self-reference was in part directed at such terms as 
"necessary”, since "it is necessary that p" can often be paraphrased as "p 
is true by virtue of the meanings of its constituent terms”, and "believe", 
since p in "A believes that p" shows much the same referential opacity as 
p in "A says that p". The formal objections to a semantics for modal logics
are overcome by extending the designation of terms to cover possible worlds. 182
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Yet general problems about the extension of logic to capture the form of 
referentially opaque clauses are not thereby solved.
Now generative grammar on its own has little to say about referentially 
opaque clauses. Self-embedding is the principal syntactic feature for 
Chomsky, but all embedded clauses (relative clauses, etc.) are treated 
similarly, or distinguished by different grammatical functions assigned
to an element which occurs outside the clause and in the base P-marker
for the clause. An analysis in the spirit of Tarskian semantics in which
opaque clauses are thought of as mentioned is foreign to transformational
grammar. So is the following analysis in the same tradition, due to 
183Davidson. The problem in, e.g., indirect discourse is that we assign
the familiar semantically significant structure, but the usual consequences 
do not follow. The solution is to analyse, e.g.
Galileo said that the earth is flat.
as
Galileo said that.
The earth is flat.
where "that" in the first sentence is a demonstrative referring to the second 
sentence. Thus the content sentence (or, better, utterance) can be assigned 
the usual structure because it is not contained in the sentence (utterance)
whose truth counts.
A part of the logic of natural languages about which transformational 
grammar has nothing to say on its own concerns the reference of indexical 
items - e.g. demonstrative and personal pronouns - and indexical aspects - 
e.g. tense, which cannot be determined wifftout knox/Ledge of the context of 
use. A commonly drawn distinction is between syntax, semantics, and 
pragmatics, which is concerned not only with expressions and their referents, 
but also with the users of expressions and their possible contexts of use,
132
and so with indexical expressions. Transformational grammar by its very 
nature ignores pragmatics, but the tendency within logic as adapted to 
natural languages has been for the border between semantics and pragmatics
to break down since truth conditions often depend on considerations in
. 184pragmatics.
If, inACollaboration of (Tarskian) semantics, logic, and grammar, so
little of the interesting work is doen by grammar, we must ask what
transformational grammar has to offer to a theory of logical form for
a natural language. Harman has incorporated analyses from transformational
grammar in a theory of logical form, but the interesting features are 
T85largely motivated by considerations from-outside grammar. Such projects
indicate that transformational grammar sometimes is suggestive for or 
supplies a convenient notation for the analysis of the logical form of 
natural languages. And, further, it clarifies intuitions by giving 
translations fem natural language into whatever analysis of logical form 
is justified by the version of (Tarskian) semantics one has at hand.
But the burden borne by transformational grammar is restricted in 
two ways. On the one hand, if the grammar is to do any work, there must 
be a translation of the natural language into the language of its grammar.
On the other hand, we must have the semantics first to know what transform­
ations are relevant to a logical analysis.
In opposition to Quine’s logical conservatism, we can allow for a 
complex structural analysis of sentences of natural languages to whatever 
degree is deemed necessary to permit the canonical notation to encode the 
information relevant to which sentences a given sentence is a consequence 
of and which sentences it has as consequences. Still, this is a specialist 
discipline; it attends to only some aspects of natural language. (It 
would be misleading, if not straightforwardly false, to say that it considers
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a distinct function of the organism.) The semantics of natural language
eschews psychological considerations. Davidson has argued’’"^ that we can 
have a clear notion of testing the correspondence of a theory with a speaker’s 
intuition only if we take deep structure to be logical form; this proposal, 
he points out, has the advantage that internalized structures play no direct 
role in testing the proposed logic. Yet he seems to hold that finding a 
semantics for a natural language is an empirical affair. But, by the same 
token, systematizing a branch of mathematics would be an empirical affair.
The logician is a native speaker (or near enough). The testing is not 
matching the consequences of the theory against waht is observed, but is 
like testing a mathematical generalization by applying it to specific
cases. More general formulations may be shown wrong in the light of more
particular cases; but this is because the latter were not taken into
account, which is not like observing them. ’'Intuition” here has no psychological
overtones.
What the semantics of natural language is concerned with in particular
is what is done in or with natural languages. Phonology is not of interest
to it. Rather, such things are drawing inferences, but also mentioning
187utterances or indicating contents and, further, speech acts in general
are the concern of the semantics of natural language. These are the sorts 
of things which physiology can tell us nothing about; rather, they are what 
we know how to do by virtue of the fact that we get by in a cultural 
environment, that we are subject to an objective structure. It takes a 
great deal of analysis - reflection, if we wish to call it that - to 
formulate the rules involved, which are tacitly followed. From the point 
of view of the language user, this is an abstraction; it does not say what 
goes on in him when sounds are produced or received.
Transformational grammar, on the other hand, is concerned with 
phonology, so (however distantly) with phonetics, with what goes on in the
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medium and, thence, with what transpires in the language user. It is a 
specialist concern different from the semantics of natural language. It 
attempts, however, to be all-embracing. But transformational grammar lacks 
the resources on its own to capture what we do which is of particular logical 
interest. In so far as it takes over the requisite resources and enters 
this domain, it is no longer concerned with biological activities, or with 
what might have an innate foundation.
It must now be admitted that a great deal of the most important aspects
of language are located "at the surface". And here context beyond the
language user (cf. especially indexical aspects) becomes critical. But 
188Chomsky does not see this as a threat to his innatist position, for 
everything is accounted for by some cognitive structure, presumably with 
an innate foundation. Modifications and idiosyncracies are presumably 
accounted for in terms of performance. Chomsky now considers it possible 
that the language faculty constructs a grammar only in conjunction with other 
mental faculties, so providing only an abstract framework. He considers 
it a reasonable hypothesis that there is an innate learning theory for
common-sense understanding and that this faculty shares a common stock with
. 189the semantic component of the language faculty. Although he admits that
his simplifying assumption that learning is instantaneous is obviously false, 
he holds that the assumption is still acceptable. For, since a grammar 
generates an infinite system of "potential experience", the input to a
learning theory at any stage of development can be considered as the grammar
. 190available at that stage.
It is critical for Chomsky’s position that only components which can 
be considered innate are involved in linguistic competence. For, once one 
component is allowed to depend essentially on the subject’s mastery of
conventional techniques, the language faculty would not simply be an abstract 
framework, but could be regarded as only a set of physiological initial 
constraints which are exploited and adapted as need be. Linguistic holism,
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for nativism to hold, must involve not only items of a certain component, 
but also all relevant components.
Vendler maintains that knowing what a word means involves mastery of 
191 . . .the whole language. And he thinks that this implies that a child must 
have native equipment encoding all the salient aspects of adult language -
the fundamental illocutionary, syntactic, and semantic features of any
. 192 .possible human language. Vendler considers the objection that it is 
sufficient for the child to have an initial crude grasp of the language 
which is developed by adding words. This is presented as a meaning-as-use 
position and Vendler sees Skinner here. Merely responding to stimuli, he 
replies, is not understanding. Furthermore, understanding is not acting.
Finally, acting upon someone’s words presupposes understanding what has
. 193been said.
Now understanding is involved in non-linguistic cases; e.g., we 
understand how the motor works, why the crops failed, etc. If Vendler is 
to rely on understanding which is not overtly reflected in the use of words, 
then he must admit that certain faculties other than that of language are 
innate. More significantly, we understand people's actions, their signifi­
cance, what they mean. But these actions could not properly be described 
without assuming certain circumstances and some relation between at least two 
persons. But how can the innate, e.g., speech-act forms take account of 
the other person? and the circumstances in which utterances are appropriate 
If we grant that there is native equipment accounting for our understanding, 
then we must ask for the equipment which brings this equipment into play 
in the proper circumstaices, and the equipment which brings this further 
equipment into play, and so on. Or we can keep understanding at the surface 
as the exercise of practical knowledge which one has gained through induction
into a culture.
When I understand a command to do something, I need not act. But, in
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thus disobeying the command, I must be able to act. Further, it is presupposed 
that I did act on something similar (leaving "similar” unspecific).
Otherwise there would be no reason to charge me with disobedience. We would
not say of someone that he understood an utterance unless we had reason 
to think that he could act like most people in similar (cultural) circumstances;
i.e. unless we had reason to think that he had been inducted into a culture.
With the vast majority of people we meet, this passes as a presumption.
Similar actions in similar circumstances suffice. A child’s initial
grasp of a language can be described (by adults) as crude. But it is improper 
to describe our progressive acquisition of a first language as the addition 
of words. Holism with regard to the individual’s culture-dependent 
capacities figures from the start. A child learns how to use the same
words in different sorts of circumstances and learns that the same sorts of
responses are appropriate in other sorts of circumstances. He also learns to 
make new distinctions with new phonemic types and new syntactic forms.
The acquisition of a language is a process both of expanding horizons and 
of drawing finer distinctions. The child's early expansions and distinctions 
depend on the fact that his immediate social group has the capacities in 
question and that his actions are evaluated as if he shares them.
We must insist on the fact that semantics involves gross, public 
behaviour, (overt) speech acts in particular. This makes implausible the 
view that semantics is biologically determined and that semantic interpret­
ation is covert. The complex symbols for lexical items are sometimes 
regarded as filled out so as to specify the meaning of -the item. This is 
supposedly accomplished by "semantic markers (features, components)" analogous 
to distinctive (phonetic) features. It is held that these markers form a
universal stock of human concepts, only some of which are realized in any
. 1^4 . 195
g.ven language. Such views usually concentrate on physical concepts.
Similarly, Vendler uses "concept" much as I have (having a concept, he holds,
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is potentially knowing the meaning of a word, and, in the case of nouns, 
knowing what a (sort of) thing is), but he adds that a concept is a lexical
item with the more significant co-occurrence restrictions already written
. 196 . . . .in. He circumvents arguments showing that language use is tied to
getting about in the world - describing, picking out, or producing things - 
with the counterexamples that I could not pick out molybdenum from a sample
of rare metals or tell a chiliagon from a 1001-sided figure, yet I know
. 1^7what these things are, and so what the corresponding nouns mean.
Yet some of our most important words, as I have argued, depend on 
picking out features of the behaviour of an organism, usually in an environ­
ment - e.g. ’’pain” and "fear”, not to mention "smile", "cry", and other words 
concerned with expressing, and "hide", "search", and other words referring 
to animal activities. I sometimes, e.g., hide and I sometimes truly state 
that I hide and also that someone else hides. But what guarantees that what 
I and others do is captured by the semantic marker interpreting what I 
say? Again, what would guarentee that the semantic marker would supply 
the proper interpretation when I say "I feel pain"? Is the same marker 
involved in shrieking? writhing?
Furthermore, to refer to certain culture-dependent activities, I 
must be*able to perform them. For example, I could hardly use "promise" 
unless I were capable of promising. Can I, then, promise only because I 
have the relevant semantic marker? Much of our moral vocabulary ("offend", 
"commend", "command", etc.) is similar, as is our vocabulary relating to 
simpler legal activities ("sue", "plea", etc.), although in these cases 
we may lack the esoteric knowledge (and the certificate) to carry out the 
actiity step-by-step. Indeed, the breakdown between the ability to use the 
word and to perform the activity occurs when the activity is esoteric. As 
the esoteric activity depends on the more common activities, so the ability 
to use the esoteric word depends on the ability to use the common word and 
perform the common activity.
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If, as we have argued, counting, classifying, etc. are culture-dependent 
activities and we could not use words referring to these basic activities 
unless we could perforin them, then, by a parallel argument, we can understand 
the esorteric terms for the activities of the scientist only because we can 
perform these basic, culture-dependent activities. But our ability to use 
words referring to number and dimensions of length, time, momentum, etc., 
as well as members of taxonomic divisions depends, at a basic level, on our 
ability to perform the relevant operations. So our ability to use more 
esoteric words for natural things (e.g. "molybdenum”) or words for more 
complex features (e.g. "chiliagon") or natural things depends on our ability 
to perform certain basic culture-dependent activities. How, conversely, 
could our ability to perform simple, culture-dependent activities (which 
may seem quite arbitrary from a more sophisticated point of view) depend on 
innate, biological semantic markers interpreting words in either mathematical
or taxonomic sciences?
One aspect involved in language which assuredly is biological is 
phonetics if only because speech sounds are made with identifiable patts 
of the body. But this aspect is innate only in the sense that any physiological 
structure and its functioning - e.g. the lungs and respiration - are innate. 
There is no more reason to hold that the child has the same phonetic knowledge 
as the linguist than that the child has the same knowledge as the pediatrician. 
It could not be generally true that whatever is required for knowledge must 
be innate - otherwise we could argue from the fact that I know that Fiji 
is in the Pacific to the fact that Fiji and the Pacific are innate in me.
The holistic character of the common stock of distinctive phonetic features, 
if it exhibits linguistic competence, exhibits that of the linguists who 
formulate and use the system. Generally, speech sounds are no more peculiarly 
linguistic than digital positions until we consider them as exploited.
Because of Chomsky’s abstract and syntax-oriented notion of phonology, 
his phonology is as closely related to syntax as it is to phonetics. And
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the general view is that syntax mediates between phonetics and semantics -
it relates sounds to meanings. What this shows, however, is that certain
rules of forming comparatively long phonetic strings (including breaks) are
more naturally exploited than others. (Phonological rules are like Gestalt
effects: both are exploited. Chomsky’s clearest examples of innate
principles are those governing the application of rules of intonation and 
198 . .stresss. ) Phonetic rules in general are not held to be universal in the 
sense that they must be exploited in any given language. The general 
principles governing the.applicability of phonological rules are of the 
same form as those governing syntactic rules. But this is hardly surprising 
when it is considered that the same formal apparatus is used in both 
phonology and syntax; similarly, both an alcohol molecule and the command 
structure in an army can be represented by tree graphs. In the present case, 
however, there is reason for using the same formal apparatus: syntax must 
link up with phonology. But this liaison shows how the sound structure is 
exploited. In addition, syntactic competence is a very small part of our 
knowledge in general and it seems more natural to attribute knowledge of 
syntax to the linguist, who formulates a simplicity metric, than to the 
child. Generally, ths synchronic linguistics of this century and even the 
diachronic linguistics of the last have concentrated on phonology and syntax 
and neglected semantics. This neglect is understandable, since a knowledge 
of semantics requires an understanding of the endeavours of thecultures 
which use the languages in question. Syntactic ability, on the otherhand, 
is relevant to knowledge only in so far as it allows natural sounds to be 
exploited so that semantics gets a hold.
It seems that the syntactic aspect which Chomsky relies on most - 
self-embedding - is so general beyond linguistic contexts that the fact 
that human languages exhibit it can be explained environmentally. Sampson
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has noted the ubiquity of self-embedding - in political structure^ where 
there are different levels of government or administration; in organisms
where semi-independent units such as cells go to make up other semi-independent
. . • 199 .units such as tissue, and so on; etc. Sampson also claims that self­
embedding is the only candidate for a linguistic universal which has not 
been questioned on empirical grounds.That this sort of structure is 
exploited is suggested by Martinet’s claim that the relazive clause construc­
tion is a relatively recent development in Indoeuropean languages and i-s... typical
of cultures which witness frequent innovations. His explanation for the
. . . 201 use of this structure is that it affords new referring expressions.
Davidson, in his analysis of referentially opaque clauses presented above, 
points out that "that” in the context in, question was origarally a demonstr­
ative pronoun referring to the statement in, e.g., indirect speech which 
has become incorporated into the "that" clause. This move seems to have 
been commonly made in Indoeuropean languages and other languages, such as
Finnish.
In language acquisition, an account in terms of exploitation rather
than biologically grounded tacit knowledge is in place. Empirical studies
show that initially not only the child, but also his elders are little 
. . . , 202sensitive to the child’s syntax. What is important is the speech act
performed and the circumstances of its performance. Despite the predilection 
of generative grammarians for statements, questions and commands have the 
major part in the very early stages of language learning and psycholinguistics 
has increasingly turned in this direction. The generative grammarian’s reply 
would be that the utterance, to count as English, would have to approximate 
the syntactic structure of English in a significant way, not just in a 
generalized way. But this is false. It is not always clear, nor need it be,
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that the utterance of an isolated word is an elliptical speech act or
whether it is a simple linguistic exercise similar to numbering or
203attaching labels. One can often not say what speech act the child "intended”, 
nor need one. What is important for language acquisition is how the 
utteraice is taken. And one need not always be able to say what larger 
linguistic context the utterance is placed in, which would allow the 
ellipsis to be expanded into a grammatical sentence.
The child is not only presented with a linguistic corpus, which, as 
Chomsky points out, is small by certain criteria. But - and Chomsky never 
mentions this - he also presents a corpus (however imperfectly formed) to 
his elders. The linguistic structure presupposed in language acquisition 
is x?hat we have called an objective structure; it is not biological nor 
in the child. Further, thepresence of this structure accounts for tacit 
linguistic knowledge. The elders do not have the problem of determining 
the grammatical rules which the child follows, for the child’s corpus is a 
part, albeit a very imperfect part, of the on-going corpus of the language
as a whole.
The child’s behaviour is assessed in its induction into a culture.
This is evaluated largely in terms of what is done; hence the importance 
of the speech act and the relative unimportance of syntax initially. What 
we have called transitive acts of cognition - e.g. picking out things in re - 
allow what is done linguistically to be of general importance, rather than 
simply a potentially elegant form of behaviour which might have aesthetic 
or ritual importance. Intransitive acts initially would be simply forming 
syntactically correct sentences, syntactically assessing those uttered by 
others, using the form of speech act appropriate in the linguistic context, 
and evaluating others’ speech acts on the same grounds. If we could perform 
these alone, not much more could be said about what we do than could be said
about, e.g., the courtship rituals of birds. Once we have learned how to 
do things linguistically, we can carry on with what I have called intransitive
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self-teaching, which covers both what Chomsky calls the intuitions of the 
native speaker and the formulation of a grammar by the linguist to capture 
these intuitions; syntactic analysis, however, is a small part of this 
compared with what falls under the heading "semantics”. (E.g. arithmetic 
is applicable to all sorts of things; syntax, only to human speech.)
Indeed, the syntax cannot be analysed without a grasp of the semantics, for 
the evidence for transformations depends on semantic relations.
This points back to the point made earlier, that linguistics, as it 
concerns knowledge and not sounds and the reactions they naturally elicit, 
cannot be an empirical science on a par with the physical sciences. For, 
when meaning is involved, linguistics formulates our knowledge and does not 
predict or empirically explain what utterances are acceptable. The point 
can be put more generally by saying that cognition is "explained" by 
giving the criterion of success, which is a cultural rule or norm shared 
by the members of the culture or specialist discipline. This point is of 
more general interest because of psychologists’ claim (encouraged to a
considerable extent by Chomsky’s work) that automaton models analyse what
the human must do; as this is not displayed in gross behaviour, it is
thought that it must take place in the CNS. Yet there is in any culture a
common stock of everyday knowledge and cognitive concepts applying to gross 
behaviour, which is ignored by such projects.
When the everyday concepts are ignored, and the translations attributing
cognition to subcortical processes take over, comments such as the following
by Miller result. Writing about human recoding of "information", he states
that the search "for ways to map a strange, new phenomenon into simpler and
more familiar ones" "is something we call ’thinking’; if we are successful,
20 Awe call it 'understanding’ ", Other famous examples include "explaining"
remembering (occurrence) as retrieving information from a memory unit. But 
when I remember my case, I retrieve it from the shelf, not a bit of information 
from my brain. My public action cannot be explained by an internal action of
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retrieving an internal case against which the public action is matched.
For the duplication of the action asks for a further explanation.
The claim is that the automaton is a model of some aspect of an 
animal’s behaviour and that the competence is internalized. Concerning 
automaton models of human cognition, a distinction is now normally drawn
between the hardware, which is not shared by the man and the machine, and
. . . 205the software describing the actions common to both. The hardware of
the human is the CNS and perhaps other systems; the hardware of the auto­
maton is the circuitry of the processing component, the memory tape of the 
storage component, etc. Within the software, a distinction is drawn
2 06between two further levels: the executive programme and subroutines.
It is claimed that, within these three levels, the functioning of the lower 
level does not explain the functioning of a higher level. For the 
executive programme could have used different subroutines to obtain the 
same result; and the subroutine is realized either by neural synapses or
circuit activations.
But, if cognition is indeed internal, the neural synapses and the 
circuit activations simply are performances of the subroutines. And the 
execution of certain subroutines is one way of carrying out the executive 
programme. This account is still a story of what the hardware does, although 
the materials and arrangement of the hardware is not the interesting part 
of the story.
. . 207 .J.A. Fodor maintains that psychologists who "characterize the 
etiology of behavior in terms of a series of transformations of information ... 
(, where) the neural event which encodes it is one of the causal determinants 
of the behavior of the organism" are not "committed ’to redrawing the logical 
geography’ of our ordinary mental concepts". They are only after psychological 
distinctions. "The natural kinds, for purposes of theory construction, appear 
to include some things that the organism does, some things that happen in 
the nervous system of the organism, and some thing's that happen in
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its environment". It makes no difference that "the states of the organism 
postulated in theories of cognition would not count as states of the organism 
for purposes of, say, a theory of legal or moral responsibility".
It is not evident why happenings in the environment or the CNS should 
be thought to be constituents of cognition. They enter into an account of 
what is exploited in cognition, but our ordinary cognitive concepts refer 
to persons; we are interested in what the person does or can do. It might 
be replied that cognitive psychology is interested in such things as 
seeing, which is not a sort of action. But the same comment is in place 
here as was made with regard to understanding: we have no reason to hold 
that a person sees the thing in question unless we have reason to think 
that he could act appropriately, which involves a presumption that he has 
acted appropriately in circumstances similar in some way to the present.
A rejoinder might be that we could have a law that no one is to look upon 
object A, but not that no one is to see A, for seeing is not something we 
do. This is true, but as a reply it ignores the "logical geography" of 
our ordinary concepts. In the case in question, we would arrest persons 
who have seen A. If someone looks upon A, then he has picked out, seen A, 
knows what A is, and has some understanding of the significance of A; 
otherwise we might as well arrest gnats. Ordinary cognitive concepts are 
not only sufficient to account for human cognition, they also are necessary 
for it. More esoteric concepts supplement, but do not replace them. It 
is indicative of the subtlety of ordinary cognitive concepts that, while 
they all involve the actions of a person, many make no direct reference to 
these actions.
As opposed to the metaphorical extension of everyday concepts to 
automaton functions and the projected re-application of technical terms to 
components of the human anatomy, factor analysis presents a less ambitious
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and more empirical appraoch. Factor analysis finds "significant dimensions"
its purpose "is to find a new set of variables, fewer in number than the
original variables, which express that which is common among the original 
208variables". The new, independent variables, when used as experimental
variables, give more significant data. In everyday life, we assume that
there is one factor for each word used to refer to personal attitudes,
abilities, etc. But factor analysis shows, e.g., that there are two
independent dimensions covered by "group morale" and seven covered by 
„ 209depression .
What do such findings tell us about cognitive concepts? No new things 
are found; although we say that someone feels depression, this is not like 
feeling the chair against one’s back. The fact that seven independent 
factors are picked out under "depression" indicates that correlations 
with other emotional states, activities, etc. can be grouped in seven 
different ways - it says something about how people act, how their actions, 
dispositions to act, etc. relate to one another. Furthermore, talk of the
dimensions which are measured must include at least a tacit reference to
people, their characteristic activities, etc.; on the other hand, one can 
refer to orthogonal distances independently and without any assumption 
about what "fills" the distance, picking out only the end points. Again, 
these findings do not do away with common-sense knowledge and concepts.
When it is said that there are two independent factors govered by "group 
morale’,' we can ask why "group morale" covers both. Factor analysis might
tell us that there is a correlation between mathematical and musical
abilities, but it cannot tell us what mathematics and music are or what
it is to exercise these abilities.
This points to a dilemma for the person who wishes to explain human 
cognition - let us call him the "psychologist", the scare quotes indicating 
that he might not be engaged in the academic discipline called psychology. 
Now the "psychologist’s" investigation must be guided by the cognitive
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210 . . . concepts we already have. "Psychology" indulges little in concept
formation; concept formation, on the other hand, is typical of the natural 
sciences, where it allows simple and powerful explanations of familiar 
phenomena. Psychology (more broadly) can show, e.g., what conditions are 
conducive to the development or exercise of knowledge or what sorts of 
physiological and behavioural traits are exploited by homo sapiens. But 
this does not tell us what knowledge is, what we in fact know, or what 
goes on to constitute cognition. The point can be made if we widen what
Popper c-alls the principle of transference: "what is true in logic is true 
. 211 . .in psychology". What is true in logic can be found only by doing logic;
and why it is true can be explained only in logic. If a psychologist 
investigates, e.g., the frequency of self-contradiction, he must know what 
a contradiction is. Again, Popper refutes historicism as follows. A good 
deal of history concerns the acquisition of knowledge. We could not predict 
this acquisition in advance, for then we would have to know what by 
hypothesis is not known until later. So the general thesis that the develop­
ment of history can be predicted is false. Similarly, the thesis that by
knowing how underlying factors cause cognition allows us to explain
. • • 212 cognition is false, for these factors would then already be the cognition.
We can allow "psychology" and psychology to develop their own jargon
and hence their own concepts applicable in a limited domain presupposing 
213 .everyday concepts. There are even cases of psychological concepts entering
the vernacular - those of intelligence and motivation and a number of 
Freudconcepts. But their entrance is a gradual process and relies 
heavily on the previous concepts and endeavours of the community at large.
Physics can formulate new concepts and apply them in such a way as to
eupLain familiar phenomena in unfamiliar terms and as not to prejudice the 
data, because it has a correspondence principle. According to this principle, 
a theory or law which replaces a less satisfactory or refuted theory or law
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in a particular domain must explain all that the replaced theory or law
(apparently or almost) explained. This is often done by showing that the
. . . . 214old theory is a limiting case of the new theory. Theories such as
statistical thermodynamics do not replace the nucleus of common-sense 
knowledge and concepts about, e.g,, heat, disorder, etc., but rather give 
a more accurate and theoretically fruitful way of accounting for the facts.
The theoretical endeavour itself is in part constrained by the common^sense 
knowledge and concepts it goes beyond.
The task of the natural sciences is not to replace our everyday concepts; 
these concepts perform a central function in human life. They are at 
the centre of the objective structure; the concepts of theoretical disciplines 
develop from this nucleus and eventually gain a large degree of independence. 
Everyday concepts are certified by millenia of use. Those of scientific 
disciplines undergo certification in an explicit and rigorous manner in a 
much shorter time. Everyday concepts are generally not fit for the sort 
of exactness and explicit theoretical fruitfulness demanded by organized 
scientific enquiry; yet, unlike scientific concepts which have proven 
unfruitful, they cannot be dropped without altering our way of life. One 
task of natural science is to establish what I have called extensional
identities between everyday concepts and its own concepts. Positions such 
as Eddington’s on the two tables, which maintain disparate ontological 
commitments for everyday and scientific concepts?have been criticized rightly 
for explaining away what they intend to explain. The extensional identities 
referred to maintain a link between our everyday activity and scientific 
research, between common and esoteric knowledge, and allow one part of the 
society to repay the support given by the society at large.
As concerns cognitive concepts, there are no dimensions relating every­
day concepts and knowledge with esoteric concepts and knowledge which could 
be formulated in psychological research such that the first are the limiting
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cases of the second. People are neither small societies nor large organs.
While an organ may figure in a relevant reply to the question "How do you 
know?”, our knowledge is not allotted to various parts of our body, nor do 
the parts communicate information to a central store. Similarly, while we 
learn much of our knowledge from individuals engaged in disparate specialist 
disciplines, our cognition is not like the resolution of a think-tank.
Even the formulation of the problem of psychological realism is mis­
leading, There appears to be a tacit assumption that a field of empirical 
inquiry, to show that it is concerned with real things, must show that it 
has its own objects independently of human investigation; or, failing this, 
that its laws are independently motivated and refer to objects which eventually 
admit a reduction to physical states. But our cognitive concepts are 
applied to animate things because of the behaviour they exhibit in certain 
circumstances or because there is reason to think they have come to be 
capable of such behaviour in such circumstances. Neither the behaviour nor
the circumstances are describable in terms which could be paraphrased in the 
. 215language of physics. And some of the clearest cases of behaviour and the
circumstances to which it is relevant are culturally determined.
Chomsky has had ample opportunity to consider objections similar to 
those we have levelled. His replies fall into three categories, none of 
them completely satisfactory. He either sees his opponent as a Skinnerian 
behaviourist, or re-asserts a realist position based on his autmoaton 
model (usually somewhat disguised), or picks a weak point in presentations 
of the theory of speech acts. Chomsky admits that he considers the most 
careful work in the theory of speech acts as a reversion to behaviourism 
despite very explicit denials by its adherents. He even sees Wittgenstein
as Skinner, but never mentions the extent to which behaviour is underdetermined 
by natural environmental factors for Wittgenstein; he never mentions
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217 He objects to Quine's behaviourismfamily resemblances or cultural aspects.' 
with more justice.
For Quine as well, verbal behaviour is underdetermined by environmental 
factors; this leads to his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation.
Chomsky sees this (and particularly Quine’s position that extensionally 
equivalent grammars fit verbal behaviour equally well) as unscientific:
218physical theories as well are underdetermined by the evidence, he states,
but we do not abandon realism in their case. Quine sees nothing wrong with
empiricism admitting innate biases and quality spaces; Chomsky finds this 
... . 219 .position incomprehensible. Against the object that the regularities
the linguist observes in the subject’s speech are regularities true of what 
the subject knows and not regularities ke knows, Chomsky asserts that the
knowledge is unconscious; he assumes that tacit knowledge must be an internal
. 220 structure (grammar) in accordance with the realist practices of science.
He considers the objection that knowing a language is a case of "knowing
how" analogous to the skill of a bicycle rider. His reply is that such a 
221framework is too "impoverished”. Another objection (of the pattern we
rely on considerably) is that the assumption that the child can learn a
language because he knows a more basic language leads either to a vicious
circle or an infinite regress. Chomsky denies this consequence of assuming
that in language use "the user employs an internally represented grammar.
We can easily construct a model (say?a computer program) that functions in 
. 222this way". In all these cases, Chomsky secures his position to scientific
realism.
Chomsky considers the objection that any attempt to present sentences
as abstract objects produced and understood independently of their role 
. . . . . • 223m communication is either circular or inadequate. The way out of this
dilemma, the objection continues, is to identify semantic competence with 
the ability to perform and understand speech acts. UnfortunateLy, this 
objection is connected with the formulation that (in the words of Searle)
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making a statement to the effect that the flower is red consists in 
performing an action with the intention of producing in the hearer 
the belief that the speaker is committed to the existence of a certain
state of affairs as determined by the semantic rules attaching to
v 224the sentence.
Other speech-act theorists considered by Chomsky also state their positions
. . . 225m terms of what the speaker intends the audience to believe or to do.
Chomsky has a very simple and effective reply: there are cases in which lang 
uage is not used for communication and this theory does not account for them.
However, Chomsky cannot escape from the original insights which brought 
language use into focus. The question of intention comes in when we consider 
the performance of a speech act in the presence of an audience, but without 
the usual conversational implications. For intention is brought up to 
account for cases in which an action lacks the usual implications. Secondly, 
when a person utters a string of sounds without an audience, there is no 
reason to hold that he is not simply engaged, e.g., in ritual behaviour 
unless there is some presumption that he has previously engaged in communi­
cation. On the other hand, if we allow soliloquy to be primary - and there 
is no reason in Chomsky’s theory why it could not be - then we are left with 
the question how the speaker ever becomes capable of communicating. The same 
problems beset the role given in the hearer to belief. For there is no 
reason to think the person has the relevant belief unless there is a presump­
tion that he has acted appropriately before in a communicative situation.
And if belief is held to be conceptually prior to action, we are left to 
account for how it gives rise to action.
Chomsky has not worked out the implications and details of his 
position as thoroughly as some of his followers. In fact, the notion 
of man as a biological machine is not peculiar to generative grammarians.
The philosopher, D.M. Armstrong seeshis work, directed to philosophers, 
as defending those psychologists who
226
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. . . . 227identify mind and brain. A follower of Chomsky, the (psycho-)linguist
J.A. Fodor, claims to do speculative psychology which presents a theory of
mind which both extrapolates from available psychological theories andhopes
to be philosophically respectable; the psychology he takes views mental 
228processes as computational processes. Both lack proper concepts of
persons and their behaviour. Furthermore, on the account given by either, 
it is impossible to consistently draw a distinction between what is mechanical, 
biological, and cultural. Finally, both rely heavily on the notion of
belief and on the notion that belief causes behaviour. This they share with
. . . 229Chomsky, who at times maintains that what is innate is a system of beliefs; 
othertimes he compares thehypotheses formulated by the linguist to those
formulated by the child, weighted by his innate competence and referred
„ k i 230to as beliefs.
Armstrong holds that, as a matter of contingent fact, mental states
. . . 231are identical with purely physical states of the CNS. Concepts of a
person and his behaviour are ignored, so much so that he holds that disemb­
odied existence of mental states or experiences (bound together as the mind)
. . . . 232 . .is a conceptual possibility. The CNS is a locus for cognitive dispositions
Furthermore
Dispositions are seen to be states that actually stand behind their 
manifestiations. It is simply that the states are identified in 
terms of their manifestations in suitable conditions, rather than in 
terms of their intrinsic nature. ... talking about the mind, we (are) 
committed to talking about inner states of the person. ... To admit 
dispositions as states lying behind, and in suitable circumstances
giving rise to, behaviour is to contradict the whole programme (of
. . 234behaviourism).
233 z
The dispositions which are of particular interest are beliefs.
. . 235Perceptual beliefs are held to account for selective behaviour and
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perception is the continuous mapping of what goes on in our environment or 
236 The distinction between cultural (linguistic in particular) andboyd.
natural breaks down for beliefs. 237 So does the distinction between animate
and mechanical; purposive behaviour is explicated by analogy with a homing 
238rocket with a feedback device to correct vacissitudes in its course.
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noticed only later.
Knowledge is accounted for in terms of beliefs and their causes.
Since perceptions are states of the CNS, there is no need for them to be
conscious, so they may come in a great flood of detail, and may even be 
240 Introspection is a ’’self-scanning process of the
242. 241 .brain” which may be erroneous and does not reveal all mental states.
Finally, since we are born with our CNS, we should expect Armstrong to hold
. . 243that certain cognitive aspects are innate, as he does.
With the behaviour which is usually associated with persons in their 
circumstances explained away, the question arises of a criterion for the 
application of our mental vocabulary. Armstrong claims that we could determine 
whether animals (or men) have beliefs or mental images by correlating our 
introspective reports with idiosyncratic neurophysiological processes, the
occurrence of which in animals would be "compelling evidence" that they too
. 244have beliefs and mental images.
I shall defer criticism, and move to Fodoer’s position, which in many 
respects is a sophistication of Armstrong’s. Armstrong to a large extent 
explains away even the psychology he intends to defend. His generalizations 
could largely be in terms of neurological or even physical states. But what 
we want are psychologically significant generalizations with their own 
vocabulary; we could then attempt to correlate physical and psychological 
states. Fodor rejects psychological-physical reductionism, since general­
izations are captured differently by physics and psychology, so both must 
have their own taxonomies. What he allows instead is a "token physicalism" - 
i.e. any psychological occurrence is identical with some occurrence
describable by terms from physics alone. 245
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Fodor wishes to explain overt behaviour in terms of belief such that
an act "is the consequence of computations defined over representations of
. . 246 . . .possible actions". He presents a model for decision on behaviour, which,
being linguistic, invovles an infinite number of distinct representations
. . 247and involves semantic properties such as truth and reference. The
model is in terms of the beliefs the agent has of the behavioural options
open to him in a particular situation and the weighting he assigns to the
, v <- • 248consequences of each option.
The fact that this "langugae of thought" is innate is said to be
. 249confirmed, firstly, by considering "concept learning", i.e. learning which 
involves hypothesis formation and confirmation. The hypotheses are weighted 
by a simplicity metric which takes into account the way the organism
represents its hypotheses. So the organism (like the scientist postulating
hypotheses in the organism to explain its observed behaviour) must, Fodor
concludes, have a representational system.
The innateness of the language of thought is confirmed, secondly, from 
250the nature of perception. Fodor claims that a psychological analysis of
perception must recognise that perception, too, involves hypotheses
formation. But there is also "the computational problem in perception
integration", for theorganism must "infer the appropriate task-relevant
description of the environment from its physical description together with
whatever background information about the structure of the environment it
has available"; so it must choose "the best hypothesis about the distal 
. 251source of proximal stimulations". A typical case is the analysis of a
token of a sentence (the nature of the distal source does not, apparently, 
matter) on acoustic, phonological, morphological, and syntactic levels.
Mappings from the output of sensory mechanisms to the language of 
thought over which computational routines are defined require transducers.
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. . . . 252The visual system interpreting Gestalt effects is one such transducer.
People differ from machines, he claims, in that they have more sensors and
they learn one of their compilers (transducers), the language they
. 253internalize.
To defend the linguistic status of the language of thought, Fodor 
attempts to show how the relation between linguistic forms and propositional 
attitudes (not only believing, but also fearing, wanting, intending, learning,
and perceiving that p) can be mediated by something other than public
• • v i • 254convention, viz. by nomological necessity.
We shall concentrate on a few of the major assumptions shared by
Fodor and Armstrong. In particular, both rest their accounts on the notion
. . . . . 255 .of belief as a disposition in the CNS which causes overt behaviour. And 
both rely on a private language of the sort described by Fodor.
Fodor maintains that an organism 0 believes that p (formulated in the 
internal representational - private - language) when
i) 0, in situation S, is in a computational relation to ”p" 
corresponding to a sort of behaviour Ik, and
ii) 0 has chosen to perform Ik as opposed to other options in S by 
weighting the consequences of performing Ik and the other options
in S.
One sort of behaviour is uttering ”p”, which is true or false as the belief 
that p is true or false. Since 0’s weighting or computations could be 
erroneous, it is always possible that the utterance of "p” is false; indeed,
all utterances 0 ever makes could be false.
Fodor admits just this, but adds that it does not jeopardize the 
coherence of any language.
... even in the case of public languages, coherence doesn’t require
a stable relation between the way the terms are used and the way the
world is: What it requires is a stable relation between the way the 
256terms are used and the way the speaker believes the world to be.
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Beliefs must have something to do with events or actions which go 
beyond language and linguamorphic activities. If not, they are idly posited. 
Now, with the exception of speech acts and other acts interpreted according 
to norms, principles, etc., what we do cannot be inconsistent. So inconsistent 
beliefs are shown up when they are implemented - we know then that at least 
one is false. Even if we allow a neurological criterion for attributing 
beliefs, there is still a condition of consistency. For it is up to the 
neurologist to insure the consistency of his descriptions of the neurological 
states, which would be the manifestations of these purported beliefs.
But if all beliefs could be false, any sequence of beliefs might be 
inconsistent. And, since a sequence of beliefs is, when formulated, 
itself a belief, and any belief can be analysed as a conjunction of two 
or more beliefs, the beliefs themselves might be incoherent.
What Fodor does is move the problem back one step. What was a problem 
about the consistent use of terms, their application to situations, and 
the truth or falsity of tokens of sentences now becomes a poblem about the 
consistent implementation and truth and falsity of beliefs. If there is a 
language of thought and it is relevant to our relation to our environment, 
then it as well must be used. Furthermore, if we are to talk about true and 
false beliefs, as is generally assumed (although we might talk about approp­
riate and inappropriate beliefs as we do about behaviour), then it seems 
we must allow that belief is linguamorphic, since truth and falsity are 
semantic properties.
If we must choose as to conceptual priority between (public, conventional) 
language and belief, it seems that we must choose the former. For the 
implementation of belief in general does not explain language use in general, 
while we can think of the silent implementation of belief as a surrogate for 
uttering and acting according to what is said (which has a long tradition).
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Furthermore, sentences and their uttered tokens have a syntax; but the only
temptation to assign syntax to beliefs is due to remote theoretical consider­
. 257ations.
Finally, we learn how to speak and we can given an account of this; but 
we do not say that we learn how to believe. This linguistic fact does not 
licence the conclusions that we know how to believe from birth, for "know 
how to believe” is not English. We are said to know how to do something, 
but not to believe how to do it. This, in conjunction with what we have said 
about the connection between practical, essential, and propositional knowledge 
in Chapter I, suggests that knowing how, or practical knowledge is presupposed 
by belief. Indeed, purported expressions of belief concerned with a certain 
discipline are ignored as somehow out of place when expressed by someone with 
no practical knowledge in the discipline. We expect an answer to ”Why do you 
believe ...?" (the common reply to a belief-expression, as "How do you know...?” 
is the common reply to a knowledge-claim) to be answered by exercising one’s 
knowledge relevant to the endeavour in which the expression of belief occurs.
Fodor does think that the regress from natural language to the language 
of thoughfaccomplishes something. We are asked to consider computers.
These use an input / output language to "communicate” with the environment
and a distinct, internal machine language to "talk to themselves" (i.e.
■ • 259compute). Compilers (i.e. transducers) mediate between the two.
But this says nothing at all about how belief is to do its job or even 
why the input to the compiler is relevant to the organism or to the environ­
ment. Furthermore, if engineering principles work as truth definitions, we 
could call truth definitions the principles by which a machine sorts gravel 
into pieces two inches or less in diameter (called true) and larger pieces 
(called false).
Fodor, although he holds he is exempt from Wittgenstein’s private language 
260argument because neurological events are public, feels that the argument
has some relevance to his position, as it most certainly has. He states that the
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argument is unacceptably verificationalist, for it shows at most that unless 
there are public procedures for telling whether a term is coherently applied, 
there will be no way of knowing whether it is coherently applied. But it 
does not follow, he adds, that there is no difference between applying the 
term coherently and applying it at random.
But the point of Wittgenstein’s private language argument is that if 
there is no way I could use a term incorrectly, I could not use it 
correctly. For example, if I attend to a sensation and pronounce "S",
I have not established a connection beteeen the use of "S" and the occurrenc
of the sensation. For "correctly”, when applied to my subsequent utterances 
of "S" means "consistently with my own definition". But there is no 
difference between having used "S" consistently with my own defintion and
seeming to have. 262 I cannot justify what seems to be a consistent use by
appeal to another sensation; this would be like buying several copies of
the paper to see whether what is in it is true. 263 Memory impressions cannot
help, because the claim to revive the sensation in question is just as in
need ofjustification. 264 But if the distinction between correct and incorrect
has disappeared, so has the concept correct. So'tules" in my private language 
are only impressions of rules. And the proof that I am following a rule
must appeal to something independent of my impression that I am.
Fodor’s objection relies on unsupportable distinctions between applying 
a term, coherently applying a term, and knowing that the term is coherently 
applied. He again thinks in terms of believing that the term applies and 
this blinds him to the connection between being able to apply the term, e.g., 
"A" and knowing what (an) A is. If all "applications" were incorrect or 
incoherent, there would be no sense in talking about applications. The 
criterion for the application of a term is the same as the criterion for the 
correct application of the term. Dropping a handful of name-tags onto a 
crowd at a convention does not count as randomly naming or misnaming the 
individuals. There can be incorrect applications of a term only if the term
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is used in a principled way so that certain cases would violate the princple. 
What a principled use requires is that some explanation can be given for 
its misuses - e.g. that the user was tired, that the sun got in his eyes, 
that he is prone to Spoonerisms, etc. We can say how a person has learned 
to apply a term and how he knows that the term ”A” applies to a certain A.
But what we cannot explain, because any "explanation” finishes where it 
started, is why a person, given that he is an English speaker, applies, e.g.,
the term "chicken" to chickens or refers to chickens as chickens.
Furthermore, applying the term "A" in a principled way is simply knowing 
what ^.n) A is. And if I know what (an) A is and can apply the term "A", then 
I can generally tell when someone has incorectly applied "A" or when he 
applies it (a number of times) incoherently. If I could not, then I could 
not apply "A" myself. I can also be shown when I have misapplied "A"; if 
there were no way of explaining to me my "misapplications", they would not 
be applications at all.
One sort of explanation for the incorrect application of a term refers 
to the beliefs of the speaker. E.g. Fred sees the apples on a tree otherwise 
hidden by a nearer plum tree, and, believing the apples are on the plum tree, 
refers to it as "the apple tree". We can give explanations of consistent 
misapplications of a term by bringing in false belief. E.g., Fred, convinced 
that apples come from the sort of tree others call a plum, henceforth 
applies "apple tree" to this sort of tree.
But consistent misapplications of terms presuppose that one can give 
an explanation. This in turn supposes that the person in question can 
(correctly) apply terms, that is, that some uses of his terms do not ask 
for an explanation. And this is to say that the person knows how to use, e.g.jj 
English. Consistent "misapplications" of the majority of terms by a society 
is not misapplication, but (correct) linguistic performance. Similarly, an 
individual's implementation of any consistent set of "beliefs" is the exercise
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of a competence; any other set of '’beliefs” would do as well, for the 
question of their truth does not arise. I conclude again that knowing how 
is conceptually prior to believing (that).
At first glance, it is surprising that Chomsky is willing to 
characterize innate competence in terms of having a set of beliefs. This 
becomes understandable, however, when it is realized that the competence 
in question involves primarily propositional knowledge and only secondarily 
practical knowledge, and, further, that the beliefs are really hypotheses.
But, firstly, there is a difference between hypotheses or conjectures 
and beliefs. Chomsky thinks of the child as a linguist conjecturing a 
grammar for a newly discovered language. But it is perfectly intelligible 
to frame a hypothesis and add that you do not believe it is true. It might 
be the only candidate in the present circumstances, or it might be presented 
for the sake of argument, or framed to test a vague intuition. Furthermore, 
beliefs are expressed, not framed.
Secondly, the sorts of propositions or rules or structure which Chomsky 
postulates as innate suffer from much the same defects as Fodor’s model for 
decision on behaviour as an explanation of human performance. For they do 
not explain how we know how to use language, because we must ask how the 
structure is used. Again, the rules function in such a way that the person 
said to have them cannot make an error. But then there is no reason to say 
he correctly follows them. In "following” these "rules” he would be like a 
machine incorporating principles to sort gravel into two sizes. There can 
be malfunctions, but not errors. Following a set of rules or having a 
competence is not functioning in a way determined by these rules.
Fodor asserts - and it is implied by Armstrong's position - that a 
convention depends on the, parties having the same beliefs - a convention is 
a coincidence of beliefs. But this explains conventions in terms of what
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depends on conventions. For cultural endeavours are possible only because 
there are conventions, and beliefs relating to these endeavours depend on
them.
We have rejected the central role given to belief by Armstrong and 
Fodor and also Chomsky. In these accounts, belief is something standing 
behind overt performance. We thus have further support for our view that an 
account of' human cognition is primarily concerned with overt behaviour and 
the circumstances in which it occurs described in a way relevant to it.
This also supports the view that human cognitive concepts are tied to the 
notion of a person.
Another aspect central to both Armstrong’s and Fodor’s account is the 
notion that internal dispositions of the CNS are cognitive and cause overt 
behaviour. This is seen to be inconsistent with an account of human cog­
nition in terms of overt behaviour. Armstrong writes that he holds a realist 
view, according to which, if an object has a dispositional property, there
must exist a "categorial basis” responsible for its manifestation of certain 
266behaviour in certain circumstances. 
267
Squires has replied to this with
a regress argument: since the object would have to have the dispositional
property and so the categorial basis even if no manifestations occurred, 
what is meant is that the basis would cause the object to behave in the 
appropriate ways in relevant ciccumstances. So a dispositional property is 
attributed to the categorial basis and the analysis must be applied to this 
property, and so on.
Armstrong argues that for the disposition of a rubber band to stretch 
one inch under force F to be attributed to it at different times, the 
numerical identity of the rubber band is not sufficient, for dispositions 
change over time; rather, one must rely on the continued existence of the
categorial basis or inner state. 268 Squires replies that the correlation
of this state with the relevant manifestations either gets us no further than
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we were with the thing itself, or itself requires a further categorial basis
to account for its manifestations - and so on. 269 The acquisition of a 
270disposition is a change, Armstrong replies in turn, but dispositions are
potentialities, not actualities, so some actual basis must be acquired in the 
. . . 271change. Squires points out in reply that "actual” is not opposed to 
"dispositional": there are actual conditional properties just as there are
actual categorial properties.
With respect to persons, Squires’ point is that in separating the 
inner from the outer, what is left is incapable of the behaviour it was 
postulated to explain; if there were a part of a person which accounts for
his behaviour, it would be the person himself. 27 2 We are tempted to locate
certain activities "inside" the person because they can be done without any 
. 273 . . .external sign. But these carry implications about overt behaviour which
we are not tempted to so locate. For example, saying something under 
one’s breath entails not saying it aloud and, if a chess player is mulling 
over his next move, it follows that he is not doing any number of things.
Since it is not a part of someone which talks or makes moves, it is not just 
a part of him which mulls over or ponders.
What convinces some that there must be cognitive structures and 
processes standing behind overt behaviour is that we must somehow "internalize" 
maps, rules, instructions, etc. to account for our ability to follow these 
when they are no longer present. This gains plausibility from the fact that 
the learning involved is often not explicit. "Internalization" is a term 
used extensively in the biological, behavioural, and social sciences. In 
particular, Chomsky and his followers hold that language learning is a
matter of internalizing the grammar. Furthermore, tree structures are
generated by the internalized and innate rules to govern speech production 
and to match received signals. Indeed, innatism would be idle if there 
were no such internal products.
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Tree graphs can. also represent a number of other competences. One
such is our memory for and, generally, competence in urban geography. Results
from experimental work in which subjects are asked to estimate distances
and angular measures of routes traversed in various parts of a town suggest
that spatial relations are not remembered in terms of metric properties;
rather, they are remembered in a way which could be represented by graphs,
in which only topological connectedness (the order of locations and turns)
. 274is presented. In a graph of a town, each vertex of degree greater than
two corresponds to a road junction and each vertex of degree two corresponds
to locations encoded. A subject’s ability to find new paths can also be
expressed in graph-theoretical terms.
It has been suggested that paths of such graphs correspond to 
. . . 275"programmes" which guide locomotion. We could think of remembering a
path as having an algorithm generating it. A person's knowledge of the 
shortest routes from his house to various important locations in his town 
or district could be represented by rules (corresponding to subcategorization 
rules) giving all the alternatives at each intersection. Suppose the
destinations are all public agencies of some sort; we could have rules
(corresponding to lexical insertion rules) specifying agencies at the ends
277 . . ;of paths. Since metric properties are not remembered, the paths can be
where each node is labelled by the sort of intersection it is. We could also 
imagine that there are co-occurrence rules for the agency-labels in that 
certain sorts of public agencies tend to be near ones of some other sort,
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distant from others of the same sort, etc. Given other reference points, 
similar trees would be generated. A child whose geographical competence is 
represented by such a tree could grasp the geography of another town or 
district. If the difference in towns or districts lies in the interchanging 
of the locations of two or more agencies, the difference in the child’s 
understanding could be accommodated by one or a few transformation rules.
As a very simple example of what might be internalized, consider the
path from A’s home to the grocer’s i
Home i
----------- o---------------- ---------
i
ii
-------- j------------ So Grocer
* ii ,i •
4 1
This corresponds to the instructions (in this order): "Turn left outside 
the house" "Turn right at intersection." "Turn left at intersection."
"Enter agency at T-junction."
Now it would not help to have the instructions internalized in the 
sense that I say them to myself, which would accomplish no more than having 
someone else say them to me. But perhaps the major reason we speak of 
internalization is to account for why someone behaves in the absence of the 
instructor as he did in his presence. In the instructor’s absence, some 
modified version of his instructions echo through the person’s head at the 
appropriate place. But the instructions might echo through one’s head at 
any time or place; why just when it is appropriate to turn right?
Why, first of all, do we turn right when the instructor says "Turn right 
We could always do otherwise. If we say because we want to get to the 
grocer's, then it can be asked why we wanted to get there, and so on. And 
there are any number of answers to the first question which would have been 
appropriate, e.g. we wish not to be punished. But there is one general 
answer which has a special position: we understand what he says. Generally, 
given this reply, no further question is asked (with the exception in
i
164
special cases of, e.g., "When did you learn English?" "When did you regain 
your hearing?, etc.); the further account is required in the case of mis­
understanding. In particular, there is no need to refer to internalized 
rules or structures or internal processes.
Now the phrase which echos through my head is appropriate when I reach 
the intersection because it describes what I do - it is no longer an 
imperative. In the initial case, I understand the instructor. Subsequently 
I could give the instructions, but this would accomplish nothing in the 
present case, for I know how to get to the shop. (That I know how to 
turn right (when so instructed) is unimportant.) I do not obey the instruc­
tions every time I go to the shop. Nor do I remember them every time I go 
to the shop. I perhaps do remember the instructions in another way - e.g.
I can reflect on the instructor’s odd accent. But this is independent of 
remembering how to get to the shop, which is similar to remembering where 
I left my case or simply remembering my case. Here again there is no need 
to posit something internalized or internal processes.
A fortiori an internalized graph would be of no avail: if it is not 
the instructions themselves in a different form, then the instructions are 
needed to interpret it.
But, it is objected, we are supposing prior competences, A’s ability 
to use language, in particular. What the graphs represent, on the other 
hand, are very basic abilities which suppose no more general or basic
abilities.
Suppose, then, we interpret the graph as specifying an automatic form 
of locomotion. Person A sees- an empty milk bottle and automatically stands 
up, walks out the door, turns left, etc., and ends up at the grocer’s. 
Suppose A responds to cues at each point where a "decision" is called for. 
But then we would be left with the problem why the "internalization" of«^—
I
comes into play just when A is presented with the cue: either the cue on 
its own would be a cue for A to turn right or there must be a third factor
which brings the internalized node into play just when the cue occurs.
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To give the general suggestion some plausibility, we must assume a 
situation such as the following. An empty milk bottle is a cue which triggers 
a complex behavioural pattern determined largely by internal factors. A 
sees the milk bottle, automatically walks to the first intersection X (standard) 
paces away, at which distance he turns right, and carries on in similar 
fashion. For this to work, he must have some means of recording his
progress, so that, e.g., he turns right after x paces.
left turn x paces right turn y paces left turn z paces enter 
90° 90° 90° agency etc
278The diagram is no longer a graph, for metrical properties are specified.
To see what ’’internalization" implies here, consider what would happen 
if the recording 4&vice fails. E.g., it does not begin to function until 
after the first x-n paces, so A overshoots his first turn. Has A made a 
mistake, got something wrong? Compare this with the case in which A sets 
out for the grocer’s, but x-n paces before the first turn he goes blind.
Desperate for milk, he carries on, but overshoots the first turn, What 
sort of error is this? A’s error was that he did not turn right; he didn’t 
know when he was at the turning. We might blame him for carrying on, or,
allowing this, for not asking people, feeling the kerb, etc. But what we
. . . . 279 . .cannot blame him for is going blind. This was his misfortune; although
280it accounts for his error, it is not his error. Similarly, if the recording
device malfunctions, this is A’s misfortune, but not the error itself.
But, now, if the error, A’s getting it wrong, is a public affair, 
involving his (gross) behaviour and the circumstances in which it occurs 
(described in a way relevant to behaviour), then getting it right must be as 
well. We might wish to delve beneath A’s skin to find out why he made the 
mistake; perhaps then we could account for the error in terms of the mal­
functioning of an organ. But, given that A knows how to get to the grocer's? 
an account of why he gets it right - either in terms of his internal machinery 
or in terms of his (gross) behaviour and its circumstances - simply cannot
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be demanded. And, further, the fact that A knows how to get to the grocer’s
cannot be accounted for in terms of internalized structures, for these are
either idle or they beg for another explanation, viz. why they come into
play when they do. All in all, internalized cognitive structures do not
explain what they are postulated to explain. There are certainly internal
structures, but these function or malfunction and cannot be the loci of
cognition or cognitive dispositions. They function correctly in the vast 
281majority of cases. When they malfunction, activities which exploit them
are liable to go wrong and the resulting errors can be accounted for in 
part by these malfunctions.
We may look at the wrong thing, fail to see something, and act hastily 
on what is only glanced at; but these are all things we do. Our eyes do
not make errors, although they may fail us. ’’The testimony of the senses" 
is only a quaint phrase. In visual error (if it is in fact error, and not 
malfunction), the buck cannot be passed to one’s "deceptive" visual apparatus. 
In any straightforward sense, we neither do nor do not know how to use our 
eyes. The locution "use your eyes" has a use in so far as it relates to 
looking for or at something (as opposed to acting habitually or intuitively).
Compare this with the case of using a compass. In some important 
ways, a compass is exploited in ways similar to the ways we exploit our 
natural endowment. (This point, when extended to other gadgets, is a powerful 
argument for realism in the natural sciences.) E.g. we judge the ship is 
10° off course by compass, by eye, etc. We neither say that our eyes tell 
us nor do we say that the compass tells us that the ship is off course; 
rather, we use our eyes or we use the compass to find out. A malfunction 
of the compass (which is not, of course, an error) can account for error.
But there are important differences. Errors occur not just when we
use the compass in order to get somewhere, but also when we are simply taking
compass readings. There could be no equivalent with the eyes. We learn to 
28 2use a compass and we either do or do not know how to use a compass.
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Other, perhaps more interesting cases of urban-geographical competence 
involve applications to novel situations or general competence. Such cases 
would involve map reading and picking out courses, but also turning 
right when presented with the sign |. In any case, there is no reason
to suppose that internalized rules, directions, or graphs are involved. They 
are not involved in the particular, familiar cases, and what the general 
case adds are public signs - maps, directional indicators, etc. and written
and verbal tokens.
This introduces competences exercised in activities other than loco­
motion; still, the signs must have some relevance to locomotion. If A 
draws a map including his present position, butdoes not know how to begin 
to follow any route portrayed on it, we would have good reason to say that 
he did not know how to use the signs; he might only have memorized an 
array of signs.
No matter how explicit is a map or a set of directions we give to a 
person, he still must apply them - select certain features as relevant and 
decide whether he is at a certain place. These selections and decisions 
are determined by neither environmental nor internal factors. In general, 
a person has a competence or knack in an endeavour when he can apply the 
rules in a discriminating and innovative way, when he can take advantage 
of the possibilities offered by that endeavour, and when he can engage in 
activities of that endeavour for purposes which go beyond it.
A person acquires a knack by experience - not experience in the sense
of a stream of mental occurrences, but in the sense of trying out, learning
how to do something. Errors are to be expected; eventually the person
himself will be able to correct them. The activity becomes second nature.
While the explicit formulation of rules is a powerful heuristic device, unless
one has some competence in the field in which these rules are applied, they 
283can be of little help in advancing one’s understanding. The fact that
these activities become second nature explains why the rules need no longer
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be enforced. The agent can evaluate his own behaviour. Indeed, an individual 
totally isolated from the culture into which he was inducted will most 
probably continue to observe its conventions. This is not because they 
have somehow taken over his internal machinery, but simply because observing 
these conventions, or following these rules has become second nature. Chomsky 
suggests that the extension of established competences to novel sorts of
situations can be accounted for in terms of an extended notion of transform-
284 .ation. We have given an example in terms of urban-geographical competence.
But such an account is not needed. The same general knack is usually 
sufficiently open-ended to take on new cases. If a major adjustment is 
called for, more trials, with inevitable errors, must occur before one 
acts in.general by second nature.
There is a consequence of Chomsky’s view that the human language 
faculty is a species-specific faculty of mind^^ whieh illustrates the 
results of confusing what is natural with what is conventional. The 
consequence is that there could be possible sciences not accessible to 
humans. Chomsky thinks of innate competence as a set of rules or at
least principles governing the application of rules. We can think of these 
rules as a set of independent axioms generating a system. Any number 
of rules could be taken away, any number of consistent rules added; we could 
even replace the set of rules with a set completely disjoint from it. For 
the system generated by the rules is the sole constraint on what are taken 
as axioms, and there is no claim that the system is complete. It so happens 
that we have the competences we have; it is a matter of biology.
Chomsky allows that there are human innate cognitive faculties other 
than that for language, e.g. ’’common-sense understanding"“a system of
beliefs (sic), expectations (sic), and knowledge concerning the nature and
. ?87behaviour of objects, their place in a system of ’natural kinds’...”
He also suggests faculties to account for various Gestalt effects, numerical
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and spatial intuition in mathematics, and the recognition of faces. ‘ One 
need only imagine a device with one or more other faculties (we could not, 
of course, say what these are) to see what Chomsky is on about when he claims 
that there could be possible fields of knowledge which are not accessible
to us.
There are indeed certain biological constraints on humans; e.g. humans 
can endure only a certain acceleration. But these are not (directly, at any
rate) constraints on what we know. Again
of statements:
I
We do not know how to travel faster
than c.
We do not know how to produce a
perpetual motion machine.
We do not know how to cross a pine
with an oak.
, consider the following pairs
II
I know how to drive this car
faster than 50 mph.
I know how to make a pinwheel 
which will continue to spin indef­
initely, given the slightest breeze
I know how to cross a pumpkin 
with a squash.
Furthermore, the statements in column I state what we could not know how to 
do. The statements in column II look like those in column I. Perhaps, we 
are tempted to think, our technology has not yet come up with a solution 
to the problems of flight at speeds greater than c as it has for supersonic 
flight; or perhaps one dinks there is some secret to travel at speeds 
greater than c which will always remain inaccessible to human knowledge as 
some maintain certain psychic phenomena are beyond the scope of our knowledge. 
But, in fact, the statements in column I are circumlocutions for statements 
of general laws. They thus state something we do know, and not in the 
trivial sense that we can say of someone that he knows that, e.g., he does
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not know the capital of Albania.
There are more inviting analogies to Chomsky’s claim. E.g. we could
not know the answer to certain (unsolvable) mathematical problems. But
knowing this is knowing something about the mathematical discipline in
question. Again, we cannot know the position of a particle in one dimension
and, simultaneously, its momentum in that dimension beyond an accuracy of
by AxAp h/2. But knowing this is again knowledge of physics (even X
on the interpretation that particles have definite positions and momenta 
smaller than specified by this formula). Chomsky’s position, on the other 
hand, is that there could be possible fields of knowledge inaccessible to
us.
Now humans are not biologically equipped to fly. Yet it is odd to 
say of a person that he does not know how to fly unless we mean that he 
cannot handle an aeroplane. (In some contexts it might be acceptable, 
but this is when the species is personified, as in children's stories, 
where representatives from different species portray human character types.) 
Again, it is odd to say of a person with a permanently damaged larynx that 
he does not know how to speak; rather, the fact that his vocal equipment 
does not function accounts for the fact that he does not speak.
Chomsky is not principally concerned with the opposition between the 
faculty of language and, e.g., that of flight. Rather, he sees the faculty 
of language on a par with, e.g., our ability to do mathematics. Further, 
if some other $>ecies had a faculty for a field of knowledge inaccessible 
to us, we could never know this. Chomsky would bring in the point used 
against Skinner: we must be able to specify the competence before we can 
say what has it, how it is acquired, etc.
But this shows that there could be no biological evidence for or against 
this thesis. There is a communality to knowledge which allows us to say 
that fields of knowledge developed by a culture are accessible to its members.
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Chomsky would have this communality depend on biological factors; so, e.g., 
tensor calculus would have been accessible in some way to the Babylonians.
However, certain disciplines r e.g. mathematics - develop to the point 
where they are indpendent of biological factors. What one does in stating 
an arithmetical formula is not properly described by giving distinctive 
features matrices or any other aspect connected with out biological equipment. 
Rather, it must be described in mathematical terms, which requires understanding 
a portion of mathematics. Admittedly, there is a link between out mathematical 
concepts and the signs we use. But any signs will do, as long as they are 
consistently used and the requisite relations can be established, which is
a matter of use.
It might be objected that if Martians have developed a science, there 
would be a good chance that they could not communicate it to us. Indeed, 
there would be a good chance that Martians (if there were such things) could
not communicate with us at all.
This is perfectly intelligible. The reasons would be biological, but 
not because a Martian’s speech organs or whatever and CNS or its equivalent 
are wired differently from ours - this would present a technical problem 
in decoding. Rather, there might not be any way for either of us to get 
a handle on the other’s basic vocabulary which is used in conjunction with 
typical forms of behaviour. If a Martian’s ’’behaviour” is totally different 
from ours, how could we teach it to use expressions such as "I have pain” 
or "I am afraid”? And how could he apply ’’pain” and "fear” to us? Further­
more, the words for basic actions would be without a context for the Martian, 
and so without a use. Many of our cultural institutions such as legal 
systems, and so their vocabulary, might presuppose behaviour of a sort 
indicating nothing to a Martian. The acquisition of the rest of our vocab­
ulary depends on having these basic terms.
If we and the Martians could share our basic terms, there is no reason
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to think that esoteric terms could not be shared. Martians might be so 
equipped that, e.g., group theory appears more natural to them than basic 
geometry or they might add one three-digit number per microsecond. Still, 
although we and Martians might have different developmental histories, there 
is no reason to think that, once the basic vocabularies are translated, we 
could not eventually learn any field of Martian knowledge which does not
directly require the equivalent of a behavioural context. Chomsky, on the
. . 289other hand, thinks more m terms of the esoteric fields being excluded.
This suggests why we apply "know” and other cognitive terms to
animals, even though we have emphasised the cultural aspect of knowledge.
It is because animals share forms of behaviour with us. (Here again practical
knowledge is basic.) This does not suggest that cognitive terms might
be applicable to inanimate objects which move about, change shape, etc. in
response to environmental changes. Much of the environmental response of
an animal’s body or a human’s does not count as behaviour, so cannot count 
. . . 290as the display of cognition. We do not generally say of an animal that
. . 291it knows how to do what it can do from birth. E.g., we do not say of
fish that they know how to swim or of humans that they know how to breathe.
Some development is needed.
Chomsky sometimes characterizes his position, not in terms of innateness,
but in terms of maturation, with cognitive structures arising from the
. . . . . 292interaction of the organism with its environment. The development of
cognitive structures is likened to the development of the leg.
But such development does not give rise to knowing; basic sorts of 
practical knowledge, rather, arise from learning. And learning, in these 
b^sic cases, involves trying, particularly trial and error. Trying need 
not involve intending, nor need there be a point to trying,, What is tried
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depends on the criterion of success, and this is given in the case of animals 
(where convention is not involved) largely by what the adult is normally able
to do.
If something tries to do something, it is conceptually necessary that 
it could fail. Trial allows of error; only if we could get it wrong can we 
be said to get it right. When the success has come to be taken for granted, 
the ability is often not counted as knowledge. For example, a fledgling 
flapping its wings in the appropriate fashion is said to be trying to fly, 
because the adults normally have the ability to fly; yet the adults are 
generally not said to know how to fly. Practical knowledge as well must
- allow of error; this distinguishes "know how" from other paraphrases of "can".
The trials and errors are manifest in (overt) behaviour and relate to
the circumstances of the behaviour. The criterion of success must be external,
for "know" is used in such a way that if something knows something, it thereby 
293has an advantage.
We have relied a great deal on cultural rules. Such things are the 
explicit subject of sociology. Yet internalization figures large in this 
subject. Furthermore, the notion of functional (systems) inegration, taken 
with that of internalization, results in a view of the "compartmentalization 
of the self" reminiscent of automaton models incorporating transducers. Finally, 
sociology has come to use graphs; when such structures are internalized, they 
are remarkably like P-markers. To maintain my position against this attack 
on the flank, then, I shall investigate and argue against these points.
The term "sociology" covers a great range of academic styles. We shall
be concerned with the sort which analyses social structures with an eye both
to the systematic relation of the components and the activities of the members
of the societies. As such a discipline, sociology has been colonized by math-
• • . 294ematics in a number of ways m the last thirty years or so. In this
respect, sociology can be thought of as generalizing certain methods of econ­
omics, the most successful social science. Some of the units of
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economic theory - monetary units, persons, institutions, fiscal periods, 
etc. - are so obvious that to some extent theory has grown up with practice. 
Concerning the applications of mathematics, of particular interest is an 
analytic tool for micro-economics known as game theory: one can determine 
certain "equilibria", in which it is not possible that anyone involved 
would have been better off if he alone had acted differently and all the 
rest had acted just as they did. The situations in which the sociological 
notion of unintended consequences is involved are structurally similar to the 
situations to which game theory is applied. Game theory and the notion of
unintended consequences are in some ways restricted versions of Wittgenstein’s
. 294' ... .notion of a language game. The significant value of these approaches is
that they focus on the prerequisites for the use of items which require social 
relations, and they do not directly concern themselves with tangential 
natural properties and relations.
Much of the better work in this direction was syntehsized by the 
American sociologist Talcott Parsons, who has had considerable influence
in the English-speaking world. Parsons analysed society as a system of
. . . 295 . . .functionally mter-related variables. Functional analysis is a genuine
part (but only a part) of social theory; it points to feedback in the causal
processes of social life by creating a number of abstract models of certain
. 295’ . .features of a society. These are then treated as totalities - Parsons’
"boundary maintaining systems". After these models have been analysed, 
they can be used to give a true causal explanation of social problems.
We can imagine any number of social relations - whether between
individuals or between groups - which could be represented by graphs or 
. 296digraphs. We take V(G), the vertex-set of graph G, to be the components 
of a culture and E(G), the edge-set, to be the realtions in this culture.
A structural model is, then, an abstract formulation of V and E. The model 
is interpreted when V and E are interpreted; the members of V may be 
individuals or groups, and the groups may individually have their own
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structure. As an example, "clique" has been defined to be, "for a particular
. 298value of n, the points that are mutually reachable by m-paths when m^-n". 
Again, the relation has-power-over can be represented by the edges of a
graph, where the members of V are roles, positions, offices, individuals,
299or tasks. Now a tree structure would represent that organization which
minimizes conflict in orders.A more stable structure, less vulnerable 
to disruption in paths of command, is represented by a "semilattice".
Given such structures, we can go on to investigate the actions of agents
. 301subject to them, the realm of action theory. Action theory relates to
the actor’s purposes, knowledge of and assumptions about the social situation,
302 . ...and norms. We can then introduce models of interaction, which allows us
to say something about individuals as members of social systems. Parsons
303 . . .presented a micro-social model, then extended it to social structures in 
general. Interaction, heheld, occurs when any one actor ("ego") needs or 
wishes to take account of the actions of another actor ("alter"). Interaction 
results in a pattern of mutual expectations which becomes a set of norms.
The rights, duties, etc. imposed on ego and alter by the resulting norms
define their "roles" in relation to one another.
A great advantage of the interaction approach is that social change -
which remains intractable for many rigid structuralist accounts - is seen
. . . . 304to result from the conditions and processes of interaction itself.
Furthermore, this change is unintentional, for as soon as ego must take into
account the actions of alter, the intentions of both are at most like initial
. 305moves in a game.
Now the concept of functional interdependence refers to the way in 
which different sets of rules, norms, values, role-structures and institu­
tions characteristic of social life are inter-related. It has been claimed
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that the only theory which accounts for this at all satisfactorily explains 
306it "as the largely unintentional product of social interaction over time".
Tf]& greater functional integration of simple societies can be expressed in
terms of the relation between an individual and the structure of his society 
. 307 . .It is held that at the "ideational level", the greater functional integ­
ration of simple societies results in a "patterned relation between the diff 
erent items of culture". This is for two reasons. Firstly, there is
"total" internalization - each member internalizes all or most of the norms
and symbols of the culture - because each member tends to participate in 
all activities. Secondly, constant interaction between members favours 
standardization. In complex societies, different individuals participate 
in different components and, when the same individual participates in two 
components, he does so by fulfilling two distinct roles. So different 
individuals internalize different sets of norms.Again, when the indi­
vidual is "drawn into" distinct sectors, "the different parts of the self 
are possibly compartmentalized, so that the internal strain to consistency 
may ... be low".
. . 309I fail to see, however, that any of these points show that cases
of functional integration must or even can be accounted for by involing 
the notion of internalization. Meaningful connections between systems of 
cultural activities can be accounted for just as well in terms of one sort 
of activity exploiting another - or both exploiting each other - so that 
any individual who has the knack in one will find it easier to learn how 
to do the other. For example, industrial conditions exploited the Japanese 
family structure in that Japanese society has become one of consumers, 
producers, importers, and exporters like Western society. Conversely, 
the Japanese family structure exploited industrial conditions in that 
industrial organization in Japan relfects family relationships and the eco­
nomic and professional aspects of Japanese life remained integrated in much
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the same way. What did change was the efficiency of production and the 
availability of goods and services, which were desiderata before industrial­
ization. This is not to say that industrialization has left Japanese 
culture as the generation which began it would have liked; there have been 
a good many unintended consequences. But we need not appeal to industrial­
ization alone to account for these.
In such cases it is even self-defeating to hold that two components 
are internalized. We can imagine a person who has mastered two completely 
disparate sorts of social activities, e.g. a pre-industrial Japanese who 
went to England for his education and mastered the English language, system 
of etiquette, etc. On returning to Japan, he acted like anyone else; but 
if he had returned to England, he would have spoken impeccable English, taken 
up cricket again, etc. There is no reason to think that any English manners 
or knacks which he might have displayed or employed in Japan could be 
described in terms of the Integration of two sets of norms resulting in 
new ones. The Japanese did exploit those Western techniques they found 
advantageous; and this did lead to more fundamental social changes. But 
this was because the techniques were employed by the society at large or a 
component of it. If acquiring these knacks were thought of as internalizing 
the procedures, we would still have to account for the fact that the procedures 
have become those of Japanese and not, e.g., English culture.
Again, there is no reason to think that the knacks of the person in 
our example must be such that "the different parts of the self are compart­
mentalized”. If our Anglicised Japanese had two compartments, one for 
Japanese norms and rules and one for English, it could be asked how he knows, 
when he is in Japan, that just these rules and norms are appropriate. He 
might display behaviour which would have been appropriate in England, but 
is not in Japan. But the explanation of this would be like the explanation 
why a pianist inappropriately plays a flat when he has changed key. We
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largely follow rules, behave in accordance with norms, etc. without
formulating the rules and norms and without debating whether they apply.
Indeed, if we had to formulate every rule and debate every case, we could 
never get started. As a consequence, we do not always catch ourselves 
behaving in a way appropriate to some situation, but not the present.
Furthermore, some structures are sufficiently like others that a knack with 
the one makes it easier to develop a knack with the other; however, some­
times one does not master the second, because one can get by without. When 
errors occur, it is not because there are two competing components in the 
person, but rather because the person is exercising a competence which 
basically is not appropriate for the case.
The social structure can be described as having components and accord­
ingly, the society can be thought of as compartmentalized into professional, 
socio-economic, religious, etc. groups. But while sociological roles are 
determined by the structure, persons are not. One person can fulfil any 
number of roles or none at all (e.g. Robinson Crusoe); the person is 
individuated independently of the role he fulfils. Although what sort of 
action a person does is often determined by the role he fulfils, the perform­
ance is not attributable to internalized components - there is only one agent.
Parsons has a notion of personality which has little to do with persons.
He holds that the specific motivations to conform or the general need to
conform are internalized, so that the fundamental values of the society become 
310
part of the "personality". So what becomes part of. the personality is general 
to the culture. This is reflected in the fact that the highest of Parsons’ 
three levels of abstraction relating to social action is the personality, 
the system of motives and concepts as internalized in each individual.
Despite appearances, the terms "internalize" and "personality" are 
meant to have no psychological overtones. Psychologism is generally rej­
ected in sociology because the factors it postulates to explain social
311forms result from the very forms themselves. Action theory shares m
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this end, and, indeed, its intention is to exclude psychology from social
. 312explanation. Parsons’ theory of action has been criticised for having 
no actors and little action and for separating the personality system from 
the social system, dealing only with the latter. It is suggested that
sociology, to be explanatory, must include propostions that are psychological
. 313m the sense that they are stated and tested by psychologists. But
this falls victim to the original criticism of psychologism.
What is really wrong with a great deal of sociology which is labelled 
"functionalism”, "action theory", or "structuralism" (hence a great deal 
of sociology) is that if overemphasises its own variables. Structure is 
something abstract; when it is complex, it requires mathematical methods 
to be clearly presented. Personality, as treated by Parsons, and roles 
are also abstract. Internalization, is a relation between abstractions.
The situation is not improved by introducing considerations about the 
natural equipment of homo sapiens, for this does not relate to the 
circumstances described in a way relevant to the questions at hand.
Rather, what is wanted is a notion of a person and his behaviour in cir­
cumstances described in the relevant way. A person’s actions are not all 
subject to the rules, norms, etc. of the society. Further, it is up to 
the person to apply the rules, to determine when they are appropriate,
and to decide what to do and when to do it. Social rules make the activities 
possible. But, if these constraints are held to determine what happens, 
then we can no longer speak of (human) activities.
Chomsky claims to give a rationalist account of the acquisition of 
language in particular and knowledge in general; the similarity lies in 
innatism. But his historical claims are unsupportable and there are very 
fundamental differences between his position and seventeenth century rat­
ionalism. Innatism was not a biological thesis for the rationalists, they
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found it necessary to keep some vestige of the concept of a person, something 
beyond the individual was regarded as essential for cognition, and they 
denied that there could be inaccessible possible fields of knowledge.
Of the philosophers with whom we are concerned, Chomsky discusses
Descartes at length and occasionally cites or mentions Leibniz. Locke is
not mentioned in Cartesian Linguistics, Chomsky’s historical work, and only 
3 T Atwice in Aspects (stating that he presented a parody of innatism).
Malebranche is not mentioned at all. Indeed, Malebranche would be an acute 
embarrassment for Chomsky, for he was a rationalist, yet denied innatism. 
Furthermore, he held that ideas in the mind could not account for knowledge; 
the standards must be present to us, but must be shared with others.
Chomsky's citation of Descartes’ two criteria determining whether
something is a man - i.e. involves body and mind, and so is not a mere
machine or animal - is unobjectionable. The fact that one of these criteria
involves language, however, gives him a historical starting point to go on
to claim the Grammaire Generate et Raisonnee (Port Royal Grammar) and other 
31.6works on language are of Cartesian inspiration. These criteria also
suggest to Chomsky a broader position: a distinctively Cartesian theory 
of mind. But, in fact, both criteria were presented in much the same form 
by Suaraz, Descartes’ great Scholastic predecessor, and the criterion inv­
olving language was presented by at least one anti-Cartesian, Sergeant.
(We shall present the passages in chapter VIII.) Suarez uses these criteria 
to distinguish between what wereknown as material and spiritual faculties; 
both were attributed with cognition, but only spiritual faculties with 
rational cognition. These criteria were used by Suarez and Descartes to 
distinguish between men and animals; they were also used by Descartes to 
distinguish between what is not and what is explicable purely mechanically.
Chomsky sides with Descartes’ theory of mind for two reasons. Firstly,
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he sees Cartesianism as emphasising the creative aspect of human, especially
. . . . . . . . . . . 317linguistic, behaviour, and so incompatible with behaviourist positions.
318 The similarities, as ISecondly, Chomsky shares Descartes’ nativism.
. . 319 . .think Chomsky would admit, end here. Chomsky’s ’’mentalism” is that
. . . . . . . . 320of Sapir; it is the firm denial of operationalism. And he claims that 
seventeenth century mentalism was an attempt to save something from mechanism 
and that its eventual demise resulted from a more general scientific view.
One difficulty with Chomsky’s historical position is that innatism 
and certain grammatical positions appear to be all that is isolated under 
the label "rationalist” and even these two aspects lack any evident conn­
ection. Book IV of the Essay has been called rationalist because (proposit­
ional) knowledge and reasoning are accounted for largely without reference 
to experience. This account, furthermore, was typical of the empiricism of 
the day, the major claim of which was that the mental inventory comes from 
experience, and then can be used to formulate knowledge which is not given 
in experience. Furthermore, the Cartesians (especially Malebranche, but 
also Descartes in Les Passions de 1’Ame) had a keen interest in recurrent 
patterns of thought; they differed from Locke on this point in that they 
sought an explanation in corporeal dispositions.
The universal and explanatory nature of the Port Royal Grammar, a major
. . . . . ....................................321
theme of Cartesian Linguistics, is seen to be Cartesian in inspiration.
. . . 322 .This has been convincingly refuted by Lakoff. She points out that the
generative and transformational elements of this work are more clearly 
and extensively presented in an earlier and better known work by Lancelot 
(co-author with Arnauld of the Port Royal Grammar), the Nouvelle Mdthode 
pour facilement et en peu temps comprendre la Langue Latine. The third 
edition (1654) of this work disclaims credit for the contents, which it 
attributes to the infleuntial sixteenth century Spanish grammarian Sanctius.
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The first edition (1644) of the Nouvelle Methode was prior to Lancelot’s 
discovery of Sanctius’ Minerva and contains none of the elements of trans­
formational grammar. Chomsky discussed the Minerva in Cartesian Linguistics,
. . . . 323but claimed that it was concerned with literary criticism. However,
Lakoff’s closer investigation easily reveals that it is as much a work in 
universal grammar as was the Port Royal Grammar.
Chomsky replied that what separates the Port Royal Grammar from
. . . . 324 ... .Sanctius is the Cartesian revolution. But this is simply begging the
question.
There is also the suggestion that later works in universal grammar 
had Cartesian inspiration. There is little to be said for this in the 
case of the Romantics, and Chomsky did not mean to suggest an historical
connection in this case. 325 But a connection is suggested in the case
of the eighteenth century figures, the most important of which is Du Marais. 
326However, Aarsleff has shown that universal grammar in the eight­
eenth century looked to Locke for theoretical support and that this is 
especially true for Du Marais.
Harman has replied for Chomsky that Locke was subject to a Cartesian 
. - . . 327influence which he transmitted to his successors. The historical claim
appears to be vacuous now; if anything, there is a claim that all human 
languages have a common element which is not due to convention. This follows 
from the general point we maintain, that convention was not understood in 
the period under considerations. Universal grammar can be supported, not 
only by appeal to universal innate factors, but also by appeal to universal
environmental factors - we all receive much the same mental stock.
We shall see that there are very significant differences between the 
Cartesian and Lockean theories of mind; indeed, there, is as much accord
between each of them and certain Scholastic theories as there is between
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the two themselves. Their accounts of language use are also significantly 
different. Locke accepts a two-sign theory: a word is a sign of an idea, 
which is the sign of a feature in re. This is the standard Scholastic acccount 
Descartes, on the other hand, criticised this theory thoroughly in the 
Dioptrics. (Chomsky ignores this work, Spinoza’s discussion of knowledge 
involving words, Malebranche’s on words replacing natural features, Leibniz’s 
criticism of Locke’s two-sign theory in the Nouveaux Essais, and generally 
all the Cartesian literature which concerns the meaning of words and the 
use of verbal tokens.)
The agreement with the Cartesians is on a very broad level, that certain
distinctively human activities and our ability todiscern certain features
depend on innate capacities. However, the capacities which are of interest
are different in the two cases. The Cartesians often parrot Descartes,
giving the two criteria; thus the quotations from Cordemoy which Chomsky 
328presents. They have a reasonably clear and frequently articulated position
on the meanings of words and the use of verbal tokens. But most of this 
is developed with an eye on mathematics. Grammar was one of the subjects 
of the trivium, so was suspect of producing ’’prejudice”; at any rate, it 
was regarded as lacking the clarity of methematical subjects, being a 
"historical” subject. The Port Royal Grammar was not directly part of the 
Cartesian programme; rather, it was the product of a pedagogical movement 
whose quest for clarity and simplicity in traditional subjects was in large 
part inspired by the general CArtesian outlook. Universal grammar was not 
a central Cartesian interest; mathesis universalis was. Indeed, the work 
in which Descartes presents the two famous criteria is a popular account of
mathesis universalis. W.K. Percival has concluded that
Chomsky has so far failed to show convincing proof that Descartes
had any influence on the French universal grammarians of the late
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seventeenth century. ... unlike most of the other major philosophers
of the seventeenth century, Descartes was relatively uninterested in 
329language.
Rodi-Lewis mentions Cordemoy’s Discours Physique de la Parole as a counter­
example to this. But this work is on exactly what its title states - the 
physiological production of speech sounds. Such investigations were inspired 
by Descartes’ physiological outlook and sought to describe what we earlier 
sketched as the output of the nervous system (when this results in a natural 
utterance). That is, they are concerned with "speech" as this in principle 
could be imitated by a machine.
As to further hsitorical suggestions, Chomsky associates Ralph Cudworth,
. . . 330 .the Cambridge Platonist, with Descartes. There indeed are similarities:
Chomsky finds the major one when he parallels their statements about the 
need forinnate ideas to perceive geometrical figures. But it would be a 
mistake to think that Cambridge Platonism owed much to Descartes. Henry 
More , one of its earlier representatives, became a firm opponent of Cartes­
ianism, thinking it a form of materialsim. If one looks for sources, a 
common source can be found to account for the similarities between Cambridge 
Paltonism and Cartesianism. We shall see in the following chapters that
Cartesianism has knowledge-theoretical affinities with Thomism; references 
to an inborn light, a divine spark, etc. are completely within this trad­
ition. In fact, Cambridge Platonism, with its reliance on such things 
as plastic natures to account for physical change, denied one of the main
tenets of Cartesiansim: universal mechanism.
Cambridge Platonism is significant in a discussion of seventeenth 
century innatism because of Locke's familiary with it at least as early 
as his first opposition to innatism in the 1660s. The deism to which 
Cambridge Platonism tended and the notion of plastic natures were earlier 
presented by another representative of innatism whom Chomsky discussed in
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. 331 . .detail; Edward Herbert of Cherbury. This is the only adherent to innatism 
discussed by Locke in the Essay; references in the early drafts show that
he came across Herbert's De Veritate in 1671.
Herbert's nativism is considerably different from Descartes’. Herbert
has a theory of faculties according to which reason ("discM¥°SW§”) is the
. . . . 332least reliable and "natural instinct" the most reliable. The mark of
reliability is the control of unhesitating action. This is obvously unaccept­
able to Cartesians, not only because it is incompatible with animal-mechanism
(not to mention mechanism in general), but also because for Descartes judge­
. . . . 333ment, hence the possiblity of hesitation? is essential to human cognition.
. 344Indeed, Herbert regards all faculties as sorts of sense ("sensus") and
. 345
knowl edge as the conformity between faculty and object, i.e. feature.
For Herbert, knowledge is necessarily related to the general make-up of 
the environment. Empirical knowledge is accounted for by the so-called
analogy between the microcosm and the macrocosm, which is spelled out in
. . . . . . 337medical terms (his medical theory is called anatomia vitalis ) as the
harmony between the humours within the body and the corresponding elements 
338in the world. There are harmonies within the humours and within the
elements; but these amount to the same, since the harmony of the world is
the standard by which the relation of bodily humours is evaluated. Holding
this, Herbert maintains that we know all things because we contain (elements 
. 339 .of) all things. Rational knowledge is accounted for by the so-called
. 340 . . .analogy between the mind and God, which is spelled out in legal terms.
God is held to direct the aspects of the world relevant here by "universal 
. 341providence". Thus the world is a well-ordered state and a person's
rational faculties are harmoniously disposed (so that he is attributable 
with knowledge) in so far as they are analogous to the harmony cf the world- 
state. Herbert is concerned mostly with general principles of conduct,
186
largely related to religion; his goal was to further religious harmony by 
finding a set of principles acceptable to all parties. He only incidentally 
mentions mathematics in this context. These rational principles are discovered 
by universal consent ("consensus universalis"); "consent" here does not 
refer to a speech act, but to a "consensation", a "feeling togher", the
common acceptance of principles making social life possible. Thus these
. . . 342principles are accepted only by omni homine sano & integro. (Herbert
cannot avoid some sort of circularity: those who follow the principles 
are those who give the evidence that counts.) The system formed from the
totality of such principles is called the providentiae Divinae universalis 
. . 343 . .idea & Typum optimum, and is a sort of objective structure which regulates
the world in universal providence. As God governs the world, so (it is
. . . . . 344 .maintained) the mind has dominion over the body and the universality of 
rational knowledge vis-a-vis empirical knowledge is accounted for.345
This was unacceptable to Descartes, as he let Mersenne know in corr- 
346espondence. On the other hand, Gassendi presented a proof for the exist­
ence of God from universal "consent" (as did his disciple, Bernier). Gassendi
. 347 . . . .published a letter to Herbert m which he was critical of some of Herbert’s 
more naive reliance on universal consent, but did not criticise the overall 
programme. Indeed, Herbert’s theory, with its reliance on sense and view 
of reason as unreliable, could be called empiricist in many respects.
Herbert and Chomsky agree - and in this they are in sharp constrast to the 
Cartesians - in their biological prospect. Otherwise, there is the vague
agreement that, in Herbert’s language, experience is not possible without
. . . 348 .certain first notions. But Chomsky holds that linguistic competence
depends on the environment only to be triggered; Herbert, on the other hand, 
holds that knowledge essentially involves a relation between that which knows
and that which is known.
Another philosopher discussed by both Chomsky 349 and ourselves is
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Leibniz. In fact, Leibniz maintains points that are more than superficially 
related to Herbert’s - e.g. the body somehow mirrors the macrocosm - and 
shares with the Cambridge Platonists the view that there is life throughout. 
However, Leibniz makes it clear that he considered Cartesianism "the ante­
chamber to the true philosophy" and for most points it is best to regard 
him as broadening the interests of Cartesianism and making good its defects. 
In so doing, he attempts to work in non-Cartesian elements. One such element 
is simultaneously worked into Cartesian mechanics - to correct the conser­
vation laws and supply a guarantee that mechanical configurations are 
instantiated - and into Cartesian metaphysics - to guarantee individuation. 
This element is the monad, and, although it is introduced into mechanics, 
it is what supports thepositions that there is life throughout and that 
simple substances mirror the universe.
A second element, or group of elements, is introduced to supplement
Cartesian mathesis universalis. One of these elements has the same source
as Herbert’s "Zetetica" (a method for relating first notions and the idea 
& Typum optimum) and involves recursive elements for generating propositions.
Chomsky never mentions this. (In fact, he only briefly mentions one of the
. . . . . 350notions exploited by Leibniz, and this not in connection with Leibniz. )
. . . 351The source m question is the ars magna of Raymond Lull. This was
conceived by Leibniz’s predecessor’s in terms of a circle or a series of 
concentric circles with symbols for concepts positioned on the circum­
ference (s) at equal distances. Complex concepts were seen to be generated 
either by the alignment of symbols on the series of concentric circles 
whose relative positions could be changed by rotation of one or more of the 
circles, or, when only one circle was given (as with Herbert’s Zetetica), 
by the series of symbols occupying a given position in a sequence of rot­
ations. In either case, the symbols are a finite set of generators, and 
the set of strings thus generated together with the operation of rotation
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and concatenation form a semi-group. Given a subject-predicate analysis of 
propositions, the concatenation of symbols could also be thought of as 
forming subject-predicate sentences, with the subject and predicate of 
various degrees of complexity.
Leibniz took over this method in an early work entitled De Arte Comn- 
inatoria. He was critical of his predecessors because they envisioned a 
fixed set of concepts. Herbert, for instance, chose the ten Aristotelian 
categories. When interpreted propositionally, the resulting concatenations 
were not usually taken to be true; in the terminology of the time, this
was not an ars judicandi. Rather, it was seen as an ars inveniendi, as
. . . 352presenting concatenations whose truth values were still to be determined.
As what can be true depends on the form of the propositions, the simples 
indicated by the generators should be of general interest for a theory of 
entailment and a theory of truth. Leibniz saw them as just this. Finally,
it is possible to arrange the apparatus in De Arte Combinatoria in the form
. . . 353of a rewriting system generating tree structures.
Attempts have been made to find the elements of a generative grammar 
. . . . 354 . .m Leibniz’s work in general. Leibniz was very interested in grammar
as a universal, formal subject. In his proposed revisions of Alsted’s 
Encyclopaedia, in which he lists subjects according to their conceptual 
priority (whereas Alsted arranged subjects according to pedagogical exigencies), 
Leibniz lists grammar first; he speaks of argument forms which are licensed 
by grammar. His later interests in a universal character as well as in 
logic appeal to the simples of the ars combinatoria. All these aspects 
of Leibniz’s work are relevant to contemporary syntactic analysis; however, 
a great deal remains to be done to show precisely where the similarities 
lie and what they amount to.
Leibniz owes none of this to Cartesianism. Rather, his interests in
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grammar and combinatorial methods were acquired from within Germany. Rep­
resentative of the German tradition, and very influential on the young
. . . . 355Leibniz, were the members of the Reformed university at Herborn. Chief
among these was Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588-1638), whose reputation was 
guaranteed for the next century by his Encyclopaedia (1630). This was a 
massive work, covering every aspect of philosophy, every academic and many 
practical subjects. Leibniz wrote: "Diligentissimus Joh.Henr. Alstedius,
356cujus Encyclopaedia mihi pro captu illorum temporum certe laundanda videtur”. 
Furthermore, Leibniz sketched a number of programmes to revise the Encyclopaedia. 
The Encyclopaedia contains a universal grammar and a section on the ars magna, 
with a number of sections on related artes.^?
A further similarity between Leibniz and Chomsky not mentioned by
the latter is their interest in automata. Chomsky’s only references to
automata in our period are with respect to Descartes’ criteria that a thing
is a thinking thing, where he mentions that the period was greatly inter- 
35 8ested in automata. Leibniz, in fact, built or designed at least two
automata: an "arithmetical machine" which performed arithmetical
operations and a "geometrical machine" which performed inferences of sorts.
Man-made automata were characterised as having a finite number of components.
359 .Monads in general, on the other hand, were referred to by Leibniz as 
360spiritual automata, infinite in complexity, thus capable of retaining a 
trace of the past, relfecting theuniverse, and being charged with the future.
The monad simulates the Dum Deus calculat et cogitationem exercet, fit mundus. 
Furthermore, Leibniz described the hierarchy of monads as an infinite 
tree structure; he even speaks of the relation of one monad (occupying 
a node) to those beneath it as "domination" - the term used for the relation
between nodes in a P-marker. "Rational souls" differ from other monads in 
that they are capable of reflection, which requires "sensible signs" - vocal
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or written tokens; thus a rational A 6<O "dit ce Moi”, and so is attrib­
uted with consciousness - it can refer to itself as the subject of actio 
so is responsible for them.
The differences between the Chomskian and rationalist theories of 
knowledge and mind are vast. For Descartes, what is innate is immune from 
empirical data and is determined by reflection, or conceptual analysis. The 
universal restrictions for any human language which Chomsky gives, on the 
other hand are contingent and are supposedly established by empirical invest­
igation. Furthermore, the phonetic and semantic features are universal in 
the sense that they are part of a universal human stock, but anyone of 
them need not be employed in any one language. But what is innate for
Descartes is common to all creatures which have science of things. Again, 
the innate components of our linguistic competence according to Chomsky are 
necessary in the sense that they are necessary for (are required for) the 
acquisition of language; it is a contingent matter that there are such 
components. Opposed to this, Descartes’ innate ideas are concepts from 
subjects which contain only necessary, i.e. true non-contingent propositions.
When they are said to be necessary for ..., it is in the sense that one 
362cannot have one concept without having another. Finally, the role
experience plays in Chomsky’s innatism is different from the role it plays 
363in Descartes’. The fact that there are deep structures ’’remote from
sense” is an empirical fact, so for Chomsky the relative paucity of the child’s 
experience is a contingent matter; and what experience it has is supposedly 
used to test hypohteses. But, for Descartes, what is ’’remote from sense” 
could not be a construct in any empirical theory. For example, what a 
(perfect) triangle is cannot be found by empirical investigation, but only 
by studying geometry. Experience could suggest certain ideas which are 
innate in Descartes’ sense - e.g. a rectangular object used for one purpose, 
then cut along a diagonal to be used for another purpose might lead one to
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formulate the concept of a right traingle; but experience is a check only- 
in the sense that looking back through one’s calculations with pen and 
paper is a check.The propositions in question are in principle immune 
from empirical counter-evidence.
Chomsky considers the charge that his formulation of innatism as
an empirical hypothesis removes the question from the traditional arena.
He concedes that his conclusions seem ’’ ’fully in accord’ only with certain
specific aspects of (classical innatism), namely, Descartes’ theory of
perception of regular figures, and Leibniz’s remarks on innate and unconscious 
3 6 Aideas and truths that are innate as inclinations, and so on”. His reply
is that it is a mistake to read the seventeeth and eighteenth century figures
365in terms of the modern distinction between "scientific” and "philosophical".
Descartes’ approach to innate ideas and mind is said to ignore this dist- 
366inction. Scientifically, he explained everything mechanically except
certain observations about humans (himself and others) - thus he postulated
a second substance. Descartes’ doctrine of innate ideas (Chomsky claims)
was not simply to account for necessary truths, for it was involved in a
theory of percpetion including "Gestalt properties and related structure (and)
goes well beyond the domain of necessary truths as understood at present..."
367But, firstly, as Chomsky admits, the "unconscious" knowledge which 
Leibniz allows is "accessible to consciousness", while the unconscious 
knowledge he allows is not. This difference is fundamental. In Leibniz’s 
own language, we know necessary and eternal truths by re|( ection; as this 
requires "sensible signs", we can formulate them. Leibniz in fact draws 
a sharp distinction between necessary and contingent truths; Chomsky’s 
linguistic hypotheses would fall on the empirical side. Furthermore, although
Leibniz characterises innate truths as inclinations and innate ideas as
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dispositions to think, he never refers to our innate endowment as a system 
of beliefs, for in Leibniz’s eyes competence is connected with practical 
knowledge, which he thinks can from the start also be characterised as 
systematic propositional knowledge.
Secondly, Descartes’ doctrine of innate ideas is applied in perception 
in exactly the same way pure mathematics is applied in empirical enquiries.
A very central problem for Descartes is how our knowledge of pure
mathematics and other fields involving only necessary truths is applied in 
perception. Furthermore, innate ideas are those which have objective reality, 
are involved in clear and distinct perception, and are associate with true 
and eternal essences; necessary truths arise from them. (Much the same 
can be said for Leibniz.) Chomsky is concerned only with the acquisition 
of knowledge, which was of secondary importance for the rationalists; they 
were primarily concerned with the application of our "science”.
Finally, Chomsky obscures a fundamental distinction almost universally 
drawn in the seventeeth century. This is the distinction between scientia - 
knowledge which can be systematically organized and involves only necessary 
truths - and other sorts ofknowledge (sometimes said to be mere cognitio).
It cuts across the contemporary distinction between science and philosophy 
in that pure mathematics and philosophy fall under "scientia", while the 
empirical sciences - including linguistics (to go by the claims made for it) - 
do not. The question of innateness in the seventeenth century concerned 
scientia; in this century it is an empirical question.
It is important to notice that Leibniz’s position is also conceptual.
The reason we cannot learn mathematical and similar truths from experience 
is not because of the paucity of examples, but simply because no number of 
particular truths suffices to establish a general, let alone, necessary truth. 
Leibniz, admittedly, allows that animals perceive and, further, that they 
apperceive because they have the requisite structural complexity - sense organs
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in particular; and humans reflect (so are conscious) because they have 
the further complexity required for the use of sensible signs. Furthermore, 
perception (and everything following from it) is described as a computation 
by spiritual automata. Yet the principles of their computation are con­
ceptual, arrived at by conceptual analysis. The primary move is to form­
ulate scientia or science by reflection, and then determine how it is applied 
to things in re.
Another significant difference is that consciousness plays no role in 
Chomsky’s account; but we have seen how central it is for the rationalists. 
The significance of this is twofold. Firstly, it allows that rational 
beings apply rules, and do not (just) operate/them; for the notion of con­
sciousness was connected with the possibility of making errors (particularly 
in judgement) in the seventeenth century. Secondly (and related to the 
first point), consciousness concerns the whole and individual person.
The rationalists took account of our concept of a person. It is all 
too true that odd things happened to this concept. The notable aspect of a 
person which leaves no trace in either res cogitans or res extensa is his 
(gross, overt) behaviour. This is because a mathematical analysis was 
applied to every aspect of any spatial display; what could not be explained 
in terms of the gross parts was held to be explicable in terms of the internal 
minute parts standing behind gross activity. But some of the things which 
people do remained enshrined in the concept of res cogitans. And this 
concept bears some relation to public behaviour: the two Cartesian criteria 
show this, as does Leibniz’s comment on Locke’s discussion of personal 
identity.
Also, the rationalists found it necessary to introduce something 
beyond the individual thinking thing. If thoughts or trains of thoughts 
had no standard by which they are judged right or wrong, they would be no 
better than mechanical operations. But the standard was supplied for the
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rationalists by God, divine science in particular. So one thing Chomsky
has missed is the move in the Third and Fourth Meditations which introduces
divine science and explains our errors in relation to it. At this stage
Descartes has eliminated the evil demon.
The rationalists were aware of the relevance of circumstances to a
person’s activities. Leibniz has monads reflect the whole universe from 
their own point of view, thus insuring that actions are relevant to circum­
stances. The same guarantee is established with occasionalism. Part of
the motivation for both views was the realization that human activities 
368are not described in physical or physiological terms. This disparity
was regarded as unbridgeable by causal relations. Recall that Chomsky seems 
to make all faculties innate, but is still faced with theproblem how they 
relate to circumstances. Leibniz circumvents this problem with pre-established 
harmony.
Finally, Chomsky misses the first move in the elimination of the evil 
demon, at the beginning of the Second Mediation, where Descartes establishes 
that there is nothing in the mind of which we are not conscious. This 
eliminates the traditional sensitive (biological) faculties, leaving only 
the rational soul. Chomsky, who is concerned with our biological equipment, 
cannot escape the evil demon. Let us grant, what we have argued against, 
but what is consonant with Chomsky’s position: that elementary mathematical 
knowledge is determined by our biological hardware. Following Chomsky, 
imagine that only certain results of computations are "accessible to conscious­
ness". Suppose the device functions on a threshold principle such that the 
component responsible for the flow of information to consciousness and 
activities directly related to consciousness can let through only six bits 
of information consecutively; it must then accept a seventh bit before it 
can let through another six. Thus, when seven distinct objects are picked out, 
only the first six are recorded in consciousness; a seventh recording in 
consciousness corresponds to an ei^th recording by the whole device. Likewise 
for rational activities: eight units or numerals must be generated in the deep
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workings of the device for seven units or numerals to be let through to the 
conscious part. The deep workings count as we consciously count, except they
include a number between six and seven.
As things turn out, we get by with our conscious arithmentic. But this 
is all show, for the operations we really perform and the mathematics we really 
know is something else. For example, when we divide a group into seven, we 
actually divide it into eight; when we seem to count ...-5-6-7, we actually 
count . . .-5-6-°*'-7, where is really the seventh numeral. We might expect 
physiology to tell us what we really do, but it could not. Suppose our physio­
logical science is so sophisticated that we are able to identify some of the 
happenings that control the flow of information to the conscious part. We would 
still not discern that the conscious part does not register the real process; 
for the seventh happening would not be counted by the conscious part as we 
observe these neural happenings.
But would there be any reason to say that we really count this way, 
that the real., occult arithmetic contains the numeral between six and 
seven? Would the real arithmetic not be the one we get by with, with 
which we describe things? The functioning of the hardware (its software) 
would not be an arithmetic at all; rather, it would be a biological law 
(or general fact) that we cannot count the seventh item in a sequence. If 
there is no technical way around this biological fact, then it would somehow 
be a general physical law that the seventh item in a sequence has not the 
same effect as the first six or subsequent ones. There would then be 
something myseriously arbitrary about the laws of nature - in seventeenth 
century terminology, the universe would have an imperfection.
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Suarez and Seventeenth Century Philosophy, 
and the Distinction Between Material and
Spiritual Faculties.
. CHAPTER VI
We wish to do a number of things in this chapter, which will eventually 
culminate in chapter VIII in the identification of two uses of "idea” and 
their immediate historical background. First of all, we shall show the per­
vasive influence in seventeenth century Scholasticism of Suarez and his col­
leagues of the Jesuit College at Coimbra. We shall also argue that any 
relevance one might think Neo-Platonism has for our subject is more reason­
ably attributed to the positions maintained or simply discussed by Suarez, 
his colleagues, and followers. Their distinction between material faculties 
(common to man and beast) and spiritual faculties (attributed with rational 
cognition and knowledge) - which will occupy the next three chapters- is 
introduced. Most Scholastic accounts held that these two sorts of faculties
are bridged by the intellectus agens, to which the following chapter is 
dedicated. We discuss it here only to draw a distinction between Thomism 
and nominalism. Roughly, as concerns accounts of knowledge, seventeenth 
century rationalism follows in the footsteps of Thomism, seventeenth century 
empiricism follows (sometimes explicitly) in the footsteps of nominalism. 
However, Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz accepted a thoroughly mechanical 
physiology which eliminated material faculties in the Scholastic sense. 
Mechanical physics made obsolete the position held by most Scholastics, that 
inceptive cognition involves the transmission and reception of an accident 
distinct from the subject in which it inheres. Certain nominalists had already 
denied this, and to this extent all new philosophers shared a nominalist 
legacy. Furthermore, Suarez, despite his purported Thomism, was heavily 
indebted to nominalism. A case wdll be presented for Locke's dept to 
nominalism; his position is compatible with this Scholastic movement because
he explicitly rejects Cartesian physiology and so can include the equivalent 
of material faculties under ’’mind”, His theory of ideas is Scholastic in 
that ideas for him (like Scholastic species) are characterised as signs. We 
then discuss Suarez’s theory of species and the Scholastic doctrine of material 
faculties. The last part of this chapter shows the difficulties encountered 
when a distinction in terms of operations is used to distinguish between 
material and spiritual, faculties - or between animal and distinctively human 
cognition - if even empirical essential cognition (i.e. cognition by means of 
species or signs) is allowed to material faculties.
The failure of such attempts leaves the distinction between empirical and 
rational cognition to be accounted for either in terms of what is done with 
what is offered by material faculties, or in terms of objects peculiar to 
spiritual faculties. These approaches concern the intellectus agens or what 
takes its place and are discussed in the following chapter. The issues intro­
duced in this chapter lead, in chapter VIII, to a distinction between two 
uses of ’’idea” corresponding to two sorts of objects of cognition: l) natural 
signs, involved in casual or genetic accounts, and 2) concepts (considered as 
part of divine science) which are applied in both inceptive and exercisive 
cognition,
Francisco Suarez (’Doctor eximus’, 1548-1617) entered the Society of 
Jesus in 1564, completing his theological studies at Salamanca in 1570. He 
taught theology at the College of Rome from 1580 to 1585* In 1597, he was 
called to Coimbra in Portugal, expressly by Philip II (Portugal then being 
under the Spanish Crown), where he remained (except for a brief trip to Rome) 
until his death. His works of interest to us are: De Anima (1621, all but 
the first two chapters of which were written in his youth), De Deo Uno et Trino 
(1621), De Angelis (1620), and especially the Disputationes Metaphysicae (1597). 
The Jesuit College at Coimbra was the centre of the energetic post-Tridentine 
renaissance in Scholastic philosophy. The Iberian philosophers of this 
period (1563-C.1675) have been divided into six generations.2 Suarez is 
placed in the fourth. The third generation includes most notably Pedro
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Fonseca ("The Aristotle of Portugal", 1526-1599), author of the Institutionum
Dialecticarum (the most influential non-Ramist logic of its day, receiving 
thirty-four publications between 1564 and 1625) and the Commentatorium in 
Ltbros Metaphysicorum Aristotlis Stagiritae (two volumes, 1577-15S9) and 
leader of the group of scholars at Coimbra which produced the excellent and 
widely used commentaries on the works of Aristotle.
Descartes knew and respected the Jesuit philosophy (he attended the out­
standing Jesuit college at la Fleche), but he also realised the incompatibility 
of his principles with those of Scholasticism and the Jesuits soon regarded 
Cartesianism as an enemy. Descartes maintained in the Principles that none 
of his principles are new, but are very old and common and used by Aristotle.
He even once denied to a Jesuit that he wished to refute the received opinions 
of the Schools.^ Mersenne wrote to Descartes informing him that a certain 
person’s respect for him was increased on knowing his familiarity with 
Aristotle, adding that he corrects those who are misled by the clarity of 
his style into thinking that he is ignorant of Scholastic philosophy by tel­
ling them that Descartes knows it as well as those who teach it.^ Descartes 
himself wrote that it is very useful to have studied the entire course of 
philosophy as it is taught in Jesuit schools before elevating one’-s mind above 
pedantry; philosophy, he adds, is no-where better taught than at his own school, 
la Fleche. Still, Descartes* works were on the Index in 1663 and a cascade 
of anti-Cartesian literature flowed from Scholastic, especially Jesuit, pens 
from Bourdin’s Seventh Objections to well into the next century, ’•.’hen a Jesuit 
journal was established at Trdvoux in 1701 to review newly published works, the 
editors, while promising to remain neutral in all matters but those of religion, 
were openly hostile to Descartes and Malebranche. ' Descartes anticipated this 
attack, as is revealed in his correspondence withMersenne just before the 
publication of the Meditations. Expressing apprehension of the attacks of Bourdir 
the Jesuit author of the Seventh Objections, Descartes considered, studying 
certain Jesuit philosophical works, but eventually abandoned the project.8
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In this correspondence, Descartes never mentions the works of Suarez; yet he 
retained a familiarity with the Disputationes Metaphysicae: when queried by 
Arnauld in the Fourth Objections about his phrase ’materialiter’, he refers 
to its use ’apud primum authored qui mihi jam incidit in manus’, i.e. Suarez.9 
With the exception of those of the Co'imbrians, the works which Descartes 
mentions in this correspondence were heavily indebted to Suarez, whose works 
are not mentioned here probably for the same reason that those of the 
Co'imbrians were found unsuitable, i.e. they are too long. Indeed, Descartes’ 
position on the creation of eternal truths is in express contrast to Suarez’s 
and there are close similarities between Descartes’ notion of objective 
reality and Suarez’s notion of conceptus objectivus.
Malebranche as well was raised on the Jesuit philosophical corpus, which 
dominated in the Catholic parts of Europe throughout the seventeenth century.
He also retained a familiarity with Suarez’s works throughout his life: in 
the important ExL air as sent XV (on occasionalism) he cites the Di sput at i ones six 
times,and in his last work he presents a large passage from Suarez to counts 
his opponent’s assertion on the position of the Church Fathers.
In the course of the first third of the seventeenth century, the Jesuit 
philosophical corpus (especially the Disputatlones Metaphysicae) was taken up 
and adopted throughout Protestant Europe, Throughout most of the century, 
then, Suarez and, to a lesser extent, the Co'imbrians, were considered the 
definitive Scholastic philosophers throughout Europe. Still, the Jesuit 
philosophy was not accepted uncritically by the Protestant Schools. In 
addition to the obvious religious differences, there were different present­
ations of the important notion of conceptus objectivi. The reason for this 
dissemination is to be found in the vacuum left in philosophical education 
by the Reformation and the need for polemic reasons of some philosophical 
ability. The process began in Germany, whence the original works, but more 
commonly Protestant adaptations, spread to Britain. ■
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In German Protestant Scholasticism,12 the Jesuit philosophy first made 
its mark among the Lutherans. Their most important representative was 
Christoph Scheibler ("the Protestant Suarez”, 1589-1653)> Professor at Giessen 
from 1610 until the suspension of the University in 1624. His Opus Met aphy si cum 
(1617), the most widely used text on metaphysics in Protestant Germany,1^ was 
a complete resume of Suarez1s work without modification of plan or doctrine.12^ 
The most important Reformed philosopher was Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635), 
Professor at Leyden from 1620 until his death.A. Heerebord, his editor and 
pupil with Catesian leanings, asserts in the preface to Burgersdijk’s 
Institutionum Metaphysic arum Libri Duo (1640) that these volumes ’’compendia 
tantum esse Suaresiorum conceptum” and in his own work calls Suarez ’’omnium 
metaphysicorum papa et princeps.n1^
Leibniz’s relation to Scholasticism has been the matter of some controversy.
17 18But Eschweiler points out that von Nostiz-Rieneck’s conclusion that Leibniz 
was not familiar with Scholasticism is due to not considering later Scholast­
icism and1^ that the conclusion Leibniz reached in his youthful ’’Disputatio 
metaphysica de Principio Individui” (1663) was Suarezian, all his sources 
(not citations) most probably being from the seventeenth century. Leibniz’s 
two teachers at Leibzig - Jakob Thomasius (who had a paternal relation to him 
and later corresponded with him) and J.A. Scherzer - belonged to the school of 
Daniel Stahl from Jena, whose positions according to the preface to the 
Pr ae cep t a Met aphy si c ae of I64I were ’’selecta ex met aphy si corum doctoribus et 
magistris Suarezio, Fonseca, Mendoza allisque.,.”20 Leibniz himself mentions 
that in his youth he studied Rubius and Fonseca and claims to have read Suarez 
like a novel, In his maturity, Leibniz most often assumed a position reveal­
ing some Scholastic inspiration when criticising the Cartesians.•
Dutch domination of Reformed philosophy was guaranteed by the dispersion 
of their co-religionists in Germany in the course of the Thirty Years AJar, The 
last major product of German Reformed philosophy was Alsted’s Encyclopaedia.
We have previously noted Alsted’s influence on Leibniz. Loemker suggests that 
Leibniz derived platonic elements from the Herbom School.23 But, allowing
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for Alsted1s originality and eclecticism, one need only rarely go beyond the
dominant Scholasticism we have discussed to find materials for Alsted’s
pedagogical presentations. He typically rearranges subjects to meet his
needs. For example, his "Pneumatica” is a considerable departure from the
arrangement of the traditional de anlma. The unifying theme is not the anima -
the by virtue of which something is alive - but spiritus. Yet spiritus is
defined (as in Scholasticism) as ’’substantia omnis corporaturae expers” and
the discussion is in terms familiar from Scholastic texts labeled de anima,
except plants and animals are excluded, while God is included. More
generally, Loemker himself maintains that Suarez was the source for the
Herborn School in metaphysics. And Mora asserts that both the Encyclopaedia
and Alsted’s contemporaneously published metaphysics are ’’strongly inclined to 
26the philosophical teachings of Suarez.”
Through connections with their co-religionists on the continent, the
English universities absorbed the Scholasticism dominated by Suarez and came 
to regard Suarez as the model in metaphysics. We are particularly interested 
in the Oxford of Locke’s youth and early manhood, where he spent fifteen 
years, from his entrance as an undergraduate in 1652 until his move to the 
London residence of the future Earl of Shaftesbury in 1667. Locke apparently 
mastered his studies at Oxford, but became dissatisfied with them.^ Never­
theless, some could place the Essay within the bounds of the essentially 
Scholastic subject of logic. (We shall use the term ’’logic" in what would, now 
be an extended sense to coincide with the seventeenth century sense. "Method’’ 
would pehaps be a better name, but even this is too narrow). Edward Bentham, 
writing an apology for the usefulness of logic in the middle of the next 
century, claimed that the logical theory of the Essay was generally Scholastic28 
and that its disparaging remarks on Scholastic method are accounted for by the 
mood of his day. Now we can identify the most important logic text for Locke, 
for, while a tutor, he kept a notebook entitled "Notes on Logic”, which con­
tains inter al» eighteen folio pages of notes on the Manuductio ad logic am by
Philip du Trieu, a Jesuit who taught at Qouay early in the century.^
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Scholasticism in general was imported to Oxford from the continent and
included the Protestant re-writings of Suarez and the more important texts of
the Jesuit corpus, especially the Disputatlones Metaphysicae. Locke mentions 
31Burgersdijk and Scheibler disparagingly in "Some Thoughts on Education". The 
fact that he was familiar with the works of these philosophers is confirmed by 
a list kept by Locke of books he bought and directed his students to buy.>2 
The importance of these two continentals at the Oxford of Locke1s day is con­
firmed by at least two other sources.
Oxford also relied directly on Jesuit sources.^ One of the sources 
referred to above gives prominance to Fonseca and Suarez and his commentators; 
it adds that the best arguments of many parts of logic on predicaments, etc. 
are in Suarez’s metaphysics.
The importation of the Jesuit philosophy was one aspect of a brisk exchange 
of men and ideas in the first half of the seventeenth century between England 
and the Protestant areas of Germany and the Low Countries, which was facilitated 
by religious affinities.^ Germany, among other things, gave the legacy of 
Herborn to England through J. A. Commenius, an educational reformer and student 
of Alsted, Locke possessed four of his works on language and the Royal 
Society’s programme for a universal language has been seen as one of 
Commenius’ influences.^ In the other direction, Bacon, for example, was well 
known in Germany - Leibniz at an early age was a Baconian.^® Indeed, Herborn, 
and Commenius in particular, shared many of Bacon’s goals; Commenius’ Vis 
Lucis is dedicated "to the torch bearers of this enlightened age, members of 
the Royal Society of London"^ and Yolton places it in the course of the 
Baconian goal of a universal natural history.^0 Locke and Leibniz, then, were 
exposed to many of the same currents of thought. In both cases, Suarez, whose 
importance for Herborn we have already noted, was a major figure.
We wish to maintain that Platonism (which often had little to do with 
Plato himself) played only a subsidiary role in the development of seventeenth 
century theories of ideas. Those factors which could be called Platonist are
accounted for by their inclusion in Scholasticism, which always kept an eye on 
Augustine.
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From Arnauld’s objections appended to the Meditations to the present day, 
/•)
commentators have looked for an affinity between Cartesianism and Augustine.44” 
Indeed, Descartes’ successors fostered this view,^' Malebranche, for instance 
often appealed to Augustine’s authority.
But any thesis of Descartes’ conscious borrowing from Augustine is dashed 
by his expressions of gratitude to correspondents for references to passages 
from Augustine resembling his positions. 4a Gilson asserts that throughout 
the Middle Ages the authority of Augustine and pseudo-Dionysius made theo­
logians concede what accorded poorly with Aristotelianism»44 The position 
that the senses only excite the soul to form an image of the object,45 he 
holds, was transmitted by the Jesuit philosophy to flower in Platonism and 
Augustinianism only after 1650.4° Malebranche’s citations of Augustine are 
not imposing when it is realised that they are almost always the same and can 
be found in the selections from Augustine uublished under the title Philosoohi
Christiana (1667) by his fellow Zr®torian A. Martin.4? The telling point is 
that Malebranche asserted that he had already developed his position when he 
noticed the similarity with Augustine which gave him the security to make his 
position public,Applying Gilson’s point in the case of Malebranche, Connel 
maintains that the Scholastic doctrines cf creation and divine exemplarism are 
deeply influenced by Augustine and. Dec-Platonic thought. Malebranche rejects 
the Scholastics fcr their Aristctelianisn, but he would not have found fault 
with them where they follow Augustine.4^
Such a selective adaptation of Scholasticism was suggested by Cartesians 
themselves^0 and by Malebranche’s major (but not always faithful) English 
disciple, John Morris (1657-1711).Morris maintains that the archetype of 
created things (the objective structure) is the Verbum, the second person of 
the trinity. For precedents, he cites an enormous amount of Platonist 
literature, most enthusiastically Augustine.But these citations are 
equalled by those of seventeenth century Scholastics; those which are called 
on most are Scheibler,53 Burgersdijk, and especially Suarez (’’the great meta­
physician”) .54 He rejects the Scholastic account that ideas are had on the
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presence of bodies, so are caused by those bodies.55 The Schools, he states, 
admitted divine eternal ideas as principles of knowledge and nothing could be 
more representative of things; so they need not have looked elsewhere for the 
’’immediate objects of our understandings. ”5° Norris concludes that, admitting 
what they do, it is surprising that the Schools did not hold this view, 
especially as it "is favoured by St. Austin (i.e. Augustine), whose author!ty 
is so sacred with them upon other occasions.”-' In short, "if the Schools had 
followed St. Austin more ...... and Aristotle less, they would have left us
another system ....”'
The major reason Norris gives for rejecting the Scholastic genetic or 
casual, account is that our ideas are things of a sort different from those 
things which are meant to cause them. The most common way around this problem 
in Scholasticism was to appeal to the intellectus agens as a bridge between 
what is material and what is spiritual, where the latter, by virtue of casual 
relations, can know the former, but not vice versa. Norris ridicules this ,
faculty, as did Malebranche and, indeed, many of those who turned their backs 
on Scholasticism in favour of a mechanical account of nature. Norris’ (and 
Malebranche* s) alternative is that the soul ’’sees” things "in their eternal 
reason by participation” because the ’’intellectual light” in us is a "participate; 
similitude of the uncreated light, wherein the eternal reasons are contained."59 
Seventeenth century rationalists in general relied on God to supply and guarantee 
the concepts which we apply to things. But, in fact, the way Norris typifies 
the "intellectual light” could be accepted verbatim by orthodox Thomists as 
specifying the intellectus agens. As we shall see below, there vzere various 
interpretations of the intellectus agens and different ways in which its role 
was otherwise fulfilled in seventeenth century philosophy.
Hand-in-hand with the intellectus agens go intelligible species. The 
intentional species is what we have called a feature, taken along the whole 
length of the input course and including dispositions in re to produce it. 
Dispositions established in whatever number of faculties to which cognition is 
attributed - cognoscitive or cognising powers - were admitted by the position
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in question. Intensional species were held to be accidents distinct both from 
what produces them (since they were held to be due to the particular sort of 
activity, but not to be the activity itself) and from what receives them (since 
the power need not have the particular dispositions it has, i.e. it need not 
be "informed” by these particular species). Cognising powers were divided 
into material faculties - corresponding to some part of the anatomy - and 
spiritual powers - which alone are immortal and are responsible for our 
rational functions. Suarez and most Scholastics maintained that there are 
intensional species - called intelligible species - in the intellect; these 
relate our rational essential knowledge (since they are in the intellect) to 
our histories in our environment (since their presence is somehow due to 
things which have been in our environment). The central role of the 
intellectus agens was to bridge the material and spiritual faculties, and 
thus account for the presence of intelligible species - i.e. to "spiritualise" 
intensional species.
"Spiritual" and related terras were interpreted differently by different 
moderns; the distinction is roughly that between empiricists and rationalists. 
This distinction is already represented (though somewhat differently) in 
Scholasticism, Rationalist theories of cognition share much with Thomist 
theories, while empiricist theories of knowledge are in many respects nominalist 
Within Scholasticism, the distinction is sharply drawn by positions on the 
intellectus agens. Nominalists changed the account we have outlined. Generally 
they regarded the intellectus possibilis as the central faculty in rational 
cognition. They either rejected the intellectus agens and intelligible species 
or made the intellectus agens ad hoc, holding that initially there are intel­
ligible species only of material singulars (by which is usually meant spatio­
temporally distinct material features). In either case, this is a pure genetic 
account. Our knowledge which is not of material singulars is held to be made
by what we shall call "elevating operations" on the materials received, i.e.
/ *
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by changing their roles by comparing them, reasoning about them, etc. The 
nominalists thus maintain that there is a distinction between our cognition 
which is inceptive of dispositions - inceptive cognition - and that which is 
the exercise of dispositions - exercisive cognition - because elevating 
operations intervene.
On the Thomist position there are certain semina scientiarum - seeds of 
our science - in the intellectus agens, which are applied in both inceptive 
and exercisive cognition. These two sorts of cognition, then, are held to be 
symmetric. Intelligible species of material singulars are not admitted because 
there is no need for materials from which our science is made by elevating 
operations, for objects peculiar to our science and so to our spiritual 
faculties are supplied by the intellectus agens. All acts and dispositions 
of the intellectus possibilis, then, are held to concern universals or at 
least something other than material singulars. Still, our science is held to 
apply to things because the acts of cognition of the Intellect - whether 
inceptive or exercisive - are held to be rendered particular by the products 
of the acts of cognition of the fantasy, i.e,^kantasms. This application of 
our science to things was called "conversio ad phantasmata" and the act of 
intellection in such cases was called the "verbum". Because on the Thomist 
account all acts of intellection, inceptive or exercisive, are held to involve 
objects furnished by the intellectus agens and thus not made, the Thomist 
account greatly restricts the genetic account.
Suarez, despite his purported Thomism, rejects the essentials of the Thomis 
account - conversio ad phantasmata and the verbum. In place of the latter, he 
introduces the conceptus obj ectlvus, differing from the verbum In the way It 
is known. It is somewhat like what we have called a concept yet It is held 
to be made by the niser. There is a direct historical link between Suarez’s 
term "conceptus objectivus", on the one hand, and, on the other, Descartes’ 
term "objective reality", "idea" as used by Malebrance and Leibniz, and "notion" 
as used by various Scholastic and non-Scholastic philosophers. Conceotus 
ob^ectivi and the like were often referred to as spiritual objects. Tet the
Cartesians and Leibniz, unlike Suarez, accept conversio ad phantasmata
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Cartesianism is irreconcilable with Thomism, however, on what is probably
its most significant position: that all extended things (hence all things which
can in any sence be called material) are in principle describable in mechanical
terms alone. Substantial forms and intensional species distinct from their
subjects are thus rejected. As there is nothing for the intellectus agens to
’’spiritualise”, it drops out. Yet its position is taken by divine science, 
n
which is identified with human science. The body, now see^as in principle 
capable of a purely mechanical description, takes over the role of the 
intellectus possibilis as that which secures dispositions. In the Dioptrics 
Descartes explains one class of cases included in the relation between exercises 
of corporeal dispositions and occurrences in the mind as meeting conditions 
imposed by the objective structure. It was in the Dioptrics that Descartes 
first presented his mature views on judgement and the will. Generalised 
versions of this explanation were accepted by the Cartesians and Leibniz. The 
most natural approach in individuating rational beings i£ spatio-temporal con­
tinuity. Consciousness, not as memory of past deeds, but as continued respons­
ibility for what one undertakes or does might seem a candidate for the principle 
of individuation. But one must be able to pick out the agent before respons­
ibility is assigned to him. The difficulties of individuating agents for 
Cartesianis. are notorious; Spinoza’s position, in fact, seems the most 
natural Cartesian position on this point.
The physics of the rationalists brought them closer to nominalism than to 
Thomism. Nominalism had a great influence in the seventeenth century. In 
addition to Suarez’s near-nominalism, nominalist positions were presented 
in detail in his works and those of the Colmbrians (who were more nearly 
Thomists)c The nominalists were the most outspoken critics of accidents 
distinct from their subjects, a view held to be incompatible with a mechanistic 
physics. Because of this, Malebranche, looked for precedents for occasion­
alism among nominalist authors, in the fifteenth eelaircissment appended 
to the Recherche: and Leibniz stated the debt of the new philosophy to
nominalism m the introduction to his edition of a work by Nizoli a sixteenth- 
century nominalist. As the rejection of accidents distinct from their subjects 
concerns an account of knowledge, it goes with the general rejection of the
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intellectus agens and intelligible species in the new philosophy.
Nominalismj however,, had a more direct influence
than this: Gassendism was allied with it. This is most clearly revealed 
in the Abr&gg de la Philosophie de Gassendi (1678) by the physician and 
noted travller, Francois Bernier (?—i'6S8). Bernier, as we shall see, 
follows the nominalists, particularly Burandus, on the relation between 
the understanding and the phantasy,
Gassendism introduces difficulties into the nominalist position,
however, because all material activity is to be explained by atoms of
various shapes and sizes in various states of motion. Our material faculties
and those of animals are held to be cognising powers, yet are to be
explained by atoms. Thus the leap which is inexplicable for Bernier is
not between material cognising powers and the intellect, but between
insensible atoms and the sensation they cause. The thing which thinks,
then, spills over into the phantasy. Gassendi, who expressed surprise
that Descartes meant by "idea” something other than a phantasm (as he in
fact had in the Regulae), suggested that "mind" ("mens") should include
the phantasy. The mind on this position secures dispositions and is
outfitted by the senses. These ideas occur in roles; new roles are created
by elevating operations and we are subject to rules only on having cognised
the relations between disjointly-received materials of what results from
them by the mind’s own operations. Only then have we a science to apply
to things in re. Perhaps the most extreme view of this form known in the
seventeenth century was that of Hobbes, who maintained that all of our
cognising faculties are material; elevating operations are attributed to
speech. Thus Leibniz, while stating the debt of the new philosophy to
nominalism, warned against Hobbes’ plusquam nominalism. Hobbes and
Gassendi found common ground and both wrote unsympathetic objections 
. V •appended to the Meditations. Descartes was eventually reconciled with
Gassendi, but rejected Hobbes’ attempt to find common ground in that they
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both sought explanations in terms of figure and. motion alone. (Leibniz 
however, was heavily influenced, by Hobbes from his fifteenth year 
until his mature philosophy began to take shape. This influence was in 
physics and politics^'A* and above all in the arithmetical model of reason­
ing, which, unlike terminalism, he never abandoned. But what Hobbes saw 
as elevating operations of material faculties, Leibniz saw as the rule­
following exercises of spiritual faculties,
A nominalist influence on Locke has often been suggested. Such an 
influence could be sufficiently explained by his early familiarity with 
the Scholasticism dominated by Suarez and his familiarity, beginning in 
the 1660’s (probably through Boyle), with Gassendism. His familiarity 
with Gassendism was increased during his sojourn in Prance (1675-1679) » 
where he met Bernier. Some have seen a strong Gassendist influence 
on Locke’s empiricism; Leibniz ^r‘was of this number. And some have seen
»
Locke’s empiricism as a debt to Hobbes. Locke, however, was perhaps 
equally familiar with Cartesianism, A number of studies have indicated 
the extent of Cartesian influence in England in the seventeenth century, 
even before mid-century. This influence (felt heavily in the Royal 
Society) was largely restricted to Cartesian science, method and plain­
ness of style. Locke as well probably came to Descartes through scientific 
interests, as his earliest references to Descartes (1667) are from Boyle’s 
writings. According to Lady Masham, Descartes’ works were the first
philosophical works which interested him and, although he often disagreed, 
•7 j
he found them very intelligible, ' Locke’s familiarity with Cartesianism 
was especially a result of his residence in Prance and was reinforced by 
his stay in Holland in the 1680’s. His journals of the time and as late 
as the 1690’s show a lively interest in the Cartesian literature,
especially in the entry from 1678 entitled ”Methode pour bien etudier
2’TO
la doctrine de M . de Cartes”. 72 Still, Locke denies a number of theses
central to Cartesianism in the Essay, which was not well received by 
73orthodox Cartesians. * However, there were certain Cartesians, particularly 
those who engaged in polemics with Malebranche, Pierre-Sylvain Regis and 
notably Antoine Arnauld, whose theories of ideas showed some similarities
to Gassendi1s or at least nominalist views. Both held that ideas are 
simple apprehensions and allowed elevating operations. A large part of the 
Arnauld-Malebranche polemic consists of Arnauld’s defence of abstraction 
and Malebranche* s version of conversio ad phantasmata. Both, and parti­
cularly Arnauld, insisted tha't ideas are only perceptions in the mind.
Locke met Rdgis in France, Arnauld’s La Logique is mentioned in the 
journal entry singled out above and he had a copy of Arnauld’s Bes Vraies 
et des Fausses Idges in his library. Above all, Locke mentioned in his 
Examination of F, Malebranche’s Opinion ... the thesis that our ideas 
are only perceptions. Arnauld and Rdgis, being Cartesian, held that these 
perceptions are not in the phantasy; still, imagination, after Suarez’s 
duplication of material and spiritual faculties, left great room for 
ambiguity. In 1698 Locke wrote to Thoynard, concerning the publication 
of the French edition of the Essay, that he wished to offend neither
those inclined to Descartes nor those inclined to Gassendi, If he had 
Rdgis and Arnauld in mind as those inclined to Descartes, the middle road 
would not have been difficult to find; he certainly sought no common ground 
with Malebranche.
For Locke, there is a particular reason not to distinguish between 
material and spiritual faculties and to allow ideas, the objects of the 
understanding, to be phantasms: he completely rejected Cartesian physiology. 
Thus he does not share Bernier’s difficulty of the relation between 
insensible atoms in the phantasy and sensation. If we were to assign a
2't 1
vocation to Locke, it would, be as a physician; he collaborated, with
Sydenham and was employed by Shaftesbury as a physician, Locke kept a
medical notebook from his arrival in Oxford (1652)and learned the essential
medical theory of his day in lectures, coming in close contact with a 
"7I
number of representatives of the dynamic subject of iatrochemistry, z 
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Iatrochemistry - the chemical explanation of physiology - and iatro- 
explanation of physiology
mechanics - the anatomical or mechanical (in the extreme, Cartesian case)/
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- were often followed by the same physician. Locke kept notebooks on 
iatrochemistry just previous to encountering Boyle (1660), by which time 
he had clearly developed an Interest in chemistry. '" ' Although his first 
encounter with empirical science was through iatrochemistry, his greatest 
debt to medicine was to Sydenham’s practice, which (rather than Boyle or 
Bacon) has been claimed the source of Locke’s empiricism. Sydenham’s 
methodology rests on the Hippocratic tradition in which prognosis conforms 
to a general theory of signs of diseases and natural phenomena are held 
to manifest a teleological organisation whose end (in the case of patho­
logical symptoms) is the conservation of life. Sydenham used this
go /only as a working hypothesis. His own method is presented in the
Preface to his Observationes medicae (1676): all diseases are to be
reduced (without recourse to preliminary hypotheses) to determined phenomena,
distinguishing those which are constant from those which are accidental
and noting the accompanying conditions, especially those of the environ­
* 51ment contemporaneous with the stages of the disease, Sydenham did 
not go to the lengths of the ancient medical empirics in opposing hypotheses; 
his opposition was founded on the belief that the understanding cannot 
reach a comprehension of the natural mechanism producing phenomena, which, 
at any rate, manifest a sufficiency rigorous order on their own level.
The two most important texts for Locke’s medical empiricism are the
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manuscripts Be Arte Medioa (1669) and especially Anatomia (1668), in 
which he rejects the utility of anything approaching Cartesian mechanical 
physiology. There is no distinction between formal and material features. 
It is held that there is no way of getting.at the causes of or mechanisms 
behind phenomena, which present a sort of superficial rationality with 
some basis in things. Locke’s theory of signs does not share Sydenham’s 
preconceptions of a regular order to natural phenomena, for the observer 
has some part in their signification, Prom the time, of be Arte Medica, 
Locke was interested in the procedure and conceptions of physicians, not 
experimental rules of practice, Locke calls ideas as well as words 
’’signs” in the last chapter of the Essay and speaks of a general theory 
of semiotics; he adds that perhaps a new logic could be built on this. 
Indeed, a good deal of what Locke says of ideas indicates their nature 
as signs. It has been suggested that this ’’logic” is Sydenham’s medical 
’’logic” generalised. It has also been suggested that Locke’s supposi­
tion of the objectivity of our ideas of material things has its source
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in his medical writings. Still, the exercises of cognitive dispositions 
- either phantasms or concepts - were held by the Scholastics to be signs 
of material features and certain verbal tokens to be signs of them. Locke 
accepts both levels of this theory of signs, which had been rejected by 
Descartes in the ’’Dioptrics” and by Malebranche in the first book of the 
Recherche and was rejected by Leibniz in the Nouveaux Essais. Locke’s 
medical empiricism banishes the problem of the materiality of the phantasy 
or imagination as included in the mind and further allies his position 
with nominalism in general through the theory of signs. It introduces an 
important distinctive aspect in putting our cognition of formal and 
fflaterial features - not perfectly distinguished in the primary-secondary 
quality distinction - much on a par, distinguished for the most part by 
the objects cognised, and adds a confusior. in calling sensible qualities 
"ideas of secondary qualities" (rather than "secondary qualities").
We now consider Suzrez’s theory of signs involved in cognition- ^15
species - and then the theory of material, faculties^ The basis of the 
Scholastic genetic account is the position that
cognition is the assimilation ("assimilatio”) of the cognising power
(whether material or spiritual) to the thing cognised. By ’’assimilation'1
is intended ad-similation, i.e, the cognising power becomes similar to
the thing cognised. (We* here follow Suarez) What makes assimilation
possible on this account is the intensional species, which is the feature
transmitted. On being received by a cognising power (material or spiritual), 
oo
the intensional species is said to be a habitus, i.e. a disposition to 
cognisej thus, on receiving the intensional species, the cognising power 
knows. What it knows is the intensional species itself, at any stage 
from its production to its reception and to this extent it knows -that 
which :produced it, Intensional species are said to be ’’similitudes” of 
objects in cognising powers and indeed are themselves a sort of object, 
viz. that by which the objects cognised are united to the cognising 
powers.^ As a real union between the power and the object is held to 
be either impossible or improportionate, it is held that the union is 
’’intensional”, achieved by a vicarious species of the object. These 
are called ’’species” because they are representing forms; they are called 
’’intensional", not because they are not real beings ("entia"), but because 
they function in cognition ("notio"), which is called "intentio".
Still, these similitudes (also called "images") do not have the same 
qualities as that which they represent (i.e, the species are not "ejusdem 
rationis cum obectis suis”); e.g,, species representing colours are not 
coloured and those representing sounds have no sound. They are neverthe­
less held to be similitudes because, it is maintained that only a similitude 
in essendo, but not one in repreaesentando (such as that between an 
intensional species as a disposition in a cognising power and the same 
species in what produces it), requires a specific unity (i.e. must have 
the same qualities). The intensional species is said to be a similitude
of the object only by an analogy of attribution. Species are accidents 
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(for if they were substances, they could not be received) and their
%union with cognising powers is accidental, i.e. it is not of the nature 
of a cognising power to know this or that, to be informed or specified
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by this or that intensional species. They are held to be real entities 
(i.e, they could be identified independently of what they inform or 
inhere in) and bear with them their own accidental being (’’esse accidentale’’). 
Finally, intensional species are held to be really distinct from the 
cognising powers they inform.^
The Scholastic genetic account relies on a physiology, which, however, 
is not as extreme as the Cartesian because their physics is different. 
Scholastic physics relied on a description of things in every-day terms 
and was concerned with the change and communication of qualities or 
accidents. These accidents, not being of the nature of that in which 
they inhere, were held to be really distinct from their subject and to 
have their own identity as instantiated in re. Cartesian physics, on the 
other hand, relied on a mathematical description of things, assigning 
qualities to law-obeying spatio-temporally continuous configurations.
On this account there is no place for qualities or quantities identifiable 
in re independently of their subject. It was the success of this sort of 
physics which prompted many, Cartesian and otherwise, to turn their back 
on Scholasticism and its intensional species. J.B. de la Grange (like 
Malebranche, an Oratorian) published a work in!(>^ 1675 against the ’’nouveaux 
philosophes” in general. This work of 611 pages is consecrated to maintain­
ing the Scholastic position that there are accidents really distinct from
10/their subjects and is opposed to explanations in terms of local motions.
He disagrees with the Scholastics on the utility of logic, asserting with 
Descartes that ”le bon sens naturel” suffices for reasoning well. Rather
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than begin with logic, one should, begin by finding the truths which are 
the principles of others, the most important of which (he maintains) are 
those which concern accidental forms and sensible qualities. Much of 
the work is taken up in support of the Scholastic genetic account. He 
concludes by advising the Cartesians (who, he claims, concentrate on 
anatomy and study nature in experiments rather than knowing it by reasoning) 
to eschew anatomy (which is useless in deriving philosophical conclusions 
and should be left to physicians and surgeons) and to spend less time on
experiments. They should rather study the rules of reasoning and then
* <03*Peripatetic physics and metaphysics. The account of knowledge, in so 
far as it is contained in the Scholastic treatises on the soul (de anima), 
is tied up with the subject known as "physics” and thence with metaphysics, 
generally concerned with substances and what is attributed to them. This 
is one level on which intensional species are accepted or denied.
In the Scholastic account of how cognition comes about, two sorts of 
species were distinguished: species impressae and species expressae.
The intensional species as dispositions in cognising powers were called 
"species impressae", which term was sometimes reserved for the intensional 
species in the spiritual cognising power, for something (as it were) 
impressed on the soul.!<^ Species impressae are only dispositions and 
are said to be the instruments by which objects are united to cognising 
powers. They represent the object only effectively ("effective"), 
not formally ("formaliter"), i.e. they take part in cognition in so far 
as they are the dispositions exercised, but they are not the cognition 
itself. If species impressae were formal representations, the powers in 
which they inhere would be formally conformal to their objects - they 
would actually cognise their objects - and we should always formally cognise 
all that of which we have species impressae. Furthermore, there could
ai6
then be only one species impressae in any one cognising power, for a
power can cognise only one object at a time?^ Thus the species impressae
is not the analogical similitude by virtue of which the cognising power is
3aid to be assimilated to the object; it is only an instrument for forming
the actual and express similitude. The species whose occurrence is the
act of cognition and the assimilation is the species expressa or conceptus
mentis (not a concept in our sense, but an occurrence in the mind), known
as the phantasm when it is an act of the phantasy. The species expressa
is the product (i.e. cognition in facto esse), not the process (i.e,
cognition in fieri esse) constituting cognition. Suarez explains the
relation between the species impressa and the concept by an analogy hinging
on the Latin verb "concipere”. Species expressae, he writes, are like
seeds of their objects commissioned to the cognising power to form concepts.
As semen does not formally have in itself organs, but only a power of
effectively forming organs in the foetus, so the species impressae are 
I
not formal, but only effective representations of objects. The part 
played by the species expressa or concept is integral to the genetic 
account. It as well is a vicarious representative really distinct 
from the power in which it inheres, for it is the exercise of a species 
impressa. Indeed, since the concept is that by which the cognising power 
is assimilated to the thing cognised, an account of it is the end point 
of the genetic account.
The assimilation between the cogniser and the. thing cognised is a 
correspondence between an occurrence in the cognising power (or in the 
mind, taking ’’mind” broadly), i.e, the species expressa or concept, and 
the object as productive of an intensional species. The cognition could 
be a case of picking out a feature, but it could also be remembering or 
imagining it, for the species expressa depends only on the species impressa
and the power. The species expressa as an intensional (i.e. representing1)
similitude is said to have a unity (i.e. it is the same accident), identity
(viz, intensional) and conformity with what it represents; this conformity
is compared to that of a picture to its exemplar and is said to he by an
analogy of attribution, i.e. the species and its object need not share 
10^qualities. The notion of the assimilation between the cogniser and 
the thing cognised was taken by Suarez and the Scholastics in general to 
be conceptually prior to the notion of truth, which for them was primarily 
non-verbal. We say of statements that they are true; for the Scholastics 
this depends on the success nature of propositional cognition. Similarly, 
if we wish to have a terminal as opposed to a propositional notion of 
truth, the truth of the utterance of a referring term would depend on the 
success nature of essential cognition. Thus Suarez states (taking ’’thing”
- ”res" - broadly, for any subject matter, and ’’adequation” - ’’adaequatio”
- as similar to ’’assimilation” - ”ad-similatio") that real truth consists
in a certain adequation or conformity between the thing and the intellect,
while truth of reason or signification consists in the adequation between
the signifying proposition and the thing signified.1'0 The species expressa 
///' ........................
(which Suarez identifies with the verbum mentis) is in fact an analogue of 
an utterance, as we have characterised occurrences in the mind. They 
would be analogues of natural utterances (if there were such for features) 
and no more have the qualities of their objects than tokens would have 
the qualities of the features whose reception occasions their utterance. 
Both could be thought of as signs of the features received. The utterance 
and not its role is important on this level because of the part played 
by the senses - material faculties - in this account. The assimilation 
between the cogniser and the thing cognised, then, can be thought of as 
the correspondence between the feature and a natural utterance of a
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certain type, although the feature need no longer exist (in the case of
remembering) and may never have existed, (in the case of imagining).
With the collapsing of the Scholastic distinctions between material and 
spiritual faculties, "species impressa" survived in philosophical terminology 
as ’’impression”, indicating the disposition to cognise established in 
sensation. "Idea”, as we shall see, was sometimes associated with "species 
expressa" to Indicate an occurrence in the mind. Locke used "idea" for both 
occurrences and. dipositions. This explains Hume’s claim that he perverted 
the word "idea". (Hume, however, used "impression" for a sort of occurrence, 
viz. a particularly lively one, acknowledging the novelty of this use).
The Scholastic accounts of the sensitive or material faculties involved 
distinctions which were largely lost in the new philosophy. If they were not 
lost, they were treated either in terms of intensity and priority or in purely 
physiological terms, which were already present In the Scholastic account.
The Scholastics included among the senses not only the five external senses 
("sensus exteriores") which receive or perceive the species immediately from 
the material object, but also internal ("inter!ores") senses, which perceive, 
distinguish and conserve species. Organs of internal sense are located in 
the brain and are described by their physical properties to explain, the functions 
of the faculties. The Ooimbrians' “ distinguish two internal senses: the 
common sense ("sensus communis"), which cognises all the (proper) objects of 
the external senses and is located in the wet part of the brain (humidity 
being conducive to reception); and the phantasy ("phantasia") or facultas 
imaginatrix, which perceives ("percipit") as present and absent what the 
common sense cognises only as present and is located in the dry part of the 
brain (dryness being conducive to conservation). Imagination, usually a 
function, but sometimes an act, is strictly assigned to the phantasy, 
although more broadly it includes common sense as well.11& Alsted and. the 
Ooimbrians11^ consider the phantasy a higher faculty, assigning it a judicative 
function ("partim componendo, partim dividendo"). The Ooimbrians hold that 
this is peculiar to higher animals, although all animals have common sense.1^
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They call the memory the "thesaurus spec!erum”121 (a formula repeated by
Locke) and assign two functions to it: one to conserve species (memory
proper) and one to exhibit them (reminiscence, "reminiscent!a”)
Suarez maintains for a number of reasons that the species of internal
sense are distinct from those of external sense.-^3 He holds it probable
that internal species result from the efficacy of internal sense itself, for
the vital powers in the soul all act together, having similar "consensations"
("consension.es") Both the consensio and a sensus agens intentionales
125species - the internal sense itself - are needed for internal species.
These material faculties were retained by certain new philosophers, but 
with the rejection of accidents distinct from their subject the distinctions 
between the faculties collapse..
How if species in spiritual faculties are derived from those in material 
faculties, the spiritual faculties differ from them only in their concern 
with the roles of the occurrences. Yet on the genetic account we become 
subject to the objective structure by virtue of having these occurrences, 
which already have roles in the material faculties. Higher animals, it was 
held, share material faculties with us, and so have similar occurrences in 
these cognising powers. Why, then, should they not perform rational activities? 
Two ways were given for distinguishing material faculties from spiritual: in 
terms of their objects and in terms of their operations. Those who distinguished 
them by their operations did so by what we have called elevating operations. 
Suarez, however, attempted to distinguish them as well by restricting material 
faculties to the first operation of the intellect. We now consider this attempt.
According to E.J. Ashworth, Aquinas (who was followed in this by many and
disparate seventeenth-century logicians)
held that the Organon, and hence logic as a whole, was organised 
according to the three operations of the human mind. The 1 sagoge 
of Porphyry and the Categories correspond to the apprehension of 
simples, the De Interpretations to composition and division, and 
the rest to ratiocination. More simply, we have a division into 
three operations which produce in turn concepts, propositions 
and arguments,126 ’
The firsu "operation" - simple apprehension ~ as usually construed was not an
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operation at all, but essential cognition. The term ’’conceptus” was applied 
to acts of cognition, inceptive or exercisive, in any faculty. VJhen simple 
aporehension is said to be conception (’’conceptio”), it makes no difference 
whether the first operation is in a material or spiritual faculty.
To the traditional three operations of the intellect a fourth - ordering 
or disposition, concerned with method - was added in Cartesian logics, such as 
Arnauld’s and Nicole’s Fort Royal Logic (La Logique, ou 1’Art de Penser, 1662) 
and the first book of Regis’ Systeme de Philosophie (1690), also called ”La 
Logique, ou 1’xtrt de Penser”. The four-fold distinction replaced the three­
fold distinction even among many non-Cartesians and method, ordering or 
disposition was added as a further division of logical, texts in addition to 
those concerned with simple terms, propositions and syllogism. The Cartesian 
logics give the impression that they treat of syllogism only as a matter of 
form and consider ordering the important complex operation.
For many in the seventeenth century, clear and distinct perception and 
”le bon sens naturel” took the place of Scholastic logical rules for com­
position and division (i.e. the second operation) and discourse or syllogising. 
According to the Cartesians, judgement is a function of the will, not the 
intellect, and is concerned with ideas, propositions and arguments. The 
term ’’idea" sometimes took over from ’’species expressa” and, more generally, 
from ’’conceptus”. Thus the occurrence of an idea was identified by some as the
first act of the intellect. 127 But again talk of simply having an idea does
not determine whether or not the faculty is associated with a corporeal organ. 
T 23Bernier maintained'*' ' that the principal function of the phantasy is simple 
apprehension, i.e, bare imagining of a tiling without affirming or denying.
As the phantasy is common to men and beasts, it would seem that simple 
apprehension should fulfil only a biological function, vis, an animal’s or 
man’s being alive to something in its environment, But judgement is held to 
be a complex apprehension of the units apprehended by simple apprehension.
So if simple apprehension is allowed to be a function of the senses, the • 
materials are present in these for the complex operations of the intellect.
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Suarez states1-^ that apprehension (thus called because the power 
receives the object as if by drawing it in) is the act following the 
reception of the intensional species by which the thing is first vitally 
conceived, (in general, apprehension is "mentalis rei formatio sue vitalis 
conceptio per potential cognoscitivam".) Apprehension in general is 
distinguished into simple apprehension (by simple concepts, not compeur.ding 
one thing with another) and composition or composite apprehension, The 
latter divides into the second act or operation of the Intellect (comparing 
or compounding and dividing simple concepts) and the third act or operation 
(discursus, which is comparing one composition to another as consonant to 
or inferrable from it), The gap, which is particularly Important for 
distinguishing the material from the spiritual faculties, occurs between 
the first operation and the second, identified as judgement. Yet judgement 
introduces nothing beyond simple apprehension except another cognition 
which is not simple only because it is about the connection of what is simpl 
apprehended. Judgement, which is not about bare things, but about 
how they are or how they are not, is said to.be only division and 
composition.1^1 It might be thought1that one could distinguish between 
only apprehending - only compounding the extremes without having an opinion 
("sententiam") about the proposition - and judging- also adhering or not 
adhering to the proposition as true or false. But cognising the connection, 
Suarez insists, is judging and is only by reason distinct from composite
apprehension. After forming the proposition, there is no need for the
222
intellect to explicitly judge it true or false. On Suarez1 s view,
judging involves no evaluation and apparently, given simple apprehension,
is automatic. Yet by means of the distinction between simple apprehension
and judging he wishes to distinguish between material and spiritual 
13,3
faculties. No external sense, he‘writes, judges "componendo, vel 
e
dividendo", as they only discern between divers/proper sensibles. Nor, 
he maintains/does any internal sense judge by compounding and dividing, 
but only by simple apprehending.
The Coimbrians and Alsted placed the distinction between the material 
and spiritual faculties in their objects (e.g. singular vs. plural), not 
operations. The Co’imbrians accepted the Thomist position that the 
phantasy, as the vis cogitatrix, has an excellence in man ex defluxu 
rationis such that it compounds and divides singulars to form singular 
propositions and uses syllogisms composed of singular terms; the intellect 
is called ’’ratio universalis”, the vis cogitatrix ’’ration particularis”. 
Likewise, the sensitive appetite in man, joined with the will and arising 
from the same soul, is hfeld to participate in reason. They point out 
that Aristotle holds that the reminiscences (’’actus reminiscendi”) of 
the sensitive memory are like syllogisms, deriving one thing from another. 
Alsted refers to the phantasy judging by composition and division as an 
"idolum rationis”, making, not syllogisms, but idola syllogismorum,
Suarez states1 that Aristotle’s terms ’’particular reason” and ’’passive 
intellect” for the phantasy express only the dependence of our intellect 
on the phantasy, which immediately moves and is often directed by the 
intellect. Both in the Bisputationes^and in the Be Anima*Suarez 
maintains that the imagination frames (’’fingit”) certain beings ("entia”) 
which never were or even could not be from those which fall under sense 
(e.g,, a golden mountain or a chimera). In the Bisputationes this function
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is first said to be due to a participation of human imagination in the 
power ("vis") of reason, but is then said to be more simply attributed 
to reason. In the He Anima this function is mentioned to support the 
view that the senses err and are corrected by the intellect. Error, 
however, implies false judgement; thus if the senses err, they would be 
assigned a judicative function. This is avoided in the Disputationes1 
where Suarez maintains that truth and falsity are not in simple acts, 
whether in the intellect or the senses. As the imagination apprehending 
a golden mountain does not compound, neither do the external senses err 
when they apprehend something which does not exist or other than it is 
because they apprehend it as present and existing. This is not proper 
error (he claims), for, e.g,, vision does not err formally, not judging 
about the subject of colour; rather than falsity, this is an imperfection 
and an occasion of error.
Yet even as occasions, the occurrences in material powers have roles 
as materials of judgements. Suarez maintains that in every sense there 
is not only simple apprehension, but also judgement primo modo, intrinsic 
to the act of cognition. In the cognition by vision of black, a simple 
act is said to be elicited and likewise for the cognition of white.
There is not held to be a third act elicited by which vision judges 
the one to be distinct from the other. Rather, vision is said to tacitly 
(’’exercite”) judge that colours are different and the common sense to 
tacitly judge about the differences of diverse sensibles (e.g,, colour ‘ 
and sound) In admitting tacit judgements, although he avoids a further, 
complex act, Suarez admits that the occurrences in the material faculties 
are already in the roles in which the corresponding occurrences in the 
spiritual faculties take place. Intellectual competences must be 
presupposed, for even if these occurrences could be stated in a
non-propositional fashion, e.g., as the apprehension of a body to be 
black, this presupposes the competences not only to apprehend the body 
to be black, but also to be not white and to be non-coloured. In addition, 
competences to apprehend bodies as spatially and temporally distinct must 
be presupposed. In a word, the logical structure of colour-words and 
a great deal more must be presupposed if the reception of sensible species 
even by the external senses is to be anything like what we call, e.g., 
seeing a body to be black.
Bernier, indeed, held that tacitly judging counts as judging and 
thus allowed the other two operations of the Intellect to the material 
powers, albeit concerned only with singulars. Further, Bernier saw no 
distinction between the sensitive faculties of men and higher animals.
An affirmative judgement, he maintains,is only the apprehension of 
a thing with some adjoint, a negative judgement is that of a thing as 
distinct from such an adjoint. Thus, e.g., when a dog thinks a man 
to be his master, he apprehends the man with mastership. The dog’s 
enunciation, then, is imagining ’’I’Homme maistre”, which contains ”est”
(« | lj-”en puissance1’;. Likewise, when the dog recognises the man
not to be his master, he conceives ’’1’homme non maistre”. Again, the
judgement by the phantasy (privations being the products of the intellect)
that absinthe is sour contains ”en puissance” the judgement that it is
not sweet. Given these ’’propositions en puissance”, it is but a step
to affirm that the phantasy reasons: as the phantasy can connect or
separate two simple apprehensions (according to whether they agree or
disagree), it can connect or separate in ’’argumentation” one of these 
fLSapprehensions with a third,
Bernier supports his position that animals make subject—predicate 
judgements and reason with a behavioural argument in which examples are
225
evinced of animals responding to signs of danger or of other aspects of their 
environment.-^ However, while animal behaviour displays cognition of things 
to us, what animals are said to cognise depends on the objective structure 
present to us; animals, not performing conventional acts, have no objective 
structure present to them. In particular, in describing animal cognition, we 
sometimes employ non-descriptive rules and concepts, such as those governing 
the use of purely grammatical and logical terns as are needed for formulating 
propositions and arguments; yet this does not imply that animals follow 
purely conventional rules, Suarez allows a corrective function of the 
intellect over the senses; other Scholastics spoke of a participation of the 
higher sensitive faculties in reason and Bernier speaks of the senses per­
forming rational activities restricted to singulars. All three positions to 
differing degrees bring out the implications of maintaining that the roles of 
feelings by which we are alive to things are determined by the reception of 
vicarious entities by sensitive faculties. Allowing simple apprehension in the 
material faculties places the materials of rational activities in these faculties,
which are shared by man and beast. The correction of the senses by the 
intellect and the participation of higher sensitive faculties in reason would 
be better explained by the application of the objective structure in evaluating
observation reports and governing the uses of the utterances involved
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Chapter VII 
The Intelleetus Agens
We have seen difficulties in distinguishing material and spiritual 
faculties in terms of operations. We might try instead a distinction in 
terms of objects. Species have already been discussed and we have mentioned 
what were known as intelligible species - species in a spiritual faculty, in 
the intelleetus possibilis to be exact. These are an obvious starting point 
for the search for objects peculiar to spiritual faculties. As they are held 
not only to be essential for rational cognition, but also to derive from our 
relations to the ambient world, they are held to require the intelleetus 
agens ~ the major subject of this chapter.
Three views about the intelleetus agens are distinguished; the first 
was nominalist (and accepted by Gassendists), as was the second (much of 
which Suarez accepted), while the third was Thomist. The first position 
rejects the intelleetus agens and intelligible species; rational cognition 
is due to the intellect’s use of material species in new roles. On the 
second position, the intelleetus agens is largely ad hoc, duplicating the 
species in the phantasy; the resulting intelligible species of ’’material 
singulars” are the material from which the intelleetus possibilis constructs
its science. The third position maintains that rational cognition is a
. . . . t . .function of the intelleetus agens, which applies concepts in what is called 
conversio ad phantasmata.
Conversio ad phantasmata involves (it was maintained) a certain sort 
of spiritual object (viz. the verbum, an objectum in quo), which Suarez 
rejects as a veil between the cogniser and the thing cognised. Rather (he 
maintains), rational cognition of things involves only an object by which 
we cognise, but which is not itself cognised. However, when Suarez comes to
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discuss our knowledge of science, he finds it necessary to introduce an 
objectum cognitum which is not a material singular - the conceptus objectivus 
In Suarez’s account, this is the object which is peculiar to spiritual 
faculties and accounts for our science. (None of these objects are
identified with the intelligible species, which is dispositional.)
“Conceptus objectivus" is also the historical antecedent of "objective 
reality" in Descartes’ sense and "idea" as used by Malebranche and Leibniz.
The individuation of rational beings was attributed to the intellectus 
agens or the intellectus possibilis (or both). If the intellectus possibilis 
is replaced by dispositions in an ultimately mechanical body and the 
intellectus agens is held to be something common - as is apparently the case 
with Malebranche - then the standard accounts of individuation (which are 
questionable in any case) fail. On the other hand, if (as in the first 
nominalist position) species in material faculties are regarded as that by 
which we cognise and if a mechanical physiology is accepted, then there 
arises a mysterious relation between mechanical activity and sensation, 
precisely as Bernier finds. It is significant that the intellectus agens 
or what stood in its stead was central to the theory of knowledge and the 
ontological status of rational beings.
In the following discussion, we follow Suarez in discussing first 
the opposition between the first position on the intellectus agens and the 
other two positions, and then the clash between these last two. Suarez’s 
notion of the conceptus objectivus is then considered, and the chapter 
ends with the Cartesian solutions to the knowledge-theoretical and onto­
logical problems associated with the intellectus agens.
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The intelleetus agens was the centre of some of the more persistent 
problems in the history of philosophy. The notion arises from Aristotle’s
r- 1
De Anima III, 5 which Ross calls “the culminating point of Aristotle’s 
psychology.” Aristotle maintains that there is a general distinction 
between the matter which is potentially each of a class of things and the 
efficient cause which makes them; hence, in the soul, one reason - vtvj 
TraQr^ri-Koj (intelleetus possibilis. which we call passive reason when 
used before Aquinas) - becomes all things, the other - vcftj
(intelleetus agens, active reason) - makes all things. Passive reason Is
held to become all things because it is an Aristotelian principle that
that which cognises becomes (intehsionally) identical with the object
cognised. The sense in which active reason makes all things is meant to
be explained in part by an independent example of the general distinction:
the distinction between an art and its material. Ross suggests that the
role of active reason is to make passive reason become its objects by
apprehending them; so this is an instance of the general principle that
"what is potentially comes to be actually by the agency of something that
already is actually?(Met. 1049 b. 24). Aristotle continues: active reason 
x
is to the intelligible as light is to the visible. y This suggests that 
the fact that active reason already knows all intelligible objects makes 
it possible for passive reason actually to know and for the object to be
known.
Although this is far from clear, the greater occasion of controversy 
arose from Aristotle’s attempt to specify active reason beyond its function— 
’’The active reason,” he writes, ”is separable and impassible and unraixed, 
being an actuality.” ’’Separable” here evidently means “capable of 
surviving death”. Aristotle apparently held that active reason goes beyond 
the individual and is obscured by its association with a particular body, 
while the passive intellect is mortal •
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The relation between active and passive reason suggests the
relation between an objective structure and behaviour which instantiates
or applies concepts involved in it. Lack of space precludes going on
to investigate to what extent Aristotle actually was concerned with a 
5
culturally determined objective structure. Much Greek thought, and
notably Aristotle’s thought at times (he never mentions God in the De
Anima), avoids the God-intoxication which followed it. Yet where it
does so, it tends to rely on a uniform nature, thought to determine
cultural aspects. At any rate, Aristotle’s brief development of the
notion of active reason was heady stuff. Theophrastus, Aristotle’s 
. 7
successor or Scholarch in the Lyceum, regarded as serious, if not
Q
insoluble, the problems thus raised. Themistius (A. D. 320-350) wrote
about this notion: “The philosopher himself is here more like a puzzled
inquirer than a teacher.“ in fact, Aristotle discusses God expressly
in Metaphysics /\ , which was a major reason for a persistent tradition
o
of identifying active reason with God .
The identification of active reason with God took various forms
but all concluded something about the ontological status of man from an 
account of human knowledge. Alexander of Aphrodisias (H. c. A.D.200, 
called the Commentator, because he was for centuries regarded as the most 
authoritative exegete of Aristotle) identified active reason with both 
divine intelligence and divine activity and held that there was no 
individual immortality. Among the Moslems, Avicenna (d. 950) held a 
somewhat similar position, as did Averrofts (1126-1198) who added that 
individuation of rational beings is due to differences in their 
accumulated phantasmata (so individuality ceases at death.)^. The 
Jewish philosopher. Maimonides (1135-1204)made a slight advance on his 
fellow Spaniard •: the accumulated intellectual capital
enriches the intelligence common to all With little textual support,
some have seen Maimonides as a decisive influence on Spinoza; hut
scholastic precedents for Spinoza’s pantheism (if they are to he sought) 
were present in his own country and day in the discussions of the
intellectus agens, which drew from the Moslem and Jewish traditions*
To the middle of the thirteenth century, Latin Christendom was
nurtured on Augustine’s theory of mind and knowledge (which shows some 
12taint of the doctrine of active reason)* It was then presented
through the Arabs with a rich literature on active reason. Avicenna
13was first used to clarify Aristotle; then Averrofts arrived on the scene. ' 
An acceptable position was reached by Aquinas, although questions of the 
status of eternal truths and the role of the cognition of singulars in the 
acquisition of science- especially as asked by Scotus and the nominalists- 
kept the problem open.
What we are interested in is the opposition between later Thomism 
and nominalism on the subject of the intellectus agens, Suarez* position 
and various seventeenth century resolutions. Suarez and the Cotmbrians 
were famous for their encyclopedic references to previous positions, Greek, 
Arab, early Christian, and particularly Scholastic. All the
philosophers we have mentioned were summarised by them. Thus the various 
positions, with arguments for and against, were readily available in the 
seventeenth century.
It is important to realise that, at the time Suarez and the 
Coimbrians were writing, the identification of the intellectus agens with 
God was a live issue. ziabarella (1532-1589) of Padua argues as follows.^ 
Aristotle states in ne Anima (430euL7? that the intellectus (mens) agens 
exists apart from matter. in Metaphysics Z\ , where alone he expressly 
discusses the variety of immaterial forms, he limits these to God and 
intelligences. As the function of the latter is only to move their 
respective spheres, the intellectus agens must be God. Zabarella was
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the most influential non-Jesuit Scholastic for the seventeenth century: 
he is often cited by Suarez and the Co'imbrians and his popularity in 
Protestant countries is attested in the literature we previously referred 
to. His greatest influence was in logic (i.e. methodology), but it is as 
a commentator on Aristotle that he is still of value. With such an inter­
pretation of Aristotle in the Scholasticism with which Malebranche was 
familiar, it is not surprising that at least one more recent Aristotelian 
scholarhas suggested that Aristotle’s conception of active reason is 
similar to Malebranche’s theory of seeing things in God.
The illustration of phenomena is the one action of the intellectus 
agens according to Suarez, but it goes under two other descriptions^. It 
is also said to be the abstraction of species from phantasm or a spirituali­
sation, de-materialisation, subtilisation or attenuation of intensional 
species. This abstraction for Suarez does not involve a movement from less 
to more general, for the species effected is said to represent the same 
nature as the phantasm. Nor does it involve a separation and transferring 
to the intellectus possibilis: ’’hoc enim est puerile cogitare”. The third 
description of this operation is the effecting of things understood by 
their nature (”actu intelligibiles”), i.e. intelligible species; thus it 
is called ’’agens", for its function is to make the thing intelligible, to 
make the species’^. This is the
J1
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only reason it is called, "intellectus", for the production of a species 
is not understanding.' Rather, the intellectus possibilis receives 
the species and produces the act of understanding and is called "intellectus” 
because it understands and "possibilis" because it is informed by species,
The intellectus agens is not a cognising power and its action is transient^ 
while the intellectus possibilis is a cognising power and its action is
immanent. The Go'imbrians state that, as the intellectus possibilis
is initially a tabula rasa, there must be a spiritual power - the
intellectus agens - by which it is led ("ducitur") to act. These two
intellectus, they add, are really distinct as in other things there are
two really distinct aspects ("affecta"), one effecting a disposition in
the other for its operations fire is distinct from the wood it heats
and heat and other objects of the external sense are distinct from the 
*) o
senses on which they brand ("inurunt") their similitudes.
Suarez allowed for "consensation" ("consensio") to account for the
production of species in internal sense, given those of external sense. 
Why could he not allow for the same for the production of intelligible 
species? And why, given this consensio, could not species in the 
phantasy secure dispositions and intelligible species not be called 
upon? After all, it is the same soul. The best reason for Suarez to 
insist on intelligible species and the intellectus agens is the sharp 
distinction he draws between material and spiritual faculties as 
illustrated by his attempt to reserve the second two operations of the 
intellect to spiritual powers. The intellectus agens appears as an 
ad hoc bridge between material and spiritual powers, called upon only 
for the spiritualisation of intensional species. In particular, Suarez 
denies the Thomist ^rUrne§?Sthe intellectus agens by which we
judge all things, certain semina scientiarum, primae conceptiones
2y$
IntellectUs put there by God and having divine exemplars.
At the beginning of the third book of the De Anima, Suarez presents 
two reasons for denying species in general, i.e. for denying that there 
must be a conjunction of the object with the power for an act of cognising. 
The first reason is from physics and denies that it is a prerequisite to 
action that the term ("terminus”) be conjoined with the agent. This is 
the basis of nominalist rejections of species; it need not be generally 
applied, for species might be deemed necessary in one power and in this 
power suffice for another power. The second reason is that fictions 
would be species, yet they are not similitudes of objects. This is a 
powerful point, for it indicates that "cognise" is not a success verb. 
Suarez has his own way out with concepttts objectivi, which are integrated 
into his account only with the Disputationes. Here he argues only 
against the general point and relies on physical arguments to support 
the need for species in all cognising powers. The burden is on what 
is said of external sense, where he produces arguments to show that 
what is received (e.g., a visual image) is indeed needed for cognition 
as a vicarious object. He then simply states that we experience ("ex- 
perimur") that certain similitudes of corporeal things are formed in 
imagining and that if nothing remained in the power in the absence of 
the thing, the power could not cognise the. thing. He thence concludes 
that species are needed for memory (disposition), reminiscence and 
intellection.
The general, physical position denying the need for a term in the 
agent, Suarez states,*2'^has been attributed to Galens; he suggests 
Augustine on vision and adds (with more relevance) Ockham (in 2. Quaest.,
17 & 18). This is a nominalist position, although some (e.g., Burandus 
and Biel) make some concessions. The interesting position is of those
who concede that sensible objects must be conjoined to powers by species, 
but deny that there are intelligible species.'2'^ Durandus explicitly 
presents this opinion (Henry and a certain John Bacon are also mentioned), 
which appears to Suarez to be thought out expressly to avoid the 
difficulties which arise with regard to the means of producing intelligible 
species. On this position, the intellect cannot be excited to operate 
by a material object, because it is spiritual; but it can be by the 
cognition of the senses, for the same soul both senses and understands.
All the cognising powers in man (this position continues) participate in 
reason and if the soul apprehends something by sense, it is thereby 
excited to cognise more exactly by intellect.
Suarez never directly replied to Durandus1 opinion. In the immediate 
context in which it is presented, he gives only the proof described above 
for species in all powers and appeals to authority on the need for 
intelligible species and the intellectus agens.Aristotle supports 
the intellectus agens. Intelligible species are supported independently 
by citing authorities with innatist positions, in all cases held to 
involve species. Plato is said to have posited ’’inditas omnium rerum 
species”; Dionysius asserted that angels from the beginning have species 
of all things; and Augustine wrote that God produced for all time 
things both in themselves and (by giving angels the similitudes of them) 
in the intellects of angels. Suarez, however, does not answer why -there 
must be dispositions in spiritual powers of men.
Durandus1 version of consensio makes the intellectus agens redundant. 
Durandus’ arguments were the best known arguments by a Scholastic against 
the intellectus agens in the seventeenth century, having been summarised 
by the Coimbrians.^ Durandus distinguishes two functions for which 
the intellectus agens has been posited, arguing separately against
each. The first concerns the intellectus agens as Suarez envisages it, 
functioning only in inceptive cognition producing an intelligible species. 
Durandus interprets this position as implying that the intellectus agens 
impresses something on the phantasm-by which it is made fit to produce 
an intelligible species in the intellectus possibilis. But, then, 
either a spiritual or a material quality is impressed. Not a spiritual 
quality, however, because there cannot be a spiritual quality in some­
thing material; and not a material quality, which would make the phantasm 
no more fit to produce an intelligible species. The second, Thomist 
function for which the intellectus agens is posited is the production 
of exercises of the intellectus possibilis. (The arguments against this 
position also apply to Suarez’s position, for inceptive cognition is an 
exercise of the intellectus possibilis due to the action of the intellectus 
agens.) Durandus objects that intellection is an immanent act and there 
is no reason to call what does not understand ’’intellectus”. Again, if 
these two faculties are distinguished in this way, then an angel should 
have an intellectus agens, there should be a sensus agens and there 
should be a voluntas agens producing actions and a voluntas patiens 
receiving them. Also, there is the problem of whether the intellectus 
agens judges. If it does, then there would be two faculties judging 
things (it and the material potentia intelleotrix) distinct from the 
faculty which understands. If it does not, then it is less noble than 
the intellectus possibilis; but according to Aristotle and Augustine 
what acts is more noble than what receives (’’patiente”). Finally,
Durandus presents a third-man argument against this position in that 
it posits the intellectus agens to beget immaterial beings (’’entia”) 
of a degree and order different from that of phantasms. In this case,
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the phantasm cannot be even an instrumental cause, for a species which
is already spiritual would be needed to concur with the intellectus agens,
itself immaterial.
Rejecting species in the intellect and the distinction between two 
sorts of intellect or understanding, with the consequent disappearance 
of the intellectus agens, gives a different twist to the Scholastic 
genetic or causal account. This version was more acceptable to those 
in the seventeenth century who rejected accidents distinct from their 
subjects (which was anticipated by the nominalists). Bernier' rejects 
the distinction between the intellectus agens and possibilis, said to 
be contrived by Aristotle. 'The usual distinctions appear absurd to him, 
most notably that according to which the intellectus agens lacks under­
standing of things, yet foras species of them, while the intellectus
possibilis, incapable of forming species, understands by species. If 
•il
the terms are to be retained, he states, we should follow Ockham and 
Gabriel, distinguishing the two intellects neither really nor by reason, 
but calling the soul ’’intellectus agens” as it produces actual intellection 
- an act of understanding - and ’’intellectus patiens” as it receives its own 
act. But the terms, he agrees with Burandus, only create confusion: 
the intellect (’’entendement”) is a simple faculty of understanding.
Bernier also rejects intelligible species, for the intellect, he 
maintains, is a faculty of a genus superior to the phantasy, containing 
eminently all its force. When the phantasy forms a phantasm (’’phantQme”, 
said to be an image or resemblance) of a thing (either in being struck or 
in exercising a disposition had by virtue of having been struck), the 
same phantasm is envisaged by both faculties - the understanding under­
stands what the phantasy imagines - because the understanding is intimately 
present to and adheres to the phantasy. The understanding attendens
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ad phantasmata intelligit because the soul or understanding uses only
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the species furnished by the body while it remains in the body. His 
rejection of immaterial, intelligible species is not new and extraordinary, 
Bernier insists, for it was held by Themistius among the ancient
Peripatetics, Avenipare among the Arabs and among the modems he mentions 
Henry and a number of nominalists: Burandus, Gotfrey, Bacon (presumably 
John) and Gabriel.
The understanding is not distinguished in Bernier1 s position from 
the phantasy by its objects; nor is the understanding unique in its 
logical operations, for Bernier allows all three operations of the 
intellect to the phantasy. Rather, the intellect can use phantasms 
in new roles. That the intellect uses no other species than phantasms 
is said to be shown by the fact that we understand everything under some 
corporeal species or phantasm; but we thereby understand incorporeal 
things (God, angels and the rational soul) and the understanding by its 
eminence can elevate itself on the occasion of phantasms to understand 
what the phantasy can only imagine. But the understanding or soul is 
held to develop these roles, making its own rules and concepts. All 
knowledge (’’connoissance"), he states, begins with singulars because 
the understanding understands only by species in the phantasy impressed 
by the senses, which perceives only singulars. Although we often argue 
from the more general to the more special (he concedes- ), we must first 
begin with singulars to infer what is general, whence we can infer what 
is more special and eventually return to singulars. Thus universal 
axioms are said to be derived from singulars by induction' ' and the 
validity of a priori demonstration (from universal to more special) 
is said to depend on a posteriori proofs of its principles,Again,
the analytic or resolutive method (proper for teaching), proceeding by 
division from universals to singu lars, is preceded by the synthetic
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or composite method (proper for discovery), gathering together singulars 
to arrive at universals. “ '
These elevating operations, giving new roles to phantasms, according 
to Bernier indicate the disproportion between the properties of matter 
(i.e. the figure, solidity and local motion of atoms) and the understand­
ing, and so prove it incorporeal and distinct from the phantasy.
Bernier, an atomist, rejects prime matter, but retains the Scholastic 
rational soul; hence for him there is an even greater gulf between the 
material and spiritual faculties and no bridge furnished by the intellectus 
agens. Indeed, he writesthat it is inconceivable that a phantasm, 
being purely corporeal, could be made or become an incorporeal species 
by being atten uated or subtilised. The species by which- the intellect 
understands is still distinct from it, for the rational soul is distinct 
from the body. But now it is not evident how the intimate presence of 
the phantasy to the understanding adds anything which is not already 
given by the fact that the understanding is in an environment. Burandus
could maintain that there is a sort of consensio between the material
and spiritual faculties because he holds that man is a suppositum
in telli gens, ^involving only one substantial form. But one sort of 
description Bernier gives of material faculties is like hits description 
of the rest of the world, ultimately resting on atoms which already 
have their own substantial forms. Another way Bernier draws the distinc­
tion between corporeal and incorporeal is in terms of what is not passive
as opposed to_what is:
or receptive,/ the understanding cognises (”conno£t”) without.being struck, 
other way
shocked or pass ive" in any /. (”il ne patit ou ne soufre aucunement”),
. _ . ' while the phantasy produces the species expressa
("espece expresse") when struck or when it envisages or conceives the 
thing as it is perceived by sense in being struck.* The species impressa
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is said, to be the fold caused in the brain, while the species e^pressa 
('’espece expresse”) is the same fold (vestige or impression) looked at 
in actually imagining or thinking and is said to be alone properly the 
species or image, being the thing itself as it becomes the object of 
the imagination and objectively in the phantasy.
Yet he maintains that even animals judge and reason, that they have
sensitive souls and their behaviour in some cases is similar to rational
human behaviour. The mystery for Bernier lies more in the gradual change
from what is insensible to what is sensible than in the eminence of the
understanding over the phantasy, for which he invokes the same principle
as accounts for the fact that the degree of animal, more noble than
that of plant, contains in a more excellent way vegetation, growth and
generation. He dedicates a chapter to the problem of getting from
atoms to what they cause, viz. sensation. Presenting numerous examples
of things insensible on their own, but which cause noticeable sensations
when taken together, he goes through various stages of animation, showing
how sensation is continuous from the inanimate (e.g,, heat) on up. He
concludes that, since nature does not jump from one extreme to the other,
”une chose insensible devient sensible par une espece de progres ..,,
A <2quoy que 1’intelligence humaine ne le puisse pas observer”. It is 
above the wisdom of the human mind to explain how corpuscles cause
sensation in the soul. One would be no further removed from Bernier’s
position in asserting that there is life throughout as in asserting that 
the operations of the phantasy are explicable in terms of figure, solidity 
and local motion, which conspire to produce the roles in which phantasms 
occur; the function of the incorporeal understanding is then to produce 
new roles for phantasms, the materials of reasoning and knowledge.
On Bernier’s position, as on the general genetic or causal account,
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the understanding or intellect is a tabula rasa to begin with, acquiring 
materials through its intercourse with its environment, whether these 
materials are located in the phantasy or are held to inform the intellect 
itself. Furthermore, on a position such as Bernier’s, the understanding 
in a sense remains a tabula rasa, for what we have said to be physically 
in the mind is located in the phantasy. But how could a tabula rasa be 
something spiritual or anything else? For Bernier, what is spiritual is 
distinguished by its elevating operations. But for Hobbes speech takes 
over from the operations of the spiritual faculties and there is no 
problem of the relation between the locus of sensing and that of under­
standing, The explanation of things for Hobbes is uniquely due to 
knowledge of cause and effect (usually seen as a logical relation between 
premise and conclusion). Speech (it is held), by the imposition of 
names and connections of them, helps in remembering causes and effects; 
thus the reckoning of the consequences of things in the mind is turned 
into a reckoning of the consequences of names, Universals, relations, 
negations and privations are all explained in terms of names and reasoning 
is interpreted on a mathematical model as reckoning with names. The 
second two acts of the intellect and the objects peculiar to it are thus 
taken over by operations with words. Simple apprehension can be either 
sensing features or sensing verbal tokens, which are natural singulars, 
but can be given new roles by us. Still, as with Bernier, we are to 
ask how what is simply apprehended has roles to begin with if everything 
is explained by motion. Hobbes, who collapses the distinctions between 
sensitive faculties, also denies that the species of sense are received ' 
in sensitive powers. Father (as a consequence of denying accidents 
distinct from their subject) sensible qualities are held to be only 
phantoms. These are taken to be. acts in no way distinct from the sense,
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as Hobbes states that there is no distinction between process (the act 
60in fiere) and the product (the act in facto esse) in an instant.
Although phantasms or phantoms in no way resemble the motion which
causes them, we cannot help attributing them to their cause; thus
phantasms represent their causes, serving as distinguishing marks of 
5/them. Again with Hobbes, as with Bernier, the mystery is in the leap 
from mechanical activity to sensation. Phantasms for Hobbes are our 
feelings as being alive to features; yet they fulfil roles and can be 
elevated into different roles in the imposition of names. This, however, 
is not the imposition of an 'objective stricture, but an individuals 
effecting of rules. Effecting rules is itself a rule—governed activity, 
but for Hobbes there are no rules to govern this activity - thus Leibniz1 s 
charge of plusquam nominalism against Hobbes.
We now consider the two positions which admit the intellectus agens 
and intelligible species. This leads to Suarez's account, which, though 
basically that of the nominalist position presented here, is a mitigated 
genetic account in that he allows objects peculiar to spiritual faculties.
The Co'imbrians present three texts in which they opposite those who 
maintain that what is in the intellect represents the same material or 
sensible singular as the phantasm, on the one hand, to those, on the
other, who hold that only the common nature represented by the phantasm
. . . 52and removed from the singular conditions is in the intellect . The 
first position is attributed to Scotus and various nominalists; the second 
is Thomist. They portray the nominalists as holding that the abstraction 
done by the intellectus agens does not result in an abstract nature and 
that all dispositions in the intellectus possibilis are of singulars .
The burden of the distinction between spiritual and material, then is 
borne by the elevating operations of the intellectus possibilis, by
which its exercises relate to universals.
242
The question arises of how on the Thomist position concepts (in our 
sense) are applied, especially as it is maintained that there is no pro­
portion between the intellect and material singulars, for the intellect is
. 54completely immaterial . But this (they hold) is consonant with the
genius of nature, which never conserves with many what it can conserve 
. 55 ...with few . Thus intelligible species of common natures suffice for
understanding singular things, for as a phantasm concurs with the
intellectus agens to produce the intelligible species, so when the
intellectus possibilis is informed with the species of a common thing, the
phantasm can concur, not as an exemplar only, but also actively determining
the intellect to conceive the singular thing whose phantasm it is^.
Aristotle’s position, it is added, is that we do not understand singulars
by direct, but by reflex cognition; if there were species of singulars in
the intellect, they would be understood directly. The cognition of a
singular is said to be reflective because it is said to be cognised in a
verbum, which is the concept as interpreted by the Thomists, an act of
cognition of a concept (in our sense of "concept”) applied to things. The
cognition of singulars in concepts is called "conversio ad phantasmata",
which is the application of rules and concepts to things. This position
relies on the symmetry between inceptive and exercisive cognition of the
intellect. Because the intellectus agens uses semina scientiarum, both
"abstract" and "cognise" (when pertaining to the intellect) are success
verbs. Thus it is maintained^? that if the intellect conceived singular
concepts, the intellectus agens would be posited in vain, for a fiction
("fictitia") would be an abstraction and the work of the intellectus agens.
"Intelligere" as used here means much the same as "understand".
58The nominalist reply relies on the view that inceptive and exer­
cisive intellection are asymmetric. Our intellect (the reply goes) 
cannot use phantasms alone as a principle of understanding, but requires
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a principle intimately conjoined, to it - the intellectus agens - whence 
it brings forth (’’promat”) the act of understanding. Likewise, an external- 
assistance by phantasms is not sufficient for conceiving this or that, 
for it must be actively determined by an internal principle - here not 
the intellectus agens, but a singular intelligible species. This asymmetry, 
however, depends on the elevating operations of the intellectus possibilis, 
making its rules as it goes. Denying conversio ad phantasmata or any 
other means of applying rules and concepts not formulated by elevating 
operations, this is a full genetic or causal account.
Now Suarez, for whom the intellectus agens and the intelligible 
species cannot be just ad hoc because of the sharp division between
cq
material and spiritual faculties, also denies conversio ad phantasmata.
But he does so because of this sharp division. He insists that the 
intellect knows material singulars directly without reflection by their 
own proper species. Against the Thomists it is maintained that the 
intellect knows the particular conditions of things better than the 
senses; indeed, the intellect is a much more perfect memory, conserving 
intelligible species of particular conditions, than is found in the
sensitive faculties, for the senses cognise pastness materially, while 
6 0the intellect cognises it formally, Angels must have more than abstract 
species, for by abstract species singular natures could not be cognised
in a most perfect way. If conversio ad phantasmata were allowed,
• ■ 62 only the phantasm itself, which is a material singular, could be cognised. 
Not allowing that the phantasy in man participates in reason, the phantasm 
would not supply individuating conditions for the application of concepts 
to things, but would veil things from acts of cognition. Suarez wishes 
to maintain a sort of direct' realism: the concept as the exercise of a 
species is said to be an objectum quo or non cognitum which is the act of 
cognition itself. The only term produced in cognition which he allows
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is the act itself, not as a process (”in fierei”), but as a product ("in 
facto esse"). In particular, the Thomist verbum is denied, for this would 
be an objectum in quo, i.e. that in which the singular is cognised, and would 
veil the material singular as an objectum quod (i.e. cogniturn). This dis­
plays a misunderstanding of how rules and concepts are applied to things.
There is an ontological point (related to his sharp distinction 
between material and spiritual faculties) behind Suarez’s disagreement with 
the Thomists on the status of the intellectus agens. Suarez has the intellect 
outfitted with species in the course of its history in its environment.
Once outfitted, there is no need for the intellectus agens nor of the 
phantasy, which the intellectus possibilis duplicates. Given this dupli­
cation, Suarez apparently thought he had a principle of individuation of 
separated souls. .
Rational beings were variously regarded as individuated by the
intellectus possibilis and the intellectus agens. Suarez claims that
almost all the Greeks held that both intellects are separated "substances"
6 3applying to the soul, which functions as an intellectus passivus .
Aristotle’s statement that the intellectus agens is impassive and alone 
immortal is seen as favouring Avicenna’s view that it governs all things 
from above. And Alexander of Aphrodisias, he adds, held that the
intellectus agens is God because Aristotle stated that it makes all.
64 ... .Suarez follows Aquinas in rejecting these positions on the intellectus 
agens because (he claims) Aristotle showed that the soul is intrinsically 
understanding and so needs something intrinsic to produce intelligible 
species. And Augustine argued that if the power ("virtus") producing 
species were a separate substance, its production would not depend on the 
phantasms of the body. But, we might ask, why would it not suffice to have 
occurrences of material faculties instantiate rational operations by virtue
of being subject to conventional rules?
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More important for Suarez is the individuation of the intellectus 
65possibilis. According to Aquinas , both intellects are involved in acts 
66of intellection ("dictio") and so are immortal. Suarez follows Aquinas 
in explaining Aristotle's statement that the intellectus passibilis is 
mortal. Aquinas holds that this refers to the phantasy as memory, which is 
a sort of intellect - the intellectus patibilis - insofar as it is subject 
to reason. This does not prejudice the question of the immortality of 
the intellectus passibilis as identified with the intellectus possibilis.
Suarez disagrees with Aquinas in having the intellectus possibilis
the principle intellectual faculty and the sole immortal one. Aristotle
called the intellectus agens a light (i.e. a source of light, ’'lumen”).
Aquinas states this in the form that the intellectus agens manifests or
illustrates phantasms^?. He holds that knowledge ("habitus") of first
principles is an effect of the intellectus agens and that the cognition of
first principles is the same in all men because the intellectus agens is 
68 ■innate ("insitus") in all . The intellectus possibilis, on the other hand,
is initially a tabula rasa; it (unlike prime matter, which is something
only by having form) is not something by virtue of having intelligible 
. 69 Opposed to this, Suarez takes "light" for what manifestsspecies
others, not themselves, and so takes the intellectus possibilis to be the 
light manifesting truth in things^. The manifestation of terms must be in 
that which, informed by species, elicits acts of cognition, i.e. the
intellectus possibilis, which alone suffices for assenting to first
. . 71 .... . . . .principles . This position is reinforced by his terminalism, according to
which what is received via the senses alone need be cognised for the cogni-
. . . . 72tion of the connection of terms and so of first principles . Rational pro­
positional cognition is regarded as only a cognition of a series of
empirical essential cognitions. Yet the intellectus possibilis is also held 
... 73to be a tabula rasa initially . What he is really interested in, though,
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is the intellectus possibilis as already outfitted, in the way separated
souls and angels (he holds) have intellectus possibiles, but not intellectus 
74 . . .agentes . For him, but not Aquinas, the intellectus agens both effects 
. . 75acts of understanding and receives species . Aquinas admitted a real dis- 
7 6tinction between the two intellects ; Suarez sees the distinction as some­
thing less than this??.
Suarez insists that the intelligible species is the only light produced 
. 73 .by the intellectus agens . Aquinas held that phantasms are not purely
material or spiritual, for the human soul abounds with different powers?^
. . . 75and the soul m a certain way is of the body . Suarez maintained that a
soul of a more perfect degree (e.g. rational) always supposes the inferior
(e.g. sensitive) and so the rational soul cannot be united to the body 
76unless it receives some intellectual cognition through the senses . But he
holds that the intelligible species, being spiritual, must be made by
the intellectus agens, not the phantasm, for a material thing cannot
make a spiritual thing. For the same reason he maintains that angels 
-7<$must have concreated or innate species. However, the phantasm must 
have some hand in the making of the intelligible species, for the 
intellectus agens is indifferent to making this or that species. Suarez’s 
solution is that the phantasm presents the material as a sort of exemplar 
to the intellectus agens by virtue of their union in the same soul.
Our intellect, he writes,is like a medium between the angelic intellect 
and the senses. It, like the senses, which receive species from 
extrinsic objects, lacks species initially. But, like the angelic 
intellect, which has innate ("inditas”) species of all things as if 
they spread out (’’dimanarent") from it, as soon as our intellect cognises 
something, a species representing it flows (’’manat”) from the intellect 
(which could not be the case if the intellectus agens were really 
distinct from the intellectus possibilis).
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It is far from clear how rational beings are individuated on 
such an account. There is not a correspondence between the rational . 
soul and the material faculties, for phantasms are reeded only for 
inceptive cognition or intellection. Some have seen Suarez’s view of 
the inefficacy of the phantasm as allied to Platonism, but he allows 
that the intellectus possibilis in men is initially a tabula rasa and 
the account so far says nothing of sorts of objects peculiar to the 
intellect. Semina scientiarum drop out because of his terminalism. 
Because of Suarez’s duplication of faculties, in some way it makes no 
difference whether singular intelligible species and their exercises are 
in the intellect or in the phantasy. In many respects, this is still a 
full genetic account, concerned with the outfitting of the soul.
Not allowing conversio ad phantasmata, Suarez must explain how we 
come to cognise things other than material features: how we get from 
empirical essential cognition to rational essential cognition. As there 
are initially no objects peculiar to rational cognition, we must arrive 
at rational essential cognition by the exercise of rational practical 
knowledge, i.e. by elevating operations. This, in fact, leads to a 
particular sort of object: conceptus objectivi. We shall now consider 
Suarez1s replacement for the intellectus agens, which is the conception 
of the intellectus possibilis, and conceptus objectivi. These to some 
extent mitigate his genetic 'account.
TJniversals are one sort of object not captured by a purely genetic 
account and the clash between realism and nominalism centred around
these. We begin by considering Suarez’s position in the he Anima on
our cognition of universals. (in fact, formal features and substances
are on a par with universals.) Here, arguing against conversio ad
phantasmata, he argues for the need of intelligible species of material
or sensible singulars. He also argues against the view that universals
are the product of the intellectus agens.If they were (he maintains),
then we would know every universal of the species apprehended, yet we
are ignorant of many genera and differences. Again, seeing only whiteness
(a singular), one does not thereby discern this from colour (a universal).
He supports the nominalist position because (he states) the first species
imprinted on the intellect- are singular, our cognition begins with
sense and given that the senses cognise singulars, the intellect can
very easily.cognise them. Indeed, a species of Peter cannot represent
this particular man without representing man simpliciter, so universal 
.qz *
species would be superfluous. u The intellectus possibilis can cognise
universals as such when it cognises diverse singulars with the same
forms ("rationes”), whether simultaneously or successively. It then 
understands them "by diverse species partly agreeing in representation. 
Considering universals, then, is considering what is represented in common 
by diverse species of singulars,It seems probable, he adds, that the 
cognition of what is common leaves a species of it in the intellect, 
for we more easily cognise this universal again .
In the Disputationes Suarez presents three opinions on how we know
universals, The first, which he rejects, is the Thomist position (also
held by Fonseca) that universals are the product of the intellectus agens
and are cognised directly by the intellectus possibilis, which cognises
singulars only reflectively.^ (Direct and reflex cognition are two
operations of the intellectus possibilis. By the first it cognises by
its own species and by the second it cognises by considering the conditions
or denominations of a prior cognition.Rather, a universal is presented
in the concept (conceptus mentis) with a more actual and proper esse
objectivum than in the species impressa which is made by the intellectus
agens and got from sense. According to this esse something is universal.
Esse objectivum is the esse a thing has, not simply as being cognised,
but as being conceived (remembering the biological metaphor) in the
intellectus possibilis and as the object of the formal intensional 
cy.
representation, the conceptus mentis, ‘ The thing having esse objectivum 
is somehow made, for Suarez writes that those who maintain that the 
intellectus possibilis knows material singulars must also maintain that 
it makes universals, One way of making such objects is rejected in 
Suarez’s rejection of the third opinion, viz. that the universal is 
made by the comparative cognition ("notitiam comparativam") by which 
the intellectus possibilis, after abstractly apprehending the nature,
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compares it with things in which it exists; thus the universal nature
2 50'*,
existing in singulars is not something positive, but is only a similitude 
and agreement of a number of things among themselves or an ens or relatio 
rationis.53 But this (he objects) only adds the cognition of the agree­
ment of a number of inferiors in an abstract nature to the prior cognition
of the nature in the individual."^"
Suarez accepts the second opinion, viz. that the common nature can 
be abstracted by a simple abstraction or, better, precision (“per purara 
praecisionem”) of the nature from one inferior without relating either 
a superior to an inferior or inferiors among themselves.^ This is 
direct cognition, supposing 'an object,,^ (still, he admits that this 
cognition (“notitia”) is not enough to cognise the universality in the 
nature thus conceived, i.e. to cognise the universal as such, for which 
relating is required.) Allowing species of material features in the 
intellectus possibilis and relating “cognise” to any exercise of these 
species, Suarez destroys the success nature of this verb for intellectual 
or spiritual faculties. Even those who do not admit such species allow . 
that the intellectus possibilis can cognise objects other than those of 
the species it has and thus frame new species, as this cognition leaves 
a disposition.^7 Suarez must admit that pure fictions are both cognised 
and are the objects represented by concepts (conceutHs mentis) These 
objects could be said to have esse objectivum or to be entia rationis.
It is very important to realise, however, that these terms were usually 
not used for such fictions, but for special sorts of objects which 
guarantee the success nature of “cognise”, in particular, when universals 
or formal features are said to be cognised. The universality of the 
object is the work of the intellectus possibilis, for (Suarez writes)^ 
if man existed in re as the object of the concept, man would be universal 
in essendo. But it is in the thing, for (he adds) a man is made singular
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by individuating differences, so from the fact alone that man (universal) 
abstracts from these by an actual abstract concept, it is universal.
This statement could be taken in the sense that a particular man is an 
assemblage of properties. This is supported by the fact that a reason 
given for admitting species of material or sensible singulars in the 
intellectus possibilis is that it is held to know the individuating 
conditions of things much better than the senses. The statement could 
also.be taken to imply that we can in principle give a definition of 
individuals. This is apparently Suarez’s intent and species of material 
features in the intellectus possibilis are then needed only as materials 
of reason with the intellectus possibilis taking over the operations of 
the intellectus agens. The success nature of "cognise” is guaranteed 
when the cognition is of objects which require the operation of the 
intellectus possibilis, whose species are said to flow out and which
is said to manifest truth in things.
The cognition of universals is part of a larger problem of the
cognition of all but occurrences of material features which are transmitted 
to the senses and by the action of the intellectus agens establish disposi­
tions in the intellect. These other objects are due to our conception 
and are what our science is about. The broader problem is presented 
in the De Anima (which lacks much of the distinctive vocabulary of the 
Pisputationes). The senses, Suarez states here,'^cognise only .external 
sensible accidents (i.e. material features), which alone are imprinted 
on the intellect. They are said to be sensible per se since the senses 
receive species of them; the conceiving, formation of a concept, cognition 
or intellection of all else is held to depend on negation or what he 
calls "analogy". But the intellect from the cognition of accidents comes 
to consider what is hidden behind them, whence its name: "intus legens"/^'
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y?Y7The intellect is held ^to first receive spiritual species representing 
the same sensible and material things as are represented in the phantasy, 
i.e. proper sensible accidents of some substance. These, however, also 
represent common sensibles (i.e. some formal features) which modify the 
cognition of the proper sensibles. (He does not say they modify the thing 
which produces the features.) Common sensibles in some way are manifest 
("relucent”) in species of proper sensibles because it is of the nature 
of the intellect to divide what is united and to apprehend such sensibles 
by proper and distinct concepts (but not to have proper species of them). 
His examples of concepts (in the sense of acts of cognition) formed by 
analogy are the principles (’’rationes”) of substance - matter and form - 
and substance. The concept of matter is held to be formed in analogy 
with the matter of artificial things and that of the form of man - the 
soul - by relation and analogy to his operation?0^ The intellect receives 
species representing proper sensible accidents of some substance which 
also confusedly represent their subject since - the intellect represents 
in conception these accidents in concreto. It then infers (’’colligit”) 
the subject of accidents and so forms a concept of substance by discourse 
in considering these accidents (particularly their change) in the same 
subject and inferring something which supports ("substat") them,
In the making or formation of concepts, as occurrences in the intellect,
the species received from the senses via the intellectus agens act as the
materials or the vocabulary with which the intellectus possibilis performs
elevating operations; but the resultant concepts still employ the same 
105vocabulary, Suarez states that the intellect cognises things lacking 
their own species by species of sensibles and discourse and then forms 
a species of them with the species of sensibles related in a way corres­
ponding to such a cognition, as is shown by the fact that we more easily
arecognise the same thing later. Species of universals (he continues) 
formed, in a similar way, which is reflected, in the phantasy (i.e. for 
cognitio imaginativa), which first conceives composite sensibles by 
species of simples and. then forms species of these composites. With 
the phantasy this is but association (perhaps directed, by the intellect), 
but for the intellect it is the use of signs, Suarez held, (as did. most 
Scholastics) that concepts of material singulars or features as occurrences 
in the intellect are signs of these features and that vocal tokens are 
in turn signs of concepts. These concepts are what we have called 
occurrences in the mind, shadows of supposed natural utterances. On 
their own they lack roles just as phantasms in the phantasy lack roles.
But we have seen roles they can be given: they can have geometrical roles 
when formal features are conceived in considering them, a sort of 
grammatical role as the accidents of substance, and a general sort of .
explicative role as the manifestations of forms. In that concepts of 
material singulars simply have roles, they are individuated as the same 
feature^ not as ’’same feature” refers to a spatio-temporal particular 
(token), but as it refers to a type. The type is the universal and is 
the common nature conceived in the singular as a token. Thus by 
conceiving the token or individual, we conceive the type or universal.
The conceiving is using the exercise of a disposition caused by the •
•reception of a species of a material singular or feature. The senses 
furnish the roles in that they supply the starting point. But only the 
intellectus possibilis makes use of these roles. In simply using the 
exercises of species, the intellect performs elevating operations. The 
objects peculiar to the intellectus possibilis - which have esse objectivum 
- are what specify these roles or are the roles themselves. The 
intellectus possibilis makes these objects by using the vocabulary got
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from sense, for which it has dispositions. Further dispositions correspond 
to further combinations, which are all given a use by us.
These objects peculiar to the intellectus possibilis are given more 
attention in the Pisputationes. Concepts as occurrences in the mind are" 
called ’’concepttts formales”; the objects peculiar to them, which are 
concepts in our sense, are called ’’conceptUs objectivi”. Intelligible 
species of material features are allowed because they furnish the vocabu­
lary which the intellectus possibilis uses. As conceptus objectivi are 
due to the operations of the intellectus possibilis, animals do not 
cognise substances or formal features. By "conceptus objectivus"
Suarez principally means universals and entia rationis. These are objects 
in the same sense in which material features in re are objects, for either 
is said to be an objectum quod, the thing cognised, whereas the conceptus 
formalis is an objectum quo, intensionally representing, but not itself 
cognised. In the Pisputationes, the conceptus objectivus replaces the 
Thomist verbum, an objectum in quo due to the intellectus agens as this is 
responsible for both inceptive and exercisive rational essential cognition 
applying to things. The conceptus objectivus does not disrupt Suarez’s < 
attempt at a sort of direct realism. Being an objectum quod, it is known 
directly. This is most easily understood with regard to formal features: 
the conceptus formales in the intellect by which material features are 
cognised have a configuration and when these material features are cognised, 
their configuration is cognised because the vocabulary furnished by 
material features is not only exercised, but also used. The objection 
to an objectum in quo is that it does not begin with the intensional 
identity between material features in re and conceptus formales, but 
(because of the semina scientiarum of the intellectus agens) imposes
roles on occurrences in the mind.
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and
Although both the material feature in re / the conceptus objectivus 
is held, to be an objectum quod, they are not on a par in that material 
features are physically or subjectively in re and. are intensionally 
identical with what is physically or subjectively in the intellect, 
i.e. conceptus formales, while conceptus objectivi are said to have esse 
objectivum due to being conceived. In so far as vocal tokens (’’voces”) 
only express conceptus formales, they are like supposed natural utterances. 
But vocal tokens are also held to signify conceptus objectivi and as 
such they fulfil roles. Conceptus objectivi are also held to be that 
which our science is about. ' More directly associated with conceptus 
objectivi are other things which are essentially connected with linguistic 
use: truth, judging and reasoning.
The important part of Suarez’s account of knowledge is borne by 
conceptus objectivi. Yet these are due to our conception and no restric­
tions are put on how we make them either by semina scientiarum in the 
intellectus agens or by some equivalent in the intellectus possibilis, 
which Suarez allows to be a tabula rasa. Rather, the restrictions are 
furnished by the materials received from sense, which functions as the 
vocabulary for our .conceiving. Suarez’s attempt at a sort of direct 
realism relies on the intensional identity between what is physically 
in re and physically in the'mind or intellect. Thus it is held that 
what is physically or subjectively in the mind or intellect needs a 
cause. Still, this does not guarantee the success nature of ’’cognise” 
in the important set of uses which are connected with the application 
of science. This is guaranteed only by conceptus objectivi, which have 
only esse objectivum and are not held to need a cause because they 
depend on the conception or cognition of the intellectus possibilis."
The success nature of ’’cognise" when concerned with the application of
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science depends remotely on the intensional identity between material 
features and conceptus formales. Universals and entia rationis are
said to be founded in things only because they are first founded in our 
conceptions. This programme, then, stands or falls on this intensional 
identity. Yet there is no guarantee that our conceptions are related in 
the same way as are things in re. Indeed, material features which form 
the causal link are not primitives in Suarez’s account of things, but 
are due to form informing matter. Suarez admits that to understand 
things we must get behind these features to formal features and eventually
forms and substances,
Descartes replaces a genetic account such as Suarez’s in an attack 
on two levels, one physiological and the other metaphysical; both, 
however, are concerned with our judgements and our application of science 
to things. The ’’Dioptrics” (one of the essays introduced by the Discourse) 
is the salient work on the physiological level. The first step is to 
reject the Scholastic intensional species. As concerns the cognition 
of formal features, Descartes maintains, receiving a material feature 
or similitude from the thing seen is on a par with hearing or seeing 
a token of a conventional sign representing it. The latter is not a 
sign of the former; rather, as signs they are on the same level and 
the cognition of formal features is due solely to the roles in which 
they occur. The ’’Dioptrics” occupies a pivotal position between the 
Regulae, where judgement is attributed to the intellect and "idea” is 
used for an image in the phantasy, and the Meditations, where judgement 
is attributed to the will, ’’idea” is used for something spiritual and 
objective realities of ideas replace the simple natures of the Regulae.
It is essential to his position in the ’’Dioptrics" that the mind is 
not indifferent to the body, for the mind is held to judge^in the cases
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of interest in this work, formal features in vision) according1 to the 
dispositions of the body. Occurrences in the mind, such as cases of 
imagining and sensing, thus (as is emphasised in the Meditations) are 
due to its union with the body. Descartes speaks of a natural geometry 
in the ’’Dioptrics” according to which we judge of the configuration of 
things in our environment. We can do so only because this geometry is 
followed by us and instantiated in us (i.e. our body) and in our environ­
ment, By having the mind not indifferent to the body and cognitive 
dispositions secured in the body, Descartes has a solution to how our 
science applies to things. Descartes nevertheless draws a sharp 
distinction between mind and body, but this is conceptual. In the Sixth 
Replies he states that he admits only two substantial forms: thought 
and extension. Matter is considered only as it instantiates the super­
concept of res extensa and the spiritual soul only as its operations 
instantiate the super-concept of res cogitans. Accidents are determined 
by the concept they are under, so there is no place for accidents which 
could be either of the body or of the mind and so both intensional 
species and the outfitting of the mind have no place from the start.
As extended, we mechanically interact with the forms of things in our 
environment, there being no question of appearances; as thinking, we 
follow the rules and concepts which are instantiated or founded in re.
We must somehow be involved with that science which is founded or
instantiated in things, for the mind judges in accordance with the 
dispositions of the body.
The metaphysical level of Descartes’ replacement of the genetic 
account is in the Meditations. Here he must allow occurrences physically 
or subjectively in the mind for there to be judgements and to account 
for the application of science to things. The important move is the
validation of reason, which relies on maintaining that esse objectivum 
or objective reality needs a cause, Descartes’ objective realities, 
like Suarez’s conoeptus objectivi, are signified by words and are what
our science is about,
"Cognition" for the most part is not used by Descartes, It is 
largely replaced by either "thought" or by "perception" (simpliciter), 
corresponding to empirical cognition, and "clear and distinct percep­
tion", corresponding to rational cognition. The latter has a success 
nature guaranteed by what could be called (although Descartes does 
not use the phrase) spiritual objects: objective realities of ideas. 
The validation of reason depends on maintaining that esse objectivum 
or objective reality needs a cause and he insists in the Seventh 
Replies that a nosse ad esse valet consequentia. Descartes’ objective 
realities, like Suarez’s conceptfls objectivi, are signified by words
and are what our science is about, Descartes can also maintain that 
these are the objects of divine science, for, in express opposition 
to Suarez, he holds that God’s science is created in the creation of 
extended and thinking things. (This position, discussed privately 
ten years before the Meditations, did not appear publicly until the 
Fifth and Sixth Replies.) The climax of the validation of reason is 
in the causal proofs, showing that the objective reality of the idea 
of God needs a cause other than ourselves. In,fact, Descartes’ idea 
of God is the idea of divine science and ore thing established by the 
causal proofs and their sequel in the Fourth Meditation is an explana­
tion of error in terms of our own wrong judgement and an identification 
of our science with divine science. This also identifies that science
we follow with that science which is instantiated in things, for clear 
and distinct perception, which is concerned with occurrences in th,e
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mind only as they fulfil roles or have objective realities, is that 
by which we evaluate statements we naturally make or shadows of them.
Only roles of occurrences in the mind are important and Descartes 
rejects any genetic account. The two sorts of substances of which 
we have essential knowledge are not cognised as substrata, but as 
what display objective realities, whether of the concept of res extensa, 
which are mathematical formal features, or of the concept of res cogitans, 
which are simply those operations we perform. Material features are 
explained by the union of the mind with the body and are that by which 
we are alive to things, performing both a cognitive function in the 
application of science to things and a biological function. Still, ' 
the science we have is independent of these features. There is nothing 
to get behind in the cognition of substances, forms formal features 
or our own operations, all of which are perspicuous, and there could 
be nothing to which our science does not apply.
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Chapter VWI
Uses of "Spiritual”, "Idea" and "Mind".
In recent chapters we have frequently compared material with
spiritual. We begin this chapter with a distinction between two
senses of "spiritual" in which it is opposed to "material":as used for­
cer tain
what performs elevating operations andand-as used for/ objects 
peculiar to certain sorts of faculties. There is a third sense, in 
which that is spiritual which is subject to rules. If the objects in 
the second sense are associated with these rules, there is no need for 
the intellectus agens. With this gone, there are two ways of drawing 
a distinction between what is to be explained like natural bodies and 
what is not: either, in the Gassendist fashion, between what is insensi­
ble and what is sensible, or, in the Cartesian fashion, between what is 
mechanical and what cognises spiritual objects or follows rules. The 
latter distinction does away with animal thought (which was anticipated 
by Suarez). It also rejects species or vicarious representatives and 
the intellectus agens, for rule-following suffices to instantiate the 
concept of res cogitans. Now, there were two uses of "idea" c, 1600, 
both found in Suarez. One is for divine ideas and corresponds to the 
Cartesian use of "idea" or at least "objective reality", for o,n this 
position we understand because divine science is present to us, "Idea" 
was also used for phantasms, corresponding to the Gassendist use, for 
on this position we understand because the phantasy is present to us.
To these uses of "idea" and the two positions on what is not to be 
explained like natural bodies, there corresponds two uses of "mind"
("mens"), the one (Gassendist) including the material faculty, imagination,
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and the other (Cartesian) excluding all material faculties. We conclude 
with some comparisons between Descartes and Gassendi on ideas.
. The objects peculiar to the intellect - the conceptus objectivi of 
the Disputationes - offer four reasons for the spirituality of the
rational soul in Suarez’s De Anima: the intellect knows bodies not
only superficially, but also penetrates their natures and investigates 
-i
them with their causes, properties and effects; it attains directly
not only general principles ("rationes”) of things, but even transcen- 
2dentals; ens, the adequate object of the intellect, is beyond the reach 
of the senses, for it is also the adequate object of angelic intellects 
and the cognising power which considers adequately the most universal 
- ens - is spiritual because forms of non-thinking things are limited 
by being immersed in matter, from which cognising powers abstract accord­
ing to their degree of immateriality.These statements correlate two 
senses of "spiritual”, in both of which it is opposed to "material”.
In the one sense, the operations and cognitions of what is spiritual 
are held to be inexplicable in terms of material operations. In the 
second sense, certain objects are spiritual either because they do not 
involve material features (although they are resposible for their 
occurrence) or because they are not restricted by individuating condi­
tions. The correlation between the two is not perfect for all those 
including Suarez who allow intelligible species of material singulars; 
thus they must rely on elevating operations.
The relation between these operations and the objects they supposedly 
produce is not clear. The view that there are objects peculiar to 
spiritual faculties, yet somehow made by the intellect was common in 
the seventeenth century and can in large part be related to the ambiguous 
status of Suarez’s conceptus objectivus. The term "notio" instead of
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in emphasis between the two uses of "spiritual” among non-Scholastic 
philosophers who used the term "notion". This term was used not only in 
the place of "idea", but also (e.g. by some who followed Suarez, such as 
Burgersdijk and Alsted) instead of or in addition to "conceptus objectivus" 
for what we have called a concept. The first position among these non­
Scholastics correlates with the first sense of "spiritual" distinguished 
in the last paragraph, insisting on the fact that notions are made, and cn 
the gap between our knowledge and what it is of. The second position 
emphasises the second use of "spiritual" and the fact that notions are 
not given in sensation, and accounts for the applicability of notions to 
things by a certain sort of identity between them.
The first position is represented by Richard Burthogge (1638-1698+),
who was a contemporary of Locke at Oxford and apparently respected the
Essay^. He distinguishes two faculties which exactly mirror die 
6Scholastic material and spiritual faculties : sense, by which we know 
external objects by images or sentiments, and reason or understanding, by 
which we know external objects and our own acts by notions alone. Notions 
are explicitly identified with "the conceptus objectivi" of the Schools" 
and the sense or meaning of a word. The sense of a word is said to be the 
immediate (also proper, adequate and formal) object of the first act of
the intellect, the conception formed in the mind on the proposal of an
. . . 8 . .9object, word or proposition , an apprehension of reason, and an idea . 
Burthogge holds that we apprehend all things under notions; but notions 
partially veil things, for (he insists) they are made by us and are twice 
removed from things, being founded on sentiments, which are caused by 
things.
The second position is represented by three English Catholics 
collectively known as notionalists: Kenelm Digby (1603-1665), Thomas White 
(1593-1676^) and John Sergeant (1622-1707). Digby was the most famous of
263
the three: he had discussions and other contacts with Mersenne, Hobbes
11 . . 12 and Descartes and was extensively studied by the young Leibniz . The 
notionalists present an excellent opportunity to telescope the history
we have outlined, since all were staunch Aristotelians and the first two
. . . 13were just as firmly Cartesian and were respected by Descartes . Only
. . .14Sergeant, writing nearly half a century later, was anti-Cartesian . He
interprets Digby and White as Aristotelians in competition with Descartes 
16He classes Cartesians with Locke (whom he criticised thoroughly ) under
the label "ideists", opposing ideas of any description, called ’’fancies",
to notions. But, in fact, Sergeant’s conception of notion is not-far
off Malebranche’s conception of idea, for he claims that notions - here
in the form of identical propositions, that is, definitions - coincide 
. . . . .17with archetypes m the divine mind . All three, however, quite happily 
broke with Aristotelianism in accepting animal mechanism, and Digby 
dedicated half his magnum opus to the explication of such Aristotelian 
notions as rarity and density in terms of Cartesian physics. All were 
concerned with Aristotelian methodology, syllogism and identical proposi­
tions, with apparently no clash with Cartesianism. Sergeant specifies 
the historical affinities of this group further when he praises Aquinas 
for his faithful interpretation of Aristotle and criticises "the later 
Schools" (presumably nominalists) not only for their word-play, which he 
thought led to scepticism, but also for their lack of understanding of
a • 18Aristotle . •
15
Like Burthogge, the notionalists take notions to be the meanings
19 ... .of words . They also distinguish sharply between notions or senses,
. . . 20and phantasms or ideas as images. Digby’s example is the case in.which 
I ask for money; even though I imagine pistols (a type of coin) at the 
time, if crowns are brought, the meaning is satisfied. A notion is very 
much like a Suarezian conceptus objectivus or a Cartesian objective
. . . . . 21 reality: it is said to be the thing itself existing in the mind .
"Thing" must be interpreted very widely. Digby, arguing that the thing
apprehended must be in the mind of the apprehender, has "thing" corres-
. . . . . . 22 ponding to the object of rational essential cognition , then rational
. . 23 . 24 . . 25propositional and practical cognition. In a fourth argument , the 
object is the arrangement of propositions in a syllogism. Sergeant
explicitly states that notions are the things objectively in the under- 
26standing and that the being they have is objective being . The notion
of being is central. Digby, in arguing for the spirituality of the soul,
states that all distinctively human operations derive from the notion of 
27 28being , which is innate . All other notions are said to be "respects" 
"grafted" onto the notion of being. The most important of these other 
notions (which Digby also uses in arguing for the soul’s immateriality)
are what the Scholastics called entia rationis: universal notions and
. . 29notions of numbers, negations and privations .
The notionalists insist that, by neglecting the fact that we have 
notions which are the "things" themselves existing in the mind, one is 
led into scepticism. In page after page of his examination of Locke’s 
Essay, Sergeant expresses doubt that Locke can account for the fact that 
we have science of things. Their major concern is to show how science 
is applied to things. Their position is strikingly different from that 
of Burthogge, who holds that notions are merely "entia cogitationis" twice
removed from things. Notions, Burthogge claims, are founded on sentiments
.... 30and he criticises Spinoza and Malebranche for not keeping to the senses .
The role the notionalists assign to notions (held to be spiritual
objects) in our cognition of things is an instance of the generally held
principle, that the spiritual faculties govern the material faculties.
. . . . 31Bernier also accepts this principle . He states that the actions by
which we not only form universal notions but also cognise ("connoissons")
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universality (the ’’ratio universalitatis”, i.e. that by virtue of which
a concept applies to any number of instances) proves the understanding
. . 32 ...to be immaterial . He argues for the same position with the claim that
we understand universals, which by their nature lack any material,
. . . . . 33 . . . .singulanzing conditions . What is not received from sense is identified 
. 34 . . .as the essence or the quod quid est esse . This is the Thomist term for
the Aristotelian definition of an essence. For Bernier, this is not an
object in its own right. He makes it clear elsewhere that the true object
of such understanding are phantasms which have been given different roles
by elevating operations. What he is concerned with here is the sort of
understanding which is uniquely human; he makes it clear in the same
section that certain sorts of practical knowledge distinguish man from 
35beast .
We have already touched on a third sense of ’’spiritual”: that 
in accordance with which only a spiritual being* cognises the formal 
principle of good and acts from an intrinsic principle, Suarez^ 
connects the intrinsic nature of action with the capacities, unique 
to the intellect, to reflect on (i.e, cognise) itself, its acts and 
the principles of its acts^ (e.g,, species) and the facts that choices 
are made between opposite operations and human acts cannot be predicted 
by other creatures. This sense of “spiritual” places what is spiritual 
under rules, while everything obeys laws, Suarez distinguishes between 
physical or natural providence (i.e. Herbert’s divine universal provi­
dence, the realm of nature), which applies to all things animate and 
inanimate, even men and angels in so far as they have esse and operari 
in common with other things, and moral providence (i.e, Herbert’s 
particular divine providence, the realm of grace), which is proper to 
men and angels because they alone are capable of moral actions and have 
free will.' Moral providence consists of precepts, counsels, promises,
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etc., by which God has a perfect knowledge of all free effects before 
they are done and after they have been done.^
Bat if all free acts are known by God, the problem of individuating 
intellects again arises, here in the form that there is perhaps not only 
one intellectus agens or light, but one intellectus possibilis which 
performs free acts. The problem in fact covers all creatures, for it 
is held that physical providence encompasses both creation and conserva­
tion and involves not only the actions of second causes (i.e, creatures), 
but also immediate divine concourse,It is then not evident how the
actions of creatures are distinct from divine actions, and thus how 
creatures themselves are distinct from God, who is said to have an 
immutable knowledge of real existents (which is of succession and order, 
as the external denominations of preterity and futurity are not in God) 
once He has established causal relations. If we were to think of
non-spiritual things as automata, on this view spiritual things would 
be automata as well and one would look for an explanation of free will 
and responsibility such as Leibniz’s explanation in teims of infinite 
analyses.
We are not so interested in moral providence as it governs parti­
cular acts and introduces problems about the individuation and responsi­
bility of rational agents. Rather, we are concerned with moral providence 
as it is a system of rules, which could as well be mathematical, logical 
and grammatical as moral, to which our acts conform. That is, we are 
concerned with "God” as the objective structure, like an unindividuated 
intellectus agens, which is displayed in things, not as something which 
acts or to which a will is attributed. This is what Suarez calls the 
divine Verbum, the second person of the trinity, said to be the essential 
formal concept in our sense of ’’concept” which God has of creatures as 
possible, which (he adds) is how some typify an idea, viz, a represent-
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L?ing form. " It makes no difference, he states, whether one holds that 
there is one or a number of ideas in God; he prefers saying that there 
are a number, claiming that this is not contrary to divine simplicity.
The divine Verbum is similar to the verbum or concept as the product of 
an act of human cognition, for it is said to proceed from the -first 
person of the trinity by an act of understanding. Still, the Verbum 
is held to be a person (but not a distinct substance) distinct from 
the first person and is said to proceed continually.^^ Furthermore, 
the Verbum has more than esse objectivum. u Finally, the Verbum is 
a concept which does not take into account the will according to which 
things were created, The Verbum. in short, is the object of divine 
understanding in some way distinct from this understanding and comprises 
the rules and concepts which are displayed in re and which any rational
creature follows.
Objects which are held to be spiritual are to be associated with
concepts and rules since they furnish the standards of success of
rational operations. This is the sense of ’’spiritual” which is important
for the spiritualisation of intensional species. The sense of ’’spiritual"
in which only spiritual things are under moral providence gives the
rationale for the distinction between spiritual and material in which
there is held to be some spiritual thing whose operations and cognitions
are not explicable in material terms, for something must be posited as
answerable to acts evaluated in accordance with moral rules. The senses
of "spiritual” in which there are spiritual objects and in which some- 
be
thing is subject to rules are to/associated in so far as only a rule­
following being, in particular one which follows linguistic or mathema­
tical rules, can know what (an) A is (for certain values of "A"), know 
certain relations and perform rational activities. This fusion, however,
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presents difficulties for a genetic or causal account because a natural 
cause is not rule-following. The intellectus agens - the bridge between 
what is law-obeying and what is rule-governed - is particularly problematic.
Doing away with the intellectus agens, there are two ways one can 
draw a distinction between those things which are to be explained as 
natural bodies are and those whiqh require a different sort of explanation. 
For Bernier, the mystery is how we get from what is insensible to what 
is sensible. Cartesians extended mechanical descriptions to physiology 
and have no reason to look for more than a mechanical description of 
what is not rule—following, such as animals. For Bernier, the phantasy, 
common to man and beast, is present to the understanding, so it performs 
elevating operations productive of objects peculiar to spiritual beings.
For the Cartesians, what is not explicable mechanically is rule-following 
by virtue of having the objective structure present to it and instantiates 
the concept of re cogitans. It is spiritual (and so subject to rules, 
moral or otherwise) simply by cognising concepts peculiar to spiritual 
things. There must be spiritual occurrences in the mind, but dispositions 
can be secured in the body,
Descartes in particular excluded from the mind what was known as
the sensitive or animal soul. Those who held that the roles of occurrences
in the mind are due to what causes them also held that animals cognise 
because they to some degree share our physiology and because their 
behaviour is displayed to us. But the organs and their function is 
explained mechanically by the Cartesians. The Cartesians also treated 
behavioural displays much like material features. Their approach is 
to by-pass our being alive to things, so, as their goal with inanimate 
things is to start with non-descriptive concepts instantiated in things 
or, in Scholastic terminology, the forms of things, so with animate 
things the goal is to start with the following of rules and concepts,
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in Scholastic terminology, the form peculiar to man or the rational soul. 
Some animate things do not follow rules, so are explained like inanimate 
bodies. Criteria are needed to distinguish the two sorts of animate 
things; the ones Descartes selected were used by others to draw the 
distinction between those animate things which are purely material and 
those which are also spiritual. -
L.C. Rosenfield, in her work on animal mechanism in our period,
speculates^ that Aquinas (who denies that beasts have free will and
once likens them to clocks) might have influenced Descartes once he had
formulated the mechanistic view of animals for physiological and 
46 j - *
behavioural reasons. She thinks' ' that he was uninfluenced by possible
precursors, such as Pereira, whose work he had not seen in 1641 • Suarez, 
Zq
however, aired Pereira1 s opinion in his De Anima,where.it is called
the second error whose refutation is needed to establish the distinction 
between the sensitive and rational souls. The opinion is that the opera­
tions of the senses are not material or subjectively or physically in 
corporeal organs, but in the soul itself; thus the sensitive soul is 
spiritual, rational and not attibutable to beasts. This opinion is 
said to be not only paradoxical and contrary to Scripture, but also 
contrary to sense. We immediately see that beasts have organs of 
external sense and incision or anatomy shows that they have organs of 
internal sense and those organs are not given in vain. Suarez held 
that species in material faculties are not animal spirits (fluids, 
perhaps corpuscular ultimately), but that all souls but the rational 
soul are extended. We experience (he continues) that animals are directed 
by sight, hearing, etc., and are moved by appetite upon cognising, many 
effects show that they have memory and there are no fewer signs of sensing
in brutes than in children
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Rosenfield claims that denying animal thought was necessary to be
a Cartesian, whose major opponents on this issue were Jesuits^. But the
Cartesians themselves, according to Bayle, were divided as early as 1685
and granted spirituality, but not immortality to animal souls in the next
century^. It is essential in denying animal thought to deny that simple 
. 52apprehension is attributable to the senses. Norris insists on this , as
. . . . 53does Sergeant m denying that animals have notions . Sergeant distin­
guishes notions from phantasms or fancies (which animals have) by the
. . 54fact that notions are the meanings of words . This gives him one of the 
Cartesian criteria for distinguishing thinking from non-thinking things, 
for (he states ) animals do not answer pertinently nor learn languages, 
although they make sounds to' express passions and some words affect 
them with phantasms. Suarez gives both the Cartesian criteria in 
what he calls the first step in distinguishing the spiritual rational 
soul from the material sensitive soul, which consists in the refutation 
of the opinion attributed to Origen and other heretics that all beasts 
have a rational soul. He considers unanswerable the objections that
beasts lack speech ("locutio”) and that they have no freedom of action,
57but are led by natural instinct.
The distinction by the Cartesian criteria, as it distinguishes what 
cannot be held responsible from that whose actions are evaluated, had 
theological significance both before and after Descartes. From a purely 
Cartesian point of view, with dispositions secured in the body, certain 
spatio—temporally continuous things not only are subject to rules, but 
also have a peculiar sort of temporal continuity in that they are 
responsible for actions performed under these rules. Rosenfield states0^ 
that part of the appeal of the Cartesian position was the resolution of 
the theological problem of the immortality of beasts, although the argu­
ments against the animal soul were often thought to apply to the human
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soul as well. For example, Bernier , for whom the gap between sensible 
and insensible is most important, notes the intelligence of animals and 
then considers the view attributed to Pereira (Descartes only being 
mentioned) that animal mechanism is necessary for religion; he concludes 
that, on the contrary, as we are similar to animals, animal mechanism 
would lead to the belief that we are only machines. Bernier gives 
behavioural reasons for holding that animals reason about singulars
and it is this sort of view which Morris has in mind when he comments"
that we are led to believe that brutes think by imaginary experience
grounded on confused sensation, for we observe motions in brutes which
in us are accompanied by thought, but we do not see the thought, Rosenfield 
gr,
sees the turning point of animal mechanism to a more theological
hypothesis in a work by Bossuet (not published until 1722) and especially 
the works of Malebranche.^5^ This, however, was already achieved by 
Suarez, with his sharp distinction between material and spiritual faculties.
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A number of errors in faith (he states ) follow from the opinion that 
animals have rational souls. It would follow that either human souls 
are mortal or that the souls of beasts are also immortal and so capable 
of happiness and misery and other things usually connected with trans­
migration, The same points were presented by Morris a century later.
The apparent signs of discourse by beasts, Suarez explains,' do not 
show the use of reason in them, but rather the highest intelligence and 
wisdom in the author of nature, for what is produced by nature is the 
product (“opus”) of intelligence (as the Aristotelians point out) and
none of these signs show anything but a necessitated way of operating 
66 67from the instinct of nature. Both Norris and Sergeant likewise save 
appearances by attributing the apparently intelligent activity of animals 
to the craftsmanship of the artist of the world-machine.
Malebranche maintains in the Entretiens sur la Metaphysique
. 59
272,
that we cannot help but think that animals have the passions they display. 
This is due to projecting-what he calls "passions”, e.g., fear, onto what 
cannot have them because they are pure machines. It is similar to the 
projection of material features onto inanimate things, which likewise 
are held not to have them, as they instantiate only formal features.
Yet these passions are not on a par with material features, for feeling 
them is only sometimes due to the position we are in, where "position” 
is taken spatially. Account is not taken of natural behaviour, some 
forms of which we share with higher animals, and hence of cognition 
displayed by it. Still, an animal’s apparent following of conventional 
rules is attributable to our rule-following description of its behaviour. 
The distinction between what merely instantiates or founds rules and 
what follows them is supplied by the Cartesian criteria, which in effect 
state that what follows rules does not act automatically in doing so, ' 
Only by virtue of following rules can one evaluate one’s own behaviour, 
doubt and correct oneself, For those who maintain that our science is 
divine science, this gives a way to distinguish finite rational beings 
from God and from each other, for each finite rational being individually 
applies this science and is evaluated and held responsible for thus 
applying or following it. Still, there must be some way of picking out 
the performance of these acts, which are conventional forms of behaviour 
and so make use of natural forms of behaviour which we share to a large 
extent with other higher animals.
Sergeant objects to the intellectus agens because it is held to do 
something without knowing and was invented only because of intensional 
species. These in turn were invented by the schoolmen to account for a 
spiritual thing’s knowledge of a corporal thing, but they cannot say whether 
they are corporal or incorporeal^.
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With the sharp distinction between what is mechanical and what is 
spiritual in the sense that it follows rules or has the objective 
structure present to it, the intellectus agens drops out or, if it is 
retained, it is unindividuated, as we see with Norris, whose eternal
reasons distinct from the mind, but applied in cognition, replace the
69 •intellectus agens in the Thomist sense .
The Cartesians and the notionalists are largely concerned with 
spiritual objects of knowledge or cognition, those which we have by 
virtue of following rules and which are not shared with animals, For 
the Gassendists and nominalists, on the other hand, an account of our 
knowledge or cognition is about objects of material faculties (perhaps 
shared with spiritual faculties) and the elevating operations by which 
they receive new roles. ’’Idea ” was used in three, not always distinguish 
able,- ways in the seventeenth century: for what we have called concepts 
or the objects peculiar to spiritual faculties, for occurrences in 
spiritual faculties and for dispositions or occurrences in material 
faculties. (We add as a fourth, requiring special consideration, dispo­
sitions in spiritual faculties.) A number of reasons can be given for 
the confusion of these uses, such as the fact that ideas both in the 
first and in the third senses are called ’’objects” and the confusion 
between spiritual and material. All these uses were current to greater 
or lesser extents at the commencement of the seventeenth century. We
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have already encountered the first sense in Scholasticism as the divine 
Verbum, although it was only after Descartes that Malebranche identified 
ideas with the concepts of divine science. The third sense we have
alluded to in the use of "idka" for species as dispositions, but more
for \ .
commonly/their exercises in cdnceiving or inception in the first operation 
of the intellect. ;
To find the source of the term ’’idea” one need not go beyond philo­
sophical texts around 1600, particularly those of Suarez, We shall 
mention uses of ’’idea” from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
taken from dictionaries, indicating the country and date in parentheses*; 
the ordinary language uses, however are derived from philosophical uses. 
"Idea” was predominantly used in a Platonic sense at this time, but its 
alliance with "species” and with representations led to its introduction
* The countries and dates in parentheses indicate the following sources:
"Prance, 1600-1700": Dubois, J. and Lagane, R., Dictionnaire de la Langue 
Pranyaise Classique, Paris, Libraire Classique — 
Eugene Belin, 1960.
"Prance, I69O": PurtiSre, Antoine, Dictionaire Universel, laHaye
et Rotterdam, A. and R, Leers, 1690,
"Germany, 1615”: Golclenius, R,, Lexicon Philosophicum Graecum,
Marchioburgi, R. Hutwelckeri, 1615.
"Prance, 1500-1600": Huguet,E,, Dictionnaire de la Langue Prancaise du 
SieziSme Si£ole, Paris, Libraire Ancienne Edouard 
Champion, 1925*
"Germany, 1500-1600": Scapula, I,, Lexicon Graeco-Latinum Novum, Editio
Novissima, Thomae Harperi, 1657* This was frequently 
published in the sixteenth century.
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70into Scholastics account of knowledge. Suarez states‘ that "exemplar”
signifies the same as "idea" as used by theologians. He cites Plato,
Cicero, Seneca and various Church Fathers to show that there is general
agreement among philosophers that there are exemplar causes. Tet "idea"
is used with regard to human knowledge as well, as the need for an
exemplar cause is shown from human artisans since they conceive in the
mind "forman rei per artem efficiendae", called an "exemplar". He
holds that Plato was the first to talk of ideas and that they can be
called the principal and original forms. Even in this theological 
* 73use, "idea" was applied beyond exemplars, for Suarez writes' that "idea"
commonly signifies both an exemplar and a principle by which a thing
is cognised even when the thing will never exist. Aquinas also held^^
that the Latin "forma" corresponding to the Greek " £ & e " can signify,
in -.addition to exemplars, the forms or principia cognitionis of things
and as formae cognoscibilium they are in the cogniser.
7 5It is in this sense that Norris 1 claims that Plato really meant
that ideas are in the divine mind. At the beginning of the century,
"idea" in a Platonic context was taken for an eternal essence (somewhat
like God's verbum mentis), not only just as an,archetype, but also as a
universal held to be what is called a second cause (Germany, 1615).
As not necessarily connected with the divine mind, examples of "in Idea"
are given by Norris to show "how connatural and agreeable the Notion of 
76the Ideal World is to the common Principles of Human Reason ...
... how often shall they use such Expressions as these, when 
the World, or this or that Creature in it, was only in Idea, 
and such a thing is conformable to its Idea, or comes up to 
the Perfection of its Idea, and as Pair as a woman in Idea.,etc. 
And how common is it with them to talk of Vertue it self, 
Justice it self, Beauty it self, and Truth it self, and all 
these likewise in Idea, as also of a Line in Idea, a Circle 
in Idea, etc. 82.
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Digby used ’’notion” where most of his contemporaries used ’’idea”. When 
he uses the latter, it is not in the sense Sergeant uses it, i.e. for 
a phantasm, but in the sense of an ideal,7-3 ’’Idea” used for a perfect 
type or a mode of living resembling an ideal was well established 
before the seventeenth century (Prance, 1500-1600), The O.E.D. lists 
three major groups of uses of ’’idea”, the first of which is the Platonic 
sense; in this sense, it states, the word first came into modem languages 
(well before the modem period), including English.
The second major group given by the O.E.D. concerns ideas as figures,
forms or images; these uses were common by the end of the sixteenth
century. This could include exemplars in the sense of an external model
for an artist (Germany, 1715). More generally, ’’idea” was applied to
brief descriptions, patterns (France, 1500-1600), images, pictures or
symbolic representations (France, 1600-1700). DuCange7^ even gives the
following example from c.1130: ’’Portant Ideam ad praeditam ecclesiam
cum scala." In the sense of an image or a sign, the meaning of "idea” 
z?/)
and "species” converged. Brucker relates a work on ideas from the 
<2. I
early seventeenth century which attempts a refutation of Aristotle’s 
arguments against Plato’s ideas and states that the doctrine of ideas 
is to be found in Aristotle’s philosophy, for God (according to Aristotle) 
is not only the sole end, but also the only efficient cause. According 
to the author, whose presentation Brucker considers not very Platonic, 
ideas are exemplars as objects of the divine mind. • Brucker is sceptical 
of all attempts to reconcile Aristotle and Plato, yet "idea" was identified 
with the Aristotelian "species". Although Suarez gives "idea" a Platonic 
origin, ideas are placed in an Aristotelian framework, as Augustine held
that the Greek term "idea” can be rendered into Latin as "forma” or
"species” and Suarez takes Aristotle to be writing about exemplars in
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stating that the health of the body is made from the health which is in
Q3-
the mind. ’’Idea” was regarded by some to mean the same as either
the Platonic ’’forma” or the Aristotelian ’’species” (Germany, 1500-1600). 
Indeed, both ’’idea” and ’’species” derive from verbs for vision, the 
success nature of which allowed these nouns to be used for the objects 
of cognition in general. The meaning of ’’idea” was explained not just 
in terms of seeing, but also in terms of cognising because ideas represent 
what is to be made in the mind of the artisan (Germany, 1615). ’’Idea” 
was also explained in terms of the external form (’’facies”) transferred 
to ’’the eyes of the mind”, the transferring being from an object of 
’’videre” to an object of ’’intelligere” or ’’scire” (Germany, 1500-1600).
The third major group of uses of ’’idea” given in the O.E.D. regards 
mental images, conceptions or notions, which uses were also common by 
the end of the sixteenth century. In French at any rate, as a mental 
representation, "idea” was principally used for representations of persons, 
personal qualities, events or faculties and sometimes had a connotation 
of misleading (France, 1500-1600), which it retained through the seven­
teenth century (France, 1690). In 1616 John Bullokar defined "idea” 
in An English Expositor (the second English dictionary, more popular 
than its predecessor (16O4), being reprinted twenty-four times between 
1621 and 1775) as: "The forme or figure of any thing conceiued in the 
minde.’’^ We have already seen "idea” used in the occurrence sense 
for the first operation of the intellect and for a concept either as 
a phantasm or as a species expressa. It was also sometimes used in a 
disposition sense for the intensional species or species expressa in 
any of the faculties. Furti£re (France, 1690) uses it both for an 
occurrence, as a representation in the mind of what was previously 
before the senses, and for a disposition, as the knowledge ("connoissance”)
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acquired by the relation or assemblage of a number of things which were
before the senses, Gilson has claimed^'that the use of "idea” for the
content of human thought was new to Descartes, But this is contrary
to the evidence we have presented for "idea" assuming the part of "species"
or "concept". It particularly assumed the part of "species" in the sense
of "phantasm". In a work published in 1622 to show that our ideas lack
the efficacy of divine ideas, the author uses the phrases ”1’espece ou
I1 idee" and "phantosmes ou idees",The author makes use of a work
of 1599 which speaks of ideas in the divine mind, but says nothing of
ideas in the human mind, while he states that ^7
I1esprit ne peut cognoistre les choses que les sens touchent 
et appersoivent que par le.moyen des phantosmes ou idees qui 
sont portees a l1intellect par 1*imagination, et ceste puiss­
ance de l’ame qu’on appelle imaginative est dicte fantasie.
It is called "imagination", he adds, because an impression is left on it.^ 
This precise use of "idea" for a phantasm in the Scholastic sense
and other uses of "idea" can be attributed to Suarez’s uses of "idea".
An exemplar or idea, Suarez claims, must be physically or formally in 
the soul, and so cannot be the conceptus objectivus because it must direct 
the action of the agent "quoad specif ic.afcionem (ut ajunt) rather,
an idea must be the conceptus formalis.^ "Idea" is not restricted to 
exemplars, but is generally used as a synonym for "conceptus formalis".^0 
Because of Suarez’s duplication of faculties, "idea" as used for a 
conceptus formal!s could easily be transferred to the phantasm. Referring 
to conceptus formalis, "idea" nevertheless retains its meaning as a 
divine exemplar, for it is held that exemplars or ideas are formally 
or physically, not objectively, in the divine intellect, so even the 
divine ideas are conceptus formales.However, as such, ideas are no 
longer species and are not dependent on sensible materials. Conceptus 
formales are normally accidents distinct from the intellect in which
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they are said, to inhere; but for God "inhere" is not used' properly and 
exemplars as conceptus formales are not distinct from the divine 
intellect.God alone is said to exercise exemplar causality with 
respect to all substances and natural accidents, while the art of 
intellectual creatures is restricted to the change of accidents by the
use of accidents.
Alsted also identifies "idea" in the created case with"conceptus 
formalis" and "species" and distinguishes an idea from a conceptus 
objectivus or notio,^ Some German authors (perhaps following Fonseca), 
however, used "idea" more in the sense of the Thomist verbum, something
involved in a reflex act. An idea here is associated with the definition
of a thing and (although i't is still something made) the term is used
in a sense recognisably related to its Platonic origin.Alsted, in
logical contexts, uses "idea" in the sense of the essence of a thing 
a p.
known to us. He also has an intermediate use, considering idea as
exemplars, yet having a logical use,
Descartes in the Meditations spoke of ideas as occurrences in a 
non-corporeal or spiritual thing. In addition, when he speaks of innate 
ideas and clear and distinct ideas, the burden is borne by objective 
realities, which, like the notionalists notions, are objects peculiar 
to this spiritual thing, Gassendi and Hobbes unhesitatingly took "idea" 
as referring to a phantasm. This was not a new term, but the explanations 
of material and spiritual things had changed; in particular, there is 
disagreement as to what is to count as an occurrence in the mind and as 
thought, for neither "mind" nor "thought" clearly distinguished between 
what we share with animals and what is peculiar to us as rule-following 
beings. Descartes, furthermore, had to give a new twist to an established
use of "idea".
There are two texts in particular in the Meditations which occasioned
the disagreement "between Descartes and Gassendi and Hobbes. One text,
which was written'to draw a distinction other than that which is
important for the controversy, occurs in the Second Meditation. Descartes
here states ‘ that certain of our thoughts - ideas - are like images,
while others, such as judgements, which alone can be true or false,
and affects (e.g,, fear or desire), add something to these similitudes
of things. Hobbes quotes this in his objections and, naturally taking "
’’image” and ’’similitude” as applying to phantasms, asks’how there can . 
*'cj&
be an idea of God. Gassendi noted the same in his objections and 
in his Disquisitio,^" an extended reply to Descartes’ replies, re-asserts 
that the only images of things (as .Descartes defines ’’idea”) are appear­
ances in the phantasy. The second text occurs in the Sixth Meditation, 
where Descartes explains the difference between imagination-, - which 
depends on the body, and pure understanding. One should be cautious 
of what Descartes means by ’’pure understanding”, as words play an 
essential part in pure understanding and all cognitive dispositions are 
secured by the body. Pure understanding is called upon for rational 
cognition which is not applied to things, which is not to say that 
sensible signs are not necessarily involved. Here Descartes takes 
our essential cognition of a triangle as an example of imagination and 
our essential cognition of a chiliagon as an example of pure understand­
ing, We not only understand a triangle, he writes, but also intuit as 
present the three lines comprising it, i.e. we imagine it, while we 
understand a chiliagon to be a figure comprising a thousand sides just 
as well as we understand a triangle to be a figure comprising three 
sides. Although by habit (he adds) we imagine some confused figure 
when we think of any body, the figure, when we think of a chiliagon, 
is not peculiar to a chiliagon because it is not different from what
082
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would represent any other figure comprising a large number of sides.
' \ 01Gassendi comments that, as Descartes admits, an idea is an image 
and an image represents the thing as it is; but then the image and the 
representation of the chiliagon would be confused and the perception 
of it would not be intellection, but imagination,
Gassendi, with his nominalist position, cannot accept that there 
could be an idea or object of the understanding which is not in a material 
or corporeal faculty; furthermore, images can only represent corporeal 
things, with which they have something in common. If we imagine and 
understand some body, he ask’s in the Disquisitio, how could we dis­
tinguish the image in the corporeal imagination from the image in the 
incorporeal intellect? If the latter are to represent bodies, then the 
intellect would have to be extended; and if the mind is not extended, 
how can there be an idea of it? Still, if understanding or intellection 
were without images, there could be no understanding of bodies. He 
suggests, to allow for images in the intellect, that if the same faculty 
reasons and understands, we should allow that it also imagines (unless 
we are to have a cognate faculty for every function). This repeats the 
suggestion presented in his objections appended to the Meditations. 105 
He quotes Descartes from the piece of wax example to the effect that 
the perception of colour, hardness, etc. is not a vision or feeling 
in the corporeal organs, but is only the inspection of the mind. In 
that case, Gassendi states, the mind would not be distinct from the 
imaginative faculty (”ab imaginatice”). These suggestions are of prime 
importance for what is to be taken as the mind, occurrences in the mind, 
thought and consciousness. We have already seen that the important gap 
for Bernier is between what is insensible and what is sensible. This
suggests a use of ’’spiritual” other than that with which we have been
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concerned and animals would be, if not spiritual, as least thinking. 
"Spiritual” was already used in the 1670’s by those who adhered to 
Scholasticism for corporeal sensations, suggesting that the functions 
of the sensitive soul, whose objects were duplicated in the rational 
soul by Suarez, were usurped by the rational soul. La Grange uses 
"id£e" for any act of cognition as a product and an accident distinct 
from the soul. The only part of the path of the intensional species 
which is not in a spiritual faculty is from its production to its recep­
tion; the reception itself takes the place of the intellectus agens in 
the change from corporeal to spiritual. This is described by stating 
that what is corporeal causes something spiritual, which la Grange 
admits is incomprehensible, but appeals to experience for proof that 
there are such causal relations, Ideas are held to be images, but 
they must be spiritual, for la Grange, like Suarez, holds that the 
object must be proportionate to and specify the power. Against the 
Cartesians and others who deny accidental forms, it is maintained that 
an idea cannot be the soul itself sensing, for cognising the object - 
the connoissance - is not the soul itself, but a spiritual being. 
Bernier,1while discussing the first operation of the intellect, 
identifies an image with an idea, which is said to be present to the 
understanding when we think of something. (Bullokar’s English dict­
ionary of 1616, as we have seen, already stated that an idea is a form 
conceived in the mind.) If "mind" is taken to include the phantasy, 
the occurrences in the mind are objects of the understanding and are 
(in Scholastic fashion) distinct from the understanding, but not from 
the mind. This allows a neutrality to a causal or genetic account in 
not specifying how dispositions are secured and on this account one need 
not specify what sorts of objects must be present to us for us to be
2B3O
thinking things.
Descartes, on the other hand., keeps "spiritual”, "mind", "thought"
and "conscious" solely in the realm of what is subject to rules and all
else is merely law-obeying and to be explained mechanically. Replying 
W*7to Hobbes, he states that he has always taken "idea" for all which 
is immediately perceived by the mind (i.e, is not in the body). When
I desire ("volo") or fear something, he continues, since I at the time 
perceive that I desire or fear, the desire ("volitio") and fear count 
as ideas. The same position is emphasised in the definition of "ideas" 
in the presentation of his system appended to the Second Replies. Here 
he states that he calls images depicted in that part of the brain called 
the phantasy "ideas" only in so far as they present something to ("inform 
ant") the mind itself applied to ("conversam") that part of the brain. 
This is Descartes’ equivalent of conversio ad phantasma tarn, but the 
phantasms are purely mechanical occurrences in the brain. Still, 
occurrences in the non-corporeal mind are needed, which are ideas as 
here described. These are feelings, but they need not be our being 
alive to something, for that to which the mind is applied or converts 
is the brain, which secures cognitive dispositions. Rational knowledge 
is associated with the mind alone and this is applied in the mind being 
applied to the brain; by purely mechanical connections from the brain 
to our environment, this knowledge or science is applied to things 
beyond the body. There is a symmetry between inceptive and exercisive 
essential cognition and some account is to be given of those sorts of 
objects - objective realities for Descartes - which must be present to 
us for us to be thinking things.
There is no difference between sensing and imagining on this level. 
To distinguish the two, we must be able to evaluate these occurrences, 
which can be done only in considering the roles of the occurrences.
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Judgement is essential to this distinction. Asked by Amauld in the 
Fourth Objections how an idea of a sensible quality could be false,
Descartes refers to Suarez’s use of "materialiter". An idea taken
materially or an idea materialiter, Descartes replies, is an occasion 
for judging falsely. Simply as an occurrence, it makes no difference • 
whether it takes place in the brain or in the mind. But, being an 
occurrence in the mind, an idea materialiter is not indifferent to 
judgement. Opposed to this is an idea taken formally or an idea 
formal!ter, which is said to have objective reality, i.e, that in 
accordance with which we judge. Ideas formal!ter are individuated by 
the objective realities they have, but Descartes looks on them as 
dispositional. Exercises of these dispositions occur in roles specified 
by the objective realities which individuate them. By virtue of 
occurrences in the mind having objective realities, they can be evalu­
ated and imagining can be distinguished from sensing. The disposition 
is secured in the brain and the occurrence is physically in the mind.
The objective reality is in the mind in so far as there are occurrences 
which are said to have (instantiate or found) it. Yet it is essential 
to Descartes’ position on the applicability of science that certain 
objective realities - formal features - be instantiated in re.
In the same reply to Hobbes, Descartes states that he used 
’’idea” for lack of a better term (’’nullam optius habebam") because 
it is used by philosophers for the forms of perception in the divine 
mind, which has no phantasm. This is odd in that it was held that 
there are no temporal acts in the divine mind. Yet Suarez applied 
"conceptus formalis", identified with "idea", not only to human 
intellects, but also to the divine intellect, where a conceptus formalis 
is no longer a species, is not distinct from the intellect and does not
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depend on sensible material. Descartes elsewhere states that the world
is an ens rationis divinae mentis and held that divine science - the ’
objective structure — is created by God in creating the world. The 
’’perception” which could be allowed in the divine mind, then, is this 
act of creation, the forms of which are those concepts which (assuming 
divine and human science are the same) we follow and are instantiated 
in re. ’’Idea” in this sense is the object of a spiritual faculty. Often 
when Descartes uses ’’idea”, especially when he speaks of clear and 
distinct and innate ideas, the emphasis is on the objective reality.
These play a part both in the mind and in re; the ’’forms of perception” 
in the divine mind form a bridge between the two.
Both the Cartesian and the Gassendist positions we have treated so 
far are concerned with occurrences in the mind which are not judgements 
and to that extent are simple. Still, there is an important difference 
between the two positions in that occurrences in the mind are never 
indifferent to judgement for Descartes, hence we are conscious of all 
occurrences in the mind. Again, an essential aspect of objective realities 
is that they are standards for our judgements. In so far as Descartes’
followers either assimilated occurrences in the mind to the Scholastic 
first operation of the intellect or minimised the importance of the 
objeptive reality of an idea, they presented a theory of ideas amenable 
to Gassendi’s position even if they insisted that ideas are not in the 
phantasy. Amauld and Nicole do the first in the Port Royal Logic, 
where an idea, the form by which we represent things, is associated 
with the first operation of the understanding, conceiving or simple 
vue. P.S. Regis minimises, if not eliminates, the notion of object­
ive reality (while employing the term). In his Systeme de Philosophie 
he compares the causes of an idea with those of a picture; God is said
286
to be the first efficient cause, the action of the object the second 
efficient cause, the soul itself the material cause and the object the 
exemplar cause,, If this account is not to be simply causal, the 
exemplar cause must play an important part. However, under the criticism 
of du Hamel, he admits that objects are only metaphorically exemplar 
causes, which properly involve an intention. To the objection that 
even if objects were the real exemplar causes, they, like pictures, 
would not contain formally all the ideas represent, he replies that 
pictures which do not represent their originals are not really pictures. ' 
But this is false if it means that pictures must be like what they 
portray and ignores Descartes’ insight in discarding the intensional 
species in the ’’Dioptrics” that a likeness is not required for represent­
ation. Du Hamel concentrates on the relation between similarity and 
resemblance, pointing out that the Scholastics hold that an idea is 
similar to the thing by an intensional resemblance, which is sui generis 
and not like a picture in relation to what it portrays, while the 
Cartesians alone hold that we are to judge external things by our ideas. 
But how does an idea represent what it does not resemble? Regis agrees 
that the issue is not decided by saying that an idea represents as an 
image, formal or objective. Rather, he claims, ’’represent" means 
’’make known” and ideas, being connoissances, make known even If we 
cannot show how they do so. Mention is never made of objective 
reality in a context where it should be critical; rather, Descartes’ 
embarassing use of "image" is given the central part.
There was a good deal of confusion about Descartes’ meaning of 
’’idea” and its relation to images and the operations of the intellect. 
P.D. Huet, in his Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae (perhaps the most
influential criticism of Cartesianism in the closing years of the
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seventeenth century), writes that Descartes sometimes (following most
philosophers) meant by ’’idea” the first operation of the intellect,
but sometimes the image of a thing, not in the phantasy, but in the
soul, and sometimes the second and even third operations of the intellect.
Gassendi'1^5 thought that Descartes, in distinguishing ideas from phantasms,
used ’’idea” for the inferring (i.e, a necessary consequutio) from a
supposed antecedent and held that inferring is no more intellection 
intended
or understanding in the sense Descartes/than is imagining. A spokesman
for Gassendi (in a letter intended for Descartes) took up the same issue.
He cannot understand what is meant by”idea of God”, "idea of the soul”
and generally ’’idea” when it is said to be of something insensible, for
philosophers usually mean by ’’idea” a simple concept such as an image 
11 sin the phantasy or a phantasm. Rather than spiritual occurrences 
or objects, he suggests phantasms and elevating operations. He refers 
to the Third Meditation, where Descartes speaks of an idea of the sun 
which astronomers have from innate ideas in demonstrating its size.
The idea expressed by a simple name such as ”sun”, he replies, is of, 
e.g,, a luminous small circle and by reasoning we infer that it is 
much larger than this; but, while saying that it is much larger, we 
still have the same idea. Perhaps, he suggests, Descartes meant 
by ’’idea” what is expressed by words and the distinction between ideas 
in the phantasy and those in the mind, intellect or reason is between 
what is expressed by a simple term and what is expressed by a proposi­
tion, Thus the idea of a chiliagon acquired by counting its sides 
(different from that acquired by seeing it) would be expressed by the 
proposition ’’This figure has a thousand sides.”
The Cartesian position avoids the terminalism of Suarez or Gassendi
because it admits no occurrence in the mind indifferent to judgement
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and. rational essential cognition, concerned with objective realities, 
is the cognition of a concept in the objective structure. The cognition 
itself is discrete, but the concept is defined only by its position in 
the structure. Essential rational cognition involves propositional 
rational cognition. For example, the rule that the sum of the angles 
of a triangle are equal to the sum of two right angles involves the 
concept of a triangle, which in turn involves the rule. Spinoza uses 
this example in maintaining that there is no affirmation or denial
besides the idea itself and vice versa and further maintains that there
is no distinction between will and understanding, which are only the
individual volitions (e.g,, affirmations and denials) and ideas.
Both are modi cogitandi and he maintains that if one recognises that
an idea is a "modum cogitandi, nemp ipsum intelligere" and not a mute
picture, one must admit that we cannot have a true idea, the standard
of certitude and the norm of truth, without being certain of its 
\ 22truth. A modum cogitandi for Spinoza takes the place of Descartes1 
objective reality because of his ontological position, for it is a 
concept of divine science. His point on one level is that there is 
no standard other than the rules we in fact follow. On another level, 
with which Spinoza is more concerned, what is involved are the concepts 
instantiated in things, including our own body, of which the mind is 
the idea. He allows for error, but attributes it in particular affects 
and eliminates free will, hence rule following and responsibility as 
we have treated it, holding that the ideal in method is achieved by 
a spiritual automaton. The position maintained by Descartes and 
Malebranche, on the other hand, takes the will to be that which is 
responsible for the deviations from the norm as well as successes and 
as that by virtue of which an individual is responsible.
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Now Descartes could, have replied to Gassendi’s spokesman by asking
for the norm of truth in those rational activities by which the phantasm
caused by the sun is elevated to the role of representing an astronomical
body of solar magnitude, for there must be some rules and concepts
governing the inferences. Instead, he concentrates on the use of words.
Gassendi in the Disquisitio felt that definitions of ’’clear understanding”
and ’’distinct perception” are needed. As we go from a three-sided figure
to a four, five, ... -sided figure, there is apparently no boundary where
imagination stops and understanding begins; indeed, the obscurity of
the chiliagon is apparently 'due to understanding. Knowing that a chiliagon
has a thousand sides, that a triangle has three, being able to demonstrate
things about them and being able to understand them all at once, after 
f nall, is only understanding the words. Leaving out ’’only”, this is 
exactly the point and it is essential to Descartes’ major endeavour - 
the renovation of the sciences - that imagining and sensing are the 
application of the same science which is considered unapplied in simple 
understanding. Descartes states that he understands by ’’idea of God”, 
’’idea of the soul”, etc. only what Gassendi’s spokesman understood when 
he wrote that he did not understand them; he did not say that he conceived 
nothing by ”God”, ’’soul”, etc. For we cannot express anything by our 
words (’’paroles”) when we understand what we say but at the same time 
we have the idea of the thing signified by our words.There is the 
same distinction between what is expressed by a name and a proposition 
for both the mind (’’esprit”)’ and the imagination; it is the manner of 
conceiving which makes the difference: everything we conceive without 
an image is an idea of pure mind and everything we conceive with an 
image is an idea of the imagination, By ’’.imagination” Descartes
does not mean a corporeal faculty, but our being alive to things or
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similar occurrences in the mind due to our position or history in 
our environment by virtue of which our science is applied to things.
By speaking of pure mind he does not intend to imply that there are 
occurrences in the mind corresponding to nothing in the body and that 
dispositions are not secured in the body. Rather, in these cases there 
is no natural connection between the (spiritual) object of thought and 
the occurrence in the body. This is considering solely the roles of 
occurrences, e.g,, those which correspond to conventional signs. For 
Descartes, the meaning of a word is not tied to a natural type of 
occurrence in the mind. As our imagination is very restricted, Descartes 
continues, but our mind hardly at all, there are few things, even
corporeal, which we can imagine, although we can conceive them. The 
science of bodies (perhaps thought more than anything else to be subject 
to our imagination because it concerns only sizes, figures and motions) 
is not founded in phantasms, but on clear and distinct notions of our 
mind, ’’Understanding” as used by Descartes means just that and we 
apply our understanding of ’bodies by virtue of imagination as this is 
taken broadly to include sensing. The rules and concepts - the objects 
of spiritual faculties - furnish the criteria of success, clarity, 
distinctness and simplicity and furnish roles for utterances and occurr­
ences in the mind
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Chapter XX 
The Vision in God.
In this chapter we are primarily concerned with. Malebranche1 s account 
of our knowledge, which was labelled "the vision in God". This account 
is allied to his occasionalism . which maintains, inter al.. that God 
'causes occurrences in the mind on the occasion of occurrences in the 
body. And it depends on his position that ideas (i.e, Descartes1 objec­
tive realities) are not in the mind. The vision in God is faithful to 
the general outline of Descartes’ account and is in a line of development 
leading to Leibniz’s account. An important part of Descartes’ position 
that substances are perspicuous is the identification of divine and 
human science. To make this identification, he held that divine science 
is created and consequently that the divine will and intellect are not 
distinct. Divine science is the idea of God, but this is distinct from 
God according to Descartes, and so there is a gap between God and the 
idea of God, If it is maintained, as Spinoza maintained, that there 
is no distinction between divine intellect and will and no distinction 
between divine science and God, then extension is as necessary as God. 
Malebranche’s occasionalism depends on the rejection of species, on 
the rejection of the allied Scholastic account of causality and on the 
view that substances and divine science are perspicuous; it also depends 
on the distinction between divine intellect and will, on which he is in 
agreement with Leibniz. Occasionalism does not introduce a deus ex 
machina; rather it is close to a dual-attribute theory, with instantia­
tions of the concept of a rule-fo 11 owing thing individuated by mechanical 
c onfi gura ti on s.
2'92«
Malebranche1 s-account of our application of science to things is 
largely given in terras of what he calls intelligible extension; all 
the rules and concepts of geometry. This is in keeping with the 
Cartesian programme, which emphasises the part played by units. It 
also accounts for the major part of our rational cognition according 
to Malebranche, who holds that ideas are relations and judgements are 
relations of relations. Malebranche sharply distinguishes ideas from 
what he calls sentiments, which are occurrences in the mind. We are 
held to know ourselves only by sentiments, as there could be no applica­
tion of science to occurrences in the mind simply as such.
The Malebranche-Amauld poiemic is a clash between the two major 
theories of ideas which we have distinguished; Malebranche held that 
ideas are concepts (and also are not in the mind) and Amauld held that 
ideas are occurrences in the mind, viz. perceptions. The polemic covers 
objective reality (which Amauld holds to be a property of ideas), 
whether perceptions in the mind can represent what is infinite and how 
"idea" must be taken for . Cartesian clear and distinct perception to 
serve its function. In all cases, perceptions in the mind cannot account 
for what is intended. There must be something which is not physically 
in the mind to serve as a standard. Thus Malebranche justly accuses 
Amauld of scepticism. Amauld also accuses Malebranche of scepticism 
because, in his account of how our science is applied to things, a 
third thing distinct from the mind and what is cognised in re is involved. 
But Amauld1 s criticisms exhibit a misconception of the function of 
concepts in the application of science, a misconception allied with 
his misconception of objective reality. Leibniz sympathises with 
Amauld1 s general position that ideas are in the mind, but he agrees 
in detail with Malebranche, He must hold that ideas are not only in
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the mind, but are dispositions to think because, to insure the individua­
tion of things, he holds that the objective structure is instantiated 
in every monad, which instantiates an. unextended analysis of its 
spatial display. Ideas for Leibniz are what we have called ideas 
formaliter and are individuated by their objective realities.
It is not until the Meditations that Descartes presents his mature 
position on objective reality and judgement. Still, there are parallels 
between the position presented in this work and those presented in his 
early Regulae, the most notable change being with regard to judgement.
In the Regulae, he speaks of simple natures instead of objective realities. 
Here he has judgement as a function of the intellect and uses ’’idea” for 
images in the phantasy. This position is changed in the '’Dioptrics”, 
the essay on the judgement of formal features in vision published with 
the Discourse, with Descartes1 criticism of the intensional species.
For vision in particular, the criticism goes, but for any cognition 
of the world about us, an image is not necessary to pick out spatio­
temporal positions; a word does this, yet it is in no way like what 
it signifies. The feeling associated with hearing a token of the word 
is on a par with the feeling had in being alive to the spatio-temporal 
position. Hearing the token need not elicit a feeling similar to 
seeing the position for the utterance of the token to pick out the 
position. Rather, either feeling independently of the other is capable 
of picking out the position if it fulfils the proper role. These roles 
in the "Dioptrics" are held to be specified by a natural geometry in 
accordance with which we judge distances and other formal features.
With the "Dioptrics", the theory of judgement has changed and images 
in the phantasy would have no more part than intensional species. The 
presentation of the "Dioptrics" emphasises what we do in accordance
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both with certain concepts and with the disposition of the body. With 
this work, new support is given to innatism, as we shall see,
A certain part remains basically unchanged throughout Descartes1 
works. This is the part filled by simple natures in the Regulae and 
objective realities in the Meditations. These are the concepts of the 
science which we follow and which is displayed in the world. The 
intuition of the Regulae, the rational essential cognition whose objects 
are simple natures and their composites, becomes the clear and distinct 
perception of the Meditations. The equivalents of objective realities 
in the ’’Dioptrics” would be 'the concepts of the natural geometry, but 
these would only play some of the part. For some objective realities 
or simple natures apply to extended things, but others - e.g., those 
of understanding and volition - are not distinct from the thing which 
thinks, while others - e.g,, those of substance and numbered things - 
apply to both.
The distinction between imagination and pure mind is critical to 
Descartes’ mature position. Imagination includes all those occurrences 
we are said to have by virtue of the mind’s union with the body, whether 
or not they correspond to the reception of a feature. These are 
empirical cognitions and are usually called perceptions. These are 
ideas materialiter and their role is not important; yet they are not 
indifferent concerning judgement, for they are said to be for the good 
of the body and in having them we are ’’led by nature” to think that 
they are in things. The paradigm of these feelings is pain. Opposed 
to perception is clear and distinct perception, for which occurrences 
in the mind are of interest only in so far as they fulfil roles. This 
is the function of pure mind and is concerned with objective realities, 
corresponding to Suarez’s conceptus objectivi. However, they present
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restrictions by virtue of which occurrences in the mind, count as
thought of something or other. The occurrences in the mind. and. their 
dispositions are said to have objective reality, but it is not clear 
that the objective reality itself is in the mind. At any rate, it is 
not physically in the mind.
Descartes distinguishes in the Sixth Meditation two ways in which 
we exercise our science. In either case, there is an act which is 
evaluated, so there is not just an analogy for Descartes as there is 
for Herbert. The two ways in which our science is exercised are dist­
inguished by the phrases "mentem se convertere ad se ipsum” and ’’mentern 
se convertere ad corpus”. The latter is conversio ad phantasmata, but 
the phantasms are held to be only mechanical occurrences in the brain.
This is also described in the Hegulae, where Descartes insists that 
we are not to consider simple natures in abstract, as isolated meanings 
of words, but are to consider them as constitutive of complex concepts 
and as instantiated in re. (E.g., we are to consider a line as the
termination of a surface.) What is needed in addition to the concepts 
or objective realities which are applied to things and the end products 
of a mechanical process originating outside the body are occurrences in 
the mind or feelings which are our being alive to features to which 
these concepts are applied. These are what we have called ideas 
materialiter as they fulfil roles and the conversio ad.phantasmata is 
imagining, remembering or sensing, depending on the relation of the 
body to its environment. In sensing and vivid imagining, these feelings 
are projected onto spatio-temporal positions. The projection, and so 
the conversio ad phantasmata, are open to evaluation by the same concepts 
which are applied; in the case of vivid imagining, the act is evaluated 
as incorrect. All essential cognition for Descartes involves rational
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essential cognition; thus beasts, as they have no objective structure 
present to them, are held not to think.
When the conversio is the application of concepts to things in re, 
the objective reality of the ideas in question functions an as objectum 
in quo, like the Thomist verbum. When the oonversio is that referred
to by the phrase ’’menturn se convertere ad se ipsum”, occurrences in the 
mind are needed only as something fulfilling roles and whose objective 
reality functions as an objectum quod, like Suarez1 s conceptus objectivus. 
The Cartesians speak of this as reflection, which is similar to what 
Suarez calls reflection, but need not concern objective realities as 
they are in fact founded in the occurrences in the mind of the particular 
person. In this way, we can judge about things from our ideas, i.e. we 
can consider concepts or objective realities of these ideas which are 
instantiated in things and are constitutive of them. Both sorts of 
conversio are immanent acts, although they could be accompanied by 
transient acts. The first sort is a transitive act, the second sort, 
reflection, is an intransitive act.
In reflection, then, one considers non-descriptive rules and concepts 
on their own. These are independent of what physically exists in re, 
but for Descartes they are not independent of how the world is, For 
according to Descartes eternal truths - the rules of the objective •
structure - are created by God. They are created in creating both 
extended things and thinking things and are held to be things of a 
sort themselves: Descartes once called these truths entia moralia, 
comparing them to the laws effected by a monarch. His position on this 
was formulated in opposition to Suarez*s position that from the fact 
that God knows eternal truths, it follows that they are independent of 
Him, What the shift to his position achieves which is of interest to
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us is the identification of divine and human knowledge. Only by the
divine guarantee arrived at in the Third Meditation can we (on Descartes1 
that; which.
view) be guaranteed that, we formulate in intransitive self-teaching 
A
is the objective structure, which we tacitly follow both in intransitive 
self-teaching and in our cognition of things in re.
The middle four meditations are an exercise in reflection. He
begins by eliminating everything from the soul or mind except occurrences 
simply as they fulfil roles. Descartes is interested only in what is 
perspicuous, with non-descriptive concepts which are independent of 
their instantiation; yet he needs something to instantiate them to 
guarantee that the objective structure has an application and that there 
is in fact something which can apply it. As species are eliminated, 
one considers only what is essential to a rule-following being. The 
concern initially, then, is with that part of the objective structure 
which we have called the concept of res cogitans. These meditations 
are not an exercise in introspective psychology. The concern is with 
formal features, concepts comprised in res cogitans and instantiated 
in any rule-following thing and instantiations of the concepts of res 
cogitans and res extensa, which Descartes calls substances. Material 
features, both as felt by, e,.g,, Descartes and as projected onto things 
(by virtue of which we pick out things) are discounted. Descartes thus 
begins with those rules and concepts to which we are subject and which 
supply the criteria of success in our non-natural endeavours, reversing 
the order of the genetic account. The problem of other minds arises 
only in so far as the problem of the application of the objective structure 
to any sort of thing arises, i.e. in so far as the existence of things 
distinct from Descartes* own following of the objective structure is in
doubt
298
The problem Descartes faces is due to the fact that acts of rational 
essential cognition are discrete, but are successes only in so far as 
what is cognised has a position within an objective structure. In 
particular, he must rule out the possibility that there is more than 
one objective structure present to us or that the object of a purported 
act of cognition is not comprised in the objective structure. Given that 
there is only one objective structure and that it comprises all possible 
cases, all acts of rational cognition, whether essential, propositional 
or practical, interrelate. This is shown in the causal proofs for 
the existence of God, Having justified purely rational cognition, 
i.e. clear and distinct perception, Descartes can explain error as 
wrong judgement and appeal in the Sixth Meditation to purely rational 
knowledge in the evaluation of the judgements we make by virtue of having 
feelings as they relate to the positions we are or have been in. This 
gives a distinction between imagining and sensing in terms of the coherence 
of the latter. With this, the application (so Descartes holds) of the 
objective structure to things in re is justified; the justification in 
effect is an appeal to the eminence of the spiritual soul over the 
material body, for rational knowledge is due to res cogitans alone, 
while the feelings which are the occasions for judgements about our 
environment are due to the union of res cogitans with res extensa. This 
could be looked on as an attempt at direct realism of a sort, undertaken 
by rejecting Suarez’s attempt in so far as it excludes species and relies 
on the equivalent of an objectum in quo.
Descartes’ programme exhibits an understanding of how concepts and 
rules of our conventional knowledge are determined by their positions 
in an objective structure, how they apply to things and how they furnish 
the standards of success. By identifying the objective structure with
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divine science, perspicuity is extended to everything. Substances, 
whether thinking or extended, are not veiled by their qualities; every­
thing in principle, whatever its dimensions, can be explained either 
mechanically or in terms of the rules it follows. This is an ideal for 
a highly sophisticated endeavour in which the explanatory and predictive 
power of our theories and their simplicity and exactness are maximised, 
For Descartes, as for Malebranche and Leibniz, the whole objective 
structure of this sophisticated endeavour is present to any rational 
being throughout its whole history. This is sometimes stated by saying
that we know the infinite before the finite, Descartes makes use of
this in the course of the causal proofs and it is intimately connected 
with his view that we do not contain eminently all of God’s perfections,
so the idea of God needs a cause distinct from ourselves which contains
these perfections. For Descartes, the idea of God is primarily the idea 
of divine science or, rather, divine science itself. This science is 
not something we extract or form, but something present to us, whose 
rules and concepts we are subject to. The view that this complete 
science, which leaves no room forfurbher rules and concepts, is present 
to us is associated with the desire to have everything perspicuous and 
exact, for there is no place left for indeterminancy in the application 
of rules and concepts. We have already shown what is wrong with this
view. .
In maintaining that the divine science or objective structure is 
created with the things which display or follow it, Descartes denied 
that there is any distinction between divine intellect and divine will;
God does not first understand eternal truths and then will in accordance
with them that things exist. However, the idea of God is identified
with the objective structure thus created. The faculty by which we
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know God is said not to be distinct from the faculty by which we know 
ourselves, displaying our dependence on God, We are images of God, 
Descartes maintains, in so far as our will is infinite and free. He 
denies that this is a liberty of indifference, as he should, for only 
rule-following beings are free in the way he intends; we have free will 
in so far as we have the objective structure present to us or, as 
Descartes writes, we share the same ”vis cogitandi” with God. As in 
the Third Meditation he is concerned only with res cogitans, the 
dependence in question is not just for conservation, but also for the 
concepts we follow, i.e, objective realities of ideas, which alone need 
a cause. The intellect, as opposed to the will, is said to be finite: 
its capacity to clearly and distinctly perceive is limited. By virtue 
of this difference between intellect and will, Descartes exculpates 
God from our errors, God, he states, did not give me a faculty for 
error. There could not be a faculty for error, as what a faculty is 
for is determined by what counts as a success. Error, an imperfection, 
is said to be due to the will, in judging, outstripping the intellect. 
An infinite will is held to be a perfection and the responsibility 
rests with us because the concepts are present to us; we could always 
have judged otherwise or suspended judgement. We could (he states in 
the second causal proof) give ourselves perfections - ideas having 
objective realities, as only res cogitans is in question - but there 
would always be some which we lack. In both causal proofs, the funda­
mental opposition is between the finitude of the objective realities 
of the ideas we actually perceive and the infinitude of what we could 
clearly and distinctly perceive.
There is thus a gap for Descartes between God and the idea of God, 
for we cognise that according to which God operates and not God as He
30 r
is whether or not He creates the world. This leaves God "behind a veil
of His own science. Descartes happily drops his desideratum of
perspicuity for God (he warns particularly in the Principles not to
consider what is beyond the scope of the human intellect, such as the 
cousels of providence) to identify that science which is instantiated 
in the world with our science. But even God becomes perspicuous in 
looking at things from God* s point of view, which can only be done by
I
identifying the idea of God with His science, as Spinoza does. Descartes
maintains that we can affirm of a thing what is clearly and distinctly
perceived to be contained in the idea of it. Necessary existence, he
claims, is contained in the idea of God; therefore God necessarily
exists. But, Spinoza adds, necessary existence is contained in the
idea of extension, therefore extension necessarily exists, Descartes
maintained that extended things are in God eminently; but they are also 
extension
in extension eminently, as is the essence of all extended things,
If one maintains that there is no distinction between the divine
intellect and will and identifies divine science with God, then there 
is no way to avoid the conclusion that extension is as necessary as 
God. Furthermore, bare extension is immutable, omnipresent and simple, 
as one cannot separate one part of • ; extension from another,
Malebranche does not veil God behind His science. Rather, ideas 
(objective realities), divine and human (for they are the same according 
to Malebranche) are said to be God as participable by creatures. I.e, 
divine science is comprised in God. In particular, the idea of exten­
sion is identified with God. Still, he avoids Spinoza’s position by 
distinguishing the divine intellect and will. As what is actually .
created depends on God’s will, extension instantiated in re is distinguished 
from the idea of extension in God. Admitting a divine will distinct
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from the divine intellect re-introduces final causes and Scholastic
moral providence or the realm of grace, Malebranche was praised for 
this by Leibniz who also distinguishes between divine intellect and 
will and holds that divine science^and so God, are perspicuous. Still, 
both Malebranche and Leibniz held that nature is to be explained purely 
mechanically. Furthermore, nothing more than divine science is pers­
picuous, What Malebranche says about the divine will which goes beyond 
the account of the employment of our science is introduced in an attempt 
to give a clear explication of religious dogmas. He felt that he was 
doing for Descartes what Aquinas did for Aristotle and states that he 
takes scripture and the pronouncements of the councils as his facts 
in religion. What is perspicuous is what we have said is comprised in 
the objective structure. For Malebranche, this includes what he calls 
"l’ordre", a system of supposedly universal moral rules regarded as 
relations of value after the fashion of geometrical propositions stating 
proportions. (His favourite example is the rule that a man is of more 
worth than a horse.) He holds that these rules, unlike ideas^are in 
some wqyin us and are manifested in what he calls ’’natural inclinations”. 
More importantly, the objective structure comprises for Malebranche the 
rules and concepts of mathematics.
The perspicuity of divine science is like the perspicuity of 
substance. Maintaining the perspicuity of either relies on denying a 
part f6r intensional species and minimising the part of material features. 
The essence of body is held to be extension and material features are 
only that by which we pick out various spatio-temporal positions. 
Furthermore, the operations of things in re are held to be explicable 
solely in terms of extension, i.e. mechanically. We know (on this position) 
the forms of things in re - formal features - and hence extended substance.
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It is only a matter of projecting- material features as occurrences in 
the mind, so that we cognise instantiations, of these; forms, and;, so of' extende< 
substance. A similar account for mind, or thinking substance is presented 
by Descartes and Leibniz, although the first-person case differs from 
the third-person case, for there is a procedure involved in determining 
that the concept of res cogitans is instantiated in things distinct
from us# Malebranche does not allow that there is a concept or idea of 
res cogitans, yet our own thought, and so ourselves as thinking things, 
could not be veiled from us; still, there is a disparity between the 
first- and third-person cases.
Malebranche*s occasionalism is a consequence of the position on the 
perspicuity of substances and divine science and the account of the 
application of science to things. Occasionalism is often parodied in 
the fozm that God raises my arm when I go to lift something and causes 
pain in me when my hand is burned. But Malebranche* s account is not 
that God reads my mind and then decides that my arm should go up.
Malebranche distinguishes five- levels of occasionalism. Two of these 
are concerned with his explication of religious dogmas and we shall 
ignore them. On the other three levels, God is little more than the
objective structure and His will is invoked only to account for what
in Scholasticism had been explained by causes. According to Malebranche 
there is established by providence a plan for the course of the world 
before its creation. Furthermore, divine concourse is required for 
the unfolding of this plan, for God is seen to be as necessary for 
conservation as for creation. So far, this is in agreement with the 
general Scholastic position and Descartes invokes continual creation
in the second causal proof in the Third Meditation, But the Scholastics
also maintained that second causes - particular finite things - are
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causal agents. Their explanation of causality was much the same as 
their account of how we come to have essential knowledge of material 
features, which, indeed, is a special case of causality. For causality 
was attributed to the production of an accident by the cause and its 
reception by that which is affected. But this is no longer acceptable 
in a mechanical explanation of things in which motion is not distinguished 
from the thing moved. Thus divine concourse is seen to be the only 
causal activity. As this follows a plan, in which everything has been 
determined, there are no choices made by God after creation. Further­
more, the plan itself is supposedly subject to very tight restrictions, 
for (it is held) God, if He is not to belie His attributes, must create 
that world in which the simplicity of laws and the number and ‘variety 
of individuals are mutually maximised. This description leaves things 
much as before, with only extended and thinking things, each of the
latter united with one of the former.
One sort of occasionalism is that between bodies. The laws governing 
this are mechanical, and causal activity is replaced by extended things 
whose motion obeys mechanical laws. A second sort of occasionalism is 
that between occurrences in the mind and the presence of ideas (equi­
valent to Descartes’ objective realities). This is stated in a number 
of ways, some of them misleading, as when it is stated that when we 
look for an idea, it is already present in a general way, or when it 
is stated that God makes ideas present to us when we wish them. What 
is intended, however, is simply that occurrences in the mind have roles 
which are specified by the concepts (i.e. ideas) in the objective 
structure present to us; when we properly formulate a mathematical 
problem, the solution is found by intransitive self-teaching and to 
this extent was contained in a general way in the formulation.
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The most interesting, test known, and most often parodied form 
of occasionalism is that "between occurrences in re and occurrences 
in the mind. However, mind-body occasionalism is a consequence of 
considering things under two concepts, one of that which follows rules 
and one of that which obeys laws and instantiates geometrical features. 
This sort of occasionalism was almost common property among Cartesians 
in the two decades after Descartes1 death and was suggested in Descartes1 
later works, Malebranche is very explicit in the eleventh Eclair- 
cis semen t in rejecting dispositions in the mind or various "facilites” 
in the mind; rather, dispositions are secured solely in the body. The 
body, then, takes the place of Suarez’s intellectus possibilis. Prom 
the time of the third book of the Recherche, Malebranche saw the
account involving the intellectus agens as one of the two major compe­
titors with his vision in God. (The other was innatism of various 
forms.) He objects to the intellectus agens because it is held to 
make a spiritual object from something material. He also objects to 
it because it is held to produce these objects without models, i.e. 
the production presupposes the cognition which the object produced is 
meant to make possible. God, in the office of what we have called 
the objective structure, takes the place of the intellectus agens and 
the ideas in God specify the roles of the occurrences in the mind, all
of which correspond to occurrences in the body. The important aspects 
the
in Malebranche’s account are/mechanical system from the object cognised 
to the occurrence in the brain and ideas specifying occurrences in the 
mind. Occurrences in the brain are purely mechanical happenings as 
Malebranche divides up things, and so occurrences in the mind corres­
ponding to them must be introduced for his theory of judgement. The
occurrences in the brain cannot be said to cause those in the mind,
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because their only activity is mechanical, while occurrences in the 
mind, function only in the realm of judging and cognising. Both mech­
anical activity and thought are perspicuous and the introduction of 
a causal relation between the two would introduce something opaque. 
Descartes most often, as in his correspondence with Elizabeth, relied 
on an opaque notion of causality when concerned with the correspondence 
between the body and the mind. A notable exception is in Notae in 
Programma, a late work in which he defends innate ideas. He extends
the term ’’innate idea” to cover material features. Such occurrences
are called innate to emphasise the fact that they are not got from 
something else, for they could not be'understood except as instances 
of thinking. He insists that these occurrences are not like motions, 
which he calls occasions of them. Now maintaining that there is a
causal relation between what is in re and what is in the mind furnishes
much of the support for the view that there are two substances in a 
sense other than instantiated concepts. If we consider the difference 
between thinking things and extended things as the difference between 
two concepts, there is no reason to look for a bridge between them 
in terms of a natural activity. To a large extent, Malebranche’s 
occasionalism is a dual-attribute theory with the attribute of rule­
following thing individuated by mechanical configurations.
Despite the fact that in Malebranche’s occasionalism, what God 
does is determined by the initial ’hhoice”, Leibniz held that occasion­
alism relies on a continual miracle, and so denigrates divine wisdom, 
For Leibniz, the fact that a thing is distinguished from others by 
its properties depends on the fact that its history is the sequence 
of its own activity. The Cartesian display of science in re, with 
the essence of body only extension, although held to be determined
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by laws, involves only God’s activity; the only history enacted is 
God’s, Likewise, the occurrences in the mind corresponding to those 
in the brain exhibit God’s activity. To avoid this, Leibniz replaces 
Malebranche’s occasionalism with his pre-established harmony and 
divine activity is restricted to an approving concourse. As simple 
substances are held to be unextended, interaction has no place.
There is only one substance, the monad and the spatial display founded 
by those monads it dominates.
When Malebranche speaks of the objective structure, he generally 
speaks of what he calls intelligible extension ("l’6tendue intelligible”). 
This term was introduced in the gclaircissements in 1678 in explaining 
vision in God. It is regarded as the whole of geometry. In the
Recherche he uses "idea” in three ways, Firstly, he speaks of occurrences 
in the mind, such as material features, as ideas in the first two books, 
then restricts "idea” to his proper use of the term in the third book.
He was criticised for this by Foucher as early as 1675 (before the 
appearance of the second volume of the Recherche) and by Amauld and 
eventually by Locke. He admits to both Foucher and Amauld that he 
did use "idea" for an occurrence in the mind, stating that he did so 
to facilitate his exposition. The second way he uses "idea" in the 
Recherche is for an objective reality (although he does not explicitly 
state that he uses "idea" in this sense until his polemic with Amauld). 
And the third way is for an idea applied to a thing (as when he speaks 
of the idea of the sun, which is the same as the idea Descartes says 
astronomers have from innate ideas). Intelligible extension replaces 
ideas as objective realities. This is not a great move, for intelli­
gible extension contains all the concepts of geometry and even in the 
Recherche Malebranche looks on ideas or concepts as being defined only
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•with regard, to their relation to other ideas.
Two aspects about intelligible extension become apparent in the 
polemic with Amauld, Firstly, intelligible extension is not all of 
divine science, which also comprises what he calls ’’nombres nombrants”, 
i.e, numerical concepts regarded (in the case of counting numbers) as 
concepts of sets of A’s, where "A” is some sortal term. Secondly, 
although our ideas are identified with the divine ideas, we do not 
use the same ideas or concepts as God in cognising things. Intelligible 
extension is said to be the archetype of all created things, Malebranche 
even admits that it comprises the perfections of a toad, that is, 
there is a concept or idea of a toad as a very complex mechanical 
structure. Although we apply the same geometry in cognising, e.g,, a 
toad as is instantiated in the toad (and so was applied by God in 
constructing the toad), we do not apply the same concepts of this 
geometry, for we do not cognise the toad’s minute structure. In fact, 
as Malebranche holds that natural systems are infinitely complex, we 
could never apply the same concepts to a thing which God followed in 
constructing it; the latter concepts are an unattainable ideal.
The emphasis on geometry is in keeping with the Cartesian approach 
to begin with what furnishes the standards of simplicity and exactness.
In the ’’Geometry”, an essay appended to the Discourse, Descartes 
identifies the unit of length with the unit of counting and develops 
the coordinate geometry in establishing an isomorphism between operations 
on lengths (given a unit) and addition, subtraction, multiplication, 
division and root extraction. In the Regulae, above all concerned 
with perspicuous simples, the two most fundamental simples he presents 
are a unit (in general) and magnitude (in general), which are corre­
latives, as in specifying a unit, one specifies a magnitude. These
309
are fundamental to the Cartesian endeavour (as we have indicated above) 
and the general programme presented in the Regulae is to analyse 
complexes into simples. Descartes suggests that magnitude be treated 
as extension, but this is for facility and leads to his geometry, one 
of whose advantages he saw as the ability it gives us to grasp an 
algebraic problem in a geometrical display.
Malebranche gives a central position in the sixth book of the 
Recherche to what he calls the idea of unity: a general specfication 
of the role of a unit in any dimension. Ideas in general are said to 
be relations. Usually a unit is supposed for two related quantities, 
but he also allows for relations in which a unit is not specified or 
one of the relata is taken as a unit. All in principle can be explained, 
given units and rules for generating mechanical configurations« Still, 
the "in principle" is important, for he allows that extension is 
infinitely divisible. With units, relations and methods for generating 
configurations, he feels he has a way to overcome the restrictions 
imposed on our knowledge of nature by our biological conditions.
For what is veiled (e.g,, by material feature's) is veiled only because 
we are of a certain size and have certain organs. These restrictions 
can be overcome with'-instruments, (Malebranche, in addition to being 
an expert mathematician, was an expert microscopist and gave numerous 
talks on the anatomy of insects to the French Academy of Science.
He illustrates the relativity of our perception of size in the Recherche 
with the example of a mite, whose visual field can be supposed the 
same as ours but which sees things veiled to us because of our size.) 
Malebranche holds that arithmetic and geometry are the true logic and 
replaces logical and grammatical relations with mathematical relations, 
as when the grammar of words referring to pitches is replaced by the
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ratios of the frequency of pitches. As ideas are held to be relations, 
judgements are thought of like proportions as relations of relations 
and arguments are said to be relations of judgements. Although 
Malebranche did not state that necessary truths are seen in God until 
the Eclaircissements, the relational view of judgements was presented 
in the sixth book of the Recherche and, given that ideas are in God, 
it is a short step to hold that their relations are as well.
An essential distinction for Malebranche is between "sentiment”, 
used both for individual occurrences in the mind and for the process 
of having these occurrences,' and "idee". In the polemic with Amauld, 
he identifies ideas both with objective realities in Descartes* sense
and with clear and distinct ideas in Descartes’ sense. Ideas are
spiritual objects of a spiritual faculty and are of formal features. 
Sentiments, although they are occurrences in a spiritual faculty, are 
not objectsF^c&respond to occurrences in the body and are either 
material features or passions. Ideas are the meanings of words, or 
at least of mathematical words, whereas the only linguistic function 
sentiments have is as they are connected with natural expressions or 
their conventional replacements as these have an emotive role, concerned 
with our connection with others according to Malebranche. As ideas are
the meanings of words, we can demonstrate things about ideas or what 
they are of. On the other hand, we can demonstrate things about 
material features only as they are made extensionally identical with 
formal features. He uses the term "connoissance" for the science we
have articulated and "connoitre" is used for rational cognition, 
i.e. that which has ideas as objects, whether or not the idea is 
applied to things. "Sentir" is opposed to "connoitre" for that cogni­
tion which does not involve ideas
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Now Malebranche maintains that we have no idea or concept of 
res cogitans; in particular, there is no idea or concept which applies 
to ourselves as thinking things. He does not deny reflection (he uses 
the term), which is rational cognition not applying the things. This 
is also called ’’pure perception” and is said to correspond to nothing 
in the body. This is misleading, for in the fifth book of the Recherche, 
concerned with passions, he states that there is no thought without 
some passion, which has a connection with occurrences in the body.
The connection he denies is a natural connection, for when he speaks 
of reflection in the sixth book, it is always with regard to conventional 
signs. Having no idea of ourselves, we have no connoissance of our­
selves. He admits we know ourselves, us ing ’’connoissons” in its 
broader, ordinary use; but this is solely by what is called ’’sentiment 
interieur”. Sentiment interieur includes all occurrences in the mind, 
most notably passions (e.g,, fear), but also material features even 
though they are projected, and so attributed to things in re. These 
are treated on a par in so far as they fulfil no roles. These occurr­
ences'" as such are acts of purely empirical cognition since they do not
involve ideas. All such cognition, then, according to Malebranche is 
of ourselves, although these occurrences correspond to occurrences in 
the body and thence, perhaps, to occurrences in our environment,
• (Although we cannot know ourselves by demonstration, sentiment interieur 
is supposed to give us a more intimate knowledge.)
Although he denies that we have rational cognition of ourselves, 
he admits that we can sense or feel ("sentir”) that we rationally 
cognise (’’connoissons"). For example, when we count, there is sentiment 
interieur corresponding to each act of counting. But these acts of
counting are just as discrete as what is counted and likewise found
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numerical concepts. That he does not allow this to be cognition by­
idea shows the importance he places on geometrical concepts over 
arithmetical concepts in picking out things, for bodies are extended 
and we must pick out extended spatio-temporal segments to be able to - 
count. It also shows the importance he places on measurement. In the
discussion of our knowledge; of ourselves both at the end of the third
book of the Recherche and in Eclaircissement XI he states that we 
cannot demonstrate things about ourselves (as thinking things) because 
we know ourselves only by sentiment interieur. But, he adds, we can
establish extensional identities between those of our sentiments which
are material features and formal features. His example is the reduction 
of tones to the lengths of strings and eventually to frequencies. We 
can then demonstrate things about sounds, but this is no longer know­
ing something about ourselves, for what is measured is in the production.^ 
transmission and reception of the feature. Still, he should allow that 
sentiment interieur, a temporal process, can be measured with temporal 
units,
A reason Malebranche gives for his position that we know nothing 
of ourselves by idea is that ideas are representative, i.e. they are 
concepts which specify roles by virtue of which occurrences in the 
mind are fit to pick out things. Indeed, we have and do not pick out 
our own feelings. For example, the statement "I am in pain” is norm­
ally a criterion of pain. If we were to say ”1 know I am in pain”, 
if the use of ’’know” is allowed, it adds nothing to the original 
statement. There is reason even to hold that ’’know” is not properly 
used in this case because there is no way we could be mistaken; 
there is no standard of success, except in the performance of the 
intransitive act which is the uttering of the statement, and there the
standard is simply grammatical, Malebranche considers the cognition 
of material features as analogous to feeling pain. We can now see 
his reason for not admitting that even temporal measures and numerical 
concepts are applicable to us as thinking things, for their applica­
tion depends on us picking out things which are counted and events
distinct from us which are timed.
Still, we pick out pain in others and this is where a concept of
pain has a place; but not always. When we see another person or a 
in pain
higher animal,f\we cannot help but have a feeling sympathetic with him 
or it. Wow Malebranche holds that when we see even a higher animal 
in pain, we project our ’’passion” - pain - onto the animal as we 
project material features onto bodies. Immediately after discussing 
our knowledge of ourselves in the Recherche, he discusses our knowledge 
(again using ’’connoissance” in what for him is a broad sense) of other 
minds. This, he states, is by conjecture, meaning not that we have a 
thought-out judgement, but that we project our feelings onto others. 
Peeling in this way that another feels pain is unlike feeling pain 
ourselves because we could be mistaken, even though it is an automatic 
reaction. In this sense, our knowledge of other minds (and all that 
is physically in the mind according to Malebranche are feelings) is 
by conjecture.
An essential part of Malebranche1 s account is that ideas are not 
in the mind. Around this centers his polemic with Amauld, who 
maintained that ideas are only perceptions, not like species or 
concepts in the Scholastic sense, but the mind itself. The polemic 
began with Amauldrs publication of Des Vraies et des Pauuses Id£es 
(1685) and was most heated in the 1680’s. A second phase occurred 
in the 1690’s with an epistolatory exchange.published in the Journal
des Soavans and occasioned by Regis1 criticism of Malebranche in his 
Systeme, After Amauld* s death, it was continued by Malebranche in 
the first decade of the next century, with a further work and a collec­
tion -of works from the polemic. The polemic was closely followed by 
Leibniz during his most formative period. And Locke repeats many 
of Amauld* s points in his Examination of P. Malebranche * s Opinion ... , 
whose major thesis as well is that ideas are only perceptions.
Both Amauld and Malebranche affirm that the controversy is about 
the nature, not the origin, of ideas. As Malebranche uses ’’idea” in 
the sense of objective reality, the controversy naturally turns to 
the nature of objective reality, Eor Amauld this must be a property 
of a perception. He insists that it is of the nature of a perception 
or idea to represent and that one cannot show how it represents, as 
representation is something primitive. To explain how objective 
reality is a property of an idea, he states that an idea has objective 
reality as a purse has or contains five coins. But, Malebranche points 
out, an idea cannot become an idea of something as a purse can come 
to have five coins. It is not the perception, but what it is of which 
is important. The principle of individuation of that by which we 
know something is not given by stating what is physically in the mind. 
Rather, an occurrence in the mind is fit to pick out something because 
it fulfils a certain role and this role is specified by a concept, 
objective reality or idea in Malebranche*s sense. The concept could 
not be an occurrence, for then temporally distinct occurrences could 
not fulfil the same roles. Nor could it be physically in the mind, 
for it then could not act as a standard. Eor the same reason, the 
concept could not be just a disposition physically in the mind.
The argument for the vision in God which,Malebranche relied on
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most heavily from the time it was first presented, in the third book 
of the Recherche begins with the observation that our ideas, reason 
or the science we use is infinite, immutable and necessary. But, 
it continues, we are none of these, while all three are true of God. 
Therefore, our ideas or reason is in or simply is God. Now neither 
occurrences nor dispositions in the mind are immutable. Concepts, 
on the other hand, are neither physically in the mind or physically 
in re. In this sense we can allow that they are immutable, although an 
objective structure is tied to a culture and its endeavours, which 
change. Still, one evaluates the judgements of any rational being 
at any place or time according to the objective structure present 
to one. Furthermore, one applies the concepts of the same objective 
structure to all things at all times and places.
Regis introduced into the polemic the question of whether something 
which is finite in essendo can be infinite in repraasentando. He 
and Amauld must maintain that it can, Malebranche maintains that 
it cannot. Now we can use a sign - **oo ’» - for infinity and we can 
use a complex sign, e.g., ”1, 2, 5, •••”> to represent an infinite 
series of, e.g., numbers. Likewise, occurrences in the mind corres­
ponding to these signs can be of infinity and of an infinite series 
of numbers. But the marks or the occurrences alone do not represent. 
Rather, they represent by virtue of fulfilling roles, which are speci­
fied by concepts, objective realities or ideas in Malebranche*s sense.
On Amauld* s position, a type of occurrence in the mind, perhaps as 
an exercise of a disposition, is potentially infinite in application.
But then we need some standard by which to judge that these occurrences 
are of the same type. This standard could not be another occurrence, 
for then we would need a further standard to judge that the other
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occurrences are to be ranked, under it.
The polemic also concerned whether ’’idea” must be taken for a
perception in the mind or something distinct from the mind for one to 
be able to conclude God’s existence from the idea we have of Him.
Amauld maintains that unless the idea of God is a perception or a 
type of perception, and so is caused, one could not ask for the cause 
of the objective reality. If the idea (i.e. objective reality) of 
God is God Himself, then our knowledge is no longer what is in question 
and one cannot begin by considering oneself as a thinking thing. 
Malebranche replies by repeating that what is finite cannot represent 
what is infinite. Furthermore, what is caused is a mind knowing God, 
not the objective reality itself. Finally, we have knowledge of God 
only because of His presence, not because of something intrinsic to us.
Another question raised was whether ’’idea” must be taken for a 
perception in the mind or something distinct from the mind for the 
truth of the maxim that we can affirm of something all which we clearly 
and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of it. This 
concerns the necessity of our ideas and reason and the necessity of 
the objective structure or God, Now non-descriptive rules and concepts 
are necessary in so far as there could be no description which could 
lead us to reject them, for they specify the roles by which utterances 
and occurrences in the mind are fit to pick out things and are the 
standards by which we evaluate these utterances and occurrences. 
Furthermore, they could in principle be learned intransitively and 
even (given that one has a handle on an objective structure) could 
be formulated by intransitive self—teaching. Amauld’s position with 
regard to the Cartesian maxim is that if ideas were distinct from 
the mind, clear and distinct perception would not be about our
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knowledge; rather, it would he about some third thing. But this is a 
misconception of the nature of the third thing. This misconception is 
related to Amauld’s position on how an idea has objective reality. 
Knowing a concept is having a concept, where ’’having” is used in the 
sense of having it present to us, not in the sense of either having 
an occurrence in the mind or having a disposition. Malebranche replies 
that if clear and distinct perception were of ideas in the mind, then 
there would be no guarantee (indeed, no reason to suspect) that what 
is.clearly and distinctly perceived to be in the idea of a thing can 
be affirmed of it. We could', in that case, only say what is true of 
our ideas. Malebranche accused Amauld of holding a position leading 
to scepticism in the later part of the polemic. In the preface to 
the collection of works from this polemic which Malebranche had published 
in 17O9, he states that his reason for presenting these again is to 
combat scepticism. It is significant that Malebranche mentions 
Locke’s Essay in particular as a work whose views lead to scepticism. 
Without concepts, objective realities or ideas which are not percep­
tions in the mind, we have no standards to evaluate our judgements 
and nothing to specify roles by which what is physically in the mind 
is fit to pick out things.
Amauld also accuses Malebranche of scepticism because of the 
third thing introduced in clear and distinct perception, Malebranche 
presents his position largely in terms of intelligible extension.
But the third book of the Recherche, where he first explicitly treats 
of ideas, was written before he developed the notion of intelligible 
extension. Here he refers to ideas as spiritual beings, as represent­
ative beings (although he later states that they are neither modes 
nor substances) and as objects of thought distinct from the mind.
Amauld. opened the polemic by accusing Malebranche of re-introducing 
Scholastic species, the elimination of which was vital to the Cartesian 
position that substance is perspicuous. Malebranche replies that he 
used the language of the Schools because he wished to combat their 
position. Still, it is important to Malebranche1s position that ideas 
are spiritual objects of a spiritual faculty, that they are not in the 
mind and that only by having them present to us can occurrences in 
the mind pick out things in re. On the other hand, ideas cannot be 
intelligible species or conceptus formales in Suarez’s sense, for 
ideas according to Malebranche are only of formal features and are 
applied and not caused. The function Malebranche assigns God is 
similar to the function of the Thomist intellectus agens, yet ideas 
for Malebranche cannot be universal species or verba in the Thomist 
sense, for they are not dispositions or occurrences and are not in
the mind,
Amauld again accuses Malebranche of introducing a veil in his 
criticism of Malebranche’s version of conversio ad phantasmata. 
According to Malebranche, our science - primarily geometry - is 
applied to things by projecting sentiments which render intelligible 
extension particular. For example, in seeing a red square on a blue 
background, the concept of a square, which intelligible extension 
comprises, is cognised and is applied to a particular spatio-temporal 
position by virtue of the sentiments of red and blue. The sentiments 
themselves would not be projected without the concept. Only what 
Malebranche calls weak and languid sentiments, which we have called 
material features, are held to be projected beyond the body; what are 
called strong and lively sentiments - e.g., pain - are not. This is
a type distinction among sentiments. For each weak and languid type,
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an occurrence of it is projected only if it is sufficiently strong, 
as when we sense something or have a strong imagination of something, 
as in hallucination. If the sentiment is very weak, as in normal 
imagination, it is not projected.
Malebranche, in a misleading, figurative style, sometimes speaks 
of this as the soul painting portions of intelligible extension to 
render it particular. Amauld holds that on this view, one would 
cognise only a third sort of thing, a depiction in intelligible exten­
sion. But Amauld fails to distinguish between ideas and sentiments. 
The sentiment, according to Malebranche, like Amauld’s ideas as 
perceptions, is only in the mind. The idea is that by which the senti­
ments are projected in spatial configurations, but it is not something 
particular on which they are projected nor is it that in which 
they are. Amauld writes as if formal and material features were on a 
par for Malebranche, and so must both be either in the mind, in re or
in a third thing.
Amauld, maintains that the projection of sentiments onto intelli
gible extension to render it particular, quite apart from introducing
a third thing, could not explain how we cognise particular things. 
Intelligible extension, the criticism runs, is capable of representing 
anything. To say that it is rendered particular by sentiments, and 
and is thereby that by which we cognise particular things, involves the 
same sort of problem as presenting a painter with a blank easel or 
a sculptor with a block of marble and asking him to produce a picture 
or sculpture of St. Augustine. Intelligible extension could not 
explain representation because we would need a model to depict the 
thing represented in it. Malebranche’s reply is that the sculpture 
of St. Augustine is potentially (”en puissance”) in the marble. The
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particular conditions are all furnished by sentiment, according* to 
the correspondence with the body. Intelligible extension is capable 
of representing anything because it contains the models of everything.
It is the raw materials which must be given for sentiments to be any­
thing more than occurrences in the mind.
Still, this does not guarantee that what is picked out is 
St, Augustine and not a complex geometrical figure, perhaps in the 
mind, coloured in the same way as he. We can allow that intelligible 
extension suffices for intransitive acts and that by it transitive 
acts are fit to pick out things. But given only it and occurrences 
in the mind which are projected, there is no way of getting beyond 
diagrams to things. The problem arises because descriptive rules and 
concepts have dropped out. There are no natural sortals allowed, 
for the only sortals are units of measure. Nothing is said of principle 
of individuation of things, only of geometrical figures, which are 
not individual, Furthermore, the only way parts of extension are 
distinguished is by the material features which are projected on them; 
the universe could as well be one extended thing which we distinguish 
into variously coloured parts.
It is, then, not without reason that Amauld accuses Malebranche 
of Spinoz.aism. Amauld1 s reason in particular is that if we see all 
extended things in God, then God must be all extended things. This 
reason, however, will not do, as it again fails to distinguish 
between ideas which are concepts of any number of possible things 
and sentiments which render an idea particular and by which it is 
actually applied to . some thing, Malebranche insists on the distinction 
between intelligible extension - God as containing the archetypes of
all extended things — and the attribute of immensity - the attribute
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of God. by virtue of which He is in all places. Yet Malebranche con­
flates these two in the Entretiens sur la Mort, appended to later
editions of the Entretiens sur la Metaphysique. This work was written 
after a severe illness and was held by his biographers to be one of 
his most religious works. In the Entretiens sur la Metaphysique he 
had developed his account of our application of ideas to include the 
projection of strong and lively sentiments - pain in particular - to 
parts of our body, which is included as a case of rendering an idea, 
viz. that of our body, particular. The sentiment corresponds to an 
occurrence in the body and the idea of the body is in God. In the 
Entretiens sur la Mort he conflates the correspondence between the 
body and the mind with the rendering of the idea of the body particular 
by occurrences in the mind. The consequence is that the body itself 
is in God and the mind is what instantiates it. This is not exactly 
the position of Spinoza, for whom what physically exists is oonatfis, 
primarily to do with extension; but it is very close to it,
Leibniz,in his writings of the l680fs concerned with ideas, 
agrees with Amauld1 s position that ideas must be in the mind. However, 
he holds this position for other reasons, most notably to avoid the 
Spinozaisn on which Malebranche verges. (Leibniz was in correspondence 
with Amauld at the time of the polemic with Malebranche and his .
Discourse on Metaphysics forms part of this correspondence. Yet a 
number of parts of this work reflect parts of Malebranche1s Traite. 
de la , H'ature et de la Grace, which occasioned the polemic.) On the 
nature of ideas, Leibniz follows Malebranche except on the question 
whether ideas are in the mind. He distinguishes (especially in the 
Houveaux Essais) ideas from perceptions, which are occurrences. He
also agrees with Malebranche on the application of our science to
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things, on abstraction and. generally on the question whether ideas
are made.
Descartes’position on whether ideas are made is not always clear, 
but when the question is of ideas which are said to have objective 
reality, he allows for analysis and synthesis, but not for our making ■ 
of new ideas. In the Third Meditation he distinguishes ideas into 
those which are adventitious and due to the senses, those which are
factitious and made and those which are innate. Factitious ideas are
made from adventitious ideas and neither as such have objective reality. 
This allows only what any one allows who admits imagination in addition 
to memory. Those ideas whose objective realities are important are 
those which are innate, When Descartes states that the objective 
reality of the idea of God needs a cause, he does not mean to suggest 
that all other ideas can be made; rather, he means that, given that we 
have those ideas whose objective realities are instantiated in us as 
thinking things, we can thereby have those ideas whose objective realities 
are instantiated in extended things. Again, clear and distinct percep­
tion is concerned with ideas which are innate, and so cannot be made, 
for (he holds) there must be a cause for what is clearly and distinctly 
perceived.
We must distinguish between concepts being involved or involving 
other concepts and representations being made from others or concepts 
being formed from representations. A concept involves another because 
rules involving further concepts converge on it. A concept is not 
formed from representations of what it is of, for the, representations 
are of the thing in question only because they instantiate or found 
the concept. There are two ways representations could be made from 
others. In so far as the same thing has different roles at different
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times and in so far as a number of representations are associated or 
parts or aspects of one representation are given independent roles.
In either case, the roles are specified by concepts.
Now analysis and synthesis as Descartes treats them are concerned 
with concepts as involved in or involving others. When he speaks of 
conversio in the Regulae, he speaks of a number of natures or concepts 
which involve one another. When he writes that an idea (e.g., of the 
sun) is made from innate ideas, what is meant is that a number of 
concepts are applied to the same things in re. This is synthesis and 
establishes an extensional identity between a concatenation of material 
features assigned certain spatio-temporal positions and a concept 
comprising a number of formal features. He in fact speaks of abstrac­
tion, but this is the consideration of one concept involved in a comples 
without considering the others; this is analysis.
This sort of abstraction is endorsed by Amauld in the Port Royal 
Logic. But against Malebranche’s position on the' application of 
concepts he maintains that we make ideas which represent various 
features. This is in general by comparison and his position in this 
respect is compatible with Gassendi’s, In particular, he holds that 
we form ideas of numbers by comparison. His example is of Thales, 
who gives twenty men each a thaler. By comparing the men with the 
thalers, he maintains, we form the idea of twenty, which is common 
to. both, Malebranche’s reply is that, to make the comparison, we must 
already have the idea (concept) of (a group of) twenty. If ideas were 
perceptions in the mind, one would compare two groups each with a 
third group, which only introduces another term of the comparison, 
Malebranche holds that ideas in general are relations; these are
applied in making comparisons, but they are not foimed from things
’3 24©
compared.
For Leibniz, ideas are not made, but applied. He maintains this 
postion agianst both Hobbes and Locke. In the second book of the 
Nouveaux Essais he is continually critical of Locke on the formation 
of ideas. His postion against abstraction is presented against 
Locke’s view that knowledge is from particular to general, maintained 
both against innate ideas in the first book of the Essay and against 
maxims in the fourth book. Leibniz replies that the evidence - what 
one would cite to support one’s claim - on the particular case is due 
to the general concept or. maxim which is applied in the cognition of
the particular. Leibniz puts more emphasis on propositional rational 
knowledge than do the Cartesians, who are principally concerned with 
ideas and their objective realities. Thus he holds that truths of 
fact are justified or evaluated (*’se justifient”) by truths of reason. 
Leibniz..maintained that ideas are in the mind because of the
function he assigned them in the individuation of that which has them, 
thus avoiding the Spinozaismon which Malebranche verges. Simple 
substances were an early concern for Leibniz and the Cartesian position 
that the essence of body is extension and that of mind thought was a 
target of his from 1670. He gained a thorough knowledge of Spinoza’s 
system in the early 1670's and saw in it the difficulties regarding 
individuals inherent in Cartesianism. His mature postion on monads
begins to appear in the Discourse on Metaphysics, with the notion of 
an individual concept. Pre-established harmony, which was presented 
in opposition to Malebranche’s occasionalism, appeared publicly in 
almost final form in the "Nouveau Systeme", an article published in 
1695* Monads instantiate the objective structure and restrictions 
of it, mirroring the universe from their own points
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of view, Malebranche held that the objective structure is basically 
geometrical; it is not instantiated in the thing which thinks and 
we have no idea of ourselves. But Leibniz wishes to analyse geometrical 
concepts into mathematical and logical concepts. He takes logic to 
be a science, rather than an art, as it was generally held to be in 
Scholasticism and by Cartesian authors on logic; it is held to be 
of great importance, an attitude diametrically opposed to Malebranche’s. 
Spatial displays on Leibniz’s position are founded by.simple unextended 
substances and the objective structure is instantiated in us. Thus 
we do not see all things in'God; rather, we see all-things, including 
God, by reflection. Still, we perform the same acts as God, as ’’same 
act” refers, not to the same occurrence, but to that which has the 
same standard of success. We perform only some of these freely and 
we perform them in a temporal sequence and from a point of view.
Leibniz does not usually speak of ideas as objects, but when he 
does (as in the Nouveaux Essais and his writings of the late 1680’s), 
he states that they are objects in us, as they must be if we instantiate 
the objective structure. Still, in his comments on Locke’s Examination 
of P. Malebranche's Opinion, Leibniz agrees with Locke that if we see 
all things in God, we should see the idea of ourselves in God, When 
he treats ideas as objects in us, he adds that God is the immediate 
external object. Knowing ourselves by reflection and thereby knowing 
the rules and concepts we follow, we know divine science, which is 
the divine intellect.
Ideas as objects are spiritual objects since all monads are 
spiritual automata performing spiritual operations; their activities
as
God reads things) are arithmetical ,and logical. However,(at
we are responsible for only some of these activities and what is
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spiritual is distinguished, by the subject matter with which it is con­
cerned* Law obeying is conflated with rule following in the transla­
tion of- what is extended into what is unextended.
The objects in us are not held to be occurrences. Leibniz 
maintains that the object of thought must precede the act, as he 
should, for these objects are the standards of success of the acts.
The monad (or mind for those things which are conscious) which domin­
ates the body secures dispositions, for it instantiates the analysis of 
the body. Perception is the exercise of the- dispositions and there 
are no bare faculties. Thought or rational cognition is an exercise 
of these dispositions, which are concepts and innate ideas. Thus
Leibniz holds that innate ideas are like veins in a block of marble
which mark out the sculpture potentially in it, for concepts are in 
us and occurrences in the mind are exercises of them. As the mind
instantiates the objective structure, the dispositions to think are 
individuated by concepts of the objective structure, so they are what 
we have called ideas formaliter, Leibniz rarely uses the term 
’’objective reality”, for ideas as he uses the term are individuated 
by objective realities. We have the same ideas as God in the sense • 
that we follow the same standards; but our ideas are not identical 
with God’s in that they are distinct dispositions.
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Chapter X .
The Cartesians and Leibniz on Naturally
Following Rules,
We do not acquire rules and concepts because of our causal relations 
in the world; rather, we become subject to them by being inducted into 
a culture. By being subject to non-descriptive rules and concepts, we. 
can apply rational knowledge to natural things. We can accept the 
accounts of the Cartesians and Leibniz in so far as they hold that 
ideas, objective realities or concepts are not physically in the mind 
and are applied to things to which we are alive. But on their accounts., 
these rules and concepts are not acquired and are common to all rational 
beings. In this chapter we shall consider two related reasons they 
had for maintaining this view. One is the correspondence between the 
mind and the body, especially as described in their theories of vision. 
The body is to be described according to the ideal science and the mind 
is held to perform mathematical operations according to the disposition 
of parts of the body. These calculations are not corporeal or material, 
yet are held to be naturally performed; so they are performed by some­
thing spiritual. This conflates law-obeying with rule-following. The
second reason is that the ideal science and the reduction of all
descriptions of natural phenomena to it, although this must be formulated 
by us, is held to be already in effect as the divine science. Finally, 
on the position that we naturally follow the rules of this ideal, there 
is no way one could show that what this science is applied to is any­
thing other than a diagram founded in occurrences in the mind.
The endeavour to maximise the explanatory and predictive power,
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the simplicity and exactness of our theories is a cultural ideal, yet 
Descartes takes the concepts and rules of this ideal to he naturally 
displayed in re and followed hy all rational beings. The rationale for 
this can he seen in the "Dioptrics” in which a maximally simple and 
exact physiological description of the body is applied to the physio­
logist himself. Descriptive concepts and rules drop out and are replaced 
hy perceptions and feelings. Only res extensa and res cogitans, motions 
physically in re and occurrences physically in the mind are left. The 
account in the "Dioptrics" contains the seeds of Leibniz’s monads as 
spiritual automata, for we are held to make geometrical judgements of 
things in re in accordance with that geometry which is natural because 
of the disposition of the parts of our body, in particular, because of 
the disposition of the eyes and their constituent parts. Furthermore, 
consciousness is.,tied.to the disposition of the parts of the body, for 
we are held to be able to be conscious of what is in a straight line 
from the periphery of the body. This position contains the view that 
we follow rules because the body instantiates the objective structure 
and that rational practical cognition occurs naturally. The natural 
geometry is then innate not only in the sense that anything which 
excogitates is held to follow it, but also in the sense that dispositions 
in the body are sufficient to specify ideas formaliter
and thus to determine which objective -realities are 
present to the mind, What Descartes writes about the complexity of the 
body and the extent to which the relation between occurrences in the 
mind corresponds to the relation between occurrences in the body is
not sufficient to determine whether this was Descartes’ view or whether
he had a view beyond that outlined in the "Dioptrics" and the Passions
of the Soul. In the latter work he writes that we can change the relation
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between physiological activities and. passions of or occurrences in the 
mind. Leibniz, on the other hand, states in the Monadology that if
Descartes had the correct conservation laws for motion he would have
come upon the system of" pre-established harmony. If this were Descartes* 
view, then he would be committed to the position that the body* s disposi- . 
tions are infinitely complex, as the objective structure (according to 
him) is infinitely complex. At any rate, the position on judgement in 
the ’’Dioptrics” overburdens consciousness,, for we are held to be responsible 
for all these judgements. Yet, because of the part Descartes gives 
to prejudice throughout his later works, it is essential that we be 
held responsible for a multitude of judgements we are "led by nature” 
to make, and that we are conscious of all feelings physically in the 
mind because we are held responsible for the judgements we make on their
occasion. ,
Leibniz’s theory of monads is a generalisation of the account of 
the exercise of rational knowledge in our relation to our ambient world 
given in the ’’Dioptrics". The mind corresponds in infinite detail with 
the body and neither influences the other, for Leibniz’s physics is 
deterministic. Geometry is reduced to logic and arithmetic. The 
examples Leibniz most often gives of simples are concerned with ens •
or a being in general, which is a universal unit of counting. Monads 
are held to engage in an occult arithmatic and their counting takes the 
place of Scholastic intensional species, for all correspondence between 
them is attributed to the correspondence between their rational practical 
cognition. There are no windows to admit species, since the cognition 
of simple substances themselves suffices.
Since Leibniz holds that matter or prime matter is an abstraction, 
an assemblage of simple substances or a spatial display in general, he
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finds no problem with the path from what is material to what is spiritual. 
Nor is there for him a mystery in the move from what is insensible to 
what is sensible, for what is sensible or apperceived is a concourse of 
insensible spiritual happenings: rational practical cognitions, which 
could in principle be spatially displayed if we had the requisite 
techniques and instruments.
Leibniz, unlike the Cartesians, held that animals think. But he 
holds there is life and perception throughout, as there must be simple 
spiritual substances performing occult arithmetic to found spatial 
displays. There is a threshold at which perception becomes noticeable, 
where the concourse of perceptions results in apperception. He sometimes 
gives behavioural criteria for apperception, as in the Nouveaux Essais, 
where he states that a boar responding to a call apperceives the cry.
He more often relies on the physiology of those things which sense and 
apperceive at least in a simple way to distinguish them from those 
things which merely perceive; in particular, what senses has distinct 
organs of sense. Certain monads have a sufficient complexity that 
their apperception reflects the objective structure, which they can 
formulate and reflect by means of conventional or (as Leibniz says) 
sensible signs. Reflection involves consciousness and responsibility, 
which gives these monads a special sort of continuity as moral beings.
Yet this continuity depends on the continuity they have simply as 
substances, for traces of conscious acts are secured in the substance 
as dispositions of which it is not conscious, but which have an effect 
on its future acts and may again be exercised in a conscious act.
In reflection and the formulation of rules and concepts and even 
in one’s induction into a culture, Leibniz holds, we become subject to no
new rules and concepts because we instantiate all the rules and concepts
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of divine science, as do all monads. Leibniz allows for periods of 
sensitive and even conscious monads in which they differ from those 
monads which do not sense only in their dispositions which some day 
may have a noticeable effect or which are the traces of past appercep­
tions. Monads during these periods are said to be dormant. He thus 
avoids the problem of the natural origin of simple substances. He 
thought that there was evidence for this in the existence of germ cells, 
a recent discovery due to the microscope. There were thought to be 
similar microscopic bodies havingAunique relation to the developed body 
after the destruction of the' latter. Leibniz held that every dormant 
monad is always associated with a spatial display and dominates an 
infinite number of other monads. The spatial display is said to be 
second matter, as opposed to prime matter, and is not an abstraction, 
for it is well founded. Only by its correspondence with second matter, 
it is maintained, can the continuity of a monad be guaranteed, for the 
continuity of a monad must reflect spatio-temporal continuity. What 
determines whether a monad is sensitive is the presence of organs;
what determines that a monad is conscious or reflects is its use of
conventional or sensible signs. No class of monads is distinguished 
by the fact that they perform rational activities, for all monads are 
spiritual automata,
Leibniz conflates law-obeying with rule-following because of the 
translation of what is extended into what is unextended. The rales and
concepts of the highly sophisticated ideal of a perfectly simple and 
exact description are held to be followed by that to which they are 
applied. "Spiritual” is bifurcated by Leibniz between those operations 
which are merely calculations and those for which we are held to be 
responsible. This distinction corresponds to the distinction between
the realm of nature and. the realm of grace. The exact correspondence 
between these two realms which he thought he could explain was considered 
by Leibniz to exhibit divine wisdom, for a perfect craftsman need not 
interfere with his work. Some, such as Clarke (whom Leibniz thought 
denigrated divine wisdom), regarded such a view as materialist in the 
end. Indeed, God plays little more than the part of a concept comprising 
the rules and concepts of a complete science and the concepts of all 
possible individuals; the determination of which individual concepts 
are to be actualised is done by a calculation, albeit involving an 
infinite number of steps.
Leibniz1s position is like Hobbes’ position inverted: what Hobbes ' 
took to be material and extended, Leibniz takds to be unextended and 
spiritual. What is peculiar to rational creatures, Hobbes takes to be 
due to the use of language. Similarly, Leibniz held that reflection 
is always connected with sensible signs and that language is the best 
mirror of the mind. Still, he opposes Hobbes on ostensive and stipula- 
tive definition as the commencement of our rational knowledge, for 
giving a definition is itself a rule-following activity. Yet for Leibniz 
these rules are instantiated in all monads because of the correspondence 
between what is extended and unextended. Furthermore, the rules of 
natural languages are regarded as only approximations of the rules 
instantiated in all monads. He states that his primary concern is with 
ordinary language, but he treats ordinary language with arithmetical 
models and looks on it as a calculus. He looks for a natural language, 
which would mirror all minds, and a universal character, which would 
make explicit those rules followed by all minds. Logic is held to be an 
adjunct to grammar and to be involved in the analysis of any spatial 
display. In one fragment, Leibniz attempts to display prepositions as
spatial relations. All of these are attempts to formulate that science 
which all things obey and. follow and. which is formulated, in various 
imperfect versions by conscious things.
The seeds for Malebranche*s vision in God are also to be found in
the ’dioptrics'’5 but Malebranche does not hold that the infinite complexity 
of the body corresponds to a similar complexity in the mind, whose limited 
capacity he emphasises. Much of the first book of the Recherche is 
devoted to a development of Descartes* theory of vision. The position 
of this discussion in Malebranche*s first work shows the importance of 
his theory of vision to his ’general account. Malebranche accepts 
Descartes* criticism of intensional species? the feeling ("sentiment”) 
associated with a feature and the feeling associated with a verbal 
token are on a par. In particular, the meaning of a word is not held 
to be an occurrence in the mind, but an idea (in his sense). Malebranche 
differs with Descartes in that he maintains that sentiments and the roles
they occur in are not determined by judgements made by us; rather, God 
must give us sentiments or occurrences in the mind in certain relations 
on the occurrence of certain dispositions of the parts of the body, in 
particular the visual faculties. Still, his position entails that we 
naturally follow rules because the objective structure is instantiated 
in the body; thus his position conflates law-obeying with rule-following,
Malebranche relies on God to give us sentiments because he insists 
that we do not cognise the operations of the muscles, nerves, etc, of 
our own body in our day-to-day commerce with our environment. This 
rules out the sort of correspondence between mind and body which Leibniz 
supported, Malebranche also insists on the limited capacity of the 
mind, although he holds that it has the same objects as God. The notion 
of judgement is not as overburdened as with Descartes, for all those
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occurrences in the mind which are occasions for us (and not God) to 
apply the rules and concepts of the natural geometry are to some extent 
explicit or, in Leibniz’s terminology, apperceived, Since we are not. 
held responsible for cognising the activities which result in discrimin- 
able spatial distinctions, the mind need not instantiate or found the 
whole objective structure or even that part of it - geometry - concerned 
with mechanical activity, Malebranche does not speak of a natural 
geometry. Rather, he speaks of a divine optics both in the Recherche 
and especially in the Entretiens sur la Mgtaphysique, for it is God 
who gives us occurrences in the mind in roles specified by the geometry 
displayed in the world. Nevertheless, the notion of conscious is over­
burdened, as we are held to apply the rules of this geometry to all 
discriminable spatial displays at all periods of our life.
Occurrences in the mind or sentiments are said to be given by God 
for the good of the body. They need not inform us how things really 
are, for they depend on the history of the body and its relation to its 
environment. The complex sentiment or sensation given us by God is 
called a natural judgement by Malebranche, Natural judgements relate 
to the geometrical distribution of things in our environment because
a number of sentiments are involved, Malebranche holds that we are led
by nature to consent to natural judgements, i.e, we are inclined to 
conform our own judgements, which Malebranche calls free judgements, 
to natural judgements. Natural judgements are the occasions of error 
because their function is to inform us of what is good for the body, 
not of the real distribution of things. As God gives us natural judge­
ments and the distribution of things depends on Him, Malebranche states 
that natural judgements can be (and usually are) false from God’s point 
of view. Thus God misleads us. But He does so for the good of the
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body: we ourselves, because of the limited capacity of our mind, could
not take into account the infinite detail which we would have to know
to preserve our body. Furthermore, God is not the author of our error, 
for the free judgements are made by us. Finally, we are supplied with 
a means of interpreting natural judgements so that we are not misled, 
for divine science or divine optics is present to us and by this we 
can evaluate judgements, either free or natural. The theme of the
Recherche is the avoidance of error. In the sixth book Malebranche
presents the science which is to lead us from error, i.e. mathematics 
and its application to things. The first, second and fourth books are
I
concerned with the relation between dispositions and occurrences in 
the body and occurrences in the mind, which are occasions of error. 
Malebranche’s general remedy for error is the application of mathematical 
sciences to things, especially our own body.
We have seen how the correspondence between mind and body and the 
application of mathematical science to the latter supports the view 
that all rational beings follow the same objective structure, which 
is identified with divine science. The application of this science is 
held to be in a form of conversio ad phantasmata. Analytic and synthetic 
methods unpack and re-apply the rules involved in this, giving us 
formulations of them and their applications. The success of the pro­
gressive use of these methods gives the Cartesians and Leibniz another 
reason to hold that all rational beings naturally follow the same 
objective structure: divine science is the human ideal and all rational 
beings are held to be engaged in the same endeavour. The Cartesians 
propose a hypothetico-deductive method by which we eliminate hypotheses 
about extensional identities between formal features and descriptive 
concepts, especially those of material features. Eventually the ideal
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of divine science is achieved. What is obscure and confused is replaced 
by what is clear and distinct and perspicuous to any rational being, 
Leibniz put this in a more general setting. He is concerned primarily 
with propositions which are used to justify our assertions. He in fact 
describes the appeal to rules to which two interlocutors are subject 
and the coordination of conventions. But the ultimate case is supposed, 
in which there could be no further rules and we are held responsible 
for performing the logical steps which are meant to be assumed in our 
ordinary discourse.
In the Discourse Descartes speaks of suppositions which he wishes 
to eliminate, for he wishes to have all his explanations in terms of 
concepts which owe nothing to the senses. The elimination of these 
suppositions involves for the most part the extension of mathematical 
description to things which were described with descriptive terms. But 
the suppositions on which he particularly relies and only twice (in 
Le Monde and the Principles) "provej” are his basic laws of motion.
These laws establish the conservation of motion as a scalar quantity 
and special cases of its conservation as a vector quantity, (For ’’motion” 
as used by the Cartesians, one can read ’’momentum”.) To ’’prove” these 
laws, Descartes appeals to divine immutability, which must, he feels, 
be reflected in some way in the world which God creates and conserves.
In fact, very little is made of the fact that immutability has a divine 
source. He warns that, solely judging by the senses, his conservation 
laws appear not to hold, but he also states that he is only extending 
to motion a principle which has been applied by others to other properties 
and even suggests that his laws agree with the most ordinary experiences. 
One should regard his reliance on divine immutability, not as an attempt 
to establish something factual about the world, but as formulating a
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regulative principle for our investigations of nature and. the applica­
tion of mathematics. In a similar vein, even the possibility of 
mathematics is held, to depend on God as the fons omnis veritatis in 
the Meditations, Divine immutability,however, is concerned solely 
with the application of mathematics: granted that some quantity is 
conserved, we have a handle on a mathematical description of nature, 
for we. have some constant value to introduce into problems. Yet from - 
the regulative principle alone, we cannot identify the quantity which 
is conserved. The fact that divine immutability is called upon only 
for a regulative principle is supported by the fact that Malebranche, 
in questioning Descartes* laws of motion in the sixth book of the 
Recherche, while accepting that it follows from divine immutability 
alone that some kinetic quantity is conserved, insists that we must 
consider descriptions of experiments to determine what this quantity is. 
In wishing to eliminate what is due to the senses, Descartes did not 
rule out experiments; he in fact states that we must rely on crucial 
experiments to arrive at the final explanatory system (which he appears 
at times to have thought was within sight) and suggests foundations for 
experimental work at the close of the Discourse, Rather, he wishes to 
eliminate our reliance on concepts involving concepts of material 
features and natural sortals and bulks. The regulative nature of divine 
immutability is further supported by the dispute between Malebranche 
and Leibniz, both of whom accepted the principle. In this dispute, 
carried out in the Journal des Spavans in the 1690’s, the issue is 
settled (in Leibniz*s favour) by appeal to experiments or descriptions 
of moving bodies alone.
Another sort of supposition, also called ’’conjecture" in the Regulae 
which Desacrtes discusses in the Discourse concerns what he says of
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deducing causes from effects. The cause-effect relation here is a 
logical relation or something similar, ’’Deduce”, however, is usually- 
used by Descartes for a relation between terms, those which are given 
being the causes and those which are deduced being the effects. This 
was the common use of ’’deduce” in the seventeenth century; ’’infer” 
was reserved for the relation between propositions. When the terms 
are mathematical, the deduction is the performance of a mathematical 
operation (e.g., ”3+5 8”) o** the redescription of a formal feature
in accordance with an isomorphism between disciplines (e.g., ’’circle 
with radius r and whose centre is at the origin” ”x +^z=r”), In 
either case, the deduction could in principle be a case of intransitive 
self-teaching and the deduction establishes an intensional identity. 
Sometimes, if not usually, what Descartes intends by ’’deduce” is the
’’deduction” of terms for material features or natural bulks or sortals 
from terms for formal features. This establishes an extensional identity 
between the two and is the reduction of our ordinary descriptions of 
things into the language of the programme whose goal is to be able to 
explain or predict any event and to describe all of nature with maximum 
simplicity and exactness. This is the explanation of things by laws 
formulated in purely mathematical terms, which are held to owe nothing
to the senses. *
To achieve a complete science, this reduction would have to be 
performed for all ranges of material features and for every natural 
bulk or sortal. The ’’causes” in the deductions establishing the 
extensional identities are, at least initially, conjectures or supposi­
tions. Descartes states in the Discourse that the deductions as much
prove the causes by the effects as vice versa. In the endeavour to
achieve the final physical science, one must form hypotheses - here
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taken as terms conjectured to be extensionally identical with others - 
and test their consequences in experiments; Descartes particularly 
suggests crucial experiments. This is the hypothetico-deductive method, 
but involving terms, not propositions. It is seen as an expedient when 
Descartes thinks that the complete physical science is within sight.
The application of this method is seen in the essays following the 
Discourse, for which the Discourse was an introduction. In the "Geometry” 
an intensional identity is established between the concepts of geometry 
and those of arithmetic and algebra; the hypotheses are justified by 
following out the consequences of the isomorphism established between 
the operations of the two and in particular by solving geometrical 
problems with algebraic methods. In the "Dioptrics" he attempts (among 
other things) to establish extensional identities between homogeneous 
colours and the angular velocities of particles; the .hypotheses 
are meant to be justified by accounting for various phenomena involving 
homogeneous and heterogeneous light. In the "Meteors" extensional
identities are established between various formal features and atmos­
pheric phenomena and the hypotheses are to be justified by predictions 
and explanations they allow one to give of these phenomena. Again, 
in his physiological works, Descartes attempted to account for not only 
all the observable motions of sentient creatures, but also the variety 
of sensations or feelings which we have in terms of his general mechanics. 
This subsumed physiology under his general description of the world, 
as given in the Principles or Le Monde, which he once described as a
novel.
The details of Descartes1 programme were all in a sense hypotheses 
to be justified by the explanations and predictions they give. Descartes 
had a sanguine and a practical side: he sometimes spoke as if the
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complete science was at hand, lacking only the details and that almost 
anyone, given enough time and following a few informal rules, could 
attain this; othertimes he recognised the tentative nature of his own 
general physical principles. Yet he never questioned* the view;-, that 
only those things which perform the analysis escape an analysis in 
terms of mathematical units and their relations. In the Discourse, 
where he presents his rules, in addition to rejecting various semi­
formal methods current in his day, he claims that the methods of geometry 
and algebra are not general enough. He suggests in their stead the 
methods of analysis (claimed to have been a secret of ancient mathema­
ticians) into simples and a consequent synthetic return. The method 
of analysis was to assign constants or variables to what is involved 
in a problem, Descartes suggests, not the replacement of this mathema­
tical tool, but its general application to all but res cogitans, where 
a more descriptive approach is assumed. This method was sometimes 
described as assuming the truth of what is to be proved, as one forms 
equations to find the values of variables when certain parameters are 
held constant. The method of analysis and synthesis is central to the 
early Regulae, which leads into the development of his geometry, but is 
cut off before the proposed end. Simples of extended things are 
considered to be units and constitutive of things. Still, we must 
rely on conjecture sometimes to assign a particular simple. The synthetic 
return is then the deduction of terms which results in what can be tested,
Malebranche, in the sixth book of the Recherche, speaks of supposi­
tions as conjectured formal features for the explanation of material 
features and natural bulks and sortals. Here again he presents the 
example of the reduction of tones to lengths and frequencies and he 
also introduces theoretical entities, specified in terms of formal
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features alone, to explain such phenomena as solidity and magnetism.
Leibniz, as in the Nouveaux Essais and his correspondences with 
Conring and Tschimhaus, sees the hypothetico-deductive method in a 
broader setting, including not only relations of terms for formal 
features to other terms, but also relations between other sorts of 
terms and relations between propositions. Leibniz subsumes the 
hypothetico-deductive method under the method of analysis and synthesis 
in his exchange with Conring, in which he defends these methods against 
a rigid Aristotelian rationalism. Against Conring1 s view that all 
deduction must be from first principles which are known to be true, 
Leibniz insists that we rely on principles for which we have no proof 
and which would themselves rely on other principles for their justifi­
cation. The purpose, of analysis is to make some of these principles 
explicit. More generally, analysis exposes the truths of reason and 
their constituent concepts and the truths of fact involved in our 
cognition of a problem, configuration or state of affairs. The truths 
of fact here are for the most part general and are to be tested by 
their consequences. By further analysis beyond the particular problem, 
configuration or state of affairs, in Leibniz’s ideal case one reduces 
all truths of fact to singular truths of fact which are related in series 
by the principle of sufficieht reason. To reach this ideal, however, 
one must have made explicit the rules and concepts of our science,
Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz share the method according to 
which formal features are posited to explain phenomena and these 
explanations are tested by their consequences. The purpose of analysis 
is to make explicit the rules and conepts involved and so give restric­
tions on which formal features are to be posited. In the ideal case,
when we would have the complete science, no conjecture would be involved,
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as the analysis would, reveal the formal features, In all cases which 
involve the explanation of material features, configurations in re or 
natural bulksor sortals, the synthesis consequent to the analysis, 
although involving only rational operations, is a transitive act because 
the analysis begins with things in re and. the result of the synthesis 
is tested, against things in re, i.e, the analysis and. synthesis are 
set within an empirical context. The analysis and. synthesis together 
is a conversio ad phantasmata which has been unpacked, revealing the 
rules and concepts which are applied in our cognition of things. The 
conversio ad phantasmata is a sort of intuition, while the analysis and 
synthesis which involve no conjecture is a discourse. Analysis and 
synthesis, when no conjecture is involved, applies a natural geometry 
to things in practical cognition as we are held to do naturally in 
Descartes1 and Malebranche’s accounts of our judgement of formal features' 
in vision; but in the latter the rules and concepts are not formulated.
When a conjecture or supposition is involved in the analysis and
synthesis, it does not unpack the steps we are meant to perform naturally,
but presents a context in which to formulate and test hypotheses about
the formal features which are constitutive of things. This is only a step on 
way
the /to the complete description of the world. Again, analysis and
synthesis differ from conversio ad phantasmata in that they are only 
sometimes concerned with a particular spatio-temporal expanse. More 
often, analysis and synthesis are seen as establishing the extensional 
identities we have mentioned. Establishing these identities supposes 
we already have the science which is followed. On the other hand, 
purported formulations of this science are held to be checked by 
conversio ad phantasmata. Descartes introduces conversio ad phantasmata
in the Regulae as a check on the relation between simple natures, which,
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when treated, merely verbally, are treated, discretely, Malebranche
discusses the use of the senses in demonstration in the Entretiens sur
la Metaphysique, Although necessary truths are known only ty means of 
ideas (he maintains), which are the meanings of words, they are more 
apparent in diagrams in which they are rendered sensible by the sentiments 
we project onto thems we literally see that the proposition in question 
is true. In addition, the sensible portrayal of propositions and terms 
instantiates them and shows that they are possible.
Leibniz repeatedly states that we must consider instantiations of 
purported formulations of rules and concepts to check their consistency.
In the Theodicy he refers to a work by J’^c’^'mJungius called Geometria 
Empirica in which theorems are proved by folding parts of figures onto 
themselves. (Various pages of this work contain figures cut out of 
the page, attached to it by only one side and contain lines along which 
theyare to be folded.) Constructions of this sort are only more complex 
diagrams. Both constructing and diagramming are intransitive acts and 
are rational practical cognition, while picking out the concepts and 
rules involved is an act of rational essential cognition. Indeed, one 
could use natural things as diagrams or constructions in so far as they 
are only to display rules and concepts.
The establishment of extensional identities between formal features 
and material features, etc, and the application of science to things 
in the various ways we have discussed relies on ideas in the sense of 
objective realities which are not physically in the mind and are not 
properties of what is physically in the mind, but are standards. They 
are spiritual objects of spiritual faculties and are spiritual in the 
sense that they are standards against which our judgements are evaluated. 
The Cartesians and Leibniz hold that the complete science is the norm
to which we are subject throughout our lives; their notion of prejudice 
depends on this. It is as if no analysis leaves room for conjecture 
and all acts of essential cognition are the application of the ideal 
science to things. The rules of a highly sophisticated cultural 
endeavour are thus looked upon as natural in a certain way, i.e. as 
spiritual and as the standards for the acts of all rational beings.
It is instructive to consider how Leibniz, by a number of steps, 
moves from treating these rules as conventional to considering them 
innate. Leibniz felt thatCartesian clear and distinct perception is 
not sufficiently perspicuous, for one can always ask for a justification. 
But he is particularly severe with Locke’s teminalism, which relies 
on the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, where an
idea can be of a material feature or a formal feature or based somehow
on these. He is particularly concerned to reject Locke’s criticisms
of praecognita and praeconcessa. These terms were used in the
Protestant Scholasticism common to Locke and Leibniz. They are, for 
example, frequently used by Alsted for what is supposed in a discipline 
for there to be a common basis on which a disagreement can be resolved. 
They are at least conventions which must be posited for there to be 
coordination of conventions; they were also supposed by some to have 
some foundation beyond convention.
Leibniz held that praecognita must be assumed to be able to exhibit
the logical validity of our everyday discourses. Leibniz unlike the 
Cartesians understood what logical form is and its relation to the
validity of arguments. The Cartesians were concerned with verbal forms 
and their manipulations as these could be applied to arithmetical and 
geometrical instances; application shows their consistency and the 
primary function of our non-descriptive terms and concepts is in their
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application to things. But Leibniz holds that the correct use of 
conventional signs is an application of them and their concepts, which 
are their meanings; thus the use of conventional signs shows the 
consistency of the statement and justifies the concept. He therefore 
applies his formalism well beyond the range of Cartesian clear and 
distinct perception, extending it to law and conventional endeavours 
in general with his universal character. In his personal papers, 
he presents his own adaptation of a method of reasoning used at least 
from Plato's time. One grants the opponent certain principia directa 
and argues from these on certain unstated assumptions - principia 
reflexa. It is the latter on which the opponents position is questioned. 
The opponent can contest the evaluation and one can maintain it, and so 
further principia reflexa could be called upon. Eventually, if there 
is not a deadlock, the interlocutors arrive at what neither of them 
deny, and the issue can be settled one way or the other. This is 
appealing to common rules to which we are subject or the coordination 
of conventions. As the principia reflexa were used in the arguments, . 
the validity of the arguments depend on them. Leibniz’s notion of 
evidence is shared by Sergeant (who criticises Locke on maxims in 
much the same way as Leibniz does) and is of Scholastic origin, related 
to praecognita and praecnncessa. What is more evident (he holds) is 
not what could be more easily stated. Rather, it is that principium 
reflexum which one would give to justify scmeone’s (perhaps, but not 
necessarily, one’s own) assertion or argument. The task is to articu­
late principles which are more and more evident in this sense, whether 
they are rules to which we are already subject or whether their arti­
culation is a coordination of conventions. In either case, we build 
up a system of rational knowledge, an objective structure.
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This objective structure is peculiar to a culture or even to a 
discipline within a culture. But Leibniz sees particular cultures or 
disciplines as manifestations of the same endeavour, following the 
rules and concepts inherent in a single natural language and articulated 
in the universal character. By a number of moves he has the supposedly 
unique objective structure instantiated in every rational being. The 
first step is the reduction of geometry to arithmatic and more . basic 
disciplines. The next step is to introduce sorites or chains of 
syllogisms, in which the premises of an argument are substituted for 
its conclusion in its occurrence as a premise in another argument. 
Enthymemes are then called upon... Enthymemes (not in the Aristotelian 
sense, but in the seventeenth century sense) are syllogisms or sorites 
with suppressed premises. Leibniz holds that our reasonings in every­
day life are enthymemes. To display their form, we should analyse them 
into sorites, each step of which is made with the greatest possible 
evidence. The analysis is to be in terms of the universal mathematics 
and the logical form displayed is the same for all rational beings.
It is further held that we are responsible in a logical way for the 
premises of the sorites which are suppressed. Finally, Leibniz holds 
that we in fact perform the suppressed steps. This is similar to the 
Cartesian position that we are responsible for judging as we are led 
by nature to judge, for we could have always articulated and evaluated 
these judgements.
On the position that one naturally follows non-descriptive rules,
there could as well be nothing besides oneself other than a diagram,
perhaps only founded in the mind, and the objective structure one follows. 
We evaluate judgements we make about the world by means of these rules, 
but these judgements on this position have nothing to do with the
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acquisition of the rules. The part played by descriptive rules and 
behaviour in our cognition and our coming to have an objective structure 
present to us is lost.
In the Sixth Meditation, where Descartes justifies the belief in 
the external world, he begins by noting the difference between the 
strength of sensation as opposed to the weakness of imagination; by 
these differences, we are led by nature to judge of the existence of 
things. This, Descartes admits, is a sign of the distinction between 
sensation as a success and imagination, but it cannot itself be the 
criterion we appeal to in evaluating our reports about the world.
Yet to allow it to be even a sign, we must allow that it works in the 
majority of cases and that our science is applicable. If our science 
were not applicable, God would be a deceiver, not because we are some­
times deceived, but because there would be no further standard of 
success beyond the criteria of success themselves. For Descartes, 
our science is primarily what has an application.
Later in the same meditation he briefly describes the physiology 
of sensation; this gives an explanation of error and eliminates the 
doubt whether there is a faculty for deceiving within ourselves. He 
concludes by presenting a criterion in terms of the coherence of sensing 
and memory, which are successes, as opposed to the incoherence of 
merely imagining, e.g., dreaming. The coherence is judged by those 
truths which are justified by clear and distinct perception. As 
Leibniz states, truths of fact are justified by truths of reason. 
Concluding with the evaluative part played by clear and distinct 
perception fulfils much of the purpose for introducing the arguments
from illusion in the First Meditation.
God’s goodness is relied on for only two points, First, and most 
importantly, it is appealed to for the reliability of reason. Without
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this, not even the questions could he framed. It is then invoked to 
guarantee that it has an application. But God’s goodness is relied 
upon in different ways in these cases. In the first case, it is 
essential for the existence of God as the objective structure, 
for goodness here involves standards from which we may deviate and 
’’all good” implies that the only science we can have is the one we 
in fact follow. In the second case, it is held that we could formulate 
the question even if God were not good in this manner. Goodness in the 
first case is something conceptual, in the second case it is not,
r
Malebranche, from the publication of the Eclaircissement, held 
that the validation of reason is a demonstration, by which he means 
that it is logically impossible for the conclusion to be false. On 
the other hand, he held (in opposition to Amauld in their polemic), 
the rejection of doubt in the existence of the external world in the 
Sixth Meditation is only a proof, by which he means that one cannot 
reasonably doubt the conclusion, but it is not logically impossible 
for it to be false. He holds, then, that we could have all those 
occurrences in the mind which we have and apply the science we follow 
to these occurrence, while in fact there is nothing besides the occurr­
ences and God. Leibniz held the same in the Discourse on Metaphysics, 
stating that it is possible for there to be only myself and God, while 
I have all the sensations which I in fact have with the world as it is,
Malebranche is correct on this point. Given the relation between 
following an objective structure and its application which the Cartesians 
and Leibniz accept, there is no way of showing that what is taken to be 
the world is anything other than a diagram founded in the mind. Our 
science is held to include only non-descriptive rules and concepts, 
which are independent of how the world is and what we are like. This
349
is held, to be applied by virtue of occurrences in the mind which are 
projected in spatio-temporal displays. This activity involves rules 
by which we evaluate whether such projections are correct or incorrect, 
but the evaluation need not go beyond moves on the diagram.
Malebranche (in the same contexts in which he writes that Descartes’ 
proof is not a demonstration) allows a demonstration, albeit conditional, 
justifying the belief in the external world. If one believes (he states) 
what is related in scripture, then one must believe that an external 
world exists since it is referred to in scripture. This has been 
criticised for supposing the' existence of a material artifact. But 
it does not, for all that is supposed is a belief that certain events 
took place. It has also been criticised for not demonstrating what 
it sets out to, i.e. that if one believes what is related in scripture, 
then one must believe that a material world exists. But Malebranche’s
concern is not so much with matter as with extended things and in so 
far as spatial relations are referred to, this conditional demonstration
stands.
The reason the non-existence of the external world is possible 
for the Cartesians and Leibniz is because a conceptual connection is 
turned into a connection relying on divine goodness. This is so because 
occurrences in the mind are held to naturally take place in roles. 
Descartes indicates part of the reason this is held in introducing a 
physiological account M explanation of error: the body naturally 
performs certain operations according to a natural geometry which it 
instantiates and these operations correspond to spiritual operations 
performed by the mind following this geometry. The concept of res 
cogitans, it is held, is instantiated naturally in us. Furthermore,
the will, which is held to carry out the applications of the rules
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and concepts, is regarded as a faculty, almost a force, distinct from
the facilities we have by being evaluated in accordance with the rules 
shared with others. Yet the geometry and indeed all the standards of 
simplicity and exactness which we are held to follow naturally are 
conventions arising from a sophisticated cultural endeavour.
Now to be engaged in this discipline, we must (at least initially) 
be evaluated. To be evaluated, we must perform transient acts which 
can be picked out by another engaged in the discipline. But for these 
to be picked out, descriptive rules must be employed, either to pick 
out the person or to pick out an enduring intransitive act, such as 
a diagram. Furthurmore, in learning to apply a subject comprising 
only non-descriptive rules, one must be subject to descriptive rules. 
There are two things left out of the account we have just criticised
which severs the conceptual.connection between the fact that we have
science and the existence of things spatially distinct from us. One 
is the role of behaviour, which is necessarily spatial: one can perform 
sophisticated activities only because one has been inducted into a 
culture by means of the evaluation of one’s behaviour. The second 
thing left out is the part played by descriptive rules, which depend 
on how the world is and what we are like. By splitting these between 
non-descriptive rules and occurrences in the mind corresponding to 
physiological occurrences, the conceptual connection in question is 
lost and divine goodness is called upon to guarantee the existence of
the external world
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CHAPTER XI
COGNITION AS RULE-GOVERNED ACTIVITY IN THE
RATIONALISTS, PLATO, AND KANT
We maintain that the model for the rationalists’ accounts of knowledges 
and cognition, despite some very serious flaws, was rule-governed actions.
In this chapter, we shall present analyses of some of their positions to bear 
this out. Now Plato’s position has at least a superficial resemblance to 
seventeenth century rationalism. In particular, Platonic Ideas or Forms are 
standards which are neither made by us nor derived from natural things. We 
shall discuss Plato, then show in what respects rationalist positions 
differed from his4 especially in way of including elements relating to rule- 
governed activity. Again, it has been claimed that Kant was the first 
philosopher to maintain that rules are furnished by the mind. I do not 
dispute that much of what he wrote about cognition can be seen to relate to 
rule-governed activity. But, in discussing Kant’s theory, I shall maintain 
that just as strong a claim can be made for the view that rationalist 
accounts were modelled on rule-governed activity.
We shall emphasise certain insights which are connected with construing 
cognition as a rule-governed activity. We shall look for them in the positions 
we present. However, in all these positions - the rationalists’, Plato’s, 
and Kant’s - overt behaviour and convention are ignored. In all cases, 
furthermore, the reason these factors cannot play a proper part is because 
the accounts suppose an immaterial soul as the subject of knowledge and 
assign some essential part to God. The insights remain, but are, as it were, 
deflected upward to be incorporated in a conceptual framework built around 
the notions of an immaterial soul and God. Such a conceptual distortion 
introduces ’’problems”, that is, pseudoproblems, many of which are well
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established and apparently respectable, but no longer face us if the insights 
are kept at the level of overt behaviour governed by conventional rules.
In the case of the rationalists, what remains of the activity of 
persons is captured by the concept of the mind. The acts this concept 
reflects are speech acts.^ We are held to be conscious of occurrences in 
the mind - shadows of speech acts. Indeed, the notion of consciousness
more than anything secures remnants of the concept of a person, for
. . ... 2 consciousness was linked to responsibility for our own acts. Of course, 
something more is needed to pick out the thing we hold responsible; so we
come back to overt behaviour.
A point to note, however, is that error, judgement, and responsibility 
are allowed for. Generally, the rationalists hold that we are not just 
spiritual automata functioning in accordance with the rules of divine 
science. (Spinoza, who does not invoke consciousness, accepts this 
consequence.)
There is, on the one hand, something modelled on a person, who errs and 
needs practice and method to develop his judgment. But, on the other hand, 
there is the individual performing acts which are best described by a 
mathematically trained anatomist and which follow the rules of a rigid 
and completely specified objective structure. The two positions are not 
easily reconciled. There opposition becomes particularly acute for Leibniz, 
who holds that in some sense we perform acts of infinite detail, although 
in another sense we perform only certain resultants of these acts. We are 
held responsible for - are conscious of - only the latter, while the former 
are simply the computations of a spiritiual automaton. But how can a 
person’s (free) acts be resultants of computations, Leibniz’s answer is
taken from beyond the bounds of human action, for he treats acts as limits
. . 3 .(in the mathematical sense ) of an infinite number of computations.
It is obvious that there are differences between the contemporary and
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rationalist notions of a rule and what it is to follow a rule. But all that
I claim is that the rationalists had notions which can be properly character­
ised as such. When the differences are made explicit, the reasons for the 
differences become clear. The differences can be summed up by saying that, 
whereas the contemporary position relies on what is public - conventions and 
overt behaviour - rationalism cashed out "can be scrutinized by others” in 
terms of being subject to the scrutiny of God. The notions of God and the 
soul had such a grip on the minds of practically all men for centuries that 
insights which in the present cultural climate could have been formulated 
in a self-motivated way were very naturally formulated in terms of the immat­
erial soul and God. The supposed relations between God and the world are 
summed up in the theory of providence. Providence involved two systems of 
divine science: nature, relating to the architecture of the world and 
generally what is "material" (roughly, what requires materials for its 
construction), and grace, relating to the laws governing rational agents 
and generally what is "spiritual", directly subject to the laws.
Xn brief, considerations were deflected from their own proper sphere 
into a traditional framework. However, there was a great deal of latitude 
in the interpretation of "God" and ‘'soul". And a great deal of philosophical 
and even scientific consideration had been deflected into this sphere well 
before the period under consideration. So much so that the resulting systems 
passed well beyond what was motivated by merely religious considerations and 
the philosophy became enshrined in religion. In some cases, indeed, what 
passed as a point on, e.g., the divine nature to us appears to have no 
religious relevance whatsoever. This sort of deflection is illustrated by 
the debate among the rationalists on how divine simplicity is manifested in 
the natural world, which, in fact, concerned the basic conservation laws of 
physics.
The upward deflection of analysis, however, introduced "problems" which
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otherwise did not occur. For example, there appear to be two systems of 
rules: those which we appear to follow and those of divine science. This
arises from the fact that a philosophical insight has been theologically 
enshrined. The particular insight is that, for something to count as a 
correct performance, there must be a criterion distinct from the performance 
and purported repetitions of it; and the criterion cannot be natural things, 
since, for them to be relevant, there would have to be a cognitive performance 
in the first place. Rather, the criterion must be a rule or principle of 
evaluation not unique to the person in question. This insight is deflected 
because God is regarded as having the last say in the evaluation of acts 
and thus as guaranteeing the public nature of rules. The rules are then 
thought of as governing not only overt actions, but also the architecture 
of natural things, and so as standing behind the natural behaviour of agents.
The fact that insights are theologically enshrined does not make
vacuous the claim that the rationalists had notions of a rule and rule-
governed activity, for some important insights are not thereby sterilized and 
still enter into an account of human knowledge and its application. We have 
just mentioned the insight corresponding to the private language argument. 
Another is the awareness of the roles of tacit knowledge - we always mean 
more than we say, or any act of cognition always presupposes more than one 
explicitly thinks. (This insight was behind the method of analysis and 
synthesis.) Finally, there is the insight that features are not simply read 
off things; rather, there is the contribution of the knower, for what we 
pick out depends on the rules we follow. This last insight calls for some 
comment. It relates to the emphasis the rationalists put on what I have 
called intransitive self-teaching or ’’reflection”, the emphasis on non­
observational knowledge, some of which was held by some (but not Malebranche) 
to be knowledge of self, since it relates to the concept of res cogitang„ 
Rationalist accounts sometimes give the impression that no effort is needed
355
on our part to become explicit about the concepts in question, that there
is some sort of mystical intuition. Yet the rationalists with whom we have
. 5been dealing all emphasised the need for "sensible signs". Still, the 
insight has been perverted to the extent that the rules and concepts in 
question are given ontological status (in God), they are held to govern 
a person’s activities independently of his history or cultural relations, 
and the activities are thought of as spatially simple.
The upward deflection of these insights, although it did not sterilize 
them, introduced "problems", such as the problem of the attribution of 
cognition to individuals. Another problem arises from regarding agents as 
somehow following the rules of science (in the seventeenth century sense) 
from birth. Questions about the application of our science became extended 
to our being alive to natural features in our environment. This eliminates 
the motivation to consider how we are able to use words to pick out natural 
features, how convention links up with our natural environment, and thus 
blinds one to self-motivated considerations of how rational knowledge ties 
up with natural forms of behaviour and empirical knowledge. Being alive to 
features was regarded as, on the one hand, natural, but, on the other, similar 
to conventional acts such as uttering observation reports. This relates 
to the neglect of "descriptive rules" we discussed earlier. It also intro­
duces traditional "problems of perception" and even enshrines phrases such 
as "the testimony of the senses". Even though the major figures of the 
framework are rejected the old "problems" and phrases die hard.
We can illustrate how some of theinsights remain by considering 
Malebranche’s proofs for his position that we see all things in God. He 
uses the argument similar to the argument we relied on in Chapter V, that 
if ideas were in the mind, they would leave unexplained what they are posited 
to explain. Indeed, this is similar to the private language argument in
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that it maintains that private events need non-private criteria. We shall 
restrict the material to Malebranche’s first presentation of the thesis, 
in the Recherche (1674), and his defence of this in Eclaircissement X (1678), 
and adds as a supplement an argument developed at greater length in the 
Meditations Chretiennes (1683).
There is reason to take the points brought up in these proofs as
representative. Malebranche always maintained that he developed a theory of
ideas (objective realities in Descartes’ terminology) which Descartes would 
51 . .have gone on to develop. And Leibniz's theory of pre-established harmony
g
was developed with a close eye on Malebranche’s occasionalism, which plays 
an essential part in these proofs. In opposition to Malebranche’s position, 
Locke’s Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion ... (written in 1694) shows 
a neglect of the insights in question.
At the end of L.III, P.II, chap. 1 of the Recherche, Malebranche 
states that there are only five conceivable ways of explaining how we 
apperceive material things. In the next four chapters, he dismisses one by 
one the first four explanations. And in the sixth chapter he supports 
his own position.? The four rejected alternatives are: 1) that ideas of 
bodies come from these bodies; 2) that our sould has the power to produce 
these ideas; 3) that God produced our ideas with our soul, or that He 
produces the ideas whenever one thinks of an object; and 4) that the 
soul has in itself all the perfections which it sees in bodies.
The first alternative is the Scholastic account in terms of intensional
species and the intellectus agens. The arguments against this in the
g
Recherche all concern points of physics. The philosophically more interesting
. . 9 .points concern the second alternative. Both alternatives are argued against 
more thoroughly in the Meditations Chretiennes, where he maintains that
features are not simply read off things and that some rule is needed beyond 
private events. If ideas are to perform their intended role, the argument
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begins, then they cannot be copies either of images received in the brain
or of what is remote from the body.^ The projections of the figures of
bodies depend on their relative situation to us, yet we always see the same
figure.Furthermore, in perspective drawings, we see a figure different 
12 .from that drawn on the surface. We cannot be said to form the appropriate
. . . . . . 13 .ideas, fop the ideas play their part without us thinking of, knowing about,
. .14.. .or even feeling the supposed formation. Again, if we form ideas, we must 
form them according to some model; but then the model would suffice.In 
short, forming ideas either from bodies or from nothing presupposes that we 
have those ideas. In the Recherche, the view is aired that the mind has 
general and confused ideas which it does not produce and that those which 
it produces are particular and more clear and distinct. But, it is replied, 
as a painter would have no reason to think that he has portrayed a particular 
man if the man is not present and he has no distinct idea of him, so someone 
who has only, e.g., the idea of an animal in general would have no reason to 
think he has a distinct idea of a particular sort of animal if he has not
already a first idea with which to compare the second; but if he has the 
16first, there is no point in forming the second.
Locke, referring to the first alternative, states that, ’’since my
principles have been said to be conformable to the Aristotelian philosophy,
‘ h1 7I have endeavoured to remove the difficulties it is chargedc'iwith. He
18agrees that species as generally understood are unsupportable, but thinks
. . . 19 .a new physics overcomes the difficulties. So, e.g., the impression of a
ray of light, when communicated to the brain, produces ideas in the mind.
. . . 20 .But how this is so, Locke says, is incomprehensible. Locke, m fact,
gives no reply to the points mentioned in the last paragraph; rather, he insist
that ideas must have causes to link them to the world.
Malebranche saw the third and fourth alternatives - usually conflated -
358
as the main rivals to his position. In arguing against these positions, he
makes use of insights about the need for non-private criteria and about tacit
. . 21 knowledge. His rejection of these alternatives follows from two premises,
I. The ideas we use are infinite both in number and in reference, used 
by all, and are necessary and immutable.
II. But none of these attributes are true of the soul (but they are
. . 22 true of God, who is "intimately present" to us).
Malebranche feels that Descartes’ first proof of the existence of God
(largely concerned withpremise I) shows the falsity of the last two
. 23 . .alternatives. He feels that his proof shows that the mind apperceives the 
infinite, but does not "comprehend" it - i.e, "take it all in" - and also 
that the idea of an infinitely perfect being cannot be something created. 
Furthermore, this proof is meant to show, as Malebranche puts it, that the
mind has the idea of the infinite before that of what is finite. This is
justified by stating that we must have (or there must be present to us) at 
all times the ideas of all things, because one cannot set oneself to think 
of (or "see" as he uses the term) objects of which one has no ideas. Much
the same is stated when he says that we cannot desire to "see" a particular
. . 24object unless we have already "seen" it, if only confusedly and in general.
What he is referring to is not making a representation (as the second 
alternative maintains), but finding a model, for he states that the idea of 
the infinite is not from the confused assemblage of all the ideas of partuclar 
beings as (Scholastic) philosophers think. Generally, the point is that any 
act of cognition presupposes a great deal of knowledge which remains tacit; 
and all this knowledge interrelates; finally, general knowledge is applied 
in particular cases.
In Eclaircissement X, Malebranche speaks of "la Raison universelle” being 
25 . .present to us. This Reason is said to be infinite: we celarly see that 
there are or could be an infinite number of geomatrical figures, that 
irrational numbers have an unending number of numerals in their decimal
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26expressions, and that we apperceive infinity in space. Reason is said
. . 27to be ’’universal”, i.e., the same for all men. Here Reason is thought of
not only as a system of ideas, but also as a body of necessary truths and 
28"eternal laws". (The latter are moral rules and are said to be relations 
of the perfections of things. They are conceptual without being mathematical.)
Reason, Malebranche continues, is necessary, ideas are immutable, and ideas
. 29and numbers are immutable, necessary, and independent.
Locke found incomprehensible Malebranche's statement that the immediate 
object of our clear knowledge is an immutable and necessary nature. Signifi­
cantly, Locke argues against Malebranche’s position as Malebranch and I have 
argued positions similar to his: i.e. ideas (or other sorts of cognitive 
equipment) do not expalin what they were posited to expalin. For, Locke
states, "how can I know that the picture of any thing is like that thing,
30when I never see that which it represents." More generally, if things are 
in God only eminently (i.e. as concepts), and we see them only in Him, "we 
can be said to see them only ’eminenter’ too", and so seeing all things in 
God signifies "no more than that we perceive them we know not how". That 
is, by "seeing" these immutable, necessary natures alone, we could never know 
what actually exists.
But this both misrepresents Malebranche’s position and suggests in its 
place what Malebranche has disproved. It misrepresents his position because 
an idea in Malebranche’s sense cannot be compared with a picture. Further, 
ideas are concerned, not with what exists, but with what can exist; our
judgements of existence, rather, are related to sentiment. Malebranche
. . . . . . . 32draws this distinction sharply and clearly in Eclaircissement X, the text 
discussed by Locke in this context. But Locke claimed that he found the 
distinction between idea and sentiment unintelligible. It was probably
remarks such as this which led Leinbiz to suggest that Locke feigned ignorance 
. . . 33 . .in the Examination. Again, Locke’s criticism suggests the first two
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alternatives (already disproved) in that the need to already have ideas by .
which one picks out things is denied; Locke looks for the model in the things 
which themselves are picked out in the employment of ideas.
In the same comment on Malebranche’s statement that theimmediate
object of our clear knowledge is an immutable and necessary nature, Locke adds
that
(if) these words do not mean that ideas are true unchangeable rep­
resentations or things, ... then they can only signify, that the idea
I have once had will be unchangeably the same in my memory; but when
. . . 34another different from that comes into my mind, it will not be that.
Universal reason, he states, is only the power men have to consider the
ideas they have one with another (e.g. if two people consider two times two,
they both must find that it equals four) and we reason by finding intermediate
. . . . . . 35ideas for comparing ideas which cannot be compared by juxtaposition. "Any 
idea that we have”, he adds, "whencesoever we have it, contains in it all 
the properties it has, which are nothing but the relations it has to other 
ideas, which are always the same".^
But here again, Malebranchers argument against the first two alternatives 
tells against Locke; we must first have a model to form an idea (in 
Lockefs sense) instantiating these relations, Ideas, like words, must be 
individuated functionally. Locke cannot give a criterion of individuation 
for ideas. Furthermore, reasoning presupposes the presence of an objective 
structure, what is physically in the mind is describable as reasoning, thinking 
of etc. only as it conforms to this objective structure.
The second premise of Malebranche’s argument against the third and 
fourth alternatives is that there is nothing in us which is universal, necessary,
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or infinite (but there is in God, who is intimately present to us). Supporting' 
this in Eclaircissement X, he states that
je puis n’estre point, ou n’estre pas tel que je suis: il peut y avoir 
des esprit qui ne me ressemblent pas; & cependent je suis certain
qu'il ne peut y avoir d’esprits qui voyent des veritez & des lois
. . 37differentes de celled que je vois ...
On the other hand, we apperceive, claims Malebranche, the idea of the infinite,
necessary and immutable natures, etc. And these ideas are identified with 
38God Himself, who is traditionally assigned the requisite attributes.
The move from premises I and II to the conclusion that we see all things
in God involves premises which are suppressed in most of Malebranche's
arguments. A brief look at these will indicate how the insights Malebranche 
captures are defected upward. And, as these premises involve what we ’’see” 
in God and how we ’’see” it, they help to explicate Malebranche’s thesis.
The first such premise is connected with the fact that, for Malebranche, 
vision in God is not vision of God. This essentially Scholastic premise is 
that God, to create all beings, must have the ideas of all beings; thus He 
"sees" (cognises) these beings in considering the perfections He contains
which relate to them. What is in God determines what we see in God and in
. . . . . 39Eclaircissement X this is "la Raison universelle". Malebranche (in 
express opposition to Descartes) states that we conceive this reason to be 
in a sense more independent than God Himself because it is necessary and 
independent and God can act only in accordance with this reason. But 
traditionally it is held that God depends only on Himself. So Malebranche 
concludes that this reason is not distinct from God. Thus we know God by 
knowing this reason; also, he adds, by knowing "I'Ordre", i.e., the eternal
moral laws.
Locke objects to Malebranche’s statement that all creatures are in 
God, although in a totally spiritual manner. He thinks that this almost
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asserts a variety in God, making material things a part of Him. Alluding to 
Malebranche’s view that we have no idea of the soul, Locke adds that
yet I fear he must be forced to talk, who thinks he knows God’s
understanding so much better than his own, that he will make use of
. . . 40the divine intellect to explain the hum<?n.
But on Malebranche’s position we primarily know la Raison universelle
and SPOrdre and "see” things in God because He is subject to these as well
and is assigned the same attributes as those which apply to him. Malebranche
says that ideas are universal, i.e,, models which anything must follow if 
. . . 41it is to be called rational. It was generally assumed that there are 
activities universal in this sense; this is a result of not understanding 
the nature of convention. On Malebxaiche ’ s position, in knowing universal 
reason, we know about others just as much as we know about God. Since it 
is held that all other rational beings must be subject to this reason and 
that this reason is independent of the fact that there are finite rational 
beings, a foundation is sought in an omnipresent being whose existence is not 
contingent.
How we are held to see things in God Is enigmatically stated by
Malebranche when he claims that the mind can see theworks of God in Him,
. • . . 42 .given that He wants to reveal what in Him represents these works. This 
qualification introduces occasionalism and the need for God not only to 
furnish the rules specifying the roles sentiments occur in, but also as a 
cause of these modifications. This does not introduce a deus ex machina, 
for God is held to have a plan - providence, involving nature and grace,
the most important aspects of which are covered by l’Ordre - which He cannot 
43transgress without belying His attributes.
The part played by this so-called natural revelation is given by
another premise which is usually suppressed in Malebranche’s arguments for
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the position that we see all things in God. This premise can be stated 
in three ways.
i) God is intimately united or present to our mind; so what in God 
represents created beings - viz. ideas - are present to the mind.
ii) God can act on the mind and (as is consonant with occasionalism)
only God can so act; so God can reveal ideas to us, He contains
. . . . . 44ideas and His substance is very efficacious.
’ . 45 .iii) God’s substance is very intelligible; the mind can "see" in 
God what represents created beings (viz. ideas) because they are
very spiritual (i.e. abstracted from particular conditions, such
. . . . 46as time and place) and intelligible.
The presence of God is needed to identify the objective structure one is 
subject to with divine reason. And divine efficacy is a restatement of 
occasionalism. What requires an explanation is the part given to intelligibility
The intelligibility of the divine substance or divine ideas concerns 
how God brings it about that we "see" bodies, ideas, or necessary truths. 
Malebrancheuses two success verbs when speaking about the exercise, 
acquisition, or formulation ofknowledge: "voir" and "appercevoir". His most 
famous thesis was formulated in terms of "voir", which Arnauld and Locke 
sometimes took Cprobably malignantly) as an ocular thesis. But "voir" or 
"see" is very much at home in non-ocular contexts, e.g., when it has the 
sense of "find out" or in the phrase "see about ...". More relevantly, "see" 
often has much the same force as "understand", implying, if anything, a clearer 
grasp: e.g., when we say we see what someone means, the point, or how something
could happen.
The seventeenth century was familiar with the use of "see" in contexts
of seeing God or seeing things or their essences in God as this was formulated
47 .in theology. This use, in fact, is figurative or metaphorical, for it
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combines features of "see" as a general achievement verb, similar to
"understand", with the feature of "see" in the ocular use, that things are 
sometimes said to be seen in something. Indeed, the analogy of seeing things 
in a mirror was used in theological contexts and also in cognitive contexts 
to explain cognition involving the Thomistic verbum, an objectum in quo.
Malebranche1s use of "see" approximates its use which is similar to 
"understand". When only physiology is involved, he restricts himself to the 
activity verb "regarder"; "see" enters only at the level at which something 
is grasped. And Malebranche is interested in the portion of this level 
which involves conventional, especially linguistic, rules. "See" is given 
somewhat wider scope in that any activity evaluated as correct according to 
these rules is taken as a case of seeing.
Yet Malebranche accepts the feature of the theological use of "see", 
taken from the ocular use, by which something is seen in something else. Thus 
he speaks, on the one hand, of seeing bodies - or formal features of bodies 
(since the essence of body is geometrical extension) - in God, and, on the 
other, of seeing our own modifications - sentiments - in ourselves. What is 
seen in God involves ideas, that is, non-private standards, so success; 
what is seen in ourselves involves no such standards, so the question of 
success does not arise. Malebranche accepts Descartes’ "a nosse ad esse valet
consequentia, so the standard of success attains an ontological status.
. . 48 .Grammatically, Malebranche’s use of "appercevoir" is closer to the 
Scholastic "cognoscere" than to the Scholastic "videre"; in particular, it 
is not followed by "en". Yet, unlike the use of "cognoscere" by the nomin­
alists and Suarez (who did not accept a nosse ad esse valet consequentia), he
uses "appercevoir", like "voir", as a full success verb. Indeed, "appercevoir"
. . . 49 . . . 50m seventeenth century French was close m meaning and identical m grammar 
to "voir". The major difference is that "appercevoir" avoids the physiological
commitments and correlates with a much broader range of activity verbs than
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’’voir” in its ocular use. This was especially true when "appercevoir"
was used with no implication of direct investigation of one’s environment,
... . 51as w n the activity is expressed by the phrase "give one’s attention to",
Malebranche distinguishes sharply between one’s apperception of
52external objects - which requires ideas - and one's apperception of one's
53own modifications. As "appercevoir" is a success verb, Malebranche holds
. . . 54 55that the understanding simply apperceives, so it cannot fall into error.
Error goes with what we do - judge - which is assigned to the will. Male­
branche also speaks of judgments in the sense of propositions; they are held 
to be relations of ideas, which themselves are relations. Reasonings in 
turn are said to be relations of judgments. He admits that the understanding
apperceives judgments and reasonings; the apperception involved is said to 
56be simple. Malebranche puts a great deal of emphasis on "attention", which 
is essential in formulating arguments, judgments, and ideas; i.e. it is
involved in making our tacit knowledge explicit. Attention, he states, 
57presupposes apperception.-' He is left to explain erroneous formulations.
Error or falsity, he states, is a relation which does not exist, and so is
not "visible" or "intelligible"; e.g, we can "see" that two times two is four,^^
58not. that two times two is five. So, also in the context of the formulation 
59of knowledge, the standard of success is given ontological status.
We have partially answered the question in what sense ideas and the
divine substance are meant to be very intelligible. For the divine substance 
simply is these ideas, which are standards of success. It remains to show 
how intelligibility is connected with divine efficacy and in what sense God
is held to reveal ideas to us. Arguing against the third alternative, Malebranche 
60states that, even if the mind had a store of all the ideas needed to see 
objects, it would nevertheless be impossible to explain how the soul could 
choose the ideas to represent the dings. Malebranche escapes his own criticism 
only because he maintains that, although all ideas are present -to us confusedly
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and in general, certain ideas in particular are ’’revealed” to us by God 
61producing modifications in the soul« According to Malebranche’s
occasionalism, these are produced, not gratuitously, but strictly in
62accordance with certain laws of the union of the soul and the body. And 
God created and conserves all things in accordance with the rules of la 
Raison universelle and 1'Ordre. God, in creating what is physically in re 
and what is physically in the mind, follows these rules; what thus exists 
is what it is only in so far as it conforms.to the rules. And by the laws 
of the union of the mind and the body, what is physically in us maps what is 
physically in re according to these rules or ideas. In this way, the 
efficacy of the divine substance "reveals” certain ideas to us. God 
thereby causes us to apperceive certain bodies. Malebranche does not hold 
that there is one idea corresponding to each body; rather, he maintains 
that ideas - which are mathematical universals - are "made particular"
(his version of conversio ad phantasmata) by sentiments. Ideas - thus God’s 
substance - being the standards of success, are said to be intelligible. 
Intelligibility is also connected with efficacy, because occasionalism 
requires divine activity in accordance with that reason which is held to be
common property.
The insights on which this edifice is built comes from considerations 
of behaviour governed by conventional rules, particularly rules (such as 
those governing mathematical activities) which are relatively independent of 
how the world is and our biological equipment. The insights are translated 
into, and distorted by, the traditional language of divine science and the 
rational soul. How the doctrine of occasionalism arises can be seen by 
consdiering that rule-governed behaviour is appropriate to, but not 
determined by, the circumstances in which it occurs. Formal features are the 
contribution of the cogniser to what is cognised. They depend on the rules 
and concepts of the culture to which he belongs and are standards of intell­
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igibility. But Malebranche thinks of them as worked out to the greatest 
possible degree and as standing behind all rational activity. Furthermore, 
rational activity is held to be non-spatial. There then arises the need for 
a bridge between this non-spatial activity and what instantiates formal 
features. Finally, the correspondence between the two is again thought 
of in terms of the same rules and concepts.
One reason the suggestion that rationalist positions capture insights 
about rule-governed behaviour might appear implausible is that so much 
emphasies was put on mathematical natures. These are not propositional and 
indeed our cognition of them is described as a sort of intuition.
Against this, we have maintained that these natures can be correctly 
thought of as concepts, the knowledge of which necessarily involves the 
knowledge of rules. This position is supported by the fact that the status 
of mathematical natures was discussed largely in terms of the propositions 
in which they occur; and, further, such propositions were put on a par with 
legal rules.
The crucial move in the formulation of rationalist positions was 
Descartes’ identification of human and divine science. Although Malebranche 
and Leibniz rejected his position that God creates eternal truths, their 
attitude to such truths and' their relation to human knowledge were much the 
same. What they differed in was the relation of eternal truths to divine 
knowledge and activity,
63Descartes in 1630 wrote that eternal truths are true because God knows
("cognoscit") them; it is not that God knows them because independently of 
Him they are true. For to will and to know ("connoistre") are the same in 
God; thus, from the fact the He wills something, He thereby knows it, and 
thus only are these true. So it is false that if God did not exist, these 
truths would still be true. Descartes’ words are remarkably similar to one
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64of Suarez’s formulations. Descartes contradicts Suaraz’s position and
adds that, if people understood the sense of their words, they could not 
65hold this position without blasphemy.
The blasphemy was the denial of God's independence. Descartes states
that everything, not just what subsists (in re), but also order, laws, and 
the foundation (ratio)) of what is true and of what is good, depends on
God; otherwise He would not be completely independent to create what He
66creates. Eternal truths have some sort of ontological import for Descartes.
He states that not only to will and to understand, but also to create are the
67same simple action in God without even a distinction of reason. Furthermore,
as truth (like objective reality) is something, God caused eternal truths 
68as He caused all else, viz., as their efficient cause.
Yet Descartes suggests differences between the way God created eternal
truths and the way He created things in re. God, he states, created eternal 
truths "ex hoc ipso quod illas ab aeterno esse voluerit et intellexerit";
but he immediately adds that, if "creavit" is restricted to the existence 
69of things, "disponuit" or "fecit" could be used. Descartes later 
became less sanguine about divine efficacy and eternal truths. In the
Principia, he rules out dispute about what is infinite, condoning only disc- 
70ussion about what is indefinite (e.g. the divisibility of matter). He then 
states that, as we do not participate in the councils of God, we should not 
look for final causes, but consider God only as the efficient cause of all.
Still, it is crucial to Descartes’ position that we participate in 
divine science. What we clearly and distinctly perceive presents restrictions
on what there can be and in the Regulae the mind is said to have something 
71 ’divine: the basis of mathematics.
The passage which reaches a happy medium is in the Sixth Replies, where 
God is said to be the efficient cause of eternal truths, but in the sense in 
which a king effects a law ("eSdem ratione qua Rex est legis effector"). Thus
eternal truths do not depend on the human intellect or any other existing
. ■» . . . 72things, "sed a solo Deo, qui ipsas ab aeterno, ut summus legislator, instituit".
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However, the law effected is not a physically existing thing ("non sit res 
phsyice existens"), but an ens morale.
We can now appreciate the ambiguity in the statement "Objective reality 
needs a cause". This can concern objective reality itself or the objective 
reality of what is physically in the mind. As God creates things phsyically 
in re exhibiting objective realities, so He creates occurrences in the mind
having objective realities. But objective reality itself no more needs a case
. . 74than does God creating, although God might not have created.
Malebranche and Leibniz as well still regarded eternal truths as rules 
like the laws of a state, even though they held that these truths are not 
effected by God. For the realm of nature is placed beside the real of 
grace. The rules of both govern God’s activity in creating and conserving 
the world, the demands of the one being belanced against the demands of the 
other. Indeed, la Raison universelle if anything took on more of the aspect 
of a body of laws, for consideration of final causality were admitted, 
Malebranche and Leibniz also maintained that divine science governs our 
activities. They rejected Descartes' position because they held that, for 
such predicates as "good" and "omniscient" to apply to God, He must follow 
rules, which then are principles of evaluation of His actions, A dependencce 
of God on something distinct from Himself was avoided, because divine science 
was held to be part of the divine substance. Descartes well knew that the 
question of truth does not arise unless there is something which could get 
it right or wrong.For him, talk about divine science hasg^point only as 
this same science is followed by rational creatures. Independently of them, 
the concept of God, for whom Descartes was so anxious to allow freedom or 
(more properly) indifference, is idle; for in this case there are no
criteria for God’s acts.
Malebranche and Leibniz were also concerned with divine freedom (in 
opposition to Spinoza), But, because God must follow divine science and
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cannot belie His attributes, Leibniz (and Melbranche to a lesser degree) is 
faced here with a problem similar to his problem '
how rational creatures are free to act. His solution for creatures is in
terms of free acts as limits appr<?4ched by the infinite number of determined 
acts from which they result. In the case of God, Leibniz answers the 
problem in essentially the same way (as, in a less strict fashion, does 
Malebranche). Nevertheless, it remains in some sense true for both Leibniz 
and Malebranche that God must create things as He does. For, if the attributes 
in question hold of Him, He cannot make mistakes. In the end, God remains 
like a machine; or, rather, the plan of a machine, partially realized in
the world.
The insights, deflected upward, take '’problems” with them. In the 
present case, either God is somehow meant to perform rule-governed activities - 
viz. effect laws - while subject to no rules or laws; or He is meant to 
follow rules, yet necessarily be immune from error. Both positions are
incoherent.
In light of what has just been discussed, it is worth emphasising that 
Leibniz, when he writes on logic and methodology, treats legal rules and 
less intuitive mathematical rules in much the same way. This reinforces our 
position that the rationalists thought of "eternal truths" in general along 
the lines of rules of a state or culture. This is further supported by a 
look at Leibniz’s views on method in general. His position can be considered 
an emendation of the Cartesian position; to the basic view of analysis and 
synthesis, Leibniz adds non-Cartesian elements. In particular, Leibniz is 
more sensitive to the use of language independently of spatial displays of 
the features in question. He is concerned with making explicit tacit knowledge 
which is the contribution of the agent in a cognitive situation. This is 
held to be non-private and to furnish principles for evaluating the activities
of others.
Leibniz saw language - the use of "sensible signs" - as involved in 
76all out thought. Mathematics suggests to him a way of capturing the
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reasonings involved. For mathematics has the particular advantage that 
figures, numbers, etc. can be ’’sensibly presented” - mathematicians have 
been so successful in their reasonings because in abstract mathematics 
"on peut faire des experiences ou preuves continuelles, non seulement sur
la conclusion, mais encore a tout moment, et chaque pas qu’on fait sur
. . 77les premises en reduisant le tout aux numbres,,,’’ Leibniz claims that 
Aristotle dressed his logic in the form of a mathematical science; but
he damningly criticises Aristotle for not learning from mathematics the 
78lesson that our reasonings are captured by a symbolic formalism. On the 
other hand, Leibniz claims that the Stoic legal theorists, especially
Chrysippus, came close to the methods of geometers; their digests are
„ ... .79said to contain demonstrations which are not captured by Aristotelian logic.
Now legal reasoning is not aided by diagrams the way geometrical demonstrations 
are; In Leibniz’s language, the thoughts involved cannot be exhibited in 
corporeal ways, Leibniz holds that this is true of the greater part of 
human thoughts; so an analysis of notions in a symbolic formalism, he
claims, is needed not by theorlogians andphilosophers, but also politicians 
80and even physicians. The formalism is meant to capture established use.
He states that the formal force of arguments is above all recognised where
they are "bound as if by ceremonies" so that "the mind cannot wander". This
situation obtains when Scholastic formulae and geometric demonstrations are
used; Leibniz also mentions the arithmetical calculations found in merchants’
books; finally, particularly clear cases of these "ceremonies" are forensic 
81and judicial processes. The corresponding "ceremonies" in mathematics 
involve rules permitting one to write down one string of symbols, given 
certain others, to make certain marks, given a certain distribution of marks 
in a diagram, etc. On the one hand, judicial processes are regarded as having 
the rigourof mathematical demonstrations; on the other hand, mathematical 
demonstrations are viewed as public ceremonies constrained by rules.
For Leibniz, human thought is to be investigated through our use of
language:
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... je crois veritablenient que les langues sont le meilleur miroir 
de l’esprit humain, et qu’une analyse exacte de la signification 
des mots ferait mieux connoitre que toute autre chose les operations 
de l’entendement.82
The language in question is ordinary language. He claimed that religious 
disputes about predestination arise from the misuse of words (’’missbrauch 
der worte”). He adds that a single clear word from ordinary language 
(” ’aus gemeinem leben genommen1 ") , circumscribed by an exact definition 
is more enlightening than a thousand Scholastic termini and distinctions.
So he would write in German, he concludes, if it were an international medium; 
but he must settle for Latin, in which he attempts to present everything 
in natural manners of speaking, "deren sich auch ein lateinischer Bauer 
(wenn einer in der Welt ware) gebrauchen wurde . .."^
Leibniz, unlike most of his contemporaries, understood what logical
form is.
Mihi vero omnis ratiocinatio quae vi formae concludit, hoc est quae
semper successura est, substitutis in praesentis exempli locum
. ... .84exemplis alns quibuscumque, rectam formam habere videtur.
Furthermore, there are, he emphasises, certain rules or laws by which
logical form is explicated, whcih justify inferences, and which, if followed,
guarantee that the conclusion is as "safe" as the premises, i.e., they are 
.85truth-preserving.
He also understood the extent to which the notion of logical form 
can be applied. In the outline of a proposed encyclopedia, he suggests 
that under the article on logic the most commonly used modes of inference 
be ordered in cjlAsses and derived from certain simples to show that these 
inferences "in forma concludant". Still, they are not to be changed into
other forms (as is done in the Schools), but left as they are found in
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86ordinary use or the works of authors. However, it was projected that 
the analysis of ordinary language would reveal general principles,
87seldom articulated, underlying all linguistic use, and so all thought.
Logic is said to be ''summenda ex usu hominum loquentium scribentiumque".
Yet there are logically valid inferences not captured by the principles of 
88logic; these, Leibniz maintains, must be demonstrated grammatically, 
from the signification of inflexions and particles.
Leibniz wished to "’articulate the rules we tacitly follow in ordinary 
language; this would lay bare the logical form of ordinary language, and 
so exhibit the inference schemata it licenses. Given this, one could 
explicitly justify reasoning in everyday life. Locke, on the other hand, 
held that our (private) mental activity could not be evaluated by such
'’maxims” and schemata.
When the mind draws an inference, it is not Syllogism that has 
discovered those Ideas, or shewed the connexion of them, for they must
be both found out, and the connexion every where perceived, before
. . 90they can rationally be made use of m Syllogism..,
Rather,
it is by virtue of the perceived Agreement of the intermediate Idea
. 91with the Extremes, that the Extremes are concluded to agree ...
In short, ”A man knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogistically". 
"Maxims" and "axioms" (or "praecognita") are propositions which (according
to Locke) are claimed to be principles of science upon which "the other parts
92 . .of our knowledge depend" and innate or first known because of their
. 93 ....self-evidence. Locke thinks this position is refuted by pointing out
. . . . . 94that self-evidence is not peculiar to maxims and axioms; they are only 
one case of "intuitive knowledge", "where that agreement or disagreement (of 
ideas) is perceived immedaitely by itself, without the intervention or help
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95 .of any other ..." Indeed, Locke adds, those self-evident truths are 
first known which consist in the ideas first in the mind; these are
particular ideas, for it takes time and pains to construct general
96 . .ideas. Thus maxims add nothing to the knowledge of the particular self­
. ... .97evident propositions of which they are generalizations. So, Locke 
concludes, maxims are no use in confirming less general^self-evident
propositions, are not the foundations on which sciences are built, and are
. . . 98no use m the advancement of sciences and the discovery of unknown truth.
Locke’s attack on maxims is levelled in particular at the view "that
all reasonings are Ex praecognitis et praeconcessis" and that maxims are 
. 99 ."praecognita". The term "praecognitum" occurred frequently in the German 
Protestant Scholastic corpus to which Locke and Leibniz were exposed. In 
this corpus, the term was used largely for what must be known before a subject 
can be taught or what must be agreed before a point can be discussed.(A 
praecognitum thus had points in common with what Leibniz called a principium 
reflexum.) Locke and Leibniz both slightly distort the meaning of "prae­
cognitum" so that it refers to supposedly innate principles. But they 
approach the question of praecognita differely. Locke is concerned with the 
order in which we acquire explicit knowledge and sees no need to justify 
what is in the mind. Leibniz, on the other hand, is concerned with the 
justification of what one claims; further, he holds that there are certain 
rules by which the activities of all persons can be evaluated, then moves
to claim that these rules are innate.
Leibniz admits that we first apperceive - can first formulate - 
particular truths. But general principles are said to enter into all our 
thoughts, even though it requires a great deal of attention to represent
102them distinctly and separately.
. . . 103 . .in knowing particular cases; the latter are said to derive their truth
They are held to be known implicitly
from the incorporated axiom. 104 Leibniz draws a distinction between certi-
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tude and evidence. Locke claimed that the certitude of the existence of
things in addition to that of God deserved to be called knowledge, although
this knowledge extends no further than present sensation. Leibniz wishes
to extend "certitude" further, for "l’on pourroit prendre la certitude pour
une connoissance de la verite avec laquelle on n’en peut point douter par
rapport a la pratique, sans follie ...”105 (As such, certitude depends
on the information available,) Certitiude relates to empirical and practical
knowledge, while evidence relates only to intellectual truths and is "une
certitude lumineuse, c’est-a^dire, ou l’on ne doute point a cause de la
liaison qu’on voit entre les idegs". Leibniz is not concerned with what is
prima facie evident. The maxim or axiom incorporated in an example and
making it true is evident, but what is evident is noticeable in the example
only when the example is an instance of the maxim, not when it is any other 
106sort of consequence of it. Succinctly, "ea per se evidentia esse, quibus
. . . 107sublatis omnibus, sublata est veritas ..." It is this sort of evidence 
which is given to justify one’s inferences.
Leibniz replies to Locke’s criticism of syllogistic reasoning in the 
Nouveaux Essais IV, XVII, § 4. Extended to all formal reasoning, this reply 
maintains that maxims are involved in all reasoning, even when they cannot 
be explicitly stated. Leibniz is concerned with formal arguments ("argumens 
en forme") in general: not just the Scholastic manner of arguing, but 
"tout raisonnement qui conclut par la force de la forme, et ou l’on n’a
x- 108besoin de suppleer aucun article", Leibniz introduces the notion of
. . 109 .a "tissue of syllogisms" or of "sorites" ("sorite"). A vast diversity 
of "ingredient" syllogisms are held to enter into such tissues 3'^^ The 
validity of the sorites follows from the validity of its ingredients. So 
Leibniz maintains that a wellkept account, a algebraic calculation, and an 
analysis of infinitesimals are almost formal arguements "parce que leur
forme de raisonner a este" predomontree, en sorte qu’on est seur de ne
t - . . „ Hls’y point tromper .
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The importance of sorites is immense, as they allow Leibniz to argue
that the underlying logic of ordinary language, hence that involved in
common-sense reasoning, is captured by a linear array of propositions,
. - . 112each step justified by a maxim. But to give plausibility to the view 
that verbal and mental processes are analysable as sorites, despite the 
fact that most of their steps would have to be contemporaneous and unapper- 
ceived, Leibniz needs the notion of an enthymeme. An enthymeme in Leibniz’s 
sense (unlike Aristotle’s - a species of probable reasoning) is a sorites 
in which a commonly accepted premise is suppressed. The need for enthymemes
is obvious; wanting to expand all enthymemes to syllogisms, Leibniz states,
. . . 113is like wanting merchants to count all numbers one by one. Yet it is
essential that the enthymemes can be expanded into sorites which display 
their logical validity; only then can we ask for no further evidence or 
justification.
Ultimately, each premise and rule of inference is to have ’’luminous 
certitude”. The rational reconstruction of what is done, where each step 
is justified according to a certain standard, is taken to be what the agent 
in fact did. Furthermore, the principles used in the rational reconstruction 
are held to be known by the agent himself. So what initially is a project 
to make explicit the public rules governing our inferences becomes a project 
to describe principles of operation innate in all rational beings and 
which lie behind everyday activities,
Leibniz also describes the method of making explicit what is supposedly 
implicit in rational activity as analysis; the explicit reconstruction of 
the situation is synthesis. The analytic-synthetic method was shared with 
the Cartesians, but Leibniz has a wider view of what is involved. His most 
succinct discussion of analysis is in his replies to the criticisms of 
Conring,^5 whose supposedly Aristotelian picture of science is similar to
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the position Locke criticises in discussing maxims and syllogism: scientific
discovery is a matter of deducing conclusions from an already established 
116set of axioms. Conring objects to what he considers to be Pappus’ notion
of analysis: one finds what is unknown by supposing it, deriving consequences 
from it until one arrives at what is given or known.But, Conring
118objects, this is invalid: what is true can be inferred from what is false.
Leibniz’s reply shows that the question is not primarily concerned
with knowing that .something or other is true; rather, it is a question of
formulating what is involved in cognition, of what is known. It is a question
of coming to understand or, in some cases, explain what is known. In the
basic cases, the interest is mainly in the contribution of the knower.
. . 119For Leibniz, analysis is concerned with more than propositions.
To analyse a proposition is to find those propositions (from some restricted
set of propositions) from which it can be deduced. There is also analysis
of terms. This is best thought of in terms of the ars combinatoria: one
is to find the set of generators (from some restricted set of generators)
from which the term can be generated. In the seventeenth century, "deduce”
was used instead of "generate". Finally, there is analysis of problems.
Leibniz said that analysis is practical, that it is an art; synthesis, on
the other hand, is a science: it deduces (in the broad sense) conclusions 
. . . 120 . .from what is already granted (or "evident", in the ideal case). Leibniz’s
examples are mathematical: e.g., the measurement of flat surfaces is 
facilitated by finding what geometrical theorems are involved. In general, 
the analysis of a problem is the resolution of a problem we cannot solve
into sOmpler problems which are in our power; his own analysis (calculus)
121 . ... is given as an example. Generally, the problem is a situation in re;
But the analysis concerns fundamentally the contribution of the knower.
The amalgamation of the conditions of the situation to the contribution 
of the knower is apparent in Leibniz’s discussion of propositional analysis. 
The function of this is to expose the propositions involved in a body of
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. . 122 knowledge. This gives a way of defending praecognita. For, although
they must be known principles, Leibniz states, someone learning a science 
must believe the master until he has learned the higher science in which 
the principles are demonstrated; so the belief is only provisional.
Likewise, he continues, principles which are not entirely certain can be 
used in demonstrations; although the conclusions are only conditional, at
least their connections have been demonstrated. The hypothetico-deductive 
123 imethod in the empirical sciences is included here. What is simpler,
Leibniz writes, is what is more thorougHy analysed. He agrees that hypotheses 
are given more value according to their predictive power. But, he adds, 
hypotheses are also accounted more probable the simpler they are to
understand; for simpler hypotheses "solve” more phenomena and involve fewer
. 124 .assumptions. Synthesis begins with principles, which in a physical context 
are hypotheses assumed without demonstration. Hypotheses are not proved by 
deducing phenomena from them; they are held, rather, because of their part
in the analysis of phenomena, which is the same movement, but in an opposite
. . . 125direction, as synthesis.
The sort of analysis Leibniz particularly wishes to defend is that 
by which we purportedly find what principles known with "luminous certitude" 
are involved in given instances of cognition. Such an analysis supposedly 
leads to terms and their connection, and eventually to simple terms. 
Furthermore, all propositions whose truth is seen to be necessary by the
resolution or understanding of their terms are held to be demonstrable by
. . 127their resolution, which, for Leibniz, means by definition. Analysis,
then, is nothing other
quam substituere simplicia in locum compositorum, 
in locum derivatorum, id est theoremata resolvere 
axiomata: et si opus esset axiomata ipsa denique
sive principia
in definitiones
in definitiones.
et
128
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The answer given to Conring is that analysis uses definitions and identical
propositions, which are immediately known, as a means "de faire le retour
z- x 129et de trouver des demonstrations synthetiques".
It is not at all clear how identical propositions and definitions are 
meant to enter; in the context of analysis, little more is obviously 
accomplished than introducing terms. Leibniz appears to officially regard 
identical propositions as what we have called intensional identities. But 
some of his examples are of extensional identities. Furthermore, he 
allows "partial identities": sentences whose predicate expression is 
analysable as a complex in which the subject expression and other expressions 
occur. Again, what is meant by "definition" seems to cover implicit 
definition; at least there is an attempt to force axiom schemata Into 
subject-predicate form. Leibniz’s ideal (it is doubtful whether he later 
thought it was attainable) was for analysis to lay bare certain simples 
which would be that part of the universal character not subject to imagination. 
These simples are said to contain "principia vinculaque etiam rerum imagin- 
abilium et velut animam cognitionis humanae" and in them is said to consist 
"quod reale est in rebus, quemadmodum praeclave animadverterant Plato et 
Aristoteles, secus quam Atomicorum scholae".
Leibniz’s position can now be seen to move well beyond capturing the 
rules of cultural "ceremonies" and analysing the logical sturcutre of 
rdinary language. His ideal is to find the intelligible constituents common 
to all knowers and what is known. What has happened is that the upward 
deflection of the insights about rule-governed behaviour has exaggerated 
these insights almost beyond recognition. Cognitive activities are still 
non-private and rule-governed private events are seen to need non-private 
criteria; Leibniz makes the criteria universal and has everything that 
happens "express" a public display. He finds the need for tacit knowledge; 
indeed, every rational being in some sense is held to tacitly know everything. 
And he emphasises the contribution of the knower; indeed, the knower in a
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sense contributes everything.
When Leibniz reaches the level of terms, he is at the level where
the Cartesians began with their analysis of formal features spatially
displayed. Leibniz differs consideisbly from the Cartesians, for he holds
that space is a phenomenon bene fundatum on simple, non-extended substances.
Still, geometrical figures, though abstract, are instantiated in spatial
displays and are a subject of Leibnizian science. The question now arises
whether both the Cartesians and Leibniz relied on a form of cognition which
has nothing to do with rules or activities, but is perhaps modelled on vision;
we might think of an intuition of the intellect having its own objects as
vision has its objects.
. . 131 .Leibniz came to hold the position that m most cases we know that 
a sort of feature is possible only a posteriori, in that it is instantiated 
in re. He distinguishes between ’’nominal” and ’’causal” or ’’real” definitions.
A nominal definition does not show that what is defined is possible; for 
this, we must rely on its instantiation. A real definition, on the other
hand, shows the possibility of what is defined a priori, "en exposant la cause
. . " . . 132
ou la generation possible de la chose definis ”• For example, the 
definition of "parallel lines" as "coplanar lines which do not intersect 
even when continued in infinitum" is a nominal definition, for we can doubt 
whether such a case is possible. But when we understand that a coplanar 
line can be drawn parallel to a given line, as long as the point of the 
pen describing the line is kept at the same distance from the given line, 
then we immediately see that what is defined is possible and why the lines
have the property of never meeting. Leibniz’s examples of real definitions 
. x 133
are almost all mathematical constructions. In the Theodicee, he illustrates 
real definition in terms of Jakob Jungius’ Geometria Empirica. Leibniz states 
that this work uses "experiences demonstratives" to prove a number of 
propositions of Euclid. When it is a question of the equality of the areas 
of figures (e.g. the Pythagorean theorem), one figure is cut in pieces which
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are reassembled to form the other. There is no suggestion of anything
like mere vision. Rather, having a real definition is a case of practical 
knowledge. It involves being able to perform activities governed by non­
descriptive rules.
However, Leibniz thinks of these rules as independent of convention. 
When it is not a question of formulating, reflecting, or apperceiving, but 
merely of perceiving, the mathematical competence is still exercised in 
practical cognition - the cognition "expresses" activity in the body.
Rather than modelling this account on a naive conception of vision, Leibniz 
presented a generalized theory of cognition of the ambient world inspired 
by the Cartesian theory of vision; to see formal features requires having 
the rational competence. Any sort of cognition of one’s environment is 
rational cognition for Leibniz (he speaks of an "occult arithmetic" 
performed in perception); hence he has no quarantee that the world is not 
a diagram or some other concatention of sensible signs.
It would appear that Malebranche models mathematical cognition on 
vision, since he speaks of seeing ideas in God. But he uses "see" for its 
success nature. He also exploits the fact that "see" takes an object, but 
the "objects" he is interested in are concepts governing our rational 
activities. Ideas are held to be relations: given an arbitrary unit, an 
idea governs the relations of the iterated applications of this unit. An 
idea might be compared to a model for building; however, it is not copied, 
but would govern the procedure of copying as it governs measuring. According 
to Malebranche,th^re must be something besides an idea for cognition. He 
has a version of conversio ad phantasmata: sentiment makes the idea 
particular, i..e., apply in a certain case, and allows the idea to "affect" 
us so that we think in accordance with it. All cognition involves sentiment; 
the part played by ideas is to determine the roles sentiment occurs in and 
to govern our rational activities. Roughly, he admits three cases in which
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sentiment makes ideas particular: in the case of "attenation”, in
considering pure mathematics, certain ideas apply in certain cases
because we use signs (verbal tokens, numerals, diagrams, etc.); in sensation, 
sentiment corresponds to features in re and leads us to judge in accordance 
with certain ideas; and in imagining, sentiment corresponds to physiological
occurrences in the brain and allows us to think of formal features as
instantiated. Because of his thoery of vision and because he treats things 
as diagrams, all three cases involved something similar to knowing how to 
construct diagrams, with ideas furnishing the rules. An important point is
that ideas mediate between our actions and the world - this is the force
of calling them representative.
These points are illustrated in the fifth dialogue of the Entretiens 
sur la Metaphysique, entitled "De 1’usage des sens dans les sciences". It 
is significant that Malebranche speaks of the construction of figures; but 
what he says could (on his theory) just as well be said of natural things.
He here expounds on objection to the effect that rational knowledge derives 
from sensation. We are asked to consider the line segment AB cut at point C.^
A---------------------G---------B
The problem is to prove that the square of the whole line is equal to the 
sum of the squares of each part plus the two rectangles constructed from 
the two parts. This is obvious, it is suggested, from considering the 
following.
E,-------------------------- J5
0 n
m P
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ABDE is the square of AB; it is equal to all it contains, so it is equal
to the squares of each side - e+n - plus the two rectangles - o+p - 
137 .constructed from the parts AC and CB. This, he suggests, shows that there
are truths which reveal themselves to the eyes ("qui sautent aux yeux”), and 
so the eyes are excellent masters. On the other hand, reason with its clear
ideas leaves us in the dark. For we cannot prove to the untutored that,
2 2 2 . . e.g., 10 4 + 6 + 2x4x6; yet it is the same to prove this with intell­
igible numbers (”en nombres intelligibles”) as it is to prove it by 
exhibiting before our eyes a line of ten units cut into segments of four
and six units each.
Continuing the objection, Malebranche sets the problem of proving 
that the square of the diagonal of a square is double the square of its 
side.138 presents the daigram •
The triangles A, B, ..., I are seen each to have a right angle and two 
equal sides; and our eyes tell us they are equal. And we see that the square 
constructed on the diagonal AB contains four right angles and that each of 
the squares constructed on the sides contains two. Thus the large square 
is double either of the others. The only reasoning involved, it is claimed, 
is on the faithful testimony of my senses - one need only compare the parts 
by moving one’s eyes.
139 . . . .This objection is countered with Malebranche’s position that it is
not our senses, but reason joined to our senses which enlightens ("eclaire") 
us. There is always clear idea and confused sentiment in viewing sensible
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objects. The idea represents their essence - the relations they have and 
can have among themselves - and sentiment informs ("avertit") us of their
existence - makes us sense their difference and their relevance to our
comfort and conservation. Against the counter-reply that the extension
of the colour itself suffices, it is claimed that sentiments are regarded
as extended only when they are referred to intelligible extention; from
the fact that pain is felt as extended, it does not follow that it is
extended. Asked why sentiments must relate to intelligible extension,
. 140 . .Malebranche replies that it is the archetype of bodies, so can
represent their nature to me. Furthermore, if the extension I sense were 
a modification of me (as are sentiments), I could learn physics and other
sciences which consist only in the knowledge of the relations of extension
. . . 141simply by attending to my own modifications. Finally , if, e.g., colour 
and pain were extended, then, when I simultaneously look at my hand and
feel pain in it, I would sense two hands.
. 142Returning to the second demonstration above , Malebranche points
out that its evident and general character derives only from the clear 
and general idea of extension, straightness, and equality of lines, 
angles, and triangles, and not at all from the colours which make these 
things sensible and particular. It is not at all certain that this 
particular square is equal to the two others, for we are not certain that 
it is a square, that a certain line is straight, or an angle right.
Still, he adds, when sentiment is joined to intelligible extension,
making it sensible, it can show the relations in which the truths of 
.143 .geometry and physics consist . Since our senses make the ideas we have 
of bodies sensible, they awaken our attention, so indirectly lead to the 
understanding (”!’intelligence") of truths; thus we should use our senses
in studying all sciences whose object is the relations of extension -
. . 144as long as we judge things only by the ideas representing them .
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This presents our cognition of features in re as if it were the 
application of colours to a surface in accordance with the rules of 
geometry. Indeed, Malebranche uses the analogy of a painter more than 
once when speaking of sentiments making ideas or intelligible extension 
particular.
Malebranche thought that we construct geometric figures in imagina­
tion. Some of his contemporaries held that such "ideas" were the objects
of mathematics. But Malebranche insists that the construction of these
images needs non-private rules, so the images cannot be what mathematics
. . . . • 145is about. When I construct something in imagination, he writes ,
c'est sur les idees de l’egalite et des proportions que je le 
travaille et que je le regie; rapportant tout a 1TuniteTarbitraire, 
qui doit ^tre la commune mesure de toutes les parties qui le 
composent ... C’est assurement sur des idees intelligibles que 
nous regions ce cours des esprits qui trace ces images ou ces 
figures de notre imagination. Et tout ce qu’elles ont de lumiere 
et d’evidence ces figures, cela ne procede nullement du sentiment 
confus qui nous appartient, mais de la realite” intelligible qui 
appartient a la Raison.
The image of, e.g., a square which I form, he adds, is exact and regular 
only in so far as it corresponds justly to the intelligible idea I have 
of the square.
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It might be suggested that Plato’s So^is modelled on rule-governed 
activity, where the rule or standard is supplied by the Idea of Form (we 
shall capitalize these terms when used in Plato's sense) and the corres­
ponding achievement, or facility therefore, expressed by (In
the following discussion, I shall follow I. M. Crombie, An Examination
of Plato’s Doctrines, vol. II: Plato on Knowledge and Reality^* and 
147D. Ross, Plato’s Theory of Ideas .)
To support this claim, first of all, we point out that the Forms
. . 148included both mathematical and moral Forms as early as the Phaedo . It 
will be recalled that one reason we gave for considering the rationalist 
account of cognition as modelled on rule-governed activity was that moral 
and mathematical rules were placed on a par (or all rules were given a 
moral character).
The important distinction is between ancj en Lcr? In the
. . . . 14-8Gorgias, Plato distinguishes these as two intellectual levels . In the
1 SO jTheaetetus 184-187 he contrasts _ sensory activity - -
here, apparently, judgement - and 6 77 • The senses are said to be
abilities or tools through which the mind becomes aware of the world.
There are qualities proper to each sense; but beyond these there are
facts concerning existence, identity, number, etc., which are noticed by
the mind without the senses (184c-d). Bodily disturbances (n<£ &are
perceptible by animals at any age, while the calculations (<*VcM<? y -r^x)
made about them which refer to "existence and utility" must be learned
(186 c 3). So "is not to be found in the sensations we undergo,
but in our thought about them; it is only by the latter that we make 
j
contact with existence and truth". (186 d) . Cutr £s to j,e sought in
the sphere of "properly mental activity about the world", the sphere of
(187 a 5). here is taken as judgement; notice how closely it
resembles the Cartesian notion of something we are held responsible for
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and consequent to sensation, which occurs despite us.
However, is something more permanent, yet fickle. Plato’s
_ thinking - is more like Cartesian judgement (and cogitare) : 
it is said to be silent discussion; £titz - the verbal form of fog,* -
is the decision the discussion comes to (189-190), One can be induced, 
persuaded, or jockeyed into holding a - it is more like Cartesian
prejudice - while bTdr must be taught. It is judgement in a dispo­
sitional sense. As a translation of " "opinion" is not far off,
although we often think of opinions as simply held and not arrived at and 
rarely think of opinions as involved in our ordinary intercourse with the 
world; "belief" also is a near miss for much the same reason. It must be 
kept in mind that is the culmination of mental activity, given
sensation.
hofa arises from mental activity, but right ( is
fickle, and does not always lead to right action; to reach 1 1
(which persists), it must be tied down by "working out the explanation" 
j
AoYioyivg) (Meno 96-98). This suggests to Crombie that Plato’s 
starting point "was the conviction that there is one state of mind which 
involves insight and hence is unshakable, and another which does not" ~ . 
Again, 6n c<r and 9 he claims do not classify propositions;
having the former is distinguished by being able to give an account 
(Xc^'W ),
Yet involves understanding; and this alone might suffice.
We might not have to be able to say what, e.g., equality is; seeing the
. . 1 S3analogy between its embodiments might suffice .
", as used by Plato, is like the seventeenth century use 
of "scientia", not like English "knowledge" in general. Crombie states5 
that Plato often, but not always, denies that we can have of
physical facts". When he does, " must be construed as a
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technical term; "... Plato has no special desire to tell us that we 
cannot, in the ordinary English sense of the words, know matters of
empirical fact .
j 1
There are general distinguishing marks of 677'cr Ttl~ in which it 
is superior to Saget. It is tied to understanding, so is conveyed by 
teaching, while can be induced by training, persuasion, etc.
(Theaetetus 201, Republic 429-430, Timaeus 51-52); further, it is tied to 
insight into necessity - why what is the case must be the case (Meno 
96-98). And is infallible in that it does not let us down in
particular cases (Meno 96-98); this suggests that it is general and 
applicable in particular cases. Furthermore, it is direct in the sense 
that it relates to what is the case (Republic, Bks. 6 and 7). It is 
sometimes implied that the "object" of can be that of t(r
But sometimes it is implied that they have different "objects" or spheres 
of operation, that of being the empirical world. The former cases,
however, are apparently accounted for by the fact that Plato thought of 
tri i r nas something like direct acquaintance, going beyond the ability 
to describe correctly
Plato’s contrast between, on the one hand, the multifarious 
held by different persons or the fickleness of one person’s and,
on the other, the stability and insightfulness of Grti.v~ suggests the
insight that private (not events, but) states require non-private criteria. 
For there is some way of deciding between conflicting judgements, opinions, 
or claims - i.e. . The man who has G n i can decide between
them. a/r-yis not "explained" on the same level as , for it
reaches the standard, and an "explanation" of this would only be a para­
phrase of what it is to reach the standard. To grasp what the success is, 
one must already have the insight. Plato emphasises this with regard to 
teaching: teaching is not inculcating formulae, but rather getting one
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to grasp the natures expressed in the formulae. (We might paraphrase this 
by saying that learning is coming to be able to use the formulae.)
It also appears that Plato had the insight that much of our knowledge
is tacit. Plato came to think of the forms as an objective structure.
This is most clearly expressed in the Sophistes, where he presents a 
. . 159 .doctrine of "greatest kinds" (or highest Forms): motion, rest,
existence, sameness, and being; these are held to form a system. The
Forms being, sameness, and difference, predicable of all Forms, as such
connect all Forms. Difference, by its special nature, also separates 
160all Forms . The science which discovers these uniting and separating
Forms is dialectic; it is pursued by the true philosopher, who has and 
161gains the requisite insights . The apprehension of the nature of 
goodness is the culmination of dialectic; "goodness provides the light 
in which we see whatever we are able to see ’in the intelligible realm’".
Crombie thinks this means
that as we make philosophical progress we get nearer to grasping 
as a coherent whole the system of universal natures, from which 
are in some way derived the conceptions that we use and the dis­
tinctions that we draw in abstract thought. Therefore in doing 
dialectic we are advancing towards an explicit grasp of the 
system of intelligible natures an implicit awareness of which 
has guided our progress.
Furthermore, what Plato is interested in are cases of what we have
called rational essential knowledge and their inter-relation. In the
Phaedrus, "Plato’s point is that the true understanding of a single
generic Form requires us not only to see that somehow it embraces a
number of specific Forms, but also to see precisely what the articulations 
1 63within it are" . Generally, Plato speaks in terms of essential, not
propositional or practical, knowledge; e.g. he speaks of knowing triangles
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and numbers . Learning is construed as the acquisition of part of the 
objective world. The mathematician who knows all about triangles (who 
"knows the triangle") has acquired triangularity - this has become part 
of his mental equipment. On the other hand, the schoolboy who can 
assert only some truths about triangles and these only with a measure of 
understanding, has acquired a likeness of triangularity - he has only
got .
Yet Plato’s position is presented as an ontological position; and
here, in particular, Forms or Ideas come in. The objects of c77 are
>
held to be Forms. £n <<r of the Forms is supposed to guide our S
about things in re. This is part of what is intended by saying that 
changing things are "copies" of Forms. But, then, this leaves Plato open 
to the third-man argument (which is akin to the sorts of arguments we have 
frequently used, that introducing further terms fails to explain our 
knowledge or leads to an infinite regress). For the Form and its copies 
must agree in something, which requires us to posit a third term; but, 
then, the third term, the Form, and its copies require a fourth term to 
explain their agreement; and so on^\ Plato never met this argument^6.
We might suggest that the third-man problem arises because compe­
tences, cases of practical knowledge - such as a geometer’s when he 
constructs triangles and theorems about them - are reified. In the 
cases under consideration, the temptation to reify is evident, for the
standards are due neither to the individual nor to his natural environment.
Still, Plato seems to be committed to objects; for one thing, the 
principle distinction between and is in terms of their
different objects. Particularly from the Republic until a rather dif­
ferent account is given in the Sophistes, Plato disparages particulars in
J
the supposed interest of Forms. fzT> is distinguished, as mentioned,
by the directness of its objects. In the Republic (476 d 3 ff.) its
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objects are characterized as completely real and those of nescience as 
unreal;.so, it is maintained, the objects of - e.g. sights and
sounds - are ’’between being and not-being'1' ,
However, Crombie explains the difference in object in terms of the
different sorts of knowledge one can have. The important distinction is 
168between having an image and acquiring an objective nature . Now, e.g., 
the road to Larisa (Plato’s example in the Meno) is a stretch of earth, 
rocks, and trees, not a system of logical necessities. So a man cannot
J
literally have it in his mind, but only an ~ an image - of reality.
On the other hand, triangularity is something like a system of logical 
necessities, so a ~ an intelligible entity - acquired by the mind.
It is perfectly intelligible to say that a local inhabitant knows the 
road to Larisa without an image, while a visitor who has been given a 
description relies on an image. But from Plato’s point of view, the 
road to Larisa is only a complex empirical object; to be familiar with it 
is not to be familiar with something ultimate, but with something "in 
flux". This view receives a means of expression by reserving "lvV", 
indicating an ultimate reality, for what determines what form the flux 
takes in particular cases. The road to Larisa itself is then seen as an 
image and "it will, not surprise us if we find Plato using a strict sense
of en t*~in which we cannot be said to know physical objects and
. • 169a relaxed sense m which, under favourable conditions, we can" .
It remains to be seen what the relation between Forms and images is, 
and how one is to advance from to ; we should also like
to clarify what the Forms themselves are. Generally, a form is an object 
of and is an objective nature absorbed into the mind. One
sort of form is indicated by the two hierarchically arranged triads in 
the tenth book of the Republic *. There is the triad of makers (596-598):
God, who makes the Form of an object; the craftsman, who makes the object,
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"looking towards the Form"; and the artist, who makes an image of the 
object. And there is the triad of skills (600-602): the skill which 
consists in using an object; the skill which consists in making it; and 
the skill which consists in imitating it. Crombie maintains thatthe 
point is that the orderliness and purposefulness of physical things are 
knowable, so are absorbable by minds without remainder; their brute 
physical existence is not.
In the Divided Line (the discussion of which culminates the sixth 
and seventh books of the Republic), Plato distinguishes four sorts of 
cognition. The second highest is <=< , which concerns mathematics.
is characterized as proceeding from unexamined hypotheses.
Plato thought of the procedure of geometry, not as deduction from axioms,
but as apprehending the implications of the figures we draw, although
. . . 171the figures are only approximations of what the reasoning is about .
. . . . 172The method of arithmetic is similarly described . So mathematics 
involves images. But the highest member of the line, involves
only forms. Crombie feels that Plato’s view was
that the form, structure, principle or what you will which cons­
titutes a mathematical entity such as a circle has no essential 
application to space. Such principles can be expressed in 
spatial embodiments, but in themselves they are prior to such 
embodiments and in no way dependent on them. Furthermore they 
are capable of other embodiments which are not spatial in kind.
The spatial embodiments of the forms have the advantage over 
all other embodiments that they are especially close to the 
originals in that the "matter" of the embodiment - space - is 
something abstract, something having no properties of its own
which might compromise the purity of the embodiment or distract 
173from it
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There appears to be a relation suggested between mathematical objects and 
ethical virtues, such as justice and goodness. Crombie conjectures that 
underlying the Pythagorean definition of justice as the number four is 
the notion of justice as reciprocity and the fact that four, the first 
square, is two times two, where it is seen that the first factor does to
the second - double it - what the second does to it. I.e. there is a
structural identity between squaring and retaliation (and a geometrical 
square). Perhaps Plato thought along the same lines, for he
stresses that the man who is to do dialectic must bring his 
mathematical studies together and see their kinship (531 d), and 
it may be that he thought that it was when we could see the 
identity of structure between an equal-sided rectangle and a 
number whose factors are n x n that we should be ready to detach
the structure from its embodiments and entertain the notion that
it might have other, non-mathematical embodiments
Crombie further suggests that the existence of structures neutral between
their mathematical and non-mathematical embodiments might confirm the
notion that "in themselves” these structures are independent of all
embodiment. Thus Plato maintains (Republic 534 b 3) that by trying to
give account of the entities which mathematicians hypothesise, we come to
know the Forms ^5. Crombie holds that all Forms have their mathematical
embodiments. Plato tended to regard "adjectival" Forms (e.g. equality)
as more important than "substantival" Forms (e.g. bed-hood). And,
although he speaks of Forms such as that of bed (Republic, Bk. X), this 
176could be a complex function of the properties beds must exhibit .
Plato dedicates a great deal of space to discussing how individuals 
acquire Forms. He has a great deal to say about teaching; Forms are not 
taught the way, e.g., multiplication tables or conjugation paradigms are 
taught. Rather, the explicit acquisition of a Form presupposes some
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readiness on the part of the learner. The importance of dialectic^?? is 
that it gives us an explicit grasp of the system of intelligible natures, 
an implicit knowledge of which has guided our progress; that is, it 
allows us to formulate the objective structure to which we are subject. 
Plato’s discussion of how we come to an explicit knowledge of the Forms 
indicates clearly that he had the insights that much of our knowledge is
tacit and that the knower makes a contribution to what is known. When
asked, further, for the source of what the knower tacitly contributes, 
Plato's answer was in terms of recapturing a memory which we hazily 
retain: his doctrine of recollection (<xV<*>/< v^cr/g) . The most famous
presentation of the doctrine of recollection is in the Meno (80-86).
This was cited a number of times by Leibniz and generally by those non­
Cartesians in the seventeenth century who held innatist positions (e.g. 
the Cambridge Platonists). The passage from Malebranche we have just 
discussed, on the usefulness of the senses in science, even bears a
resemblance to Platonic recollection.
The Meno interweaves two strands: one leading to religious notions
about pre-existence, the other to logical notions about the status of 
1 78necessary truths . Socrates, by asking the right questions in the 
right order, elicits from an untutored slave what is essentially a proof 
of the Pythagorean theorem. Socrates' account is that the slave's true 
beliefs (not knowledge, for they had to be elicited) were activated, 
enabling him to "recover knowledge from his own resources - which is what 
we call recollecting" (85 d). The purported fact that the true beliefs
were not acquired during the slave's lifetime offers Socrates his proof
. 179for immortality (86 a 6 - b 2). Crombie feels that Plato's point is 
"that a soul is at every moment of its existence capable of reasoning,
and thus capable of arriving at all necessary truths out of its own 
180resources He suggests that, when Socrates says that all natures
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are akin, he includes the soul. Saying that universal natures are akin 
with each other would express that they form a coherent system.
That they are akin to the soul would mean that the concepts which 
we are naturally prone to form, and the inferences which we are 
naturally prove to make with these concepts, correspond to these 
universal natures and to the relations between them. The proof 
of immortality would lie ... in the presumption (explicitly stated 
in the Phaedo 77-80) that if the soul is akin to eternal entities
such as universal natures it too must be eternal.
For example,
our natural tendency to classify things as round or square corres­
ponds to the difference which obtains between roundness or square­
ness as they are in themselves; our tendency to infer that a round 
thing will roll corresponds to the fact that circularity entails 
equidistance of every point on the circumference from the centre.
The Meno is brought into line with the Phaedo by thinking of the former
as maintaining a kinship of the soul to universal natures because the way 
181the mind works corresponds to the way things are .
Plato’s notion of t*Vc< g is perhaps the most glaring similarity
between Plato and the seventeenth century positions we have presented in 
this chapter. At the foundation of this similarity are the shared insight 
that much of our knowledge is tacit and the shared importance given to
the contribution of the knower to what is known. The Platonic connection 
was recognised by Leibniz. Indeed, as we have seen, Leibniz holds 
that simple natures are what are real in things and are also constitutive 
of human thought; and he attributes this position to Plato. However, he 
also attributes it to Aristotle; the opposition is between Aristotle and 
Plato, with whom Leibniz sides, and the atomists, whose decendants were 
represented by the updated nominalism of Gassendi and Hobbes’
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"plusquamnominalismus". Although Leibniz sometimes characterizes his 
position as siding with Plato against Aristotle (as in the Preface to the 
Nouveaux Essais), such a characterization was a simple, familiar way of 
expressing a complex opposition. Leibniz was more concerned to interpret 
and defend Aristotle than to solidify a connection with Plato. In his 
correspondence with his former teacher Thomasius in the early 1670s, 
Leibniz attempts to explicate .the Aristotelian notion of substantial form 
mechanically. This was one step on his way to re-introducing the 
Aristotelian notion of entelechy. This continues the tradition of 
Kenelm Digby, whom the young Leibniz greatly admired. Digby was both 
Cartesian and Aristotelian; he attempted to explicate Aristotelian notions 
such as rarity and density in terms of mechanical, Cartesian notions, and 
he centered his account of knowledge (viz. scientia) on the view that a 
"notion” is the thing itself in the mind of the knower. Conflation of 
Platonic and Aristotelian positions was almost inevitable. In fact, such 
an association is not without foundation. What Aristotle says about forms 
approaches at times what Plato said about Ideas and both see definitions 
as capturing our knowledge of forms. Such forms are along the lines of 
Cartesian true and immutable natures or objective realities. Again, the 
intellectus agens was often regarded as a Platonic element in Aristotelian 
thought; and it was a new attempt to capture the functions of the 
intellectus agens which led to the accounts of knowledge (viz. scientia) 
and its application which are peculiar to seventeenth century rationalism.
Still, there was a considerable change in the view of scientia or 
philosophia, and so of prima philosophia, in the two millenia between 
Plato and Aristotle and the seventeenth century. For the rationalists, 
mathematics was not a step to ultimate knowledge, but rather was the 
paradigm of clarity and provided the most distinct concepts possible. On 
the other hand, moral and political notions, such as justice and goodness,
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were entrenched in a religious position. Furthermore, physiological invest­
igation had, it appeared, reached the point where the processes of one 
aspect of a person could be described in a way satisfying mathematical demands 
of clarity and distinctness.
Despite the insights we have granted Plato, it is questionable whether 
his account can be thought of as modelled on rule-governed activity to any 
significant extent. One reason rationalism can be so interpreted is that 
it was concerned with the application of science, which involves activity 
(however subliminal and due to the interpretation of the physiological 
observer). Plato, on the other hand, is largely concerned with the 
acquisition of the application of truer juh is largely in running
the state. The Form of good is given much more than ethical significance.
In the Republic (508 e 1-3) it is described as "giving to (all) the objects 
of their truth, and to him who knows them his power of knowing".
The apprehension of goodness is the culmination of dialectic and allows us 
to justify our earlier dialectical achievements. Plato’s educational 
proposals give a unique position to mathematics. But the goal is the grasp 
of goodness and an understadning of justice in those responsible for a just 
state. This indicates a view of the relation between mathematics and morality 
different from that suggested by the rationalists. Knowledge is acquired 
in mathematics, or, rather, in passing beyond mathematics. The grasp, the 
success, is not displayed in an activity; rather, it is a sort of purely 
intellectual grasp. The application, the activity, comes in directing the 
state. What argues against attributing Plato with the insight that private 
events need public criteria is that he is not concerend with events.
Still, Plato makes use of the position in the Republic that it is easier 
to get a view of the state than a view of the mind; viewing the public entity 
allows one to say something about the private entity. The features of the 
state are internalized in the individual; the individual is held to
instantiate, e.g., the justice of the state. This leads to one of the
398.
(sets of) "problems” we saw arise from the upward deflection of insights: 
the "problems" of perception. For public endeavours and features of the 
world are mapped into the individual. Thus Plato thinks not only of the 
multifarious So£<*<- held by different individuals, but also of the fickleness 
of S' of the same individual. Convention drops out, because there are 
multifarious conventions. Yet t-nis very close to knowledge of terms, 
as long as one knows how to use the terms. For ordinary language is 
underdetermined by environmental factors and is learned non-inductively.
It might be maintained that Plato allows for activity within the 
individual similar to that postulated in rationalist theories of vision.
For (as we have seen) he speaks of sensory activity - - related to
Se>£©< » which itself is sometimes construed as mental activity. But the
notion of £ is relatively peripheral for Plato, especially when he
he has reached /eve/ of <r t /?/<>7, rvvhen he.
discusser c*.it is in so far as S<?£ot results from it, not as it
is an application of , let alone of fc ft <<r rq uy. Admittedly, he speaks
of right leading to right action and distinguishes e 77 / c?'/< 2 as
persistently leads to right action. Still, the sort of action which is of 
primary concern for Plato is moral (or political) action. Finally, the rel­
ation between and seems to be modelled on the realtion between
and Voiqo-i<; (and so might reflect Plato’s internalization of the 
state). The lowest member in the Divided Line is £(■ k ot t. & , which is 
similar to f since it means conjecturing or representing by a
likeness. Above this is 77t/JV(£, which is like Sp£<* as a settled judgment, 
since it means trust or confidence. is said to stand to v^f^zj
as 6 Z/< << P-((A to TJI O' T L 5 •
Plato is interested particularly in justice, seen to be a balance in
the state. Individual activity - especially mathematical activity - is largely
lost. The most important mathematical features for Plato, reflecting 
183political ideals, are static and semi-aesthetic - harmony, proportion,
J 1S4and so on.
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The seventeenth century view of mathematics was different. An important 
application of mathematics was in change and the determination of change. 
Mathematics was seen to be carried out in constructing. The mathematizatioft 
of physics also changed the position of mathematics. Harmony was explained 
in terms of what foes on in re, which instantiates mathematical features 
throughout. The Forms which Plato considered most general - being, sameness, 
differences, etc - were regarded in the Cartesian tradition as "obscure 
and general" notions arrived at from confused experience; they did not 
satisfy mathematical criteria of clarity and exactness. God was regarded 
by the rationalists as primarily a mathematician; His immanence allowed 
that He always judges our actions, including supposedly insignificant 
judgments about the mathematically describable distributions of things.
The mathematical description of the human physiology, hence our minute 
actions,’ was a goal for rationalism; it was not even thought of by Plato. 
Hence mind-body correlation was an important "problem" for rationalism, but 
did not exist for Plato. This, the lack of empirical knowledge about the 
functioning of the body, and the fact that knowledge rather than cognition 
is primary allowed Plato to get by without notions corresponding to the 
seventeenth century notion of consciousness.
Kant has been credited with being the first philosopher to maintain 
that the mind contributes the rules in cognition. He is principally concerned 
with cognition ("Erkenntnis"). Cognition is seen as an activity; e.g. he 
speaks of the coneptual conditions which must be satisfied in drawing a
line (which counts as cognition). 185 Furthermore, he is concerned with the
Reason,
cognitive presuppositions of the physics and mathematics of his day, so with 
the conditions of their applicability.
Kant is particularly clear on the contribution or tho cogniser to what
is cognised. In the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pu.v>-> 
187 he states that, so far, it has been accepted that all our cognition
conforms to ("sich richtet nach") objects; but this cannot explain the 
part of oi'r a priori concepts ("Begriffe") In extending our cognition. He
400
refers to Copernicus’ revolution, having the observer revolve and the stars 
stand still. Kant proposes a similar revolution in metaphysics concerning 
intuition ("Anschauung"). For, if objects ("Gegenstande"), as the object 
("Objekt”) of sense, conform to our faculty of intuition, the possibility 
of knowing something a priori about them becomes intelligible. To account 
for a priori knowledge, one must accept that the objects or (what is the
same) the experience ("Erfahrung"), in which alone they are cognised, conform 
to the concepts. For experience is a sort of cognition which requires 
the understanding ("Verstand"), whose rule I must provide in myself, also 
before objects are given to me, and so a priori ("dessen Regel ich in mir, 
noch ehe mir Gegenstande gegeben werden, mithin a priori voraussetzen 
muss"). The rule is expressed in a priori concepts, to which all objects
188of experience necessarily conform.
Kant begins his account in the Critique with the "Transcendental
Aesthetic", which treats intuitions. He draws the distinction, invoked 
throughout the Critique, between what is empirical - roughly, what is give 
in sensation, is contingent, lacks- strict generality, and is a posteriori - 
and what is pure ~ what is a priori and supplied by the cogniser. The 
"pure forms of intuition" are space and time. These are conditions for 
any intuition. Space in particular is the subject of geometry. The 
propositions of Euclidean geometry are held to be a priori synthetic 
judgments involved in pure spatial intuitions.
However, for the account of the Aesthetic to be correct, a number of
until account is taken of the understanding, and so also of concepts.
other conditions must hold. In fact, cognition does not properly arise 
189
In the "Transcendental Analytic", Kant sets out to show that some non-mathematic 
190concepts are a priori and how they can nevertheless refer to objects 
He eventually arrives at twelve primitive pure concepts of the understanding, 
called Categories. For Kant there are two aspects to every judgment: the
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application of specific concepts and the manner of their connection in the 
judgment, i.e. the logical form of the judgment. Kant argues that the 
objectivity and generality of any judgment in general is due to the Category 
embodied in its form; so there is one Category- for every way objectivity 
and generality are conferred on perceptual judgments, in which specific, 
empirical concepts are applied,
Kant saw that he needed a priori concepts to account for the objectivity
and generality of judgements; this insight was based on the realization 
192that to apply concepts is to unify representations.
The same functionflin a judgment gives unity to the various
representations, also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various
representations in an intuition which, generally expressed, is called 
193the pure concept of the understanding.
It remains for Kant to show the validity of the Categories. That is,
he must show that without them experience is Impossible; and, from the side
of the objects, that the Categories are necessary for experience of them as 
. 194 . .they are thinkable. This is done in the ’’Transcendental Deduction of the
Categories”. Thinking involves connecting, and Kant holds that
... all connection whether or not we become conscious of it ... is an 
act of the understanding which we might call by the general name of 
synthesis in order to indicate thereby ... that we cannot represent
to ourselves as connected in the manifold anything which we have not,
. 195ourselves, previously connected ...
Kant finds the basis for this synthesis in "pure apperception”, or the
’’transcendental unity of self-consciousness”, expressed by the representation 
. 196"I think”. Through this unity, "all the manifold which is given in
intuition is united into a concept of an object. It is therefore called
.. . „197objective ...
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To guarantee that the Categories have objects, and are not of "a 
merely logical significance of the mere unity of intuitions”, Kant introduces
the ’’schema”: "the phenomenon, or the sensitive ("sinnliche”) concept of
, . . . . t 198 „ , . •an object m agreement with the category. But a schema is not an image.
No image would be adequate for, e.g., the concept of a triangle in general. 
Rather, a schema is ’’the representation of a general procedure of the
imagination in procuring an image for a concept” or "a rule for the synthesis 
. . . 199 .of the imagination”. Since theonly feature common to every object of
experience (including ourselves) is temporal succession, schemata are 
’’temporal determinations a priori in accordance with rules .
Kant looks on the contribution of the cogniser as a system. First of 
all, there are systems of synthetic a priori judgments. These are distinct 
from analytic judgments (also a priori), for they are more than explicative 
of the subject; they state something substantive about the objects of 
intuition or cognition. They differ from a posteriori judgments (also 
synthetic) in that they are thought as having necessity and are thought in 
strict universality; these marks indicate that they are not derived from 
experience, but are a priori valid.
Kant sees the task of pure reason as contained in the question "How 
are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” He attributes the uncertain,
contradiction-ridden state of metaphysics to the neglect of this task and
. . . . . 201 . . even of the distinction between analytic and synthetic. He allies this
question with the question of the possibility of the pure use of reason in 
all sciences which include a theoretical a priori cognition of objects, thus 
with the questions ”How is pure mathematics possible?” and "How is pure
natural science possible?” There must be some sort of answer to these
. . . 202 questions, since there are such sciences, hence they are possible. Next
arises the question ’’How is metaphysics as a natural disposition (’’Naturanlage”) 
possible?", for certain questions arise from the nature of human reason
which go beyond the employment of understanding in experience. 203 But
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contradictions arise in such "dogmatic” use of reason; and this leads to 
scepticism. So he proposes to consider the limits of the power of reason
Q r\ /
by asking the question "How is metaphysics as a science possible?" And 
the answer to this must present synthetic a priori judgments of this science, 
metaphysical judgments stating something substantive about the objects (and 
so the powers) of human cognition.
The first system of synthetic a priori judgments Kant arrives at (in 
the Transcendental Aesthetic) are the propositions of Euclidean geometry, 
which must apply to any object of spatial intuition. Intuition demands a 
further account, and the Categories embodied in judgments confer on them 
objectivity and generality. Here again he finds a system, for "if we can
list all the forms of objective empirical judgment that are possible we can
. 205produce a complete list of the Categories. So Kant ’has found a clue’..."
the propositional forms of traditional logic need only slight modification 
206to supply Kant’s Table of Categories. There are four classes of three
Categories each. Kant claims that the third Category arises from a connection
of the second and the first of its class (e.g. totality is plurality regarded
. 207as unity). Kant adds that he here has the principles of a system; it
is not his purpose to show the completeness of this system, but he does not
doubt that, with requisite application of the principles, the system would
be complete in the sense that it captures the contribution of the human
cogniser in the judgments we make about the world. Kant holds that "The
table of Categories quite naturally gives us a lead in constructing the
table of principles, because the latter are after all nothing but rules for 
208the objective use of the former". These principles include general
synthetic a priori judgments - such as the principle of causality or the 
principle of substantial permanence in the manifold of intuition - which 
state something substantive about the objects and powers of human cognition. 
They are also the foundations of a system of synthetic a priori judgments.
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With these, Kant has the conditions which make pure natural science possible.
He also has the metaphysical foundations of natural science (Newtonian 
mechanics), and so has supposedly shown how a scientific metaphysics is 
possible. The system of concepts, or of synthetic a priori judgments, forms 
what we have called an objective structure.
Kant clearly displays the insight that our cognition involves tacit 
knowledge. His method is to find what we must be held to tacitly know. This 
is called a transcendental exposition ("Erorterung"), by which Kant understands
’’the explanation of a concept as being a principle from which the possibility
. . . . 209of other a priori cognitions can be seen to follow”. His whole philosophy 
is called transcendental because it is "concerned not so much with objects,
as with the manner of our cognition of objects, in so far as it is a priori• . • ' ■'"■' "r" ■' 1 "
possible”.210
However, in uncovering our hidden resources, we arrive at principles 
which we naturally follow, but which do not apply to any possible object 
of intuition. Kant discusses the illegitimate claims of reason ("Vernunft")
in the narrow sense in the "Transcendental Dialectic". This is directed
against the claims of dogmatic metaphysics, which lead to contradictions,
. . 211and so to scepticism.
For Kant, it is fundamental that "All thought must, whether directly
or indirectly ... relate to intuitions, so, with us, to sensibility ("Sinn­
. . 212 .lichkeit") ..." Speculative reason violates this principle; in particular,
Kant speaks of "Ideas" of reason, which have no application to objects given 
in intuition. To the transition in the Analytic from the Categories to the 
synthetic a priori principles of pure understanding there corresponds in
the Dialectic the transition from the Ideas to the a priori principles of
. . . . 213 .reason - certain absolute metaphysical principles. Reason (in the narrow
214sense) is held to be the power of mediate, i.e., syllogistic inference.
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Kant asks whether pure reason contains synthetic a priori principles 
and rules and wherein these principles can consist. The logical procedure 
of reason in inference, he suggests, indicates the answer.
Firstly, the inference of reason is not concerned with intuitions by 
bringing them under rules (as is the understanding with its Categories), 
but with concepts and judgments. So when pure reason also turns to 
objects, it has no direct relation to them and their intuition, but
only to the understanding and its judgments, which then relate to
. . . . . 215sense and its intuition to determine their object.
E.g. the judgment that everything which happens has a cause is cognised by 
understanding and makes the unity of experience possible, but derives 
nothing from reason?^ Secondly,reasOn achieves its unity, which is 
systematic, by arranging judgments syllogisitcally.pn giving this 
unity, reason tries to find a more general major premise for syllogisms, 
generating chains of syllogisms and eventually arriving at ultimate 
principles.
... the proper principle of reason in general (in its logical use) is: 
for the conditioned ("bedingten") cognitions of understanding to find 
what is unconditioned, by which the unity of the former is made 
complete.
Syllogistic arrangement is certainly not despised by Kant, who suggests
a maxim to the effect that systematic unity is conferred on our judgments
. . . 219by syllogistic arrangement in the search for more ultimate premises.
This maxim does not imply that there is an ultimate, unconditioned premise
or condition. But the so-called fundamental principle of pure reason assumes
. . . 220 this and thus that the chain of syllogisms can be completed.
The criticism of the use of pure reason is apparently directed
against rationalists (although much of the detail of the target is
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Scholastic). Yet, for the rationalists, experience was essential for the 
use of all our concepts. Experience (occurrences in the mind) was held to 
be essential for the application of concepts and (vaguely) to awake ideas 
or faculties individuating ideas. More importantly, experience was thought 
to be necessary to show the possibility of ideas or concepts. Indeed, the 
Cartesian thouchstone of clear and distinct perception, although it is not 
determined by experience, is elicited or instantiated in experience - 
observing obvious geometrical figures or numerical groups, imagining them, 
or using a perspicuous mathematical language. The central problem for 
Cartesianism as well was how our ("a priori") science is applicable to things. 
The rationalists did not see reason as establishing general facts about the 
world, but rather thought of mathesis universalis as systematically and 
with optimum simplicity and clarity exhibiting concepts which could or
must be instantiated in re.
Ideas (objective realities or "natural geomtery") for the rationalists 
act as their own schemata. This becomes apparent in their theories of 
vision. In these accounts, ideas act as rules governing judgments, which 
are acts made on the occasion of experience. The notion of being conscious 
of ... concerns what occurs in the mind, the occasions of judging, and 
is held to correlate with what takes place in the body and (mediately) 
in re. Kant is not concerned with physiology, does not have a theory of the 
correspondence between the mind and the body in the rationalist sense, and 
lacks their notions of judgment and of being conscious of ... The rationalists 
also have an equivalent of the unity of apperception. This is the thing in
re or our imagining as instantiating a number of concepts which could be
. . 221 . . . .isolated by analysis. (The co-instantiation of concepts in a particular
case corresponds to the Thomist conversio ad phantasmata.)
Kant in a sense presents two objective structures: that of the 
conepts of pure understanding and that of the Ideas of pure reason. (Geometry, 
concerned with the pure forms of intuition, could be counted as a third.) The
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second is allowed only a regulative use. But why draw a sharp line between 
the two? Similarly, understanding furnishes synthetic a priori judgments 
telling us something about our cognitive powers and their objects, while 
reason is a source of only analytic judgments, which are simply explicative 
of our terms. However, the same judgments or propositions which are immune 
to conter-instance sometimes seem to express something substantive, while 
other times they seem to merely explicate terms. For instance, ”F - ma” 
could be taken as a definition of ’’force”; yet it expresses an important 
conceptual relation between three fundamental concepts of physics, each of 
which has some conceptual life beyond the company of the others. We have 
a stock of terms and concepts which are systematically connected and allow 
distinctions and appropriate applications of individual terms or concepts.
To teach someone a given purely conceptual statement could count as 
explicating the terms involved; but it might count as teaching him something 
substantive about the discipline. Normally, if the person in fact learns 
that such-and-such, then he has both learned how to use the terms and has 
learned something about the discipline. Again, to separate concepts into 
those which could be instantiated in things (Kant’s concepts)' and those 
which are further removed from description ("Ideas”) is to decapacitate both
sides of the division. For all the concepts are determined by their relations
. . 222 in the same system and the use of any given concept supposes these relations.
Kant relies on the fact that some concepts are more evidently 
instantiated in things or are involved in the objects of intuition. But 
despite his reliance on construction in geometry, Kant fails to consider 
what Leibniz calls sensible signs when he insists that concepts must be 
certified by their relation to experience. Yet the most important way in 
which our concepts are certified is through established linguistic usage - 
this shows that they occupy a consistent conceptual niche and are not idle. 
Reason, for seventeenth century rationalism, was mathesis universalis. Kant,
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on the other hand, feels that mathematics can supply its own objects because
it constructs its concepts, but that the methods of mathematics (construction 
. . . . . . 223in particular) are inapplicable in philosophy. But the term ’’construction
can be applied to strings of signs and their sequences in much the same 
sense it is applied to a diagram. In short, Kant’s views of the methods 
of mathematics and the use of token are too narrow. Finally, some of the 
concepts whose relations to intuitions Kant relies on most - e.g. cause 
(not as explicated as mechanical activity) and substance (not as essence) - 
were considered, at least by Malebranche, as confused concepts. Different 
aspects are taken as important by Kant and Malebranche. Still, Malebranche’s 
concern is also with what is applicable in experience; he goes on to 
emphasise what is theoretically fruitful by mathematical criteria.
Kant’s view of the fundamental principle of pure reason (considering 
chains of syllogisms as completable with ultimate premises) could well be 
explicitly directed at Leibniz’s position we presented earlier in this 
chapter. Leibniz certainly did at times talk of arranging all knowledge 
in grand syllogistic systems. But his immediate point was often that a 
particular discourse can be analysed in a definite context as involving 
a definite (and, for the context , complete) set of implicit principles. 
Still, the major part of our knowledge which we should like to capture 
with a logical system is our use of certain verbal forms, and a desideratum 
of such a system is that it be complete and be formulated with the smallest 
number of (’’ultimate”) axioms and rules of inference. Kant felt that the
principles of formal logic are so general that they are indifferent to the
. . . . . . . 224relationship our thinking has to intuition. But, when one considers
that the application of concepts often is the application of terms and 
that logic is inherent in this application, these principles, though very 
general, are seen to have an intimate relation to "intuition”.
According to Kant, then, reason as well as understanding supplies an 
objective structure; but the one supplied by reason is illegitimate as a
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source of substantive judgments about the objects of cognition. Kant 
distinguishes three sorts of ’’inferences of reason": that in which the
major premise is always a categorical, that in which it is a hypothetical,
. . . . . 225 . .and that in which it is a disjunctive judgment. We can imagine three
types of completed sequences corresponding to these three forms. So the 
principle that, if the condition is given, the whole sequence of subordinate
conditions is also given leads to three sources of fallacy. 226 To these
correspond three kinds of unconditioned unity - three ’’Transcendental 
. . . . 227Ideas" - and three speculative disciplines.
The disjunctive form of syllogism leads to an unconditioned as the
aggregate of the members of the complete disjunctive division of the concept,
"the highest condition of the possibility of everything whcih can be thought
(the entity of entities)", the subject of theology, viz. God. The account
of God which Kant considers is essentially Scholastic: God is an individual, 
228the bearer of all possible perfections, and known by analogy.
Kant shows the invalidity of the three most important arguments for
the existence of God; he also thinks he has shown that they exhaust the 
possibilities. At any rate, the general principles of the Transcendental
Logic imply the impossibility that God (the "Transcendental Ideal") should
. 229 . . ...be an object of experience. Still, when looking for synthetic a priori
judgments as the metaphysical foundations of science, Kant is concerned 
with things as they are possible objects of experience ~ i.e. phenomena; 
he is not concerned with things in themselves independent of our cognition -
i.e. noumena. Thus
... the same grounds on which the inability of human reason to assert
the existence (of a supreme being) has been demonstrated, are necessarily
. . . . 230sufficient to demonstrate also the invalidity of any conter-assertion.
An important difference between the rationalist positions and Kant’s 
is that the rationalists held that all possible things are subject to and
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knowable through our science, which is also divine science. That is,
they do not admit noumena in Kant’s sense. The discrepencies are significant 
with regard to God and minds. In the case of God, the rationalist position 
tends to reduce Him to a super-concept embracing the whole objective
structure.
The distinction between phenomena and noumena lies behind Kant’s 
transcendental idealism. Kant can be credited with the insight that 
private events (intuitions, cognitions, etc) need non-private criteria: we 
have seen the function of the Categories in conferring objectivity on our
judgments; ’’objectivity” is meant to involve communality with other
232 . . . .persons. Holding transcendental idealism allows Kant to maintain that
the contribution of the understanding - e.g. the principle of causality 
and substance as a permanent subject in experience distinct from the perceiver - 
in fact applies to the objects of cognition. This is behind his proof that 
’’the mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence 
proves the existence of objects in space beyond me"/
For Kaut, something can be experienced as external only because it is 
intuited in space. But space itself is a pure form of intuition. According 
to Kant, space is empirically real - it is real ’’with respect to everything 
which can be given to us as an external object” - and it is transcendentally
23^+ideal - it is not real "with respect to things ... considered in themselves". 
(The same applies to time.) Briefly, objects can be intuited only "through” 
space and time, so they can never be cognised in themselves.
But the realism one would like to establish relates to things in 
themselves, noumena. Kant’s empirical realism and transcendental idealism 
are tightly bound to the cogniser, and, as far as the existence of things 
is concerned, go beyond him only if there is some systematic relation between
noumena and phenomena. But here Kant encounters a problem (which, in fact,
. . . 235 .was mentioned to him m correspondence ) to which he never gave a solution.
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In Korner’s words,
Kant assumes without qualification that perception is in part caused 
by the action of things in themselves on the perceiving self. Now 
causation, in the ordinary meaning of the term, presupposes that 
cause and effect are located in space and time, whereas according to
Kant things in themselves are not so located. The assumption that
. . . . 2the things m themselves act upon the senses is thus contradictory.
The problem is that Kant’s realism is about phenomena, which are transcendentally 
ideal; and it is not evident that this does not simply mean ideal simpliciter, 
though subject to rules of the mind.
Kant’s noumena have been compared with Leibniz’s monads (which perhaps 
are their historical antecedents). Leibniz likewise held that monads do not 
instantiate geometrical concepts (yet they instantiate arithmetical concepts 
and are substances, not only in Leibniz’s sense, but also in Kant’s sense 
of something perservering through time). But Leibniz gives us a story of 
how phenomena relate to things in themselves. For he holds that spatial 
displays - phenomena - are well founded by monads, a monad expresses the 
body founded on the monads it dominates, and the monad’s activities are a 
non-spatial analysis of the spatial display.
A large part of the difference between Kant and Leibniz rests on their
positions on sensation and what is empirical. The irreducible difference
. . . . . . 237between judging and intuition is fundamental to Kant. Much the same
distinction is summarized in Leibniz’s distinction between truths of fact
and truths of reason. Yet Kant maintains that Leibniz "intellectualized”
238appearances. Indeed (although Kant does not mention this), Leibniz
explicitly held that occurrences in the mind (’’sensible qualities”) are
analysable as intricate instantiations of concepts.
Still, if the question is about the application of the descriptive part
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of our vocabulary and descriptive rules and concepts, then some "intellect- 
ualization" is in place (but not, of course, to the extent Leibniz carries 
it). And, in this case, we should not want to say that empirical cognition 
is given, but rather that there is a suitable relation between what we do 
and the circumstances we are in. On the other hand, what is given by sense 
might be taken to be mere occurrences in the mind (perhaps establishing 
dispositions); such occurrences are our (or any other higher animal’s) 
being alive to features in our environment. But this does not give Kant 
the relation he needs between what is given by sense and the contribution 
of the cogniser; otherwise we could demand an explanation why other mammals 
have not produced systems of dogmatic metaphysics.
The reason Kant gives for maintaining that Leibniz intellectualized 
appearances is that he compares the objects of sense with one another as 
if they were things-in-general in the understanding. For the understanding
regards only their concepts, and not their place (’’Stelle”) in intuition,
. . . 239 . .wherein alone objects can be given. Kant thinks that this necessarily
led to the extension of the principle of the identity of indiscernables
(valid only for things-in-general) to the objects of sense (the "mundus 
240 . . .phenomenon"). Generally, Kant objects to Leibniz's attempt to get behind
phenomena, to understand (the workings of) things independent of, yet 
conformable with, our understanding. Leibniz, according to him, bypasses 
conditions on our cognition of objects, conditions on appearances in space 
and time more specifically, the pure form of external intuition - space - 
in particular.
Kant thought the presuppositions of Newtonian mechanics were part of 
the natural cognitive machinery of humans. He sides with Clarke aginst 
Leibniz on the question of absolute space; but his Copernican revolution 
makes absolute space a contribution of the cogniser. Leibniz, Kant states, 
thought of space as a certain order in the community of substances, while 
what is peculiar to this order and independent of the things ordered he wrote
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off as due to the confusion of this concept. So space was regarded as an 
intelligible form of the connection of things in themselves, i.e. intelligible 
substances. At the same time, however (Kant continues), Leibniz wanted 
this concept to be valid for appearances. For "he sought everything, even 
the empirical representation of objects, in the understanding and left the
senses the contemptuous business of confusing and disfiguring these„ u 241representations .
Kant asserts against the principle of the identity of indiscernables
that the diversity of positions ("Orter") is the foundation of plurality
. . . 242and difference of objects (as appearances) without further conditions.
And he argues for the principle that "space is a necessary a priori represent­
ation, which founds ("zum Grunde liegt") all external intuitions" as follows. 
We could never form a representation cf the case in which there is no space.
Yet we can think the case in which there are no objects in space. So 
space is the condition of the possibility of appearances.
Kant is correct that Leibniz focuses on things in themselves as
concepts. The Cartesians did so even more blatantly; substance was tought
of in terms of its essence, e.g. extension. But then there is the problem
of individuation; Spinoza in many ways was the most straightforward Cartesian.
Leibniz thought he avoided this problem in a number of ways with the notion 
244 . . .of monad. But when Leibniz discusses basics, the notion of individual
concepts dominates, and conatus is interpreted as conceptual succession 
(inferences or calculations) - for Leibniz, the logical "must" is not only 
compelling, but also propelling. Kant is also correct that there is a 
connection between the status of space and the principle of the identity 
of indiscernables.
Leibniz and Kant both have insights, and both mis important points.
Thre are a number of ways in which we could think of an (pure form of) 
intuition or'concept of space or spatial intuitions or concepts; corresp­
ondingly, there are a number of ways one might hold that spatio-temporally 
distinct individuals are discernable. Now our ordinary concepts of living
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things and much else are about things whose activities are spatially
complex. (But if rational agents - the concepts of which likewise involve 
a spatial element ~ are not noumena, then nothing is.) Furthermore, 
our ordinary concepts of the circumstances in which various forms of behaviour 
are appropriate and the elements of these circumstances also have irreducible 
spatially complex features. Concerning the identity of indiscernables, 
ordinary language would break down if there were no general terms; and 
it would be unusable if we had to give unique descriptions of every 
individual. So, considering the common, basic cases of cognition, one must 
allow that cognition presupposes spatial discrimination. But whether this 
implies that the cogniser has a pure intuition or concept of space is another 
question.
However, the situation is different if we consider only concepts 
within a discipline with a certain degree of sophistication, when only 
conventional sortals are involved. To arrive at a picture involving spatial 
distinctions of some part of the universe, there must be a sortal - unit - 
of distance (or length). There are a number of theoretical reasons suggesting 
which paramters and constants are relevant, while the magnitude of the 
unit is largely a matter of scientific tradition. Theoretical considerations 
suggest the conceptual salience of the transmission of light and suggest 
the speed of light times elapsed time as a measure of distance. Not only 
distances, but also spatial properties involving more than dimension(e.g. 
the sum of the internal angles of a right triangle) are determined by the 
application of the metric. This application presupposes that ’'things” (e.g. 
observers or natural bodies which emit, absorb, or reflect fight) have been 
picked out; they must be picked out independently of the picture arrived at 
by applying the metric.
Kant’s space as a pure form of intuition is at this level - he holds
that it instantiates Euclidean geometry. He is wrong in holding that space
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in this sense would have an application even whenthere are no objects which 
are spatially related. His Copernican revolution assigns these sophisticated 
concepts to our natural endowment. It might be suggested that our behaviour 
is naturally in accordance with Euclidean concepts and that we visually pick 
out Euclidean triangles, etc.; so our behavioural and visual spaces are 
the same and a natural Euclidean endowment explains this coincidence. But 
the evidence that something is picked out visually (and not just that, e.g., 
certain optical patterns form on the retina) is behavioural. And behaviour 
is described in Euclidean terms because (when the dimensions are not too 
large) this is the simplest way to exactly describe things and their
activity. It is correct that the application of concepts to things presupposes 
spatial discrimination, for the sophisticated endeavour referred to presupposes 
less sophisticated competences. But the presuppos’d/cnrelates to experience, 
in the sense of an on-going sequence of trials, errors, and successes, of 
the person who eventually acquires the concepts.
So Kant also deflects the insights. In this case, the notion of an 
individual soul , a cognitive agent which displays no behaviour, is still 
present. This leaves Kant with the "problems” of perception. He is also 
faced with further "problems". The rationalists thought of our science as 
the same as divine science and as applicable to whatever there is. One 
result was that both finite things and God were thought of in much the same 
manner as concepts. However, they were able to preserve the insight that 
non-private criteria are common criteria, for all rational agents were held 
to be subject to divine science; as this is perspicuous, so (to that 
extent) is God. However, Kant places God beyond our scientific knowledge, 
as a noumenon. While he insists that the contribution of the understanding 
accounts for objectivity in the sense that there is a factor in our judgments 
which we share with others, he has nothing to account for this communality.
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Still, Kant finds reason to maintain a communality of the principles
of rational agents in his moral philosophy. This is another instance of
his transcendental method, for, without this communality, an essential
feature of moral behaviour would be missing. Kant again has the escape
of noumena, this time in the form of (finite) rational agents. In moving
to noumena, however, he moves beyond the realm of applicability of our
science. There is an essential difference for Kant between the way we
know the rules governing our scientific activity and the way we know the 
. . 245rules governing our moral activity. Kant must maintain, with regard to
noumena, that either we do things without knowledge or else there is tacit 
knowledge which cannot be made explicit.
Still, Kant holds that moral laws are the province of reason; so 
these laws are known. What is unknowable is how the moral agent, the thing 
in itself, operates. To allow for moral activity, Kant holds that we must 
move beyond phenomena. The reason appears in the Third Antinomy. The thesis
is
causality according to laws of nature is not the only kind of causality
from which the phenomena of the world can be derived. It is necessary,
. . 246m order to explain them, to assume a causality through freedom.
The antithesis is
There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in
. 247accordance with laws of nature.
The second sort of causality mentioned in the thesis is only an Idea - the 
Idea of freedom. This Idea, Kant feels, is necessary in order to account
for the experience of moral obligation, which is different from any objective
. . . . . . 248experience within the scope of science, so of the Critique of Pure Reason.
A fundamental principle of this work is that all phenomenal events are causally
necessary. In the discussion of the Third Antinomy, Kant states that it is 
possible for man to be both a phenomenon and a noumenon. Beyond the possibility,
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that man as noumenon exists is held to be shown by the fact that we 
249 In the Critiqueapprehend the moral law and our subjection to it.
of Practical Reason it is clear that what he holds to be unknowable is moral
250 . .freedom, which is an Idea. This suggests that there is something -
moral freedom - which is beyond our cognitive faculties, yet manifests 
itself in its effects. It seems to suggest that some other rational being 
might be endowed in such a way as to apprehend this elusive feature.
But there is no further element beyond our moral behaviour; there
is nothing for us to be ignorant of. Saying that someone’s act was not
free is a way of removing that act from moral consideration (except, perhaps,
as the fact that it was not free is due to some other act by himself or
another). Behaviour, in the full sense, would not be behaviour unless it
were free, i.e. the action of an agent, and not, e.g., a mere physiological
response. Moral behaviour is underdetermined by environmental factors; it
is governed by moral rules, which are cultural. A free act ("free” being
largely redundant ) is one by which the agent has got it right or got it
wrong; if he acted correctly, he could have acted incorrectly, and vice
versa. What is correct in given circumstances depends on the moral rules.
If we engage in an activity which is evaluated by these rules, then we are
generally attributed with knowledge of these rules (even when we cannot formulate 
251 .the knowledge). We need know nothing other than these rules and the
features of particular circumstnces, where behaviour in accordance with
the rules is appropriate or inappropriate. There are no unknowable
, ... 252sequences of events or activities.
Generally, we need not draw a distinction such as that between 
phenomena and noumena. To evaluate an agent morally, we must pick out what 
displays the behaviour in question. Furthermore, our knowledge of moral 
rules and moral acts is no less obvioulsy displayed than our knowledge 
of geometry and geometrical constructions. Kant, with the distinction
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between phenomena and noumena, parallels the Scholastic distinction between 
the realms of nature and grace. But he keeps the noumenal, moral, 
''spiritual” side hidden and severs the rationalists' union of mathem­
atical and moral rules under "science”.
The "problems" introduced by the framework of God and the immaterial 
soul remain for Kant. If he were to consider the question of freedom 
with regard to acts of cognition, he also would face the problem of the 
attribution of cognition to individuals. Both the rationalists and Kant
miss out overt behaviour and convention. In the case of the rationalists,
this tends to make agents into concepts. In the case of Kant (and here 
he has something in common with Locke), agents become unknowable authors
of acts.
Kant still struggles with the functions wh'< ch were assigned to the 
intellectus agens. He is unable to see objective structures as convent­
ional. And he misses the advantage which the rationalists had in consid­
ering the supposedly unique objective structure as reified in something 
distinct from individuals. The advantage is that there is then a bridge 
between individuals and a bridge between the cogniser and what is cognised 
in re. God enters most spectacularly in the Third Meditation, where He 
allows Descartes to get beyond the ego. But He is continually on the 
scene in rationalism, whether in the foreground or the background. And 
the framework of God and the immaterial soul was common property. Further­
more, even though the major figures have departed, this framework still 
exercises a good deal of influence. The only way these positions 
can be properly assessed is to determine what role God, divine science, 
and related notions play, what insights are enshrined in them, and what
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"problems" they introduce.
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Chapter XII*
Looke
Lookers account of knowledge Is indeto’d to the Cartesian 
revolution, but it also owes&3fi£>t to his medical empiricism and 
has much in common with the nominalist and Gassendist accounts*
A great deal of the Cartesian revolution either did not affect 
Locke or was rejected by him. In particular, his account greatly 
restricts the perspicuity the Cartesians sought. Locke accepts 
the mechanical philosophy in so far as the operations of all in­
animate things are held to require no properties independent of the 
cognition of a sentient being other than formal features and 
solidity. Yet, in keeping with his particular medical background, 
mechanical physiology is not used in explaining animate things. In 
addition to animal thought, Locke restricts Cartesian mechanism in 
rejecting the position that extension alone is the essence of body, 
which also requires solidity, and in accepting corpuscles as funda­
mental physical units. His position on all three of these issues 
places limits on perspicuity. The divergence between Locke and
the Cartesians and Leibniz in their accounts of knowledge is much
more radical, for he emphasises the narrow compass of the human under 
standing. Locke’s account is fundamentally causal and a major theme 
of it is that the materials of knowledge are admitted by the few
and narrow inlets of sensation and reflection. These materials
themselves are largely opaque. Furthermore, from these materials 
our science must be made by ourselves. Generally, there are two
strands to Locke’s account: his acceptance of a mechanical
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foundation for inanimate things, in which, he has' something in 
common with Leibniz and. the Cartesians, and his emphasis on the 
narrow compass of the understanding, in which he rejects the goal 
of their accounts of our knowledge.
Locke, criticised by Norris, Sergeant and others for not 
stating what ideas are, always replied to the effect that we need 
not be able to say what they are; it suffices for the historical 
plain method that we can give an account of their origin and how 
all knowledge is built from them. Yet he characterises ideas in
a number of ways, the two most distinctive of which are as sign and 
as perceptions. The signs nature of ideas is emphasised in Locke’s 
division of the sciences in the last chapter of the Essay. Here 
he suggests that an understanding of the function of ideas can 
furnish us with a new logic, i.e. a method for the reformulation, 
direction and augmentation of the body of empirical and rational 
knowledge we have. Locke classifies ideas with words in this 
chapter as signs; with words, ideas are classified as the subject 
of the science of signs or semiotics. In a great deal of what 
Locke says about ideas, ideas are naturally interpreted as signs. 
This distinguishes Locke’s notion of ideas from the Cartesian 
notion of ideas as objective realities. Occurrences in the mindj 
for the Cartesiansjare signs of the state of the body and so of the 
body’s relations to things in its environment. Yet they are not 
the materials of knowledge. For Locke, the occurrences of ideas
are not conditions for the application of our knowledge, but are 
the materials of it. Furthermore, these materials are not per­
spicuous, for by having them we do not thereby cognise a con­
figuration or other relation, as signs, ideas (as Locke considers
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them) are like scholastic species, for the Scholastics as well 
maintained, that there are two sorts of signs, species and. words 
("voces”) •
Locke also calls ideas perceptions; the thesis he maintains 
against Malebranche is that ideas are only perceptions* He shares 
this view of ideas with Arnauld, hut makes no attempt to introduce 
objective realities. It is sometimes stated that having an idea 
is having a perception and that a perception is having an idea.
"Have" in these cases is used as in "have fear" and adds nothing to
the occurrence sense of "idea". This sense of "have an idea" is
particularly important in the fourth book of the Essay, where he 
correlates having an idea with the existence of its cause in our 
environment. "Have an idea" is used by Locke in a different sense 
when' he is concerned with having ideas because they are got from 
experience. In this sense, to have an idea is to have a disposition
for an occurrence in the mind. This se.nse of "have an idea?’ is
essential in his rejection of innatism. An idea, then, can be 
either an occurrence or a disposition. In either case, an idea is
said to be in the mind.
Both empirical and rational cognition are asymmetric for Locke, 
who is fully committed to a causal or genetic account. The inception 
of an idea as a disposition is in a perception which is caused by 
a configuration in re. This causal connection is the thread in 
Locke’s account which holds our knowledge to the world. In the
Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion he states with no indication
of disapproval that his position has been compared with Aristotle’s 
and replies to Malebranche's criticism of the intellectus agens.
Locke is not willing toatccept the physical side of the Scholastic
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account which involves intensional species. But he insists that 
ideas (whether occurrences or dispositions) must he caused by what 
they are of, while admitting that we cannot comprehend how they are 
caused. Nothing is ever said of the disproportion between material 
cognising faculties, which we share with animals, and spiritual 
faculties, for with Locke as well, the mystery has moved to the 
gap between what is insensible and what is sensible.
The disagreement between Locke and Malebranche is on a more *
fundamental level than that of the relation between occurrences in
re and occurrences in the mind. Throughout the Examination Locke 
misrepresents Malebranche’s position by implying that he and 
Malebranche use '’idea" in much the same sense. In fact, what Locke 
means by "idea" is much the same as what Malebranche means by 
"sentiment", although ideas according to Locke can be indifferent 
to judgement and are inceptions or exercises of dispositions in the 
mind. To Malebranche’s claim that reason is immutable, Locke replies 
that reason is only the relation between ideas, i.e. occurrences 
in the mind and dispositions for them. As long as the ideas are 
the same, he adds, their relations, and so reason, will be the same.
Locke never gives a satisfactory answer to the question, how 
we determine that the same occurrence in the mind is the same idea
as a previous occurrence. If the roles ideas fulfil which- are 
specified by rules and concepts are ruled out as a means of in­
dividuating ideas, then a behavioural criterion or perhaps one in 
terms of memory is to be looked for. A behavioural criterion is 
ruled out. Memory, as Locke characterises it, will not do either.
In the first edition of the Essay he styled memory the storehouse 
of our ideas. But this is not sufficient for individualing ideas,
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for his positions on our acquisition of knowledge and formulation 
of rational knowledge depend on what is in the mind in the sense 
of what we are consoious of. Locke holds that only that is in the 
mind which we are conscious of, or, having heen conscious of, can 
he revived as an actual perception. To he conscious of something, 
for Locke, implies that we can state what we are conscious of or 
lack only the requisite vocabulary to do so. In the second edition 
of the Essay Locke clarified the metaphor of the memory as a store­
house hy adding that he means only that we can have the same idea 
again with the additional perception that we have had it before.
But the additional perception presupposes that it is the same idea 
which is had again and gives no criterion of success for reviving
the same occurrence in the mind.
Locke holds that reason is the relation of ideas because he
maintains that the materials of knowledge, and so. of reason, are 
got from sensation and reflection. Ideas as occurrences inceptive 
of dispositions take place in roles, which (at least in the case of 
ideas got by sensation) are determined by their causes.
The reliance on materials received in sensation (we lee.ve 
reflection for later) exhibits Locke’s affinity with nominalism.
The first step of his plain historical method is the outfitting of 
the mind with these materials. And he says very little' about the 
correspondence between mind and body; the only point at which their 
relation is of interest is in the reception of ideas. The mind, as 
related to the body by Locke, has much in common with Suarez’s 
intellectus possibilis. Further, as the immediate object of the 
understanding when a man thinks, an idea as an occurrence is 
reminiscent of Suarez’s conceptus formalis. But Locke does not
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distinguish, a class of ideas which are the meanings of words: all 
ideas are said to he the significations of words, simple ideas 
being the significations of indefinable words.
What Locke means by "mind” is close to what Gassendi sug­
gested: the understanding and the material cognising faculties in 
so far as they are the faculties in which sensation and imagination 
take place. There is a tacit distinction between soul and mind in 
the Essay. Locke objects to the Cartesian notion of a soul which 
secures no dispositions. The soul in Locke’s account is indifferent 
to matter except in those causal relations which establish dispositions 
in it. He also objects to the notion that the soul always thinks; 
thought, he maintains, is the activity, not the essence, of the soul.
On the one hand, the soul is a spiritual substance, a substratum 
veiled by its activity. On the other hand, thought and perception 
are tied to consciousness and are placed in the mind by Locke, who 
writes that only that is in the mind which we are conscious of or, 
having been conscious of, can revive. Mind is related to person, 
for personal identity is determined by the same consciousness. And 
personal identity is independent of the identity of the soul. By 
this tacit distinction betwear mind, which ideas are in, and soul,
Locke can include the sensitive faculties within the mind without
allowing that these faculties are spiritual; ideas as dispositions 
need not be those dispositions which are in the mind.
Yet the sensitive faculties are not regarded by Locke as cor­
poreal or material,’ but are indifferent to matter once dispositions 
have been established. Locke’s distinction between mind and body
is different from that drawn by the Cartesians. Likewise, his
notion of consciousness is different from theirs, for it is tied
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to memory. ’’Person'’ is held, to he a forensic term, hut personal 
identity depends in the same consciousness in the sense that the 
person in question alone can acknowledge responsibility. Further­
more, we are held to he conscious of occurrences in the mind which 
are indifferent to judgement. What we are conscious of is independent 
of the hody once dispositions are established because memory is 
independent of the hody. The independence of the sensitive 
faculties from the hody can he maintained by Locke because he 
rejects physiological explanations in the Cartesian fashion, par­
ticularly those regarding judgements we naturally make.
Ideas as the immediate objects of the understanding when a man 
thinks^ are what Locke’s predecessors called objects in sensitive 
faculties. Locke holds that ideas are not only in the mind, but 
also in the understanding, and are not just the objects of the 
understanding. "Understanding" retains some connection with 
meanings of words, as ideas are -signs. But "understand" does not 
have its ordinary meaning for Locke since some of these signs are
shared with animals. -
Locke’s central conception is that no knowledge is innate.
As he does not admit a correspondence between the mind and the body, 
one support for innatism is removed from the start. Inna/bigm of one 
form or another was common in the seventeenth century. Any account, 
such as those given by Thomism and Cartesianism, which maintains 
that there is a symmetry between inceptive and exercisive cognition 
and does not attribute non-descriptive rules and concepts to con­
vention must hold that our knowledge of these is to some extent 
innate. Furthermore, Suarez’s account of the illumination by the 
intellectus possibilis, according to which species "flow out" from
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it when it has onoe heen presented, with a phantasm as an exemplar, 
suggests that the immediate objects of knowledge are not got from 
experience. Generally, any position which gives some part to 
spiritual objects to that extent holds that our knowledge is not 
got from experience. Locke’s arguments touch all these positions, 
but are particularly directed against an account such as Herbert’s. 
Again, however, because of the causal gap Locke admits between what 
is corporeal and sensation, Herbert’s analogy between the body and 
the world is ruled out. The appeal to universal consent in support 
of certain universal maxims flourished in England in Locke’s day.
But Locke interprets "consent” as referring to a speech act. Con­
sent as the tacit acceptance of a principle of action can have no 
part for Locke in an account of knowledge, which for him is an 
account of what is in the mind, for what is in the mind is tied to
what we are or have been conscious of and to be conscious of some­
thing for him implies that we can say what it is or only lack the 
terms to do so. In concentrating on universal consent as a speech 
act, Locke writes as if we must have the use of terms to be said 
to know what is in questions but this is contrary to his own position, 
according to which we first have ideas from experience as the 
materials of knowledge, and then associate terms with them. The 
emphasis he places on the knowledge of the terms in the first book, 
however, is due to the fact that innatism was appealed to for our 
knowledge of general maxims, which for Locke involve those com­
plex ideas whose formation depends on the use of words.
Universal consent concerns the particular form of innatism 
on which Locke concentrates. Yet his strongest argument questions 
whether any form of innatism which is not obviously false in effect
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maintains anything other than that we can have ideas or know
certain maxims. The sort of innatism which is obviously false is 
that which maintains that at birth we can apply certain maxims by 
explicitly following the same steps followed in applying them when 
they are formulated. In Locke’s language, this view holds that at 
birth we actually have the ideas constituting the maxims. The alter­
native for those who accept that we have ideas at birth is that we 
have ideas potentially, i.e. given the requisite conditions, we 
come to have the ideas actually, and so can formulate the maxim in 
question. Locke’s criticism is that if all that is maintained is 
that we could have certain ideas, then all ideas are innate. This 
in itself is not an objection to those who hold that ideas are 
innate, when "innate idea" is restricted to what is of particular 
features or aspects and is or has an objective reality. Locke here 
does not take account of criteria distinguishing innate ideas from 
other sorts of ideas. To this extent his argument must rely on his 
other claims, that all knowledge begins with particulars and from 
experience. Again, he does not consider the sense in which an idea 
is said to be innate in that ideas are not like what purportedly 
causes them, as Descartes maintained in the Notae in Programma. Still, 
what is it to have an idea, any idea, potentially? Knowledge is 
having ideas in the sense of dispositions for occurrences and there 
is the particular connection between "know" and "learn"^ which we 
discussed at the end of Chapter V, which supports Locke’s general 
point.
We have basic sorts of practical knowledge because we have 
tried to do certain activities even though innate dispositions may be
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required. Gaining knowledge in this way is learning by trial and 
error, or learning by experience and extends beyond basic practical 
knowledge. Locke maintains against innatism that aLl knowledge is 
from experience. However, there are three senses of "experience’1 
and Locke’s use of the term generally is not the one we have been 
concerned with. In this sense, "experience" is related not only 
by etymology, but also by meaning to "expert". It also relates 
to "empirical" and "experience" as these regard trials made to 
gain knowledge of nature. To have experience in this sense 
suggests success and gives a gauge of one’s qualifications. A 
second sense of "experience" is as it is used for what befalls us, 
as when we say that the accident was a real experience. "Experience" 
in this sense has no connection with "try" and we'gain facilities by 
living through experiences only to the extent that learning depends 
on confronting novel situations. "Experience" in its third sense 
is somewhat of a technical term and is particularly frequent in 
philosophical contexts. In this sense, experience is the course of 
private happenings or mental occurrences.
Most references to experience in the seventeenth century were 
to experience as the course of mental occurrences. Still, the 
first sense had some currency, for this related to the Aristotelian 
sense of "experience" ("experientia"), in which it is said to come
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from much, memory. Both Suarez and. Hobbes used, "experience" in
this sense. Suarez also uses "experience" for the course of mental 
occurrences, as when he appeals to experience to support his positions 
on the actions and. dispositions of cognising faculties. In this 
sense, the Cartesians regarded, experience as a source of obscurity 
and confusion and as veiling the structure of things in re and the 
rational activities of the mind. Experience is the source of 
deviations from the norms of action and judgement in both cognitive 
and moral contexts, as it includes both material features and the
passions. "Experience" and its translations also referred to ex­
periments in the seventeenth century and in this sense of "experience" 
the Cartesians appealed to experiences. But experience as the
course of occurrences in the mind was held to be due to the union
of the mind with the body and to the accidents of our size and other 
biological restrictions.
Locke generally uses "experience" in this sense. He, however, 
regards it as the end on the side of the cogniser of the causal 
thread which ties our knowledge to things. There are three occasions 
on which Locke’rwritings suggest the sense of "experience" in which
it is connected with trial and success. The discussion of the remedies
of the abuses of words at the end of the third book of the Essay is 
reminiscent of the project on a universal character undertaken by 
Wilkins for the Royal Society in the l66OTs. Indeed, much of what 
Locke writes about the accuracy of words and the relation between 
their definitions and natural sorts and bulks suggests improvements 
of language for those engaged in empirical inquiry. Language evolves 
through the experience of those who use it, particularly in a, dis­
ciplined inquiry, where suitable terms are needed for a grip on the
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"body of knowledge. Yet throughout this discussion, Locke speaks of 
making words signify ideas in the mind. The second occasion on which 
Locke writes of experience as it is connected with trial and success
is in Off the Conduct of the Understanding in the discussion on 
practice and hahit. Here, writing against Scholastic logic and rules, 
he states that use•and exercise and the consequent acquisition of 
facilities accounts for what is thought to he natural. But this is 
immediately followed hy a statement about the need to have clear*
and determined ideas.
The most important occasion on which Locke uses ’’experience” 
for something other than the course of mental occurrences is in his 
solution of the problem proposed by his friend, William Molyneux.
The question is whether a man born blind, who can distinguish a 
sphere from a cube by touch, could distinguish them by sight on 
being made to see. Locke’s answer is that this vould require ex­
perience. The relation between feeling with one’s hands and vision 
was used by Descartes in the ’’Dioptrics” to reject intensional species 
and support innatism. A blind man’s judgement of distance and 
position by means of two canes is presented in analogy with our 
judgement by vision. The blind man is assumed to have such facility 
with the canes that he as a matter of course judges the distance and 
position of objects which come in contact with them. As nothing 
other than the shock is transmitted by the canes, vision in a 
similar manner does not require images communicated from the objects 
seen. Depending on how ’’judgement” is used, two things (other 
than Descartes'conclusion) could be gathered from the blind man’s 
facility to judge the formal features in his environment. If
“'judgement" is taken for a verbal report or a shadow thereof, then
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this case shows that words relating to formal features have an in­
dependence from our "biological condition not shared "by words for 
material features. If ’’judgement” is taken for a natural reaction 
appropriate to the configuration of things in one’s environment, then 
this case shows that practical cognition, as the cogniser and his 
environment are described in terms of formal features alone, does 
not require occurrences physically in the mind as images of things 
in the cogniser’s environment; it suffices that the cogniser has
certain facilities from the successes and failures he has had in
getting bout. Descartes thinks of the case as characterised by 
making judgements as verbal reports, but applies it to natural 
reactions appropriate to the configuration of things, taking the 
cognition to be the performance of a judgement or a number of 
judgements. A description of the cognition is given in terms of 
formal features and this cognition is held to be rational practical 
cognition performed in accordance with the natural geometry. Sim­
ilarly, Leibniz, in discussing the Molyneux problem in the Nouveaux 
Essais, states that the blind man on being made to see could im­
mediately distinguish by sight the sphere from the cube by a sort 
of common sense or natural geometry. But if the situation is to be 
described in terms of formal features alone, we should rather begin 
with the facilities the person has which are similar to those an 
animal exercises in getting from place to place and then move to 
practical cognition involving conventional rules to which the cog­
niser is subject. Locke, however, does not give the whole answer, 
for as Molyneux sets up the problem, it involves an application of 
rational knowledge since ’’sphere” and ’’cube” are terms for formal
features. Thus there is something more than experience involved
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Again, the blind, man does not necessarily see when the defect in 
his visual faculties is corrected. Rather, he sees when he can 
discern things by virtue of having sound visual faculties; whether 
he can apply the concepts of sphere and square could be a test to o 
determine whether he sees. Still, experience in the sense of trial 
and error is required for one to be able to discern things.
The solution to the Molyneux problem is an exception to Locke’s 
normal use of ’’experience'’, 'which is for the course of occurrences in 
the mind. He states that the account of knowledge he gives after 
the first book constitutes an argument against innatism since he 
shows'how all knowledge is derived from sensation and reflection.
The programme is completed with the discussion of maxims, which are 
replaced by the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, 
which ultimately derive from simple ideas got from experience. Locke 
must maintain some form of terminalism, for ideas are got successively 
from experience and it is the same idea which is received in experience 
as is later exercised when there are further ideas in the mind. Simple 
ideas are usually not held to be defined by their relations to one 
another or to propositions, for it is as if the materials of know­
ledge are painted on a tabula rasa or, as Locke writes, a dark room 
with few entries for ideas. Locke’s historical plain method describes 
the illustration or formulation of rules by means of ideas whose 
roles are ultimately determined by what causes them, for (according 
to Locke) we have a rule only once we have perceived the connection 
of ideas which have been sufficiently refined from the materials 
received from experience.
A causal account such as Locke’s was the major alternative to 
an account in terms of innate ideas and related accounts (such as the
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vision in God.). Part of the appeal of innatism was that it avoids 
accounting for the roles of occurrences in the mind, hy their causes 
and. appeals to rules to account for our practical knowledge not 
directly dependent on our history in our environment. Innatism 
(which was rarely a thesis on development) accounts for knowing what 
we have never attended to and the fact that there are certain standards 
independent of our histories. Again, as it does not depend on the 
acquisition of discrete materials of knowledge, innatism avoids Locke’s
terminalism.
Part of the appeal of Cartesian innatism was the fact that it 
held that the science we follow is displayed in our own thought and 
no explanation (only a justification) is sought for our rational 
knowledge. By having the mind a perspicuous substance, Descartes 
was able to avoid the evil demon in the sense of something veiled 
in us causing the appearance that we follow a set of rules and con­
cepts, while we do not in fact follow them. The perspicuity of res 
cogitans also minimises the part of occurrences we have by virtue of 
the union of the mind with the body, rules out vicarious represent­
atives distinct from the thing which thinks and is allied with the 
perspicuity of extended substance.
Locke does not give an account of Descartes’ perspicuous res 
cogitans. The historical plain method is descriptive. There is a
problem with what is in the mind because the mind is held to be a 
thing, but is initially a tabula rasa and is indifferent to matter 
except for the reception of ideas. Again, ”in the mind” allows of 
a dispositional sense; but then, it appears, we could initially have 
ideas in the sense of dispositions. This is Leibniz’s point when
he states that Locke does not refute Platonic reminiscence. A
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refutation of this is consistent with Leibniz’s position because 
he maintains that apperception results from a concourse of petites 
perceptions which instantiate the same innate science and. differ by 
only mope or less from what is perceived.. Platonic reminiscence, 
he holds, accomplishes nothing because we are faced, with the same 
problem of initial acquisition in the previous life, or the one 
previous to that, etc. Locke’s reliance on initial consciousness 
does not expose the part of rules and concepts in the inception of 
knowledge. Locke in fact mitigates his position on the tabula rasa 
by admitting at the end of the first book that we have innate faculties
But restricting his account to occurrences in the mind which we have 
been conscious of precludes these from entering into the account of
how we know.
The major departure Locke makes from previous causal or genetic 
accounts is his introduction of reflection. Leibniz conjectured that 
Locke’s ideas of reflection are innate ideas under another name.
But sensatiou for Locke is a separate source of materials of know­
ledge, complementing reflection. Locke uses "reflection” in a novel 
sense, although his use bears some relation to the Scholastic use 
of the term for considering the principles - faculties and species - 
of our knowledge. Locke holds that we reflect on the operations of 
the mind, generally perception - thought - and willing, but including 
any occurrence in the mind. Reflection for BOcke, is not our attending 
to concepts independent of their application as it is for the 
Cartesians. Spiritual substance is a veiled substratumj conscious
operations are the source of ideas of reflection and even then
attention is required. Nevertheless, ideas are a source of knowledge
about operations other than those of our own mind. Locke maintains
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that reflection is the source of the knowledge we have of other minds, 
including angels and (removing all limitation) God# Furthermore, 
some ideas of reflection are materials of our knowledge of what does 
not think. The idea of active power is said to he got from reflection, 
as is to a large extent that of cause. And ideas of infinite number^ 
extent and time are held to he got by reflecting on the power we have 
of indefinitely continuing a series of ideas.
’ If reflection for Locke was similar to Cartesian reflection, 
which is largely intransitive self-teaching, then there would he no 
problem about knowledge of things distinct from our mind gained from 
reflection. But ideas,for Locke, are not concepts, but occurrences 
or dispositions physically in the mind. Ideas of reflection in 
particular are got by attending to occurrences in the mind, which are 
particular things. How, then, can these ideas be applied to what is 
distinct from our own mind? It might be replied that ideas as signs 
can constitute the vocabulary by which we frame our knowledge about 
things distinct from these signs. But this severs the causal thread 
by which our knowledge is tied to the owrld. The origin of the ideas 
of infinite quantities also poses problems. Attending to the power 
we have of indefinitely continuing a series of ideas is attending to 
a series whose members are physically in the mind. But this does 
not give us the rule for generating such a series any more than 
attending to a series of things in re.
According to Locke, reflection furnishes knowledge of the 
operations of the mind. But it does not furnish us with knowledge 
of the soul or spiritual substance, for it remains at the level of 
what we are conscious of. Our ignorance of that whose activity is 
thought is paralleled in Locke by our ignorance of material substance
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as the substratum of the qualities corresponding to ideas of sensation. 
The substratum view of substance, however, although consistently 
maintained for spiritual substance, is not the only position on 
substnace presented in the Essay. Locke uses ’’substance" in three 
senses, one of which is for substrata. Secondly, when he speaks of 
ideas of substances, he means complex ideas under which we classify 
natural things. There is no question here of the idea being of 
something behind the qualities, which is ruled out by what he writes 
about real essences. Ideas of substances are made by us, according 
to Locke, althought they must have an archetype in things, i.e. 
the simple ideas must occur together. "Sortal", a term introduced 
by Locke, is used as a synonym for "substance" by him. However,
"Sortal" is used for both what we have called sortals and for bulks
(e.g. gold). (He states that "sortal" is related to the English
"sort" as "general" is related to the Latin "genus".) Substances,
in so far as we have ideas of them are universals made by the mind.
Locke sometimes gives examples of individuals (e.g. a cherry), but 
speaks
in that he, of our ideas of them- they can be considered more specific
universals.
Locke uses w sub stance"' in a third way when he considers identity. 
Only three sorts of substance are admitted: God, finite spirits and 
particles of matter or atoms. God is briefly discussed and the 
identity of spirits, each having its determinate time and place of 
beginning, is assumed and plays no further part since the identity 
of persons (who are not substances) rests on consciousness. Part­
icles have a theoretical role, for the identity of masses or bodies 
is held to consist in the identity of the particles comprising them.
Furthermore, living things, although their identity is held to consist
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in the same organisation of parts, are composed, of particles, albeit 
in flux# Positing particles as determining the identity of bodies 
and as constituents of living things allows Locke to by-pass the 
question of a basic sortal, while maintaining that the individuation 
of things has a foundation beyond our knowledge. The individuation 
of things was a problem for the Cartesians because the basic sortal is 
a unit for them. What Locke writes of atoms as substances is beyond 
his account of knowledge and serves only an ad hoc role for identity, 
for the only ideas which are concerned are those of primary qualities. 
But when Locke discusses modes of simple ideas, he joins the Cartesians
with units as basic sortals.
The sense of ’’substance” which is distinctive to Locke’s
account in opposition to that of the Cartesians is that of substance 
as a substratum, which accounts neither for identity nor for the
classification of natural bulks and sortals. This is the central 
issue of Locke’s general defence of his account of knowledge against 
Stillingfleet. He admits we have a confused comparative idea of 
substance as what supports accidents, which was Suarez’s position 
(using ’’notio” instead of "idea”) on both our knowledge of substance and 
and our knowledge of matter. With a notion of substance different 
from that of the Cartesians, there arises the problem of the applic­
ability of our science to things. Indeed, Locke holds that empirical 
inquiry is largely not the application of science, but is concerned 
with ideas of substances (as universals). Substance as substratum 
is left veiled by our ideas with the exception of ideas of primary 
qualities, most of which are formal features. Mathematics has a 
special position in Locke’s view of our knowledge of things because 
it allows us to say how things must be. Yet ideas of substances as
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Locke discusses them have little to (to with mathematics. That strain
of Locke’s thought which emphasises the narrow compass of human 
understanding dominates at the expense of Locke the mechanist when 
he is concerned with the knowledge of natural sortals and hulks with 
which we must he satisfied, as is consonant with his medical empiri­
cism. Locke here is not concerned with the structure of things, hut
with their classification. Ideas of substances are held to need an
archetype in the sense that the collection of simple ideas comprised 
in them is due to the understanding only in so far as some may be 
left out and others included. Thus they involve a restriction due 
to things. Yet one cannot get beyond these ideas - nominal essences -
to what causes the coherence of their constituent ideas - real
essences. Locke usually characterises real essences not as mechanical 
systems, hut as Scholastic substantial forms. He sometimes writes 
about them as what is held to account for the similarity of things in 
natural generation, but he is unwilling to analyse generation mech­
anically with the Cartesians.
Still, Locke holds that we can say what qualities all things 
must have and that nothing more than these qualities need be assumed 
for the variety of natural things. Mathematics allows us to say how 
things must be. Mathematical propositions are held to be capable 
of certitude or, in Locke’s language, mathematics is a science 
because it is concerned with modes and ideas of modes (given • simple 
ideas) are of our own making. Not having archetypes in things, 
mathematical ideas are of substances as universals only as they happen 
to be included in ideas of substances, and so mathematics does not, 
let us say what qualities the nominal essences causing their con­
stituent must have. Locke sometimes speaks of nominal essences
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, - if they are mathematical concepts instantiated, in things, for he |
states that if we knew the real essences of things, we would, know 
that from which all their qualities flow. But he never identifies 4
real essences with mathematical concepts and. generally is not con­
cerned. whether the ideas which go together in nominal essences ult­
imately have a mechanical or some other cause of their union. Ideas 
of substances are concerned with classification and the mystery is 
why a collection of ideas of secondary qualities should go together.
.Sj
Mathematics is concerned with modes and neither helps in class­
ification nor explains the co-occurrence of ideas of secondary '3'6
. qualities. Thus it would take something more than mathematical
knowledge to have essential knowledge of real essences. Likewise, "1
substance as an unknowable substratum is not eliminated by the fact
■:
that mathematical knowledge allows us to say how things must be, for
mathematical ideas are of modes and do not explain what supports ■'?
collections of accidents. Locke opposes the utility of both real
essences and substance as a substratum in an account of knowledge.
• ?
But both notions have a part in his account because this account 
is largely concerned with ideas which are signs of their causes, 
but do not reveal them. Locke’s account is not of our application 
of science to things, but of the formation of our knowledge from 5
materials got from experience, which furnish restrictions on it.
One group of simple ideas - ideas of primary qualities - 
allow us to say what the real natures of things must be. But, 
again, these ideas do not allow us to explain why a collection of 
ideas of secondary qualities should go together and their part in 
classification is subsidiary to that of ideas of secondary qualities. 
Primary qualities are those qualities, such as size, figure, motion
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and. bulk or solidity, which any portion of matter must have. Ideas 
of primary qualities are said to be like these qualities. Secondary 
qualities are powers - mechanical configurations — producing ideas 
of secondary qualities. When Locke presents the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities in Book II, Chapter VIII, of 
the Essay he uses the term ’’idea of secondary quality” as most 
seventeenth century philosophers used "sensible quality”, which 
has led to great confusion. Secondary qualities themselves are 
in things. Later, in the third and fourth books, where he is con­
cerned with ideas of secondary qualities as they are comprised in 
ideas of substances, he calls such dispositions as malleability and 
solubility secondary qualities. The reason for this discrepancy is 
that Locke has different purposes in the two contexts. When he 
draws the distinction, as when he assumes atoms or particles as 
basic sortals, he wishes to determine what qualities alone need be 
attributed to things. Primary qualities for the most part are
formal features and in his account of the universal qualities of 
body, he sides with the Cartesians (with the exception of bulk 
or solidity). The application of the notion of idea of secondary 
quality in the third and fourth books emphasises our lack of 
knowledge of the cause of their co-occurrences and the need to
form determinate collections of these ideas as ideas of substances.
Here he .is not concerned with ultimate qualities of matter, however 
portions of it may be classified by us; rather, he is concerned 
with the classification, which is by means of what is apparent to 
the senses. Both material features and dispositions are signs of 
the internal constitution of things and are signs by which we 
classify things.
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Locke’s distinction between primary and. secondary qualities is
not to be found in Cartesianism or Scholasticism. The Scholastic
term "sensible quality", used for proper sensibles, was accepted 
into Cartesianism for the same qualities, but with an account which 
denied their intensional identity with accidents in re. The Scholastic 
common sensibles correspond largely to Cartesian modes of extension
or what we have called formal features. In the first book of the
Essay, ideas of secondary qualities are material features, but
primary qualities include bulk or solidity, but not time. Locke 
includes solidity because it, as well as extension (he holds in 
opposition to the Cartesians), is the essence of body and the dist­
inction as drawn here is concerned with the nature of things, more so 
than the Scholastic and even Cartesian distinctions. His distinction 
rests on the fact that any portion of matter, including particles, 
must have bulk or solidity and a determinate under the determinables 
which are the other primary qualities. Ideas of secondary qualities 
are determinables as well, but there are (it is held) systems so 
small that they lack the required complexity to cause colours sounds, 
etc., and so cannot be attributed with secondary qualities.
Ideas of primary qualities are said to be like what causes 
them. This is not a thesis about incorrigibility, for primary 
qualities are usually taken as determinables. Nor is it a thesis 
about the regularity and coherence of our reports about formal as 
opposed to material features, for he speculates that all people 
have the same ideas of secondary qualities and their regularity 
is essential for what is said of ideas of substances. Rather, as 
the cause of all simple ideas are various mechanical systems whose 
only qualities are primary qualities, knowledge based on ideas of
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primary qualities, unlike that based, on ideas of secondary qualities, 
is knowledge about the causes of the ideas themselves.
Within Locke’s programme to exhibit how all our knowledge 
derives from simple ideas of sensation and reflection, ideas of 
primary qualities, like ideas of secondary qualities, are signs.
Ideas of primary qualities are distinguished from those of secondary 
qualities only by their external relations: they are ideas of 
qualities whose determinables are common to all bodies or they are 
the ideas of these determinables themselves and we can know necessary
connections between them. Locke’s distinction between ideas of
primary and secondary qualities differs from both the Scholastic 
distinction between common and proper sensibles and the Cartesian 
distinction between modes of extension and sensible qualities in 
that ideas of both primary and secondary qualities are said to be 
caused. All simple ideas, as the end of the causal relation on 
the side of the cogniser, are signs. As the simple signs from 
which the understanding forms complex signs and eventually our 
whole body of knowledge, all simple ideas are distinct, real, 
adequate and true, as Locke maintains in the closing chapters of
the second book.
Locke did not follow Descartes in his criticism of the
Scholastic theory of signs, according to which a verbal token 
(’’vox”) is the sign of a concept as an occurrence in the mind 
(conceptus mentis) 9 which is the sign of a thing or feature in re. 
Locke maintained that two perceptions are involved in our linguistic 
cognition, a view questioned by Leibniz, who maintained there is 
only one. We first perceive the word (as a verbal token), Locke 
states, and then the idea (as an occurrence in the mind) which it 
signifies. Words as types on Locke’s account are associated with
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ideas as dispositions. Occurrences in the mind were not only signs 
of things in re according to the Scholastics, hut were also images 
of them; yet the images need not share any qualities with that of 
which they are qualities and ideas of primary qualities are like that 
of which they are images only by virtue of their external relations. 
The only further agreement between the image and that which it is of 
added in complex ideas is an agreement in structure. Still, this 
theory of meaning has the role of verbal tokens depend on the role 
of occurrences in the mind caused by things in re. Furthermore, it 
has the unhappy consequence that when we hear, e.g., "green”, it is 
as if we see, e.g., grass in summer.
As signs, both ideas of primary qualities and those of secondary 
qualities are the significations of words which cannot be defined. 
Locke has no equivalent of objective realities, which are the 
meanings of words and specify the roles of verbal tokens and shadows 
of them. Rather, for him, occurrences in the mind which have 
established dispositions determine the roles in which verbal tokens 
can occur. The roles of these occurrences are determined by that 
which causes them, which is that of which they are signs. In his 
criticism of Malebranche, Locke rejects Malebranche*s distinction 
between idea and sentiment; only occurrences in the mind and dis­
positions for them are of interest to Locke. He rejects the 
foundation for this distinction, i.e. that ideas can be expressed 
by definitions and are what demonstration is about. Locke maintains 
instead that we can define, e.g. "square" since the idea (as an 
occurrence in the mind)of a square so frequently presents itself 
to us because of the frequency with which figured things strike
the senses
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Locke not only lacks a notion corresponding to that of objective 
reality, but also characterises the clarity and. distinctness of ideas 
in a non-Gartesian fashion, as he insists to Stillingfleet. Clear 
and distinct ideas are associated with objective realities for the 
Cartesians,- and so with the meanings of words. They are also con­
nected with words for Locke, but words are taken as types of marks 
or sounds to which ideas as occurrences are bound. The remedy for 
confusion suggested by Locke is the association and parts of ideas 
with words. In the fourth edition of the Essay, he substitutes
"determined" or "determinate" for a number of occurrences of
"distinct", explaining a determined idea by its association with a
word.
Given simple ideas as materials, Locke's programme progresses 
with the formation of other ideas from this basic vocabulary with 
the aid of words as types of marks or sounds. Locke distinguishes 
three sorts of complex ideas: those of modes, of relations and of 
substances. Given the materials furnished by experience, the for­
mation of ideas of modes is restricted only by the condition that 
the combination of ideas be consistent. The materials already occur 
in the roles by which they are fit to enter into various combinations. 
Words are of greatest importance in the formation of these ideas.
Ideas of relations are a special case and are particularly 
significant for Locke’s empiricism. Relations are of greatest 
theoretical interest to Locke for the science of njarality, which 
he was urged a number of times to develop, but never did. Morality 
(as concerned with natural law) was also his early interest which 
led him to articulate his position against innatism. Ideas of 
relations, however, are of more general interest, for according to
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his terminalism, which follows from his empiricism, we receive dis­
crete signs of the qualities of things. Neither simple ideas nor 
ideas of modes and substances considered as single ideas include 
ideas of relations according to Locke. Yet these ideas somehow 
found relations and have what Locke calls respects. Thus the only 
operations of the intellect needed to form ideas of relations are 
the bringing together of two or more ideas and the attention given 
them. There need not be ideas of relations as dispositions,
for the ideas related suffice.
On Locke*s position, ideas, even those received in sensation, 
are in roles determining all their possible relations and the same 
relation is founded by a multitude of different ideas. But, then, 
how far would Locke depart from” his position if he maintained that 
ideas of relations are in the mind and determine the roles of occurrences?
Bigby states that all notions but that of being are respects and
Malebranche held that all ideas are relations. Generally, objective 
realities or their equivalents were largely relational concepts.
Against Malebranche, Locke asserted that the immutability of reason 
is the immutability of the relations of the same ideas, but we 
have already discussed the difficulty which Locke has in individuating 
ideas. Indeed, Locke holds that relations are often clearer than
what is related.
There is a suggestion in the chapters on modes of simple ideas 
(not ideas of simple modes) in the Essay, that the mathematical 
ideas of primary qualities are ideas of relations. Here Locke5 
in Cartesian fashion, takes units of distance and especially what 
he calls the simple idea of unity, as basic sortals and generates 
ideas of quantities from them. These ideas of units are more
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fundamentally simple than the ideas of shape, figure and number
as determinables or determinates under them which are contrasted
with ideas of secondary qualities. In these chapters, formal
features are treated as considerably different from material features. 
Ideas of distances, etc. as generated from a unit are not caused 
or received in sensation, while ideas of colours, etc. are not 
generated. Indeed, the relevance of ideas of primary qualities in 
Locke’s account of knowledge is*due largely to the fact that, with 
the exception of solidity, primary qualities are formal features, 
for the connections between ideas of primary qualities, unlike those 
between ideas of secondary qualities, are necessary. The causal 
thread is lost in the chapters on modes of simple ideas, yet Locke’s 
strongest arguments for the special status of ideas of primary 
qualities does not rely on causation, for they appeal to unobservables. 
If ideas of primary qualities are really relational and relations at 
any rate are often clearer than what is related, then the confusion 
in our cognition of material things and the veil of the real natures 
of things are due to the causal relations between ideas of secondary 
qualities and mechanical configurations in re. Still, Locke could 
not maintain this position and retain his empiricism, for ideas of 
relations are due to the mind and causal relations are held to
guarantee that ideas are of the features of things.
Locke’s empiricism appears most strongly in his account of the
formation of ideas of substance, which is the major topic of the 
discussion of words in the third book of the Essay. Furthermore, 
our knowledge of substance was the major concern of the first two
drafts of the Essay. Locke relates the formation of ideas of sub­
stances to two sorts of abstraction, although the second sort
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concerns simple ideas as well. One form of abstraction, if it can 
be called that, is the formation of nominal essences from simple 
ideas. This is similar to the formation of ideas of mixed modes
except that the constituent ideas must be observed to go together 
and are largely ideas of secondary qualities and signs of powers 
in things. Locke contrasts the immutability of the nominal essence 
with the changes which particular substances undergo, and states that
nominal essences are established in the mind with names annexed
to them. Apparently, the immutability of nominal essences is due 
to the immutability of the same word since LOoke suggests that the 
constituent ideas be put together under a name for our own re­
collection. Also, the ideas constituting nominal essences are to 
be given names to declare the significations of our names of sub­
stances to others. In maintaining this, Locke supposes that the use 
of a word is determined by the role of an idea caused by something 
in re. Conventions are replaced by roles established in experience, 
which must be assumed similar in different persons. The only way 
we have to check the rectitude of clustering certain simple ideas 
together under a name is by the roles the simple ideas fulfil. But 
these roles themselves cannot be checked since they a?e given. The 
formation of nominal essences is like the formation of complex terms 
from simple terms, as is reflected by Locke’s discussion of the 
definition of hames of substances. As ideas are in the mind, we 
have them only when we are or could be conscious of them. However, 
it is not clear how we are first conscious of simple ideas, which 
evidently are always received in clusters. Likewise, it is not 
clear how simple ideas and their roles are given.
Locke accepts a second sort of abstraction, which is properly
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abstraction, as it is an elevating operation. Words are not 
appealed, to, for the generality of words is explained by the fact 
that they are signs of general ideas. Ideas are made general (Locke 
states) by separating from them ideas (such as the circumstances 
of times and places) by which they are made to be of one individual. 
Other individuals are then represented by the abstract idea as 
they conform to it. This is similar to Suarez’s account of the cog­
nition of a universal by the cognition of a material singular except 
no spiritual object is involved. Locke stays on the level of 
forming a mental vocabulary.
Abstraction in this sense avoids the problem of how we are 
conscious of simple ideas, for it does not begin with simple ideas, 
but particular ideas. There are two very different movements in 
the Essay, which are never clearly distinguished. One is the move­
ment from simple ideas to complex ideas, which dominates Locke’s 
attempts in the second book to show how our knowledge can be
accounted for without innate ideas. The other movement is from
particular ideas or propositions to general ideas or propositions. 
Abstraction in this second way is a movement from particular to 
general. Simple ideas are abstract or general for Locke, and thus 
capable of being components of complex signs. The second sort of 
abstraction could (as it does for Suarez) cover the case in which 
an occurrence of a material feature (or any simple idea) becomes 
treated as a token of a type which then enters the vocabulary of 
signs. More likely, this sort of abstraction is a separation of one 
or more simple ideas from a cluster in which they are given. Locke 
holds that abstraction requires some pains, illustrating this with
the difficulty of forming the idea of a triangle in general, which is
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no particular sort of triangle. This is generally taken as a
difficulty with abstraction. Yet triangularity in general is no 
worse than shape in general or the simple idea of unity. Simple ideas, 
especially those of primary qualities, and related ideas are open 
to the same problems as abstraction if they are held to be got from
sensation.
Locke, from the time his philosophical thought first became 
original, held that sense (later adding reflection) and reasoning 
suffice to explain our knowledge, and so there is no need to rely on 
innate principles. Yet the materials got from sensation, as Locke 
describes them, not only already found relations which we later attend 
to, but also already instantiate the reason we later formulate. The 
fourth book of the Essay, is dovoted to knowledge. Locke uses 
’’knowledge” in a restricted sense for what we are certain of. It
has much the same sense as ’’science” has for the Scholastics and
Cartesians - except it refers to cognition. When he wishes to
refer to certain knowledge, he speaks of habitual, as opposed to 
actual knowledge. "Knowledge” also covers the present perception 
of things and the co-occurrence of qualities in particular sub­
stances, as we have certitude about these.
The sort of knowledge which is of interest is that which is 
the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, also
called "truth” and "certitude”. Locke dismisses what he calls
trifling propositions, in which an idea or a part of an idea is 
affirmed of itself. Both Leibniz and Sergeant supported identical 
propositions against Locke’s rejection of trifling propositions.
But Locke in fact accepts intensional identities; because of the 
part he gives to initial consciousness, what he rejects are only
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shadows of subject-predicate sentences in which either the subject 
terra is the same as the predicate terra or the predicate merely 
repeats one or more of the terms in the subject.
The foundation of science and reason for Locke is the per­
ception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas or intuition in 
cases in which this does not concern the identity or diversity of 
ideas. Locke’s notion of intuition is different from Descarte^ 
notion of clear and distinct perception or intuition, for what is 
intuited is always the relation of ideas and never ideas themselves. 
Ideas for Locke are received discreetly without judgement. This 
terminalism, which is an essential part of his empiricism, is a 
dominant theme of the fourth book, for his account of intuition 
eliminates the rules to which we are subject, but have not attended 
to. Locke is particularly concerned to reject the part in our know­
ledge assigned to syllogistic reasoning and maxims or praecognita, 
which he regards as innate principles. He has in mind the pedantic, 
methods and systems of rules which went under the name of logic in 
the seventeenth century and were inculcated in youth in their 
early ’teens. But what Locke rejects goes beyond these. He rejects 
maxims because he holds that knowledge, in this case, propositional 
knowledge, begins with what is particular. He rejects syllogistic 
reasoning because he holds that it requires justification by 
intuition. Inference, in Locke’s view,, is a chain of intuitions, 
the steps being between ideas, not propositions. On Locke’s 
position, we have no rules until we have intuited the connection of
the terms. This intuition is another case of initial consciousness
and is a shadow of the verbal formulation of propositions.
Locke’s rejection of maxims met with considerable opposition.
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Leibniz and. Sergeant insisted, that assertions which are less general 
are justified, by more general propositions, which are more evident 
in that they make explicit what is assumed in their applications. 
Indeed, we are subject to rules before we can formulate them, for 
formulation itself is a rule-governed activity. Because of Locke’s 
reliance on initial consciousness, we cannot be allowed, on his 
position, to know the majority of rules we in fact follow. Finally, 
his terminalism is untenable, for, as Leibniz points out, inference 
as a chain of ideas is at best an ideal since we must rely on such 
propositions as Euclid’s axioms.
A science for Locke is a body of knowledge comprising only - 
general propostions known with certitude. He admits a science.of 
mathematics and a science of morality, but he holds that natural 
philosophy, which is concerned with ideas of substances, will never 
be a science. He holds this because ideas of substances are largely 
composed of ideas of secondary qualities. While we can perceive 
the connection of ideas of primary qualities and we know that two 
ideas of secondary qualities under the same determinable cannot be 
of the same subject, we cannot perceive any other relation between 
ideas of secondary qualities by virtue of which they must or can­
not be of the same subject. If we knew the connection between 
ideas of secondary qualities and the primary qualities of the systems 
which cause them, he adds, we could know these relations. But we 
cannot know the real constitutions of things, whether or not they 
are describable in terms of primary qualities. Our science - mathe­
matics, in particular - is inapplicable to the real natures of 
things not because we cannot say what determinables must apply to
any particle of matter, but because our knowledge of natural kinds
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largely depends on ideas of secondary qualities. Yet there is no 
guarantee that mathematics and, in general, the rules and concepts we 
follow, are instantiated or founded in things. Indeed, Locke treats 
the corpuscular picture of the world as an hypothesis.
Leibniz objects to Locke’s position that natural philosophy 
or physics will never be a science, for he is in agreement with the 
Cartesians on the application of our science to things. Physics 
was a science for the Cartesians because they held that it is 
applied mathematics. It is only in the application that empirical 
propositions are introduced. A. fundamental part of the Cartesian
programme is the establishment of extensional identities between 
material features and concepts involving only formal features.
This is to free the investigator from the prejudices of the senses. 
Locke, on the other hand, does not mention prejudices of the senses; 
his only equivalent is the abuse of words. For Locke, it is not a 
question of the application of science, but of its formulation.
In keeping with his medical empiricism, he considers as important 
the organisation and direction of our observations by properly 
constituted ideas of substances, which involve signs and their co­
occurrences.
Locke’s account includes no equivalent of conversio ad phan- 
tasmata, and omits analysis and synthesis. There is a great deal in 
Locke about separating and combining ideas. But this is not within 
the context of a particular problem, situation or state of affairs. 
Rather, it is the formation of dispositions which again can be 
exercised in conscious acts. Locke writes very sensible things 
about judgement and degree of assent, but not as they concern 
probable assertions within a context of explanation and prediction.
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Locke also lacks an equivalent of the hypothetico-deductive method.
These differences between Locke and our other philosophers stem
from the fact that Locke’s concern is the formulation of our know­
ledge, given its materials and their roles. They are allied to 
Locke’s lack of a notion equivalent, to that of objective reality 
and to his distinction between ideas of primary qualities and those 
of secondary qualities by the external relations alone of the latter. 
The thread which ties our knowledge to the world is causality, which 
relates systems in re with occurrences in the mind. These occur­
rences are signs of features in re and establish dispositions for 
the re-occurrence of the same sign, making part of our basic 
vocabulary for the formation of our knowledge and science. The signs 
and the dispositions for them are physically in the mind and ul­
timately owe their roles to the causes of the initial occurrences. 
Taking into account only what is physically in -the mind or what is 
parasitic on it (e.g. the use of words). Locke has no check on 
the roles of the initial occurrences, the identity of signs or the 
rectitude of the formation of complex signs. Furthermore, Locke 
distinguishes imagination from sensing (as a success) by the pro­
perties of what is physically in the mind, by its vividness or 
occurrence with pain in particular. But if one’s science is made 
by oneself, it cannot perform its regulative function and the cause, 
which ties knowledge to the world for Locke, cannot be checked.
The common source of these difficulties is the fact that ideas
are caused in roles for Locke, but we cannot say more about their 
causes than that they are productive of ideas in such roles because 
our knowledge is restricted by the few and narrow inlets of sensation
and reflection. Locke’s cause,! account relies on the fact that things
456
in re instantiate an objective structure in their causal relations 
with us and. to this extent are like artifacts. Furthermore, he 
must assume that they have the same causal relations with those 
with whom we communicate. Indeed., the artifacts perhaps could, be
only diagrams or the utterances of some being
iFootnotes
Chapter I
1.
2.
3.
4*
5.
This paragraph and the next are taken from Vendler,
Res Cogitans; An Essay in Rational Psychology, Ithaca, 1972, 
Chap. 5, sect. 4 (pp 94-97 )>
ibid. , sect. 6 (pp 99~105)«
ibid.
6.
Chess, as well as played on -a board, oan be played by post or (if one 
has an outstanding memory) verbally; fractions can be added and Latin 
verbs conjugated verbally or’on paper. (This is not to say that one 
can perform these activities without some movement or other of the 
body.)
Imagine a child who was taught only to play chess. 
ibid. Vendler*s analysis of knowledge of the meaning of a word 
fibid., Chap. VI, sect, 6 (pp 130-132)) in fact agrees with what we 
say of essential knowledge, of which it is a special case. He states 
that "our knowledge of what a word means is a function of, and is to 
be explained in terms of, certain incomplete propositions.“ To know 
what '’bottle” means presupposes knowledge of what a bottle is, and 
likewise for parts of speech other than nouns. What is known in 
knowing words of different grammatical categories is exhibited as
follows;
Nouns; what (kind of thing) is a bottle
what it is (for something) to be a bottle
Verbs; what it is (for somebody or something) to sit down
what is is (for somebody or something) to push (something)
Adverbs: what it is (for somebody or something) (to do something) 
deliberately.
These (he continues) are nominalised sentences in which all slots but
IX,
the one occupied, by the word, in question are filled, by dummy words.
Thus the essential prerequisite of knowing the meaning of a word is
given by stipulating a minimum environment (’’kernel” frame). These
frames, for all but nouns, are:
N sits down.
N pushes N.
N is fat.
NV (n) deliberately.
Nouns have many possible positions in kernel frames:
N V,
N V N. •
N is N»
N is A*
That nouns are peculiar in having no definite kernel-type might 
(Vendler suggests) account for the feeling of ’’saturation” with 
respect to substantive concepts. A concept is taken (ibid., sect.7 
(pp, 132-134)) to be an open proposition; as the linguistic expression 
of a proposition is a sentence, the linguistic expression of a con­
cept is an open sentence. As the sentences fill up, the concepts 
become more and more complex. Contents are said (ibid., sect. 8 
(pp 134-135))to show concepts. Thus dictionary definitions either 
summarise syntactical constraints and co-occurrence restrictions by 
means of such syntactic and semantic markers as ’’transitive verb”; 
"animate” and "human” or display them in typical contexts; further 
distinguishing marks and presuppositions are needed to round out the
definition.
Essential knowledge or knowledge of a concept, however, is not 
just knowing an open proposition, for concepts apply to things and are 
related to practical as well as propositional knowledge. We shall have
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more to say about concepts and. words shortly.
Vendler maintains that prepositions, articles, quantifiers,
pronouns, auxiliaries, connectives, etc. do not connote any specific 
kernel frame, nor do they suggest specific co-occurrence restrictions5 
thus we do not speak of knowing the concepts of these. Such words, 
he adds, are only grammatical constants or limguistic dummies, so 
their "concepts” amount to mere empty frames. However, speech is a 
rational activity which in part is described by how purely gram­
matical words are used. E.^. we pick out a speaker’s performance of 
conjunction in particular by. picking out his use of "and”; in this 
way we can be said to have a concept of conjunction, i.e. of the use 
of ”and”. We shall associate concepts associated .with purely gram­
matical terms, arithmetical and geometrical terms together as non— 
descriptive concepts. Geometrical concepts correspond usually to 
nouns, arithmetical concepts to adjectives; so both would be admitted 
as concepts by Vendler.
7. Knowing something about the person in question or the sort of person 
in question generally suffices.
IV
Chapter II
1. Actually ”a formation of a law” or "a purported, law" is more fun­
damental for our purposes*
2. It is particularly these descriptive concepts which we eliminated 
in the endeavour to describe everything with maximum simplicity and 
exactness. We shall initially refer to these concepts as "material 
features". Lg-ter, we shall reserve this term for processes des­
cribed in the mechanical description of sensation. Later still,
we shall also use the term for the immanent act by which spatio­
temporal portions are picked out.
3. We assume that there are no words for parts and that "this" must serve 
the function of distinguishing parts.
4. Even if one could not pick out a circular thing and a square thing 
one could still be said to be able to tell a square from a circle 
if one has the concepts of these two, for one would then know, e.g. 
that a square has four corners, while a circle has not.
5* This is not to say that the rules governing the use of these terms 
are not among those rules which govern the uses of various sortal 
terms. They can be used with property terms to form pseudo-sortal 
terms (e.g* "the square one" or "a red thing") where the sortal in 
question is understood or where only a partial description can be
or need be given, without specifying the sortal.
6. This programme does not try to put one into a picture to feel things 
as they are, which wuld be contrary to its purpose. (Such pictures 
may be heuristic or memory aids, however.) Rather it seeks a des­
cription in terms of formal features and their relations. The fact
-- ‘ that we cannot construct a macroscopic model whose history would be 
similar to the systems invoked in the explanation is no objection.
V. - Chapter III
1. We could, speak of occurrences in the rational soul or in the intellect
in addition to occurrences in the mind.
2» We here ignore nominalist positions which sometimes maintained that
there are no dispositions in the rational soul.
3. Leibniz uses ”mv^!” 5 other basic quantities should then differ from
their usual description by a factor of two - e.g. momentum should be 
expressed by ”2mv".
4- If one were to look for a dominant monad it could be momentary, for
if the concept.displayed is described with exactness (as is consonant 
with the endeavour with which we are now concerned), it is displayed 
only momentarily.
5. Leibnig. suggests that only two ^concepts" are simple: God, taken 
as the objective structure, and nothing, taken as restrictions in 
general on the objective structure. How these can be said to be 
simple is not evident.
6. There are of course non-philosophical reasons for postulating un­
extended substances. Also, there was a rather general view that sub­
stances are incorruptible and that only what is extended is corruptible.
vi
Chapter IV
1. This is to he compared, with the fact that under normal conditions 
a cry displays pain; one askes what the point of the insincerity
or whatever was.
2. Actually, behaviour displaying pain is usually due to the manner in 
which something comes in contact with the animal.
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Lyons, op.cit., p. 34). The second point is made in Structures as well 
(cf. ibid., p. 38). It has been seen to have structuralist origins;
D. Hymes writes (Review of Noam Chomsky (J. Lyons), in Harman, F. (ed.), 
On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays, Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Books,
1974, p. 323):
In Chomsky’s successful introduction of the goal of generating 
all and only the grammatical sentences of a language, we can see 
the completion, or carrying through to syntax, of structuralist 
principle. It was just such a criterion of relevance and goal
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40.
41.
42.
43.
that made phonology (the forte of structuralist linguistics) a 
new field, ... and it was inconsistent and incomplete for linguists 
not to establish the corresponding principle in the rest of grammar
ibid., p. 325.
’’Formal Properties ...’’, p. 42.
Other orders are possible.
Take the rules in the order: 1, 5, 3, 7, 8. This gives
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
Sq is the initial and final state. When the automaton is in this state, 
it has accepted a string and is ready to begin accepting another. The 
arc labelled ”b” is called a loop.
E.g., Miller, G.A. and Chomsky, N. , "Finitary Models of Language 
Users", in Luce, Bush and Galanter (eds.), op.cit., pp. 476-477, 480". 
Competence in general can be represented by a state diagram, since the 
rules (more naturally presented here as instructions, so involving the 
adaptations mentioned above) specify the states, permissible state 
transitions, and which symbols are accepted at each transition. These 
structural aspects are all internal to the language user on Chomsky’s
account.
Among them were Zellig Harris, under whom Chomsky worked at MIT, and 
Chomsky himself. Cf. .Lyons, op.cit., p. 43.
E.g., Cartesian Linguistics, New York and London, Harper and Row, 1966, 
pp.'5-15? where he presents, with apparent approval, the Cartesian posi­
tion that, although ’’animal behavior can be explained, on the assumption 
that an animal is an automaton, ... man has-unique abilities that can-
Xno-t be accounted for' on purely mechanistic grounds" (p.5; but cf. 
p.65). cf. ^n^ Mind, pp.5-5, where-he states that?the early
euphoria about cybernetic and automaton models has largely been 
spent. . .
. At each epoch - the minimum unit of time - there is a set of alternative 
conditions to choose from. In the case of telegraphy, the members are
1 mark and space. Letters are represented by combinations of five units,
so there are 25 possible letters. If the code employs words of only 
5 6. six letters, there will be (2 ) possible words. Notice that the number 
of combinations grows exponentially. But one’s intuition is that the 
information transmitted is proportional to time. This suggests that 
the amount of information equals a constant times the number of epochs 
times the logarithm of the number of alternatives at each epoch 
(assumed to be a characteritstic constant of the channel). In practice, 
the constant is set equal to unity and the logarithms are in base two. 
The unit is called a bit. In our example, each letter has five bits 
of information, each word thirty.
50. When the number of alternatives is not equal to two to some whole 
power, one would have to think of the decisions as independent sets
of decisions over a number of epochs; the greater the number of epochs, 
the more nearly the number of decisions approximates the information 
in the signal.
51. For example, if the signal is an AM radio wave, the alternatives could 
be taken as the set of distinguishable amplitudes between the maximum 
and minimum amplitudes of the wave.
52. The level of the word probably comes to mind first. But because of 
the difficulty in specifying what a word is, the oppositions are 
usually taken to be between functional units called morphemes (e.g. 
liked is composed of the morpheme like and the morpheme Past Tense).
xi
However, this has led to much debate about how abstract these units 
are. E.g. are there two past tense units, -ed and -n, or one abstract 
unit, Past Tense, which is realized in at least two different phonemic 
strings?
53. E.g. th both in this and think is classed as the same phoneme, since 
no words are distinguished by whether this (range of) sound is 
aspirated or unaspirated, while for Arabic these are two phonemes.
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54. Negentropy is capable of handling signals describable as continuous 
functions; but any such signals can be specified by a finite number 
of values. Furthermore, the formula for amount of information as 
negentropy differs from that for amount of information in bits 
only in that the logarithm is base e and the unit, called a natural 
unit, equals 1.443 bits. So, although the mathematics is more 
complex for negentropy, the two interpretations amount to the same 
theory; in particular, amount of information as negentropy can
.still be thought of in terms of the alternatives one has to decide
between.
To take an example, consider strings of Hs and Ts generated by 
repeatedly manipulating a coin and recording whether this results 
in heads (H) or tails(T). Two possible four-symbol strings are 
HTHT and THHT. Since the probability of a sequence is a function 
of the probability of its subsequences, the first string is more 
probable than the second. For the sequence HH is realized in only 
one of four possible outcomes of two tosses of a coin, while the 
sequences HT and TH are each realized in two. So the second 
sequence has more negentropy or amount of information; it is more 
likely in the case of the second string than in the case of the 
first that the manipulations were intentional positionings of the
coin rather than tosses.
A language generated sequentially, such as that containing strings 
of Hs and Ts, is a "regular language”. Which symbol occupies a 
given position might (unlike in this case) depend on some number 
of preceding symbols.
55. The internal information, as considered by cybernetic theory, 
cannot be utilized in transmitting information, for it is shared
by the source and the receiver. It, or something like it, has been
Xlll
called redundancy. The redundancy of natural languages is high 
(about 50 per cent in English). It has been suggested that this 
overcomes noise introduced into the channel; for example, it 
allows us to correct spelling error; cf. Weaver, W., ’’The 
Mathematics of Communication", Scientific American, July, 1949, 
reprinted in Messick, D.M. (ed.), Readings from Scientific American: 
Mathematical Thinking in Behavioral Sciences, Freeman, San Francisco 
and London, 1968, pp. 47-51. Weaver collaborated with Shannon.
56. Op. cit. This is a collection of articles; the chapters (articles) 
of interest here are the following, all originally published in
1956:
Chapter 1: "Information and Memory", pp. 11-21;
Chapter 2: "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some
Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information", 
pp. 21-50;
Chapter 3: "The Human Link in Communication Systems", pp. 51-60.
57. For example, in unidimensional absolute judgement experiments, the 
subject is asked to judge a stimulus from one dimension - e.g. 
pitch - operationally defineable by physical means. It has been 
found that the channel capacity for man for pitches is about 2.5 
bits (ibid., pp. 24-26). This means that we can quite confidently 
distinguish six pitches, but given any more and we almost certainly 
confuse some of them. Put another way, no matter how many alter­
native pitches we try to distinguish, the best we can do is assign 
them to about six different classes without error. Similar results 
are obtained for judgements of loudness, degree of salinity, etc. 
(ibid., pp. 26-32).
58. The same comments apply to methods which purportedly measure the 
strength or distinguishability of sensations to find functional
xiv
relations with the intensity of the stimulus. These include Weber’s 
and Fechner's formulation of a law based on so-called just 
noticeable differences in the middle of last century; theirs was 
the pioneering work in quantitative methods in cognitive psychology. 
These also include work on the measurement of sensations in the
1950s by S.S. Stevens, who did much to clarify the notion of 
measurement in psychology. In all cases, the experimenter relies 
on the subject’s reports or formulates his own.
59. Cf. Wiener, N. , "Cybernetics”, Scientific American, Nov. 1948; 
reprinted in Messick, op. cit., pp. 40-46. Wiener, an applied 
mathematician, can be given the credit of founding cybernetics.
In this article he relates how he was given the war-time project 
of producing an automatic tracking system for anti-aircraft 
batteries. He decided to model this on the human operator, paying 
particular attention to the role of feedback, presumably involving 
the CNS. He enlisted the aid of a physiologist, and the project 
soon became interdisciplinary. Thus cybernetics actually began 
with the CNS in view. (However, Shannon and his colleagues at 
the Bell Laboratories were working independently in the same 
direction with applications to communications systems.)
60. The experimental utility of the notion of man as a communication
channel is limited. When we move to more than one dimension which
is physically defined, the channel capacity increases, but not 
as much as would be expected, given that these dimensions are 
independent (Miller, op. cit., pp. 32-37). Yet the channel capacity 
can be increased by taking relative judgements and by arranging 
tasks sequentially. The notion of channel capacity breaks down 
completely for short-term memory, where the way the information is 
presented, and not the amount of information, determines how much
XV
can be remembered (ibid., pp. 38-43).
61. A Gestalt is a minimum or near-minimum unit of perception and 
explains our perception of contours, objects in motion, and other 
multidimensional or many-faceted structures. Gestalt theory also 
claims to explain why certain line patterns are or are not percep­
tually ambiguous in terms of certain principles of arrangement, 
such as the principle of simplicity.
62. Cf. note 54.
63. Shannon, C.E., "A Mathematical Theory of Communication”, The Bell 
System Technical Journal, July 1948, pp. 379-423.
64. These automata are also called k-limited Markov sources because 
the probabilities of state transitions depend on previous state 
transitions. They are also a species of stochastic sources, so 
called because the D different probabilities are independent.
65. A O-order approximation uses the letters equiprobably. A first- 
order approximation uses letters independently, but with the 
frequency of their occurrence in the corpus. The symbols of the 
vocabulary can be words (involving the calculation of more 
probabilities). An example of a first-order word approximation is 
(Miller and Chomsky, "Finitary Models of Language Users”, p. 428)
representing and speedily is an good or came can different 
and so on. A second-order approximation uses the characters with 
the probabilities appropriate to the context of the immediately
preceding letter (or word); and so on.
66. ibid., p. 429.
67. ibid., p. 430.
68. To indicate how large k must be, Chomsky (ibid.) considers
The people who called and wanted to rent your house when 
you go away next year are from California.
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In this sentence, there is a grammatical dependency extending from 
the second word (the plural subject "people”) to the seventeenth
word (the plural verb "are"). So the value for k must be at least
. . . 3 .fifteen. A conservative estimate for D is 10 , giving a value for
k 45 . .D of 10 . This number could be reduced by eliminating
redundancies and allowing that we learn admissible strings, not 
of words, but of syntactic categories, and that we recognise that 
not all sequences of categories are equiprobable. A conservative 
estimate is that on average there are about four alternative
categories that might follow in a given context, so D could perhaps
k 15 9be reduced to as little as four. D is then 4 = 10 .
69. This is one of the two main themes of Cartesian Linguistics (the 
other being the creative use of language); cf. p. 29. Historically, 
it is most obviously present in the work of von'Humboldt. On p. 41 
he claims to identify the use of recursive devices in the Grammaire 
generale et raisonnge.
70. E.g. ibid., p. 65 and Language and Mind, p. 78. Drawing these two 
points, and also the creative use of language, together, Chomsky 
writes (Language and Mind, p. 100) that the "core problem of human 
language" is
having mastered a language, one is able to understand an 
indefinite number of expressions that are new to one’s 
experience, that bear no simple physical resemblance and 
are in no simple way analogous to the expressions that 
constitute one’s linguistic experience; and one is able, 
with greater or less facility, to produce such expressions 
on an appropriate occasion, despite their novelty and 
independently of detectable stimulus configurations, and 
to be understood by others who share this still mysterious
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ability. The normal use of language is, in this sense, a 
creative activity.
71. Cf. note 54.
72. We can think of the "behaviour" of the automaton which accepts our 
example as follows. It enters state S, then (Def)Det, where it 
reads "The" and goes to state N, reading "people". It could then 
re-enter state NP and proceed to state VP. But there is a further 
node dominated by NP, so it proceeds to it. It is then in state 
S. If this were not dominated by a node, the machine would be in 
a final configuration and complete its scanning. But it is so 
dominated, so it scans "The people ... year" (which, of course, 
has its own structure, not represented here), leaves S, and, as
it has been in all the states corresponding to the nodes determined 
by NP, it proceeds to VP. Cf. Chomsky, "Formal Properties of 
Grammars", pp. 342-344.
73. ibid., pp. 360-362.
74. ibid., p. 363.
75. As an illustration, consider the rules
AB -> AB 
AB -> A'B
AB -> BB ’
BB -> BA
It is easily seen that these rules generate "P-markers" such as
A B
I
A
B
B A
Lexical items dominated by either of these paths would be assigned 
to two grammatical categories. Cf. ibid., pp. 363, 365-366.
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76. ibid., p. 366.
77. ibid., p. 337-338.
78. ibid., pp. 338-339.
79. ibid., pp. 346-347.
80. An example of a transducer is a compiler for a computer; this accepts 
a language which is convenient for theprogammer and transduces it into 
the computing language.
81. ibid., pp. 339-342.
82. In following down the paths of a P-marker, the label of each node is 
entered on the memory tape, which moves, say, to the right. The 
label correpsonds to the state of the automaton at the node. The 
automaton can trace up an edge only if the label of the next node 
occupies the square to the right of the one presently scanned on 
the memory tape. Cf. ibid., pp. 342, 345.
83. ibid., pp. 366-367.
84. ibid., p. 367.
85. ibid., pp. 374-376.
86. The question is the source and extent of the excess generative power 
of the context-free grammar or pushdown storage automaton (competence) 
over that of the finite automaton (performance). It is to be noticed, 
firstly, that languages generated by a non-self-embedding context- 
free grammar can be accepted (generated) by (some) finite automata. A 
transducer accepts a string in the manner of a finite automaton with 
no output; but it maps the string into a structural description (e.g. 
a bracket labelling) given by a context-free grammar. The source of 
the excess generative power of the context-free grammar is self­
embedding. The degree of this excess is due to the degree of self­
embedding. A simple, intuitive example of the degree of self-embedding 
is the number of relative clauses in a sentence, as long as each clause
XXX
is within the context of another (except the "shallowest", which is 
in the context of the sentence itself). E.g. "The man who the boy 
who the students recognized pointed out is a friend of mine" has a 
degree two of self-embedding. Cf. ibid., pp. 390, 394-395, 400; 
Miller and Chomsky, op.cit., pp. 467-468.
87. This is because the effect of amny transformations is to reduce the 
computing space required for grammatical analysis of the sentence.
88. Miller and Chomsky, op.cit., pp, 465-466.
89. ibid., pp. 476-477.
90. pp. 10-15.
91. Reich, P.A., "The Finiteness of Natural Language", Language, 1968
pp. 831-843; reprinted in Householder, F.W. (ed.), Syntactic Theory 
1 Structuralist, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972, pp. 258-272.
92. This is called relational network theory. Where the sumbols are 
accepted at the states (nodes, vertices) and "0" represents the 
initial and terminal state, concatenation can be represented by the 
state diagram
Embedding of degree one is accomplished by adjoining a circuit ("loop") 
with, e.g., two additional states in the concatenation pattern for 
subject and predicate of the embedded sentence.
Reich finds evidence for his position in intonation patterns (which 
Chomsky also uses for evidence). The intonation pattern is indicated 
beneath the following state diagram; notice that taking a loop corresponds
to the distinctive rising of the nonterminal contour (p. 268)
The
tO!
th( loop not 
taken
Intonation
pattern .
Notice that the structure of the network is a circuit; there is no 
need for the device to "remember” how "deep" it is. Cf. p. 270:
"... this model represents memory as storabel to a depth of. one, all­
over linguistic structure. Thus, rather than charaterizing memory 
as narrow and deep, this model characterizes memory as broad and 
shallow: we might call it a BREADTH HYPOTHESIS of language memory 
structure? Reich's theory has consequences which are different from 
those of Chomsky’s.
93. Reflection on Language, p. 82.
94. Chomsky notes ("Formal Properties of Grammar", pp. 376-377) that the 
strings of regular languages are basically periodic, while those of 
context-free languages are structurally symmetric. So an organism 
is essentially a finite automaton in so far as an aspect of its 
behaviour is determined by conditions on contiguous parts (e.g. 
associative linkage); it is essentially a pushdown storage automaton 
in so far as its behaviour exhibits hierarchical organization and 
symmetries. This latter sort of behaviour is given.the title 
"complicated behaviour" and is distinguished by its ability to
interrupt one part of theperformance until some other part has been
completed (Miller and Chomsky, op.cit. , pp. 483-484). He also formulates 
indices of complexity borrowed from rewriting grammars to apply to a 
psychological theory once it is expressed in terms of a computer 
programme for simulating behaviour (ib id. , pp. 484-485).
95. Miller, G.A., Galanter, E., Pribram, K. , Plans and the Structure 
of Behaviour, New York, Holt, 1960.
96. In the following flow chart, is the test corresponding to 
operation 0^. If c* » yS , then T<x and are at the same level. A 
box labelled 0^ enclosing two or more tote units represents the 
operation of a higher-level tote unit.
This flow chart can be represented as the state diagram of an automaton
as follows
97. Miller and Chomsky, op.cit., pp 487-488.
98. New York, Meredith.
XXII
99.
100.
Cognition and Reality, Freeman, San Francisco, 1976, pp. 20 and 58. 
Schemata and the information actually available determine what is 
perceived because we can see, he claims, only what we know how to 
look for. The schemata assure continuity in perception because the 
information already acquired determines what will be picked up 
next and because some schemata are temporal by nature, e.g. those
of motion. The function of a schema is illustrated as follows
(ibid., p. 21),.where ’’perception” applies to the whole cycle (which
Directs
Neisser maintains that cognitive psychology became important only 
in the 1960’s because of the advent of computers, whose activities 
seemed akin to cognitive processes and promised a model of the flow 
of information through the mind (ibid-. , pp. 4-6). It is no surprise, 
then, when he states (ibid., p. 58) that a schema is like a "plan”
(in the sense of Miller, Galanter, and Pribram referred to above) for 
obtaining more information to fill in the format. But
The information that fills in the format at one moment in the 
cyclic processes becomes a part of the format in the next, 
determining how further information is accepted.
Furthermore, a schema is not only the plan, but also the executor of 
the plan. Biologically, he adds (ibid., p. 54), a schema
is some active array of physiological structures and processes:
not a center in the brain, but an entire system that includes 
receptors and afferents and feed-foreward units and efferents.
xxiii
101. ibid., ?♦ 110.
102. ibid., P- 111.
103. ibid., PP . Ill
104. ibid,, P- 113.
cognitive map is illustrated by the following (ibid,, p. 112);
Samples
ibid., p. 170.
Neisser maintains that most ways of detachment depend on culture 
(ibid., p. 134). For example, when the child begins to learn his first 
words, it is held (ibid., p. 169), the schema of the referant includes 
schemata for vocalization. However, detachment also occurs in 
locomotion. Now orienting schemata or cognitive maps are sustained 
over the long periods of time it takes to carry out locomotive tasks 
(ibid., 134). During this time, the moving person (or animal)
anticipates objects, so he often sustains schemata inapporpriate to
XXIV
his immediate environment. Thus a detached use of orienting schemata 
is common place, and so they can be used for purposes other than
locomotion.
107. The Logic of Modern Physics, New York, Macmillan, 1927, p. 5.
108. For example, an opex£ional definition of "acid” is the positive result 
in a test to determine whether a sample turns blue litmus paper red.
Of more theoretical interest are operational definitions which specify 
a procedure for determining the numerical value of the given quantity 
in particular cases; rules of spatial measurement are a good example.
109. The laws for the intensity of sensation formulated by Fechner,
Stevens, and others are applied by means of operational tests. Th£ 
usual tests of intelligence, emotional stability, mathematical ability, 
etc. are operational. The ontological paucity typical of behaviouralism 
arises only when one adds the theoretical requirement that, assuming 
our terms are to be univocal, and refer to things, their features, 
etc., one scientific term should correspond to one and only one opera­
tional test, or (in this case)definition.
110. A "drive" is defined in terms of hours of deprivation; a "respondent" 
as a purely reflex response elicited by particular stimuli;
"operants" (Skinner’s major concern) as responses with no obvious 
stimuli; a "reinforcer" as what increases the strength of an operant; 
and "strength" in terms of the number of hours an operant takes to 
become extinct. These terms are largely familiar from such illustrations 
as a rat pressing a bar to release a food pellet. For this terminology, 
see Chomsky, "A Review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, Language,
1959; reprinted in Fodor, J.A. and Katz, J.J. (eds.) The Structure
of Language, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1964, p.55O.
111. ibid., p. 551.
XXV
112. Verbal Behavior, p. 28 (cf. p. 22), quoted in ibid
113. Verbal Behavior, p. 115, quoted in ibid., p. 554.
114. ibid. , p. 551.
115. ibid. , p. 553.
16. ibid. , pp. 551-552.
117. Verbal Behavior, p. 108, quoted in ibid., p. 552.
118. ib id., p. 554, Cf. p. 553.*
Since properties are free for the asking (we have as many of 
them as we have nonsynonymous descriptive expressions in our 
language), we can account for a wide class of responses in terms 
of Skinnerian functional analysis by identifying the controlling 
stimuli. But the word stimulus has lost all objectivity in this
.usage.
119. Verbal Behavior, p. 441, quoted in ibid. , p. 554. Skinner defines
(VB, p. 201, ibid.) ihe unit of verbal behaviour - the verbal operant - 
as a class of responses of identifiable form functionally related to 
one or more controlling variables. But as Chomsky notes (ibid., p. 556) 
he makes no attempt to specify what similarity in form or control is 
required for two physical events to be instances of the same operant. 
Recourse to the language of probability to explicate response strength 
does not help, for this is
nothing more than a decision to use the word probability, with 
its favorable connotations of objectivity, as a cover term 
to paraphrase such low-status words as interest, intention, 
belief, and the li ke. (ibid., ’. 556).
Again, in the case of language, the phrase "X is reinforced by Y 
(stimulus, state of affairs, event, etc)”, Chomsky suggests
is being used as a cover term for "X wants Y”, "X likes Y",
"X wishes that Y were the case”, etc. (ibid., p. 558).
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Skinner divides verbal operants into three classes: mands, tacts, 
and autoclitics. A mand is a speech act and defined as
a verbal operant in which the response is reinforced by a 
characteristic consequence and is therefore under the functional 
control of relevant conditions of deprivation or aversive 
stimulation. (VB, p. 35, ibid., p. 566).
Since aversive control is explained in terms of previous injury, it 
appears that we could not respond appropriately to the mand "Your 
money or your life" unless we had a past history of being killed 
(ibid.). A "tact" is defined as
a verbal operant in which a response of given form is evoked 
(or at least strengthened) by a particular object or event 
or property of an object or event (VB, p. 81, ibid. , p. 568).
As Chomsky points out (ibid., p. 569), this results merely in a 
paraphrase of such notions as reference and meaning "in terms of the 
vague concept stimulus control".
120. VB., p. 336, ibid., p. 573.
121. ibid.
122. VB, p. 346, ibid., p. 574.
123. For example, transitive verbs are folb wed by nouns, intransitive verbs
are not. A verb is indicated as transitive (intransitive) by 
including "+___ N" ("-___ N") in its complex symbol.
124. E.g. Cartesian Linguistics, p. 65 and Language and Mind, p. 112.
125. "A Review of B.G. Skinner's Verbal Behavior", p. 576.
126. ibid., p. 577.
127. ibid., p. 549. The general principle applies to any form of complex
behaviour.
128. Cartesian Linguistics, p. 4.
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129. E.g. ibid., pp. 3, 6, 9, 29, passim.
130. "A Review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior", p. 564.
131. ibid., p. 564.
132. ibid., p. 576.
133. Reflections on Language, pp. 137-138.
134. Cf. Malcolm, op.cit., and Hockett, C.F., The State of the Art, Mouton,
The Hague, 1968.
135. On the subject of phonology, see Fudge, E.C., "Phonology”, in Lyons, J 
(ed.), New Horizons in Linguistics, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970,
pp. 76-95.
136. E.g., Aspects, p. 47, Language and Mind, pp. 19, 25.
137. Lyons, Chomsky, pp. 27-35.
138. ibid., p. 31.
139. The German-American linguist E. Sapir (to whom Chomsky refers 
approvingly) maintained a "mentalist" view: a phoneme is an ideal 
sound at which the speaker aims.
140. The first of two non-phonetic criteria accepted by the Copenhagen 
School is that sounds, however disparate, are realizations of the 
same phoneme if they are involved in morphdogically significant 
alterations. On this criterion, the short and long forms of English 
vowels (generally quite disparate phonetically) are classed under
the same phonemes; a morphologically significant alteration involving 
one of these is the present-past alteration between "bite" and "bit". 
The second criterion is distributional similarity in syllables and 
words. For example, English consonants can be classified on the 
basis of which of the sounds corresponding to w, JL, and £, can occur 
after them when they are in initial position. Glossematics, the 
method of the Copenhagen School, goes so far as to ignore phonetic 
properties in the specification of phonemes and does not insist on
xxviii
bi-uniqueness. The advantage of this is that it allows dialects with 
quite different pronunciations to be classified under the same 
language.
141. E.g., Bach, E., Syntactic Theory, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1974, pp. 15-18.
142. Cf. Lyons, op.cit., pp. 34, 40, 42.
143. ’’Explanatory Models in Linguistics”, p. 538.
144. Aspects, p. 24.
145. ib id♦, pp. 25-46.
146. ibid., pp. 25-26:
To the extent that a linsuitic theory succeeds in selecting a 
descriptively adequate grammar on the basis of primary linguistic 
data (i.e. the corpus), we can say that it meets the condition 
of explanatory adequacy. That is, to this extent, it offers an 
explanation for the intuition of the native speaker on the basis 
of an empricial hypothesis concerning the innate predisposition 
of the child to develop a certain kind of theory to deal with 
the evidence presented to him, Any such hypothesis can be 
falsified ... by showing that it fails to provide a descriptively 
adequate grammar for primary linguistic data for some, other 
language ...
147• » P- 46•
148. This was the primary justification for transformations in early
transformational theory. For example, neither of these sentences are
well-formed
* The boy gave the girl to the book.
* The girl was given to the book by the boy.
Without a transformation by which a passive form is derived from an
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active, one would have to give two statements about the relation of 
give to nouns in its environment. But, given a passive transformation, 
it suffices that the grammar state once that in most sentences, give 
must occur with animate subjects and indirect objects, but with possibly 
inanimate direct objects. Bach, op.cit,, pp. 169-170.
149. Of course, such generalizations must be made with an eye to other 
rules which are applied in the same instances and the order of the 
application of the rules. Otherwise their application may be blocked. 
One accepted way of arguing for a syntactic rule is to show that
it allows the application of another rule in a given set of rules.
Cf. Bach, op.cit., pp. 166-177 and Aspects, p. 44.
150. In Structures, rejecting the discovery procedures of the Bloomfieldians, 
Chomsky states that
a linguistic theory should not be identified with a manual of 
useful procedures, nor should it be expected to provide mechanical 
procedures for the discovery of grammars. (p. 55, n. 6; quoted 
in Lyons, op.cit., p. 40.)
Chomsky had concluded before Structures that thesupposed discovery 
procedures gave only evaluation procedures (ib id., p. 42).
151. Aspects, p. 42:
The major problem in constructing an evaluation measure for 
grammars is that of determining which generalizations about a 
language are significant ones; an evaluation measure must be 
selected in such a way as to favor these. We have a generaliz­
ation when a set of rules about distinct items can be replaced 
by a single rule ... about the whole set, or when it can be shown 
that a "natural class" of items undergoes a certain process-or 
set of similar processes. Thus, choice of an evaluation measure
constitutes a decision as to what are "similar processes" and
XXX
"natural classes" - in short, what are significant generalizations 
The problem is to devise a procedure that will assign a numerical 
measure of valuation to a grammar in terms of the degree of 
linguistically significant generalization that this grammar 
achieves. The obvious numerical measure to be applied to a 
grammar is length, in terms of number of symbols. But if this 
is to be a meaningful measure, it is necessary to devise
notations and to restrict the form of rules in such a way that 
significant considerations of complexity and generality are 
converted into considerations of length, so that real general­
izations shorten the grammar and spurious ones do not. Thus 
it is the notational conventions used in presenting a grammar 
that define "significant generalization", if the evaluation 
measure is taken as length.
152. Summing up a discussion of the ordering of phonological rules, Chomsky
states:
It is noteworthy that the devices used in defining ordering ... 
are just those that were developed, quite independently, in the 
study of evaluation of grammars. ... a natural approach to the 
problem of evaluation ... is to measure the value of a grammar 
as inversely proportional to the number of symbols in the 
sequence of schemata that results when certain notational 
operations are applied to the rules of the grammar. These 
notational devices define what counts as "linguistically 
significant generalization"; they provide an empirical hypothesis 
as to the kind of regularities that the language learner seeks 
in attempting to organize data presented to him, and that the
XXXI
linguist uses in jsutifying a particular formaltion of 
grammatical rules for a certain language. (’’Some General 
Properties of Phonological Rules”, Language, 1967, pp. 123-124.)
153. Language and Mind, p, 134. He is here concerned with the cyclical 
application of the following two rules of stress, which explain stress 
contours in English.
Assign primary stress to the left-most primary stressed vowels,
in nouns.
Assign primary stress to the right-most stress-peak, where a 
vowel V is a stress-peak in a certain domain if this domain 
contains no vowel more heavily stressed than V. (p. 131)
These rules are applied first to the innermost units, then to the next 
innermost, etc., until the stress-pattern of the whole phrase is 
generated, (pp. 131-132). The principle of the cycle is said to be 
a part of universal grammar (p. 133).
154. Cf. Bach, op .cit, , p. 245.
155. Cf., Aspects, p. 45.
156. Reflections on Language, p. 148.
157. Language and Mind, p. 22. Structural linguists, he writes, ’’for the 
first time formulated in a clear and intelligible way” ’’the basic 
question in the study of language”, showing ’’that there are structural 
relations in language that can be studied abstractly".
158. Aspects, p.67
159. Reflections on Language, p. 148.
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162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
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168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
Cavell, S., "Must We Mean What We Say?", in Chappell, V.C., 
Ordinary Language, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1964, 
pp. 75-112.
ibid. , p. 93. Cavell adds (p. 94): ,
Descriptive statements ... are not opposed to ones which 
are normative, but in fact presuppose them: we could not 
do the thing we call describing if language did not 
provide ... ways normative for describing ... (But) if
a normative utterance is one used to create or institute
rules or standards, then prescriptive utterances are not 
examples of normative rules.
The Idea of a Social Science, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
1958 (ninth impression, 1976).
Reported in Bach, op. cit. , p. 251. 
ibid., p. 252.
"Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory", in 
Davidson, D. and Harman, G. (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, 
Reidel, Dordrecht, 1972, p. 451.
ibid., p. 453.
ibid., p. 442.
ibid.
ibid., p. 446.
ibid., p. 452.
ibid., p. 453.
Reflections on Language, p. 181.
The remainder of this paragraph and the next are taken largely 
from Partee, B.H., "Linguistic Metatheory", reprinted in 
Harman, G. (ed.), On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays, Anchor, 
Garden City, N.Y., pp. 303-315. Cf. also Fodor, J.D., "Formal
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Linguistics and Formal Logic", in Lyons, op. cit., pp. 198-214.
174. Reflections on Language. Chomsky holds that all semantic inter­
pretation is determined by the surface structure (p. 82), although 
this is somewhat enriched, for the initial (his new term for 
"deep") P-markers enter indirectly into semantic interpretation 
and the theory of performance (p. 83). His "trace theory" explains 
how initial (deep) structure is still relevant. The initial 
subcategorization rule for sentences (S COMP S j) states that 
the sentence consists of a "complementizer" - such as the con­
junction "that" - and a "reduced sentence" (p. 88). Transforma­
tions such as wh-movement (Relativization) place the wh-word in 
the complementizer position (p. 89), where it acts as a sort of 
quantifier (p. 94). For example (p. 94), the "logical form" of
(1) The police know who the FBI discovered that Bill shot
is
(2) The police know for which person x, the FBI discovered
that Bill shot x
where the variable x is bound by the quantifier "for which x". 
Identifying x with the trace t left by the movement rule gives 
as the surface structure of (1)
(3) jjThe police know Qwho the FBI discovered jjthat Bill 
shot t ]]]
the logical form of which is given, given that "who" is a quantifier 
binding t and meaning "for which person t". Independent motivation 
for the trace theory comes from active-passive pairs (pp. 97-98),
such as
(4) Beavers build dams
(5) Dams are built by beavers.
The role of "dams" in the surface structure is important, because
xxxxv
(5) says something about dams and is false (since some dams are 
not built by beavers), while (4) says something about beavers and 
is true. But we must also know that in (5) "dams", while the 
subject in one sense5is the direct object in another. This 
information is supplied in the enriched surface structure
(6) Dams are ^built t by beavers^
where the direct object function is indicated by the position of 
the trace bound by ’’dams". (Chomsky admits this quantification 
is "of an unconventional sort".) Other independent motivation is 
supplied by anaphoric relations within the sentence, i.e. .
occurrences of pronouns such as "he", "each other", etc. which 
are bound by an antecedent in the sentence (pp. 99 ff.).
The motivation for the standard theory, he states (p. 96), was that 
information about grammatical functions in embedded sentences is 
provided by initial (deep) P-markers alone. But this motivation 
disappears under the trace theory, which gives a simple way to 
derive "logical form" from surface structures in which t appears.
When a transformation moves a phrase P from position X to ■ 
position Y it leaves in position X a trace bound by P (p. 95).
Chomsky as well doubts whether there is any clear criterion 
determining in general whether ungrammaticality in particular 
cases is syntactic or semantic (p. 95). A borderline case is the 
difference in grammaticality between'(1) and
(7) The police think who the FBI discovered that Bill shot. 
The difference is accounted for by the fact that questions
have a complementizer distinct from the one that appears 
with declarative structures, and that verbs are marked in 
the lexicon as to whether they may or may not appear with 
sentential complements containing this complementizer (p. 94).
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175. Generative semantics solves the ambiguity of scope in the example 
given in the text by indicating scope structurally, attaching 
quantifiers higher or lower on the tree. This had been done 
with adverbs in the standard theory and accomplishes what the
PM notation accomplishes with brackets; the insufficiency of the 
context-free grammar is made up by lexical insertion. Lakoff, 
the principal exponent of generative semantics, postulates two 
deep structures where a single deep structure in the standard 
theory is associated with two different meanings as revealed in
the surface structure. In some cases his transformations allow
either deep structure to become the other; to prevent this, he 
introduces derivational constraints. Still, not all of semantics 
is captured by semantic trees accommodated to the predicate 
calculus, for, e.g., ’’the glass is half empty" entails "the 
glass is half full".
Both generative and interpretive semantics can be designed to 
capture the fact that the relative scope of logical elements 
depends on at least four surface factors: word order (compare 
"Many men read few books" and "Few books are read by many men"), 
stress (compare "John and Mary can’t come to the party" and 
"John AND Mary can't come to the party"), subordination (compare 
"To please everyone is hard" and "Everyone is hard to please"), 
and differences among quantifiers themselves (compare the 
ambiguity of scope in "Several soldiers shot three students" and 
the lack thereof in "Every soldier shot three students").
176. Davidson, D. and Harman, G. (eds.) The Logic of Grammar, 
Dickenson, Encino and Belmont, 1975, "Introduction", p. 4.
177. Davidson’s illustration, which we present schematically, is of 
the form "a and b are 0". Grammar assigns this the logical form
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"0a and 0b". The theory of truth then gives truth conditions
for "p and q", showing that any conjunction is true iff both
its conjuncts are true; this shows that any argument of the
form ----- -*• is valid. So logic should contain this rule, which,
p
in fact, shows that a valid argument leads from "a and b are 0" 
to "0a" (ibid.).
178. ibid., p. 3.
179. ibid., p. 4.
180. Cf. Harman, G., "Logical Form", in Davidson and Harman (1975),
. pp. 289-307. His major thesis is that a theory of logical form 
must be compatible with syntax. Logical forms assigned to 
sentences by the grammar should be the same as (at least part of) 
the underlying structures assigned to sentences by a transforma­
tional grammar. A good grammar can be incorporated into a good 
theory of logical form as the device that assigns logical forms
to sentences.
181. See the excerpt from Tarski’s The Concept of Truth for Formalized 
Languages in Davidson and Harman (1975), pp. 25-49.
An essential aspect of Tarski’s semantics is the distinction 
between an object language and a metalanguage; this avoids 
paradoxes of self-reference. The metalanguage alone contains a 
truth predicate; for object language L, it gives a definition of 
"is true-in-L" which has as a consequence every sentence of the
form
s is true-in-L iff p
where "s" is replaced by a standardized description of a sentence 
of L and "p" is replaced by a translation of "s" into the meta­
language (s itself in the simplest case). But this is not of 
interest without further conditions on the theory of truth (cf.
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Davidson and Harman (1975), "Introduction", p. 19). Firstly, 
the theory must account for the truth conditions of every sen­
tence by analysing it as composed, in truth-relevant ways, of 
elements drawn from a finite stock, e.g. truth-functional connec­
tives, names designating individuals, and n-place predicates 
designating n-tuples of individuals. Tarski expressed this con­
dition by saying that the theory must give a structural defini­
tion of "true sentence". Secondly, the theory must give a way 
of deciding by recursive means the truth conditions of any given 
sentence. Finally, the statements of truth conditions must draw 
upon the same concepts as the sentence whose truth conditions 
they state (most simply when the meta-language contains the object 
language).
Tarski himself, to accommodate sentences with quantifiers, had to
introduce the notion of a sentential function. So he did not
directly state definitions of truth - i.e. give truth conditions - 
for them, but introduced as an intermediary the notion of the 
satisfaction of a given sentential function by given objects,
182. That is, the designation of terms is extended to domains with 
different individuals which may or may not exist (this roughly 
explicates "meaning"), and "true-in-L" is defined as before, but 
taking into account domains having a certain relation to that
identified with the actual world.
183. "On Saying That", reprinted in Davidson and Harman (1975), pp.
143-152.
184. The variance of truth-value of sentences depending on the context 
of utterance can be accommodated by declaring utterances to be 
the bearers of truth values or by making truth a relation between 
a sentence, a speaker, and a time. The first course is adopted,
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e.g., by Weinstein ("Truth and Demonstratives", in Davidson and 
Harman (1972), pp. 60-63) in his extension of Tarskian semantics 
to cover indexical items ("indicator words" in his terminology).
The second course is adopted, e.g., by Montague (e.g. "Pragmatics 
and Intensional Logic", op. cit., pp. 142-168), who introduces 
into a possible-worlds semantics the notion of points of reference: 
complexes of relevant aspects of possible contexts of use. For 
example, a point of reference for indexical aspects might be 
specified by giving an ordered pair of a person (the utterer) and 
a real number indicating the moment of utterance. D. K. Lewis 
(Convention: A Philosophical Study, Harvard U.P., Cambridge,
Mass., 1969) gives a similar treatment of lexical items. He wants 
to retain the syntactic descriptions because he wants his account to 
cover both logical treatments of formalized languages and trans­
formational grammars for natural languages. He rejects the semantic 
component of transformational grammar in favour of a possible-worlds 
semantics involving an account of indexical items. Cf. his account 
of "analytic", "contradictory" and "synthetic" involving indexical 
items on pp. 174-177.
185. op. cit. Harman wishes to capture entailments involving complex (but
not conjoint) predicates such as the entailment from "x walks slowly" 
to "x walks"; this is extended to relative modifiers (e.g. "large").
He applies Chomsky’s position on nominalizations of the sort that can 
refer to events in discussing ontological commitment to events.
Finally, he extends Tarskian semantics by first analysing "that"-clauses 
as embedded structures in such a way as to account for opacity. But to 
do so he must introduce a logical operator such that, where e is a 
part of a logical structure ,c^ej4'is the corresponding structural name 
of a proposition; this operator is motivated by considerations within
Tarskian semantics.
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186. "Semantics for a Natural Language", in Davidson and Harman (1975), 
p. 23. Chomsky distinguishes sentences such as
(1) I persuaded John to examine Bill
(2) I expected John to examine Bill
by the fact that when the embedded sentence in (2) is transformed 
to the passive, the result is "cognitively synonymous" with the 
active form, which is not the case with (1). But in fact,
Davidson asserts, we need do no more than ask about the semantic 
role of "John", which occurs in a referentially transparent con­
text in (1), but in an opaque context in (2). This requires no 
appeal to "the speaker’s tacit knowledge of the grammar", but 
rather rests on the explicit knowledge any speaker of English has 
of the way in which (1) and (2) may vary in truth under substitu­
tions for the word "John".
187. Lewis (op. cit., pp. 160-173) introduces mood - identifying the 
sort of speech act - into this sort of analysis by extending the
notion of truth condition.
188. Reflections on Language. The rules to do with traces are seen as 
part of universal grammar, constraining the set of learnable 
grammars and contributing to explanatory adequacy (p. 111). He now 
envisages the distant goal for transformational grammar of reducing 
the rules to ones of the form "Move NP", subject to constraints 
from universal grammar which are expressed either (i) as general 
conditions on rules, or (ii) as properties of initial (base) 
P-markers, or (iii) as properties of surface structure (p. 112).
The fact that transformational grammar properly deals only with 
sentences and not their linguistic and non-linguistic contexts is 
circumvented by bringing in other systems (p. 104). What he calls 
sentence grammar deals with some cases of anaphora - essentially
pronominal reference - for it assigns antecedents to reciprocals 
(e.g. ’’each other") and to necessarily bound anaphors (e.g. "his"
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
in "John lost his way", not in "John lost his (perhaps another’s) 
book"). Sentence grammar is said to result in logical form. Beyond 
sentence grammar, there are other semantic rules and rules belonging 
to other cognitive structures. He does not distinguish what belongs 
to which system, but together they account for reference and are 
said to involve discourse properties and considerations relating 
to situation, communicative intention, etc. and to result in "fuller 
representations of ’meaning' (in some sense)".
ibid., p. 41. Cf. pp. 42-26. Included in the common stock would 
be concepts of natural kinds in particular, which constrain the lin­
guistic categories to which names must belong. This would affect 
the operations of grammatical rules, which are partially determined 
by the semantic properties of the lexical items.
ibid., pp. 119-121.
op. cit., p. 138. Vendler identifies this as Wittgenstein’s
insight.
ibid., pp. 139-140, 126-127.
ibid., pp. 127-130 for the objection and Vendler’s reply.
Cf. Katz, J. J., The Philosophy of Language, Harper and Row,
New York, 1966, and Bierwisch, M., "Semantics", in Lyons, J., op. cit. 
pp. 116-184. On this view, an essential part of the syntactic
behaviour of a lexical item can be derived from the semantic
representation.
Cf. Bierwisch, op. cit., pp. 180-183. Bierwisch maintains that 
semantic features represent, not external physical properties, but 
"the psychological conditions according to which human beings pro­
cess their physical and social environment". So semantic structures
xli
are reducible to our basic cognitive and perceptual dispositions.
E.g. X GREATER Y might represent the general ability to compare.
X DIMENSION OF Y, the three-dimensional space orientation, etc.
These ’’concepts” are not learned; only their combinations, phone­
tic forms and morphological properties are. Our perceptual and 
cognitive equipment mediates between semantic structures and the 
world; thus we can form concepts of non-existents. Semantic com­
ponents are "abstract theoretical entities representing complex 
psychological structures and mechanisms, not lexical entries of 
any natural language".
Componential analysis is remarkably similar to the method of dicho­
tomy of Ramus (sixteenth century), which almost obliterated serious 
logical work for three centuries. It is also similar to the gross 
simplification which hid much of Aristotle’s logical work from 
Dark-Age Europe, not inappropriately known as the Tree of Porphyry.
196. op. cit., pp. 130-132.
197. ibid., pp, 135-138.
198. Cf. "Some General Properties of Phonological Rules". An example of 
an innate principle is the following principle of the cyclical 
application of rules, concerned mostly with stress.
(1) Each phonological rule is applied to a string
bounded by paired brackets of the surface structure 
and containing no internal brackets; after the last 
rule of the sequence has applied in this way, innermost 
brackets are erased and the sequence of rules re-applies 
as before (p. 115).
Rules are applied according to this principle to structures such as
Jn (a £theatr]Nic + ali 1 + ^Jn
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where N = noun, A = adjective. The rules first assign stress to 
fwtheatrj^; when no more rules can apply, the brackets are removed
theatric + al•Vand the same rules apply in the same order to 
and so on. But sometimes two rules must be disjunctively ordered; 
Rj and R£, linearly ordered so that Rj precedes R£, are dis­
junctively ordered if R^ cannot apply to a given string at a 
certain stage of the cycle if Rj has already applied to this 
string at this stage of the cycle (p. 120). Rules of stress can 
be stated by simply giving the relevant phonetic item or category, 
Y, in the context of the assignment of stress, X Y. Now the rules
XYZ and XWZ can be abbreviated as X^jZ and the rules XYZ and XZ 
as X(Y)Z. It is a general principle that two successive rules are 
disjunctively ordered if they can be abbreviated by a schema involving 
parentheses; and this principle must be allowed to apply recursively 
(p. 121). So the general principle is
(2) Let S be a schema X(Y)Z. Then all rules derived by 
expanding XYZ (or XYZ itself, if it is a rule) are 
disjunctively ordered with respect to each of the 
rules derived by expanding XZ (or XZ itself, if it is 
a rule) (pp. 121-122).
Given (2), there is empirical evidence suggesting
(3) The underlying representational schema is selected in 
such a way as to maximize disjunctive ordering (p. 124).
And there is empirical evidence for
(4) Two successive lines of a derivation can differ by at 
most one feature specification (p. 125).
Chomsky concludes this article by stating that the establishment of 
deep and general principles of phonology "will be a result of 
considerable importance not only for general linguistics, but for
xliii
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psychology as well” (p. 127).
Sampson, Geoffrey, "Linguistic Universals as Evidence for
Empiricism”, Journal of Linguistics, Sept. 1978, pp. 183-206. It 
is suggested that a high degree of survival value goes with self­
embedding. For units at any one level are not all interdependent,
thus the structure as a whole can survive the breakdown of one or
more of its subunits. Syntactically, this means that an utterance 
can still largely succeed even when one of its components is 
ungrammatical or not properly integrated.
We have already noted the general applicability of tree graphs 
and the general appeal to self-embedding organization in psychology 
and computer science.
ibid. E.g. it was suggested (Berline, B. and Kay, P., Basic Color 
Terms, Berkeley and New York, 1969) on considerable evidence that 
the colour vocabulary of languages differ in a very systematic 
way: all languages have words for black and white; if they have
a third term, it is for red; if a fourth, it is for green or yellow, 
the fifth being the other alternative; etc. But it has been shown 
that the original categorization of Japanese does not fit this 
schema; the fact that the contemporary classification does is 
attributed to Western influence, particularly industrial pigments. 
Martinet, Andrew, Elements of Linguistics, translated by E. Palmer, 
Faber, London, 1960, pp. 186-187. To take Partinet's example, when 
steamers were first developed, one could refer to a particular boat 
and say: "That boat is powered by steam”. Thanks to the relative 
clause, one could also say: "The boat which is powered by steam
is late". The relative clause and the roun it modifies are
eventually replaced by a noun referring to the artifact, "steamer". 
Campbell, R. and Wales, R., "The Study of Language Acquisition", in202.
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Lyons, J., op. cit., pp. 243-260.
203. Cf. ibid., pp. 255-256.
204. op. cit., p. 35. Miller holds that we recode information from 
observation into language. But we very rarely call reporting 
what is seen thinking. If reporting were recoding or even trans­
lating, then what is sensed would be in a language or code.
205. Dodwell, P. C., "Is a Theory of Conceptual Development Necessary?", 
in Mischel, op. cit., pp. 372-373 for the remainder of this 
paragraph.
206. The executive programme gives the overall flow of the computation, 
specifying entry to and exit from subroutines. The subroutines are 
the routine calculations. The example in note96of a tote unit 
with embedded tote units presents an example of an executive 
programme with several levels of subroutines. In humans, the 
subroutines are the performance of routine tasks such as adding 
single-digit numbers; the executive routine is the complex task - 
e.g. balancing an account - which makes use of these results.
207. The Language of Thought, Harvester, Hassocks, 1976 (first published 
1975), pp. 52-53.
208. Cattell, R. B., The Scientific Use of Factor Analysis in 
Behavioral and Life Science, Plenum, New York and London, 1978, 
p. 16; cf. p. 5.
In algebraic terms, factor analysis arranges the statistical 
results found for each experimental variable so that they are
listed in the same order in both the rows and the columns. The 
entry in the i^ row jcolumn is r£j> the correlation between 
the i1-*1 and j variables, call them i and j. When there are 
elements g common to i and i, r.. = r. .r. . The value of g can 
be found by taking all correlations into account.
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Geometrically, i (or j, or k, ...) is represented by a vector 
whose length isVt^^; r^. is represented by the angle between the 
vectors representing i and j. Full correlation (+1.0) is indicated 
by coincidence; full negative correlation (-1.0), by vectors in 
opposite directions from the origin; independence (zero correlation), 
by a right angle between the vectors. Since each factor is 
independent of the rest, the number of dimensions in the geometric 
representation is generally greater than three, i.e. the factors 
and variables are represented in a hyperspace.
209. ibid., p. 5.
210. Cf. Hamlyn, D. W., "Epistemology and Conceptual Development", in 
Mischel, op. cit., pp. 3-24. This is directed against Piaget’s 
claims for genetic epistemology, that epistemology must be based on 
empirical, psychological research to be relevant to how and what
we in fact know. The psychological foundation Piaget gives is his 
developmental psychology, involving a natural progression founded
on the mind in its relation to the world.
Hamlyn holds (pp. 3-5) that a study of the general conditions 
normally necessary for a given form of understanding concern the 
criteria for having the concept in question, not how individuals 
acquire it. Further (pp. 6-11), we cannot know what is involved 
in the acquisition of a concept unless we know what it is to have 
that concept, which is something objective, involving a common norm. 
Epistemological priorities, he continues (pp. 19—23)^ are not 
temporal, but logical. One cannot understand "red" without 
understanding "colour". But we do not teach someone "colour", 
then "red"; nor "red", then "colour". To understand "red", one 
must understand a nexus of surrounding concepts. There is no 
general rule determining how far the nexus extends; this is decided
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only in particular cases. Again, a condition for understanding a 
concept is the ability to apply it, and, again, there is no general 
rule for when and to what extent the application of a concept or 
its nexus should come into consideration. The very general 
picture given by Piaget’s three stages - from concrete to abstract - 
is and must be our normal picture, for understanding develops through 
experience, which confronts particulars. Any attempt to see the 
progression in a different order leads to unintelligibility, for, 
"given our understanding of normal human experience, learning and 
knowledge, we cannot conceive of how it might be otherwise. For 
this is an understanding of the norms which provide the criteria 
of application for the concepts of experience, learning, and 
knowledge" (p.22).
211. Objective Knowledge, Oxford, Clarendon, 1972, p. 6 passim.
212. An example of "psychology" is presented by L. Kohlberg’s studies 
of moral development (cf. "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the 
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It", in Mischel, op. cit., 
pp. 151-235). Kohlberg states that no observation and categoriza­
tion of behaviour "behaviouristically" can define its moral
status. Yet behaviour can be consistent with one’s moral principles. 
Before we can know anything about such behaviour, hox-zever, we must 
first knoxz what a man's moral judgements or principles are 
(pp. 226-232).
His psychological theory, he adds (pp. 180-195), is supposed to 
explain why there are culturally universal elements to morality at 
every stage (he distinguishes three levels, each with two stages - 
cf. pp. 164-165) and why movement is in an invariant upward 
sequence. He does not commit the naturalistic fallacy, he states, 
for he explains ontogenesis of idea systems by their philosophical
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adequacy and does not infer philosophical adequacy from temporal 
order. On the other hand, most of the reasons advanced for 
cultural relativity (cf. pp. 155-180) can be seen to commit the 
naturalistic fallacy.
Kohlberg sees his theory as combining Piaget’s developmental
psychology with Hare’s prescriptivism and Rawl’s theory of justice.
The debt to Piaget is not always obvious. He avoids the objec­
tionable aspects of Piaget’s theory - e.g. attributing knowledge 
of group theory to infants on the basis of the fact that they can 
manipulate a pivoting pointer through 360° and cancel movements in 
one direction with movements^ in the other - by considering social 
activity. Being a metaethical formalist, he states (pp. 213-218) 
that he defines morality’s uniqueness, not in terms of content, but 
in terms of the formal character of moral judgement, method, or 
point of view, best seen in reasons given for a moral judgement - 
impersonality, universalizibility, etc. This is purely metaethical, 
and, indeed, stage six ("the universal ethical principle orientation”) 
principles of justice do not directly obligate us to blame or punish. 
An implication of his psychology is that arguments for a normative 
ethic must be stepwise. He cites (p. 225) Rawls (Justice as Fairness) 
assuming a stage five ("the social-contract legalistic orientation") 
society and showing how this must be based on stage six principles.
The moral judgements involved are not about "knowledge” of rules 
(i.e. being able to state them, which children can do from about 
age six), but about "active judgement" (pp. 185-188). Moral concepts 
are essentially concepts of social relationships (pp. 190-191); 
moral development depends on the amount of opportunity for "role­
taking" (pp. 191-195). I.e. moral development is a case of cultural 
learning-how. This is borne out by his data. Children are classed
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into stages according to their justifications of their decisions 
on prepared moral problems. They are also asked to put prepared 
arguments pro and con a certain action into their own words; their 
restatements show distortions down to their own stage and only 
transitional cases give restatements from a stage higher than 
their ox^n (pp. 163—180). Data on middle-class urban boys at ages 
ten, thirteen and sixteen from the U.S., Taiwan and Mexico show 
that level one initially dominates; stage five comes to dominate in 
the U.S., level two in the other two countries. Similar data from 
isolated villages show stage one dominating throughout, with 
varying increases in the other stages (p. 172).
Summarizing his position, Kohlberg states (pp. 222-226) that
(1) the facts show a universal moral form centering on 
principles of justice as the last stage;
(2) this form assumes the fact-value distinction;
(3) yet science can test whether it fits the psychological 
facts;
(4) conversely, analysis can point out why a higher stage 
can handle problems a lower stage acknowledges, but
cannot resolve.
Points (l)-(4), he claims, show that moral psychology and philosophy
can work hand in hand.
(5) the scientific theory as to why people do move to and 
prefer a higher stage is broadly similar to the moral 
theory as to why they should.
His findings indicate that
(i) philosophical analysts are justified in asserting 
universal features;
(ii) the philosopher’s task cannot merely be to analyse
il
moral language, for there are six such systems;
(iii) since the highest stage includes the basic positive
features of lower stages, an adequate normative
ethics must include all these features.
Much of the detail and even outline of Kohlberg’s method can be 
questioned (cf. Alston, W. P., "Comments on Kohlberg’s ’From Is to 
Ought”’, op. cit., pp. 269-284, especially pp. 270-277). Why is 
there this particular sequence of stages, or, indeed, any one 
sequence? Why are there six stages, and are they as distinct as 
he implies? Does his prescriptivism imply his theory of justice? 
Still, prescriptivism seems to be the best candidate, because it 
accounts for a more sophisticated handling of moral argument.
Much of what Kohlberg finds is thatjas people gain more experience 
in various social roles which require moral judgement and argument, 
they know better how to perform as moral agents. The experience 
available to the agent depends on his society; the cultural aspect 
we call morality is really quite sophisticated in our culture, even 
though everyone is involved.
213. Cf. Toulmin, S., "The Concept of 1 Stages’ in Psychological
Development", in Mischel, op. cit., pp. 25-60; this is a reply to 
Hamlyn, op. cit.
Toulmin disagrees with Hamlyn more on method - some blend of the 
empirical and the conceptual is unavoidable (cf. pp. 25-26) - than 
on substance - Piaget underestimates the social, educational, and 
ethical aspects of child development (pp. 54-57). His position 
is not of direct concern to us insofar as it relates to procedure
within a science.
However, concerning developmental psychology, Toulmin's point 
(pp. 37-41) seems to be this. We could not say what learning a
1concept, C, is unless we could say what it is for a person, P, to 
have C; but equally we could not say what having C is unless we 
could say what it is for P to learn C. The heart of the problem, 
he states, is that criteria of cognitive grasp are complex and 
content-dependent and vary with different stages of life. So one 
task of studies in cognitive development is "to map the changing 
constellations of skills in terms of which we are to apply cognitive 
terms to human beings at different ages and stages of intellectual 
development”.
Toulmin's claim that there are different constellations of skills
at different stages is largely acceptable. Ordinary language has 
a stock of terms referring to stages (e.g. "childhood”, "adolescence" 
etc.), but is somewhat lacking in terms for activities and skills 
peculiar to stages and draws much coarser distinctions than are 
drawn in developmental psychology. It is quite psssible that 
finer distinctions with a (perhaps remote) biological foundation 
and labels for activities peculiar to stages should be a welcome
addition.
But it is misleading to call the activities skills and even worse 
to suggest knowledge peculiar to each stage. There is not an 
adult skill and a childhood skill, but rather, perhaps, a way a 
child can get by in a certain endeavour until he has mastered 
the skill. And there is not an adult, e.g..9 mathematics and a 
childhood mathematics, but rather conceptually less difficult 
branches and techniques of mathematics which the child must
first master.
214. For example, classical mechanics gives predictions very close to
those of relativistic mechanics for velocities small in comparison 
to c. Similarly, phenomenal thermodynamics gives predictions very
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216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
close to those of statistical thermodynamics if one considers only 
large systems in which local variations are very improbable.
Cf. Popper, op. cit., Chapter 6, "Of Clouds and Clocks”, pp. 206-255. 
Popper’s point is that some concepts are ”cloud-like" - the sort of 
precision envisaged in the Laplacean universe does not fit - while
others are "clock-like”.
Reflections on Language, pp. 72 (referring to Strawson) and 73 
(referring to Searle and Grice). Searle, J., "Chomsky’s Revolution 
in Linguistics” (originally published in The New York Review of 
Books, 1972), in Harman, op. cit., p. 31: "The study of speech 
acts is indeed the study of a certain kind of human behavior, but 
for that reason it is in conflict with aiy form of behaviorism, 
which is conceptually incapable of studying human behavior".
"Some Empirical Assumptions in Modern Philosophy of Language", in 
Morgenbesser, S., Suppes, P. and White, M. (eds.), Essays in Honor 
of Ernest Nagel, Philosophy, Science and Method, New York,
St. Marin’s Press, 1969, pp. 275, 279, 281.
Reflections on Language,.pp. 179-186.
ibid., pp. 200-201. "Some Empirical Assumptions in Modern
Philosophy of Language", pp. 264-265.
Reflections on Language, pp. 166-171.
Language and Mind, pp. 190-191.
ibid., pp. 191-192.
Searle, op. cit., pp. 24-26.
ibid., p. 29.
Reflections on Language, pp. 64-67 (directed at Strawson, Meaning 
and Truth, London, O.U.P., 1970), pp. 67-71 (directed at Grice, 
"Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", Philosophical Review, 1969,
pp. 147-177) and pp. 73-76 (directed at Grice, "Utterer’s Meaning,
Iii
Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning”, Foundations of Language, 1968, 
pp. 225-242).
226. ibid., p. 60.
227. A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1968, p. 2.
228. op. cit., pp. vii-ix.
229. E.g. Reflections on Language, pp. 24, 35; Language and Mind, . 
pp. 73-74, 168.
230. E.g. Language and Mind, pp. 27, 45; Reflections on Language, 
pp. 30-33.
231. op♦ cit., p. 73.
232. ibid., p. 20.
233. ibid., pp. 71-72.
234. ibid., p. 88.
235. ibid., pp. 339-340.
236. ibid., p. 209. In Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge, C.U.P., 
1973, p. 3) he claims that a belief is ’’literally a map in the 
believer’s head” by which he steers and the totality of his beliefs 
is a great map with his present self as reference point. This 
requires qualification (p. 5): firstly, general beliefs are habits 
of inference and involve no spatial reference; secondly, beliefs, 
unlike other maps, are intrinsically representative - they need no 
interpretation and cannot be misread.
237. Armstrong holds that deep structure is not specifically linguistic, 
but rather a belief to be expressed in words (ibid., p. 34).
Indeed, no conceptual tie between beliefs and their expressions is 
admitted (ibid., p. 25; Materialist Theory, pp. 340-341); he even 
conceives it possible that a dog should believe that Goldbach’s 
conjecture is true (Belief, Knowledge and Truth, p. 32).
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238. Materalist Theory, pp. 138-141. Human devices require concepts, 
for we can acquire information, that is (sic), beliefs about 
objects, events, etc., only as they are brought under concepts.
But concepts are simply capacities for acquiring capacities for 
selective behaviour towards particular objects on particular 
occasions (ibid., pp. 339-340).
239. If A,> perceives an x, then that x must be the cause of A’s perception, 
but further, there must be some resemblance between what the per-, 
ception is taken to be and what causes it (ibid., p. 230). And
if a true belief acquired in perception is reliable in the sense 
that the existence of the cause is a strong condition for acquiring 
the belief, then that belief constitutes knowledge (ibid. / pp. 237-238)
240. ibid., pp. 115, 231-232. Indeed, Armstrong states that we ’’must 
see our cognitive relation to our own mind as like our cognitive 
relation to anything else in nature" (ibid., p. 115).
241. ibid., p. 324.
242. ibid., p. 326. Introspection is needed to appraise feedback (in 
perception) and our current mental stage (as when we do a calcula­
tion in our head) (ibid., p. 367). Also, since secondary qualities 
(colours, sounds, etc.) are explained away by physicists, they can 
be neither in the objects nor, since the mind is a physical object, 
in the mind; so they must be properties of physical objects or 
processes as described by physicists (ibid., pp. 272-273).
243. Belief, Knowledge and Truth, pp. 204-205.
244. Armstrong states that attributions of belief such as in the truth 
of Goldbach’s conjecture to a dog are usually taken to be idle 
without linguistic criteria (ibid., p. 33). But, he claims (ibid., 
p. 34), neurophysiology can supply the criteria.
245. op. cit., pp. 9-16.
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He thus avoids the behaviourist commitment, due to restriction to 
actual inputs, to deny "that we sometimes act the way we do because 
that seems the best way to act given what we take to be the 
options" (ibid., p. 31).
ibid. pp. 31-32.
ibid. pp. 28-29.
ibid. pp. 34-41.
ibid. pp. 42-51.
ibid. p. 50.
ibid. p. 118.
ibid. p. 117; cf. p .
ibid. pp. 73-78.
ibid. pp. 52-53.
ibid. p. 71.
It is noteworthy that when Fodor calls on syntax for the language 
of thought (when discussing concept formation and perception in 
terms of the simplicity metric) he must rely solely on linguistic
data.
ibid., pp. 65-67.
ibid., pp. 65-68. The fact that the machine is built to use the 
machine language guarantees that the sequence of states 
and operations it runs through in the course of its compu­
tations respect the semantic constraints on formulae in 
its internal language. What takes the place of a truth 
definition for the machine language is simply the engineering 
principles which guarantee this correspondence.
The human case is treated similarly, where the CNS takes the place 
of the computer’s hardware (we can imagine an organism "born 
speaking whatever language its nervous system uses for computing”)
Iv
and the compiler uses biconditionals of the form 
'y is a chair' is true iff x is G,
where ”G” is in the machine language. To the objection that we 
could stop sooner and use the predicates of the natural language, 
he simply replies that 'is a chair’ is learned, G is not.
260. ibid., p. 79.
261. Fodor shows the misconception of Wittgenstein’s position typical 
of Chomsky and his followers, viz. that Wittgenstein, like 
Skinner, holds that language use is determined by environmental 
factors. For he states that Wittgenstein's picture of coherence
is that "a term is coherently employed when its use is controlled ... 
by the facts about the world” (ibid., p. 71). This ignores very 
central aspects of Wittgenstein’s position, such as the view that 
many of our words do not pick out properties "in the world” but 
are applied in a spectrum of cases which have only a ’’family 
resemblance”; it also ignores the difficulties Wittgenstein points 
out in the notion of the same use or application of a word or 
rule (cf. the article by Norman Malcolm reprinted in Jones, D. R. 
(ed.) The Private Language Argument, pp. 45-47. I found this 
article (pp. 33 ff.) helpful for the following paragraph).
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271. ’’Are Dispositions Lost Causes?”, Analysis, October 1970, p. 17.
272. ”0n One’s Mind”, Philosophical Quarterly, October 1970, p. 353.
273. ibid., p. 355.
274. Byrne, R. W., "Memory for Urban Geography", Quarterly Journal for 
Experimental Psychology, 1979, pp. 47-54.
275. ibid., p. 53.
276. E.g. "From the T-junction, there are two intersections to which 
one could go: a T-junction and an intersection with roads leading 
in four directions". This could be represented as: T-*TS.
277. To account for the cases where an agency is located along a path 
to another, one could introduce rules telling one, e.g., to turn
to the left and enter.
278. Notice that any general properties are due to the fact that no 
spatial or temporal context is specified; any time in A’s life, 
if we put him, e.g., in a sufficiently large playing field and 
present him with an empty milk bottle, he will go through his paces.
279. This holds only in the context of the error in question. We might 
blame him for, e.g., not eating properly if this is seen to have
led to his blindness.
280. For example, if overshooting the turn caused a traffic accident,
A might be charged with negligence. He would not be held . 
responsible for going blind; indeed, the charge might be dismissed 
when his behaviour - his error - is accounted for by his sudden
■ blindness.
281. If internal structures "malfunctioned" in the majority of cases, 
they would not be the sort of things which perform the sort of 
functions attributed to them. A prototype aeroplane might mal­
function in the majority of cases; this is because it does not 
perform its intended function. But natural things do not have
lvii
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
intended functions.
A species of bird is sensitive to the earth’s magnetic field, an 
adaption exploited in migration. This fact is sometimes stated by 
saying that the birds use an internal compass. But they cannot 
make errors in simply reading the compass, nor do they learn to use 
the compass. We can explain their migration by their sensitivity 
to the earth’s magnetic field, but they do not know how to use 
their compass in migration (or anything else). Arthritics’ 
sensitivity to changes in barometric pressure is similar. We can 
imagine the case in which physiology certifies the appropriateness 
of a certain sort of behaviour by relating it to the functioning 
of an internal structure which comes into play under certain sorts 
of environmental circumstances in which this behaviour typically
occurs. But we would not use that structure and its malfunctions
would not count as errors.
Cf. Kohlberg, op. cit. , pp. 226-232 for this instanced in the case 
of morality. E.g. subjects at his highest level of development 
cheat less, although they are no more opposed to cheating than 
others, who as well can recite the relevant rules. Kohlberg’s 
explanation is that the more advanced are "sensitive to new 
aspects of the moral situation" - e.g. they count it as cheating
even when the adult leaves the room. Thus the more advanced more
easily deal with situations which are socially ambiguous (e.g. as 
portrayed in Lord of the Flies) or when moral expectations break
down.
Miller and Chomsky, "Finitary Models of Language Users", p. 485. 
E.g. Reflections on Language, p. 12 and many other places.
This view is presented in Reflections on Language, pp. 24-27. It
is implicit in his programme from the start. He comes close to
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formulating it in Aspects, p. 25, but appears to back down on p. 26. 
But the example used here - ability to play chess - is presented in 
the later work (p. 27) as lying on the boundary of cognitive 
capacity.
287. Reflections on Language, p. 35; cf. p. 139.
288. ibid., p. 21; cf. p. 35.
289. I am supposing here that we learn the Martians’ language, and so 
are in their presence. We might instead attempt to establish 
communication with extraterrestrial intelligence by sending out 
radio signals with high negentropy relative to our background 
radiation and encoding distributions mi 'micking structures (e.g. of 
silicon or carbon based .molecules) we have reason to think are
common where life might have arisen. What we would communicate 
in, however, would be very different from a natural language.
Here we would begin with an exchange of esoteric knowledge; the 
basic vocabularies would still remain mutually unintelligible.
290. This is also the case when we say an object can do something or 
other; e.g. a heating system can turn itself off in response to 
an increase in ambient temperature.
291. There are two exceptions to this. Firstly, we sometimes personify 
species and treat their various capacities as developments from a 
common nature. Secondly, when an animal has been injured and has 
lost an ability it has had from birth, we sometimes say that it 
knows how to do the activity in question when it regains this 
ability. For example, a person who has had a lung injury and 
requires an external assistance for breathing is said to know how 
to breathe when he has made the sufficient adjustments to get by 
without the assistance; development occurs here also.
292. Reflections on Language, p. 4, passim. And when he speaks of innate
lix
structures, these are held not to come into play until triggered 
by environmental conditions; this is his major point in Cartesian 
Linguistics, pp. 59-72, where he rightly insists that seventeenth 
century innatist theories were dispositional.
293. Popper (Objective Knowledge) has suggested that the eye from birth 
incorporates a theory. He also maintains that this knowledge is 
the result of trial and error. In this case, the trials are muta­
tions and the errors are biological forms which fail to survive. 
However, species-specific equipment resulting from evolution does 
not count as knowledge, for the species-as-a-whole, let alone its 
evolutionary sequence, cannot display behaviour. To be fair, I 
must add that this is what Popper calls subjective knowledge, 
which is not of great interest for his general account.
294. Peter Abell (’’Mathematical Sociology and Sociological Theory”, in 
Rex, J., Approaches to Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
1974, pp. 92-93) gives the following summary of what the mathemati- 
zation of a discipline does not imply as a way of showing the applica 
bility of mathematics to sociology.
First, the use of mathematics does not necessarily rest upon 
ideas of quantity and measurement unless we use the last term 
in the broadest possible sense. Many - perhaps most - 
mathematical systems are essentially qualitative in nature 
and, if the expression will be permitted, it is qualitative 
mathematics that will be emphasised ... Second, and in a 
similar vein, mathematics does not imply "exactness" or 
"precision" in the phenomenon it is supposed to reflect; one 
can "build in" imprecision into the mathematics one uses if 
the phenomena warrant it. In fact, ... we often have to be
imprecise in our theoretical analyses, since the full
2941
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microstructural complexity of social phenomena is not open 
to systematic theoretical treatment at a sociological level 
of analysis. This being the case, it is only by the use of 
a disciplined theory (and technique) of "information surrender" J
that a programme of a genuine theoretical nature can be 
established. Third, there is no necessary connection between 
the use of mathematics and determinism. Fourth, despite many 
claims to the contrary, mathematical systems can be devised ;•
for handling the realm of "meaningful social action". £
"Meaning", "verstehen", "situational logic" and so on are «
not exclusive of formal treatment. Fifth, the complexity of -i
"I
phenomena, far from ruling out the use of mathematical formu­
lations, often necessitates it; though the triumphs of mathe­
matics in the physical sciences ... should not be taken as in 
any way paradigmatic. And on the sixth count, there is, thus, 
no simple equation between the use of mathematical thinking 
and what is loosely termed positivism.
D. K. Lewis, op. cit., explicates the notion of convention in terms
of games of pure coordination, in which the agents’ interests coin­
cide perfectly.
In Essays in Sociological Theory (Free Press, 1949) he analyses
professional rules. These define conditions of entry, demarcate
the boundaries of the profession, prescribe the rights and
obligations of practitioners in relation to the society, etc. But
they also establish relations between the professional practitioner
and his client, e.g. opening channels of information.
Cohen, P. S., Modern Social Theory, London, Heinemann, 1968, p. 65.
Doreian, P., Mathematics and the Study of Social Relations, London,
4
Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1970, p. 39.
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298. ibid., p. 52.
299. ibid., p. 90.
300. ibid., p. 99.
301. For the relation of action theory to functionalism, cf. Cohen,
op. cit. , pp. 93-94.
302. ibid., p. 69.
303. The Social System, The Free Press, 1951.
304. Cohen, op. cit., p. 126.
305. Cohen (op. cit., p. 26) calls this "one of the greatest contribu-
tions to the development of social theory".
306. ibid. , p. 151.
307. ibid., p. 153.
308. ibid., p. 154.
309. Purely in terms of social institutions, Cohen (ibid., pp». 151-152)
gives three ways components can be related relevant to their inte­
gration. Firstly, there is the degree to which one social process 
contributes to the operation of others. For example, education 
differentials buttress those of wealth, power and prestige.
Secondly, there is the way "in which, and degree to which, different 
features of social life can coexist without obstructing one another’s 
operations". For example, certain features of Japanese family life 
apparently coexist with historically superimposed industrial con­
ditions. Finally, there is a "psychological correspondence between 
different ideas, norms and symbols of a culture, so that they con­
stitute a consistent pattern".
Cohen adds (ibid., p. 152) three ways in which sets of norms are 
integrated and modified in the process. Two correspond, respectively, 
to the first and the last ways listed in which components are related 
relevant to their integration: if different sets of norms affect
Ixii
~ the same persons interacting with one another and these norms govern
activities which assist one another, then there will be pressure to 
make the norms mutually reinforcing; and if different sets of norms 
have meaningful connections for those who share them and they are 
internalized by the same people who commonly interact, then 
individuals will tend to produce some correspondence between them. 
The third way Cohen lists in which norms are integrated and thereby 
modified is, if different sets of norms separately elicit con­
flicting interests and also affect the same person, then there is 
pressure to resolve the conflicts by adapting the norms.
310. Parsons and his followers maintain that there are "functional
prerequisites" - conditions necessary for the operation of a social 
system - one of which is that a social system must socialize the 
young so they develop either specific motivations to conform to 
specific norms or a general need to conform to norms.
311. ibid., pp. 91-92.
312. Homans, G. C., "Bringing Men Back In", American Sociological Review, 
1964, pp. 809-818; reprinted in Ryan, A. (ed.), The Philosophy of 
Social Explanation, London, O.U.P., pp. 50-64.
313. An example given (ibid., p. 62) of such a proposition is: "Men 
are more likely to perform an activity, the more valuable they 
perceive that activity to be".
314. Chomsky points this out in Reflections on Language, p. 218.
315. Cartesian Linguistics f pp. 3-5.
316. ibid., p. 103.
317. ibid., pp. 3-13.
318. ibid., pp. 59-72.
319. Reflections on Language, pp. 217-220.
320. Language and Mind, pp. 7-8.
Ixiii
321. Cartesian Linguistics, pp. 31-51. Cf. p. 103j_
The Cartesian origins of the concern for a "grammaire 
generale" (expressing what is a common human possession) 
and a ’’grammaire raisonnee" (which will explain facts 
instead of merely listing them) are too obvious to require
discussion.
322. Review of Brekle’s edition of Grammaire generale et raisonnee, 
Language, 1969, pp. 343-364.
323. p. 33; cf. Language and Mind, p. 18.
324. Language and Mind, pp. 15-16.
325. Cartesian Linguistics, p. 2.
326. "The History of Linguistics and Professor Chomsky", Language,
1970, pp. 576-585.
327. Review of Language and Mind, Language, 1973, 453-464; reprinted in 
Harman, op. cit., pp. 201-218. Cf . p. 205:
... Locke is clearly Cartesian in all relevant respects ... 
unlike Descartes, he went on to develop a theory of mind 
that was independent of physical theory.
328. Cartesian Linguistics, pp. 7-9.
329. "On the Non-Existence of Cartesian Linguistics", in Butler, R. J. 
(ed.), Cartesian Studies, Oxford, Blackwells, 1972, p. 144.
330. op. cit., pp. 67-69. On p. 27 he quotes from Passmore,
Ralph Cudworth, C.U.P., New York, 1951, p. 8: "it is still not 
misleading to call Cudworth a Cartesian, so great was their agree­
ment in so many vital issues".
331. op. cit., pp. 60-62.
332. For biographical material, an analysis of De Veritate and a view 
on its influence, see the Introduction (pp. 9-66) to M. Carre’s 
translation, Bristol, 1937. We follow the third edition, 1646,
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333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
including De Causis Errorum (separately paginated), lacking a 
place of publication. Carre’s translation is also of the third 
edition, London, 1645 (De Causis Errorum is a later work and con­
siderably clearer than De Veritate; unfortunately, there is much 
in the latter not covered in the former). For the point in the 
text, cf. De Veritate, p. 61.
See the Fourth Meditation, where human error is explained by his 
theory of judgement, hence not only exonerating God, but also 
putting the will at the centre of the account of human activity. 
op. cit., p. 72.
ibid., pp. 3-4, 16, 34, 38.
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
p. 39.
pp. 113-114.
pp. 111-113.
pp. 114-116.
pp. 37, 61.
p. 72.
pp. 37, 60.
p. 62.
pp. 113-114.
pp. 47, 97.
QEuvres de Descartes, Adam, C. and Tannery, P. (eds.), Paris, 
1897-1910 (henceforth "AT”), T.II, pp. 56, 570-571, 596-599.
"Ad Librum D. Edoardi Herberti Angli, Epistola", Petri Gassendi 
(Opera), T.III: Opuscula, 1658, pp. 411-419.
De Causis Errorum, p. 5; De Veritate, p. 38.
Aspects, pp. 49-50. Reflections on Language, p. 219, where he 
states that he agrees with Leibniz on innate and unconscious
principles and ideas. Cartesian Linguistics, note 111 (to p. 62),
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which indicates the standard of some of Chomsky’s interpretation: 
Leibniz's view (Discourse on Metaphysics, 26) that "the 
mind at every moment expresses all its future thoughts and 
already thinks confusedly of all that of which it will ever 
think distinctly" might be regarded as suggesting the 
fundamental insight regarding language (and thought)
on which generative grammar is based.
In Language and Mind, p. 120, he suggests that Wilkin's Essay 
Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (1668) is 
an attempt "to develop a universal phonetic alphabet and a 
universal catalogue of concepts in terms of which, respectively, 
the signals and semantic interpretation for any language can be 
represented". In fact, this says nothing about innate components. 
It involves such for Leibniz, but the reasons he gives are con­
ceptual, not biological.
Cf. Couturat, L., La Logique de Leibniz, Paris, Alcan, 1901, 
pp. 33-50.
Herbert's version was held to generate questions.
Cf. Zirngibl, R., "Die Idee einer formalen Grammatik in der 
Dissertatio de arte combinatoria von G. W. Leibniz (1666)",
Studia Leibnitiana, 1973, pp. 102-114.
Brekle, H. E., "Die Idee einer generativen Grammatik in Leibnizens 
Fragmenten zur Logik", Studia Leibnitiana, 1971, pp. 141-149. 
Brekle reads a great deal into the text. When Leibniz speaks of 
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the History of Ideas, 1961, p. 323.
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(ed.), Berlin, 1875-1890, B.VII, p. 67 (written in May 1686).
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entitled "Grammatica Generalis" (pp. 265-279) and concluded with
a tract called "Delineatio Grammaticae Germanicae" (pp. 371-372),
a rarity for its day. The ars magna is presented in the section
entitled "Cyclognomica, et imprimus ars Lulliana" (pp. 2328-2337);
related subjects are presented in sections "Ars Copiae Rerum"
(pp. 2338-2340) and "Analytica" (pp. 2341-2344); more distantly
related are "Ars Copiae Verborum" (p. 2338) and "Polygraphia"
(pp. 2340-2341). The art of memory was highly developed in
Alsted’s day, and is presented in the section "Mnemonica" 
s(pp. 1959-1978). Alsted presents the Kabbala as/rule-governed, 
symbolic ars (pp. 2270-2273).
358. Language and Mind, p. 5.
359. Cf. Robinet, A., "Leibniz, 1’automate et la pensde", Studia 
Leibnitiana, 1972, pp. 285-290.
lxxii
360. Leibniz in effect reverses the relation of hardware to software, 
having extended things founded on monads.
361. Cf. Cooper, D. E., "Innateness: Old and New”, The Philosophical 
Review, 1972, p. 473. On p. 466 he states that his "aim in this 
paper is to show that Chomsky and Katz considerably exaggerate 
the similarities between their hypothesis and the old one ...”.
On p. 483 he states that "the basic difference behind different 
innateness hypotheses" largely explains the lack of affinity between
old and new innatism.
362. ibid., pp . 474-475. I change Cooper’s point some.
363. ibid., pp . 476-482. Again I change the points somewhat.
364. Reflections on Language, p. 218.
365. ibid., p. 224.
366. ibid., p. 226. •
367. ibid., p. 166. He speaks of Leibniz holding that knowledge
"accessible to consciousness”. In the same passage he refers to 
Hume on instincts as another precedent.
Replying to the charge that his position is incompatible with 
Descartes’ because the latter does not allow for the possibility 
of unconscious knowledge he states (p. 217)
... the notion "unconscious cognization" is crucial to my 
system ..., but I am not at all sure that Descartes would 
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the matter. True, Descartes seems to insist that knowledge 
is accessible to consciousness, but on this entirely dif­
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must depart from the classical traditions.
Chomsky also states on pp. 162-163 that the system of rules and 
principles is unconscious and inaccessible to introspection. He
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organism. This illustrates perfectly the difference between 
Chomsky and the rationalists. Descartes' key.move in the Third 
Meditation depends on the fact that God (he is here talking about 
divine science) is infinite, while we are finite; yet he holds that 
we share the same vis cogitandi. Malebranche's most frequent 
argument against the view that ideas are in us is that the "system 
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368. Thus Descartes does not conclude that the mind is distinct from
the body until he has clear and distinct notions of body. Similarly, 
Malebranche’s proof for the distinctness of the soul is that thought 
cannot be explained by mechanical activity.
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the verbum mentis. Cf. C.C., op.cit.t Cap.VII, Q.III, Art.II for the 
identification of the verbum mentis with both the species expressa and
the conceptus and Ibid., Art. l'V for its identification with the
expressa imago rei.
112. A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Digge (ed.), Oxford, 1968, p.2f: 
"Mr. Locke.. ,perverted(the word "idea”), in malting it stand for all our 
perceptions."
113* ibid. "By the term of impression I would not be understood to express 
the manner, in which our lively perceptions are produced in the sou]., 
but merely the perceptions themselves; for which there is no particular 
name either in the English or any other language, that I know of, " Cf. 
ibid... p. 1: "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves 
into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The 
difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness 
with/
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with which they strike upon the mind... By ideas I mean the faint 
images of (impressions) in thinking and reasoning...”
114. Exercitationum physicarum Decina Quart a, De Anima Sensitiva .... Praeside 
M.J. Francis: Respondente J. Sculteto, Francofurti 1624, art. xxiii.
115. De Anima. Gap. Il, Q. Ill, Art. I.
116. They support the need for a common sense, even though there are no sensihles 
proper to it, with three arguments (ibid). Firstly, nature is wont to 
reduce a multitude to a unity. Secondly, not only men, but also beasts 
cognise that they hear, see, etc., so this reflective faculty must be 
referred to some higher, but still material faculty. Finally, since each 
external sense is concerned only with its own proper sensibles, there must 
be some sensitive appraiser and arbiter which discerns and distinguishes 
the objects of the diverse senses and (appealing to diseases and other 
physical disruptions which interfere with the function of external senses) 
which governs the communication of animal spirits.
117. ibid.
118. ibid. Art, V.
119. ibid., art. II and Encyclopaedia, Physicae Pars VI, Gap. II (pp. 738-7.39).
120. ibid. Some held that the Facultas cogltatlva (aestimatlva in brutes) is . 
distinct from the phantasy. The Coimbrians (G.G. De Anima, op.cit., Art III, 
following Cajetan and Fonseca) rejects this third faculty. A division is 
made by the Coimbrians (ibid., Ar^. II), Alsted (op.cit.), and Scultet .s 
(op.cit.. artt, XXXIV and XXXV) between the common sense and the phantasy
in its judicative function on the one hand mid the facultus conservans 
or memory on the other.
121. op.cit., Art. II, Cf, Harris, John, F.R. S., Lexicon Tech!cum: or, an 
Universal English Dictionary of Arts and.Sciences..., London, 1704, 
article "memory”. ’’Memory is the Faculty of the Soul, which repeats 
things perceived by former sensations ... and is as it were the Store­
house of our Ideas.”
122. Alsted, ibid., Scultetus, ibid.
123./
lxxxvi
123. De Anlma, III, IX, 8. His reasons are as follows (ibid., 10): Species 
of external sense, but not of internal sense depend on their objects both 
as processes of sensation ("in fieri”) and as products (”in facto esse”). 
Species are proportionate to their powers and internal and external 
senses are two different powers. Internal species differ from external 
sensations because the actus vitalis is different from the species as a 
disposition (’'const!tuens potentiam in actu primo”): there is not a 
quality - e.g., specie - produced in the cognition of external species 
distinct from the cognition of these senses itself, (ibid., 10) If 
there is a species as a disposition produced in a power, it is produced 
per actionem cognoscendi; so species of internal sense are from external 
sense by a mediating act of cognition ("medio actu cognitionis”) and are 
not got from the external object by the mediation of species, (ibid.) 
External sensation (’’sensatio”) produces a species in internal sense as
a perfect similitude of itself and this is conserved in the internal 
sense, (ibid).
124. ibid.
125. ibid.
126. Language and Logic in the Post-Mediaeval Period, Dordrecht, 1974, p. 28,
127. Harris, op.cit., article ’’Conception”?
CONCEPTION, is the simple Apprehension, Perception or Idea that we 
have of anything, without proceeding to affirm or deny anything 
about it.
128. op.cit., T.VI, p. 218,
129. Historia Philosophica Doctrinae de Idels Augustae Vindelicorum,
aoud. D.R. Mertz et ICIC Mayer, 1723, pp. 236-237.
130. De Anima, III, VI, i. An orthodox summary of the position on the 
three operations of the intellect in seventeenth-century Scholasticism 
is provided by the Coimbrians (in Unlv. Dial. Cap.I, Q.V., Art. II). 
Simple apprehension is simply conceiving the thing without negating or 
attributing anything to it; proposition ("proposition, the second 
operation)/
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operation) is attributing something to something or removing something 
from it; and in discursus or ratiocinatio we not only cognise and 
attribute something to the thing, but we also infer (’’colli gimus”) one 
proposition from one or more others by means of logical particles 
("interposita particula illativa” , e.g. "ergo” and "igitur”). Not the 
distinction between what is immediately and mediately apprehended (i.e, 
noetic and dianoetic), but the distinction between what is simple and 
complex is of importance for the orthodox Scholastic association of the 
second two operations of the intellect in opposition to the first. 
Burgersdijk (Burgerdicius, Fr., Institutionum Logicarum ..., Cantabrigiae, 
Ex Academiae celeberrimae typographo, 1637 p. 7) states that a thema, 
which is verbal, is what can be proposed to the intellect to be cognised. 
To cognise is to form a concept (’’conceptus”) or notion (’’rtotio”) of a 
thing. Simple them at a (e.g, ’’homo”, ’’currit”) are apprehended without a
complexity ("complexione”) of notions; complex themata are apprehended by two 
or more notions conjoined (”copulatis") by an affirmation or negation.
131. Suarez, loc. cit., 4.
132. ibid., 4 and 5
133. ibid., III, VII, 6.
134. ibid., 7. He claims this to be the common view.
135. De Anima, Cap, ill, Q. II, Art. II.
136. op. cit,, Physicae Pars VI, Cap. II, Reg. VIII.
337. De Anima, III. VII, 10.; cf. ibid., 6.
138. MV, II, 18.
139. Ill, XII, 8.
140c LX, I, 16; cf. ibid., Index Locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis,
L. VI, Cap. II, Q.3.
!41. De Anima, III, VII, 6.
142. ibid.
143. op.cit. T.VI, pp, 229-232.
Bernier analyses phrases of the form "1'horarae just*’as "1'horame qui est 
juste/
144.
lxzzviii
juste”. cfc ibid., pp. 231-232. 
145 ♦ ibid., pc 241*
146. ibid.t pp.233-241.
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Chapter Vll
. Ross, W.D. Aristotle, 4th ed., London, Methuen, 1945, pp. 148-155 
I draw heavily from Ross for this paragraph.
. The terra vouj tTovTiko^ occurs nowhere in the writings of Aristotle, 
but the equivalent is given in re irolqtlkov and tc-noetlv rravrcc 
and by implication in the contrast with vouj rrccOr|Tn<os • Cf. Re Anima 
426 a 4, 45C a 12, and 450 a 24 and Hammond, .W.A., Aristotle’s 
Psychology, New York, Macmillan, 1907, p. lxxii.
. Ross* explanation of this analogy is as follows:
...active reason is a third thing, besides passive reason and 
the object, which has to be taken account of if we would under­
stand the fact of knowledge, as light is the third thing, besides
the eye and the object, which we must take account of if we would
understand the fact of sight,
. Roos finds that the passage after Aristotle’s statement that active 
reason is separable clearly implies
that active reason, though it is in the soul, goes beyond the 
individual: we may fairly suppose Aristotle to mean that it is
identical in all individuals.
The passage after thio is held to imply that the true nature of active
reason
is obscured during its association with the body, but exists in 
its purity when thi3 association is over.
And, from the next passage, considered in conjunction witn an earlier one, 
Ross concludes that for Aristotle memory and passive intellect in general, 
unlike active intellect, do not survive death.
. Very briefly: the Nlcomachean Ethics makes reference to an aspect of man
by which he has a plan or rule; in the Politics man is seen to differ from
other animals in that the State, which exists for moral and intellectual 
activity, is seen to exist by his nature; and a foothold in the Organon 
is gained by man qua social by the fact that rhetoric has aspects of 
dialectic (especially the topics) and politics*
I take most of the following history from Hammond, op* cit** pp* lxxi-lxxiv 
This is reported by Therm!stius, Paraphrasis liborgm de anima, on De Anima^
1X1, 5.
Comm* in Arist* lib* de anima, fol* 21 b*
Ross feels that such an interpretation is ruled out by the contrast 
Aristotle makes between the state of active reason during the life of the
individual and its state after the death of the individual. God is 
discussed as transcendent in Metaphysics /\ ; it seems (Ross concludes) 
that Aristotle thought of active reason in man as one of the highest 
members of a hierarchy, with God at the summit, but not as high as certain 
intelligences.
Avicenna interpreted the doctrine of active reason in terms of an emanation 
theory of the world, akin to Neo-Platonism. Intelligible forms are 
endowed with immaterial px*e~existence in pure spirits, the highest created 
intelligences* Prom these, they are passed rung>-by-rung to the last - 
active reason ("intelligentta agens”). Forms from the latter, which alone 
is immortal, combine qua intelligible forms with the sensible forms in 
individual passive intellects; they are also passed, as substantial forms, 
into material things. This dual filiation guarantees the success of 
cognition. AverroSs (the fore-most Arab exegete and very influential in 
the west) regarded both active (intellectus agens) and passive (Intelleetug 
materialis)reason as spiritual entities distinct from the body and each 
other. Active reason makes phastasmata intelligible; these are then 
received by passive reason. Both reasons ai'e the same throughout.
xci
Cf, Knowles, David, The Evolution of Medieval. Thought, London, Longmans, 
1962. .
Aquinas* view of Augustinianism as elements of Neo-Platoni3m compatible 
with Christianity is generally accepted as a broad outline. Still, 
Knowles (op,cit,, pp. 24-26; feels that Plotinus (the most important weo- 
Platonist, especially for Augustine/ drew some from Aristotle. And 
Knowles claims (ibid,, p. 214) that
Augustine’s divine illumination of the intellect..., though 
embedded in^ssentially Platonic noetic, recalls immediately 
the divine agent intellect of Aphrodisias...
Knowles, ibid., p. 218.
De Rebus Naturalibua, de mente agente, capp. 12, 13. Cf. Ross, op.cit., 
p. 152,
The Scholar in question is a certain Renan. He is mentioned in Hammond, 
op, cit., p. lxxv, referring to Brentano, Die, Psyohologie des Aristoteles 
Mainz, I867, p. 54»
XCZL1
V5” Ibid., 14-18; cf* C.C, loo.oit •, Art’s I and II, and Alsted, op. pit.,
1
Lib. XIII Physicae, Pars VI, Cap VII, Reg. II (p 764).
16 Suarez, De Anima, IV., VIII, I; cf* C.C., op. oit., Q.II, Art. II.
17 Suarez, ibid., C.C., ibid., -Q.III, Art.I.
Suarez, ibid., 2. -
H ibid., 1.
20 CsC. Loo, oit. Q. I, Art.II.
2.1 For Aquinas position, of. De Verity, I 4, ad 55 XI, 3 ad Resp. ; and 
XI, 1, ad ”Et ideo...*’.
2.2 De Anima, III, I, 1.
ibid., 5-6.
24- ibid., 2.
.95 ibid., 7 for the remainder of this paragraph.
F- —
^6 ibid., 7*
|<7 De Divinis Nominibus, cap. 7*
Super Senesim, 2, ad literam.
f
^9 op. cit., Cap. V, Q.I, Art. I, reporting Durandus, I sect., dist. 3, 
cjuaest. 5* .
30. op. oit., T. VI, p 329* 
fbid., pp 329-330.
3>2, ibid., p 330.
33 ibid
xciii
ibid
3&
36
37
40
4/
43
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
C.»Cw
loc.
, PP 330 and. 334.• 
, PP 330 and. 335- 
, P 359
, PP 359-360..
, P 361.
, pp 361-362.
, pp 290-291.
5 P 331.
3.0c. cit.
cit., p 334*
4-5 ibid., p 30.
6 ibid., p 43•
1+.7 ibid., pp 32-53.
4# ibid., p 47.
47 Leviathan, pp 15-16•
5(9 The English Works, /S’? 7- v#1, P*'
5/ ~ ibid., Vol. I, p 5 and vol. LV, p 10 and Opera Philosophica userH, erf,)?
One text (In llniv. Dial,, In Praefatlonem Porphyrii, Q.V., Art. II.) 
concerned, with the intelligible species as produced by the concourse of 
the phantasm with the intellectus agena is in their commentaries on 
Aristotle’s dialectic. The other two texts are in their commentary on 
De Anima, one concerned with the intelligible species (De Anima, Cap. II,
Q. Ill, Art.’s I-III.) the other with the concept (conceptus mentis).
(ibid., Cap. VIII, Q.V, Art’s I-II.) In the commentary on dialectic 
Scotus (maintaining singularity) is opposed to Aquinas (maintaining . 
universality). In the two texts in the De Anima. nominalists 
(e.g., Durandus, Burleigh and Richard) are added to Scotus and various 
Thomists (e.g., Cajetan, Capreolus, Farrariensis and Aureolus) are added 
to Aquinas. In the commentary on dialectic they state that they find 
these positions equally probable, which they state again in the text on 
intelligible species in the De Anima, adding, however, that they prefer 
the Thomist position as more Peripatetic, In fact, in the text on 
concepts they include Aristotle, Alexander, Themistius and AverroHs under 
those holding the Thomist position.
The intellectus possibllis distinguishes common natures by forming concepts 
proper to them in exercising singular dispositions or species. This is 
done (the position continues) either by cognising one singular, attending 
("intendendo”) only to the common nature and ignoring the individuating 
differences, or by cognising a number of singulars together, separating and 
forming a concept of that in which they agree. Thus concepts representing 
universals on this position are due to the exercise, not the inception, oF 
cognitive dispositions. The intellectus agena here performs only the ad 
hoc function of bridging the material and spiritual, faculties. Appeal is 
made to the eminence of the intellect to support the position that there
154.
55.
56.
57.
58*
59.
60.
61.
62.
65.
64.
65.
66.
67.
63.
4.
70.
7|-
72.
75.
75.
74.
are concepts of individuals in the intellect (ibid. Art. II.). There 
must be concepts of singulars, this position runs (ibid.), because the 
intellect posits an agreement or disagreement between a‘singular and a 
universal by virtue of their own principles ("rationes") and infers 
("colliglt") a universal proposition from a number of singular propositions
ibid., Cap. VIII, Q.V. Art. I.
ibid., Cap. V, Q. Ill, Art. I.
ibid.
ibid., Cap. V. Q. Ill, Art. II.
ibid., Cap. V. Q. Ill, Art. II.
De Anima, JV, III, 2-8.
ibid., IV, X, 1-4.
De Angelis, VI, VIII, 5*4.
De Anima, IV, III, 2-8.
ibid., IV, VIII, 5« He mentions only Theophrastus and Themistius and 
suggests that the Arabs Avemfpace and Averrofts held something similar. 
ibid., 4. He agrees with Aquinas that Avicenna takes the ideas of Plato 
as intelligible species.
5. T., I, I, Cap. XI.
De Anima, loc. cit., 7.
ibid., IV, VIII, 9.
ibid., 10? cf. C.C. De Anima, Cap V, Q. Ill, Art. I, "De alio...’*
S. T, I, 84, 5? cf. C.C. De Anima, Cap V, Q. I. Art. II.
De Anima, IV, VIII, 9.
ibid., 10.
ibid.
De.Angells, II, II, 14.
ibid., 9. • .
ibid., 14-15
<. t
xcva.
74*b. S> T,, I, 77» 2, ad Resp.
75.a. ibid,, 16.
75. b. Aquinas, De Anima, I, ad 18m, Etienne Gilson (Etudes sur le role de la
penaee medievale dans la formation du systeme cartesien, 2nd ed., Paris, 
Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1951, pp. 25-25) holds that this is 
coherent, but that, as Aquinas realised, lacks physical or physiological 
support. His successors tended to look for simple and gross solutions.
If they did not reject the intensional species (Ockham), they transformed 
it into a material vehicle for a spiritual quality. Eustochio a St° Paulo 
(1609) accepted the intensional species, but could not understand how some­
thing inhering in a corporeal subject could represent in a spiritual way.
76. a. be Anima, IV. VIII. 12.
76. b. De Anima, I, V, 4-5*
77. a. ibid., 15.
77*b. ibid., IV, II, 9-10. Cf. ibid., IV, VIII, 9, where he maintains the 
Intellectus agens does not produce a light ("lumen”) in the phantasm, but 
only in the intellectus possibilitis in producing the intelligible species. 
Cf. Cronin. T.J. Objective Being in Descartes and in Suarez, Typis 
Pontificae Universitatis Gregorianae, Roinae, 1966, pp. 70-84, where he 
presents an analysis of Suarez’ De Anima, concluding that the whole theory
emphasizes the gap between the phantasm and the intelleotua agens.
xcviie '
.7<g De Angelis, II, VI, 9-10 and. 12-13.
7^ De Anima, IV, II, 10-13♦
<gp. ibid.., IV, VIII, 13.
ft I Cube 11s, S. 0., Die Anthropologie des Suarez, Freiburg & Mtlnchen, 1962,
pp 190-193. .
82 De 'Anima,
to. ibid., 15
34 ibid., 12
85 ibid., 13
£6. ibid., 14
VI, VI, 6
ibid., 2.
ibid., 1.
qo- ibid., 4.
Gf. ibid.
by the intellectus agens because a species impressa is not a formal 
image and. in no way formally represents, but is a seed, or instrument 
of the object for effecting the formal intensional representation 
made by the conceptus mentis.
7^ ibid., 3.
? 5. .
cf^ ibid., 11.
ibid.
9 4. ;
• ?
G.G. De Anima, Gap. V, Q. V, Art. II. -
7# Gf. De Anima, III, II, 17, where he states that there is always a real
relation:.'rb.etween what represents and what is represented. Thus 
impossibles are cognised by species representing possible parts, 
entia rationis are framed finguntur" ) and cognised by species of
xcviii
the things in which they are founded, (given discourse and reflection 
of the intellect) and privations are known by the species of their 
positives, in the absence of which, the acts are locking.
n ibid., IV, III, 4-
ICO ibid., IV, Iv, 1-2.
p' ibid., 1.
\O2 ibid., 3.
ibid., 2.
lO4f ibid.« 3; cf. ibid.,
ibid.. 4.
Chapter VIII
1. I, IX, 32.
2. ibid., The Scholastic transcendentals - ens, unum, verum and bonum - 
are so called because they are not restricted to any of the ten 
categories.
3. ibid., 33.
4. ibid., 34.
5. For bio-bibliographical material, see Landes, M. VI., The Philosophical 
Writings of Richard Burthogge, Chicago and London, 1921, Introduction.
6. ibid., pp. 62-64, from An Essay upon Reason. Burthogge, a physician 
trained at Leyden, addressed his last published work (1699) to Locke, 
Landes (pp. xiii-xxiv) describes his method as uncritical Platonism 
except- in his Organum Vetus & Novum and An Essay upon Reason (1694), 
which Landes describes as an empiricism between Locke’s and Kant’s.
7. ibid., p. 4, from Organum Vetus & Novum. To illustrate this distinc­
tion, he states that we can recollect words either by sense, in 
retrieving the figures or images, or by reason or understanding, in 
recalling the sense or meaning of words.
8. ibid., pp. 11—12 and 14-16, from Organum Vetus & Novum, and pp. 66 and
/
68-70, from An Essay upon Reason.
9. ibid., p. 4, from Organum Vetus & Novum.
10. White had the pseudonyms Albius, Anglus, Blacke and Blacklow.
11. Digby was in Mersenne’s entourage in Paris when the Discourse was 
published in 1637, when he sent a copy to Hobbes. Cf. Nicholson, M. H., 
’’The Early Stages of Cartesianism in England”, Studies in Philology, 
vol. 26, 1929. Digby and White often "wrangled” with Hobbes: cf. the 
articles on them in The Dictionary of National Biography. Digby’s 
work of note is Of Bodies and of Man's Soul (i.e. Two Treatises, Paris,
1644), an attempt to prove the immortality of the soul from its
operations. The first treatise is a broad attempt to explain the 
corporeal world.
12. When Leibniz later related the decision he made in his fifteenth
year to follow the moderns, he referred to Digby, as he did throughout 
his life, most frequently in the late 1660’s in conjunction with 
White: cf. Couturat, L., La logique de Leibniz, Paris, 1901,
pp. 539-541. (Couturat confuses White with a certain Thomas Barton.) 
Leibniz listed Digby’s work as a supplement to Hobbes’ De Corpore in 
the proposal to revise Alsted’s Encyclopaedia. It is not unlikely 
that Leibniz got the notion (expressed in his correspondence with 
Thomasius) of considering Aristotalian substantial forms as the 
mechanical activities of bodies from Digby’s Two Treatises.
13. For Descartes’ relations with Digby, cf. AT III, p. 590; IV, pp. 209 
and 572; XI, pp. 35-37. Descartes, commenting on White’s De Mundo 
(AT III, p. 582), praised his metaphysics, although he disagreed 
fundamentally on certain physical matters.
14. Cf. J.S. , Non Ultra: or, a letter to a learned Cartesian; settling 
the Rule of Truth and First Principles, Upon their Deepest Grounds,
London, 1698. He is here particularly opposed to the Cartesian 
criterion of clear and distinct perception. For information on 
Sergeant, see: Bradish, Norman, C., Introduction (pp. 571-593) to 
his reprint of Non Ultra (pp. 593-628), The Monist, Oct. 1929. Any 
references are to the original edition of Non Ultra.
15. Cf• ibid., "Dedication” and p. 1 and Solid Philosophy Asserted Against 
the Fancies of the Ideists, London, Clevil, 1697, "Epistle Dedicatory”
16. Sold Philosophy is largely a chapter-by-chapter criticism of Locke’s 
Essay.
17. Cf. ibid., "Preliminary Fourth":
Now these Ideas of yours are the mind itself; and not the Immediate
ci
Work of the , on which (as had been shown) our Rule
is built: which gives ours and Infinite Advantage, above yours, as. 
to the stability of its Ground: Ours having, for its Solid 
Foundation, the Ideas in the Divine Understanding; whence are 
unquestionably Deriv’d, and by which are Establish’d the Essences 
of things, on which ours is Immediately Grounded ...
18. Cf. Non Ultra, ’’Dedication” and p. 1 and Solid Philosophy, ’’Epistle 
Dedicatory”.
!9. Digby, Of Man's Soul, pp. 7 and 16.
20. Ibid., p. 55; cf. his definition of "universal notion", ibid., pp. 11 — 12 
and White, T., Institutionum Peripateticum ad Mentem Summi Viri, 
Clarrissimique Philosophi Kenelmi Equitis Digbaei, Parisiis,
Federicum Leonard, 1655, p. 81.
21. Sergeant claims (Solid Philosophy, p. 27) that this is a Peripatetic 
concept perhaps paradoxical to a non-Pefipatetic.
22. Op♦ cit. , p. 3. It is agreed, he claims., that there must be some 
likeness or image of the thing in the mind of the apprehender; but a 
perfect likeness is the thing itself. Cf. White, op. cit., p. 1.
X3‘. ibid.., pp 17-18. To deem a thing such, he states, requires more
than just compositions of apprehensions. When we deem and proceed
. upon reason, the nature conceived becomes an active principle in us 
Thus settled judgment becomes a part of the soul.
•2.4* ibid., pp 1-3. When a thing is rightly apprehended, the apprehende 
can thereby make it as nature would.
5L5 ibid., pp 17-18. When our apprehensions are rightly ordered in a
discourse (syllogism or science), he writes, then they a.re ordered 
as they are in the thing.
26. Ibid., p. 30. •
27. Ibid., p. 50.
28. Digby states that "nihil est in intellectu quod fuit prius in sensu";
cii
this is to show that our soul is of an extremely different nature from 
our senses and imagination and to show how things are “so much changed 
by coming into the understanding and into the soul, that, although, on 
the one side, they be the very saim things, on the other side, there 
remains no likeness at all between them in themselves and as they are
• jf • “
in the understanding (op. cit. , p. 54).
Cf. the fifth chapter of On Mans Soul, *
3Q op. cit., p 107, from An Essay upon Reason?
...Mind., even the human, is not so properly said, to be an idea, 
as to be the principle ... of Ideas ... Thus it is in our 
Refracted, Inadequate, Real-Notional way of conceiving; and for 
an Adequate and just one, as it is above our faculties, so I do 
not find that Spinosa,' or Mai. Branche after all their ambitious 
Researches in the higher way have edified the World thereby to 
any great Degree. This way of seeing all things in God, and in 
their own proper Realities, is a way much out of the way. Other 
wise, when they keep the lower way of sense, many of their
thoughts are surprizing and excellent •
31 op. cit., T. VI, pp 286—287
3x ibid., p 284.
33. Ibid., p. 284-285.
34. Ibid., p. 338. E.g. the essence of man is "ce qui fait que 1’hoome est
horame”.
33 ibid., p 286.
De Anima, I, IX, 31 •
37 ibid., 35*
De Deo Uno et Trino, Tract. I, L. III, Cap. X, 2.
ibid., 7*
4-0 ibid., L. Ill, Cap. X, 2.
4 / ibid., L. Ill, Cap. Ill, 13-16.
42. ibid., L. Ill, Cap. V, 8. s
43. Ibid., 14.
44. Ibid. , Tract. II, Lit. I, Cap. IX, 2-3; ibid., Lib. IX, Cap. II, 4 and 
12-16.
4-5 ibid.. , Tract. I, Lib. III. Cap V, 8.
4-6 ibid,., Tract. II, Lib. IX, Cap. VI, 1-4 j 3, and. 21-22.
47 Prom Beast-Machine to Man-Machine, Hosenfield, L., New York, 1940, pp 19 
ibid.., p 19. •
4<7 ‘ De Anima, I, V, 3. He speaks of an opinion held, "nostra aetaten,
speaking in the plural of those who hold. it.
SO °P* cit., p 80.
0/- ibid.., p 75* She maintains (ibid.., p 76) that the predominant
thought of the eighteenth century was that the animal soul is non­
spiritual, but thinking. On pp 75-79 she presents J.?. Crousaz’s 
De Mente Humana (1726) and. D.R. Boulter1 s Essai philosophiciue sur 
PAme Aes Bates (1728), from which the article "Ase des Betes'' in 
the Encyclopedie was adopted., as compromises vindicating the popular 
belief that animals are not automata without introducing theological 
problems about immortality. Both maintain that the animal soul is 
spiritual, but has only those ideas necessary for the conservation 
of the body.
5X. op« cit., Vol. 11. pp 57-65. The second chapter of the second volume 
of the Theory is a classical presentation in English of animal
mechanism.
53. Sergeant distinguishes phantasms and notions by the fact that animals do 
not have notions (Solid Philosophy, "Preface”, 22). He emphasises the 
spirituality of notions (cf. ibid., p. 39) and states (ibid., pp. 24-27) 
that he uses "notion" instead of "idea" because "it is universal and 
always signifies our simple Apprehensions, or the first operation of 
our understanding ..."; "idea", on the other hand, signifies a bare
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resemblance or similitude and does not involve knowledge. Seargeant,
by the way, was not opposed to the new science; cf. Non Ultra,
"Dedication": '1
The Noble Sir Kenelm Digby, the Honourable Mr. Boyle, and some few 
others have rescu’d the university of their Peers from the imputa­
tion (of the neglect of learning)".
ibid. ,' "Preliminary First”, 22. .
ibid.., 4.
ibid.., ’’Preface”, 12.
op. cit., 2.
op, cit., pp 21-22.
op. cit., T. VI, pp 312-318. This, is a section entitled. ”Si les 
Brutes sont des pures machines”; it was written before the pub­
lication of Bayle’s Dictionaire and. its article on Pereira. 
op. cit., Vol. II, pp 63 and. 30-3l. .
loc. cit., 2.
Gf. Bntretiens sup la Metaphysique, XIV, XVII, Theodore’s speech on 
pp 246—247 of O.G. XII. 
loc. c 1 b ., 2 •
If the souls of beasts were immaterial, Norris writes, cit. , vol. II
pp 6O~6l and 67 ff.), they would be immortal. But how could souls 
made for bodies, being innocent, be in a state of happiness or misery 
after death? (ibid., pp 69-73) Transmigration only introduces addit­
ional problems (ibid., pp 71-73). If vie accept that beasts have mortal 
souls, we cannot prove our own immortality (ibid., p 63) or must 
accept the bizarre view that they are annihilated by God. immediate iy 
on quitting the body (ibid., pp 73-74)*
loc* cit • j
od. cit., Vol. II, pp 81-93.
C34.
67. °P ♦ cit., pp. 5-19.
68. op. cit. , pp. 60-61 and ’’Preliminary Fourth".
69. Norris (op. cit., vol. II, pp. 520-525) thinks it is a simpler hypo­
thesis to have the divine ideas as the immediate objects of thought 
rather than multiplying ideas, inventing intensional species, and 
introducing the inte’llectus agens (called a "Romantik Revery") to 
spiritualize what is supplied by the body. The Scholastics themselves, 
he continues, maintain that science is of necessaries and immutables; 
but only the divine ideas are such and nothing could be more represen­
tative. We see things in their eternal reason, Norris claims, because 
that intellectual light which is in us is nothing but a certain parti­
cipated similitude of the uncreated light, wherein the eternal Reasons
are contained. .
70. Disputationes Metaphysicae, Intro. to Disp. XXV.
71. ibid., XXV, I, 1.
72. ibid., Intro, to Disp. XXV.
73. De Deo Uno et Trino, Tract. I, Lib. Ill, Gap. V, 8.
74. • 5 • i 1 j 15? 1 *
75 op. cit., Vol. I, pp 136-137 and 182-183.
76. ibid., pp 16—17.
77. ibid., p 16.
78. Cf. op* cit., p 31: ”...if any man ... should imagine (the belief 
that knowledge has no limit) is but a Poetick Idea of Science, that 
never was nor will be in act...”; cf. ibid., pp 35? 52 and 89.
79. Ducange, C., Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis, editio nova,
Niort, 1883. *
80. op. cit., pp 74 ff *
81. Agnellus, S., Disceptationes de idels in tres libros distrihutae .
Venetiis, 1615.
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Cf. op. citp 85, where the following is quoted.: .
Idea est forma substar.tifica, divinae meriti objecta, quam 
agens per imitationem exprimit, et intuetur, quatenus rerum 
omnium exemplar et originem. I
op. cit., Intro, to Lisp XXV and ibid., XXV, I, 1; the references <
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are respectively to 1 ih A Quae st ior.um, in 4-6 and Metaph., c. 7. J
London, I. Legatt. Reprinted by English Linguistics, 1500-1300, 
selected and edited by R.C. .-.Iston, no. 11, Leeds, 1967*
Gilson, E., Rene Descartes: Discours de la methode; texte et <
commentaire, Paris 1925* • *
Blake, Ralph M., ’’Note on the Use of the Term Idee Prior to Descartes”, 
The Philosophical Review, Sept. 1939> P 532. The work is: L1 Incredulite' 
et mescreance di sortilege pleinement convaincue... Par P. de L’Ancre... ' 
Paris, Chez N.Bvon, 1622.
ibid., p 534. • • :
ibid., p 532. .
op. cit., XXV,I, 25-26. The argument for the position that ideas 
are formally or physically, r.ot objectively, in the intellect is in 
ibid., 5-25. Articles 17-25 argue for the position with regard to 
created intellects, viz. that exemplars of artifacts are formally 
not objectively, in them; articles 11-16 argue for it in the divine 
case, viz. that the divine ideas are the divine uncreated essence.
An idea, Suarez writes (ibid., 10), is not the thing known (taking 
•’thing” broadly) as an objecfurn quod, so it is not an ens rationis 
or a universal or abstract from; nor can it be something in re, for 
it Is only accidental to the causality of the artisan that what he r
intends to produce is a copy of something.
Cf. ibid., VIII, VII, 2>5 ".'..quia conceptus objectivus nihil praeter 
rem addit nisi denominations:?. termini conceptus formalis, Ideo non 
recte explicatur conformities inter rem et conceptum objectivum, sed
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inter rem potius et conceptual formalem seu ideam.”
Cf. ibid,, XXV, I. 17.
ibid..
op. cit ♦ , Metaphysicae Pars I, Ga,p. XXXII, Reg. Ill (p 609):
Est autem conceptus formalis ipsa intentio mentis sive actus 
intelligendi, quo quis rem intelligit, ut est cognitio hominis: 
seu, est idea et species, quae in mente effigiat ipsam rem 
cognitam. Conceptus objectivus est res, quae immediate con— 
cipitur, et est objectum conceptus formalis. Dicitur conceptus 
primus et not io prima: ut est homo cognitus.
Wundt (op. cit., pp 24-25) relates the position of Gutke (a Lutheran),
presented in his Disputationes practicae (1615)• Gutke maintained
that an idea, a signum formale or a signum conceptus, presents what
is in the concept. It is held that we cannot know things in individual
but must abstract ”e statu singularis in statum ideae”. With contents
from the senses, we are held to accomplish per actum reflexum what
angels do intuitively. A.C. Schubartus (’’Disputatio de Abstractione”,
sub praesidio D. W. Paulislevagti, Jenae, C. Freyschmid, I6p2)
presents the same position, referring to J. Martini and Fonseca’s
metaphysics (pll). One sort of abstraction () 9) is "deductio rei
sive objecti ex. statu singular it at is sive objectivo fundamental!, in
statum universalem sive ideae...” The status singularitat is is also
called "object ivus fundamental is” in so far as things are founded,
are rooted ("radioantur”) and exist in individuals.
Sic considerare aliquid in statu universali, est in idea seu 
definitive considerare et vice versa: cum idea hoc sensu nihil 
aliud sit, quam ratio ab intellectu concepta in intellectu 
alicuid multis,commune sistens.
He suggests calling this sort of abstraction "liberato rei a diff­
erent iis singularizantibus seu conditionibus individuantibus” becaw
res sint liberandae a conditionibus individuantibus, ac e statu 
individuali in statum idealem mente deducendae...
For the other sort of abstraction (p10) - "praecisio rei ab alia” —
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it does not suffice to know ("nosss"), e.g. the nature of man "in 
idea seu universaliter”, hut one must consider the essence of man, 
prescinding from all attributed to it beyond esse to arrive at a 
distinct conception of the thing.
15 °P* cit., Logicae Sect. Il, Cap. VI, Reg. I and II (p 432),
where he states that “indefinite axioms”, i.e. those without, a sign 
of quantity or a quantifier, play an important part in definitions, 
where they are called "propositiones de idea”. We do not say, he adds, ’ 
“Omnis homo est animal rationale” in giving a definition, hut “Homo
est animal rationale”.
Cf. ibid., Sect. Ill, Cap. V (p 448), where he calls an argument ■;
form ”a causa exemplari seu paradigmatica” ?
cum ex qualitate ideae colligitur qualite ideati; ut, Idea 
■est bona. E. ideatum bonum est..Vel ex ideae existentia 
actuali concluditur ideati existentia potentialis: ut,
Idea est. Ergo ideatum esse potest.
Cf. ibid., Technologia, -Reg. XVII (p 63), where he states that every 
discipline is considered either in idea or in subjecto. A discipline 
is considered either formaliter, as it simply is by its nature and 
genus, or as it is subjectively or compositively ("composite”).
What is by nature or in genus or idea is called “abstract”, otherwise
it is concrete.
<77 AT VII, pp 38-37.
ibid-- 9 PP ;79-l8o.
°P* cif* > T. m (Opuscula rhilosophica) Opusculum IV, .Pisquisitio 
Metaphysica adversus Carteslum (pp 269-410), P 322.
VQQ AT VII, p 72.
IOI op. cit., p 380.
I0Z ibid., pp 324-326
I 0 7? AT VII, p 273.
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op, cit. , pp 7 and. 606-607*
ibid., pp 606-607 •
op, cit., T. I, p 8.
AT. VII, p l8l.
AT VII, pp 160-161.
At VII, p 181.
Arnauld, A. and Nicole, P., La Logique ou lfArt de Penser, Ed-ition 
critique par Clair, P. and. Girbal, P., Paris, 1965? P 37•
Paris, Thierry, I69O. pp 169-170 188. ,
Heponse ajua Reflexions Critiques de M. du Hamel, Paris 1692, pp 14-16 
ibid.., pp 17-18. 
ibid,., pp 8-11.
Ed.itio quarta, Paris, 1694? PP 99-100*
op. cit., pp 323-333* 
ibid.., p 386 .
*** to Mersenne for Descartes, 19/3/1641, AT III, p 376*
ibid..
ibid.., pp 378-377*
Bthices ,Pars II, Prop. XLIX, Deni., Cor., and. Schol.; Opera,
Gebhardt (ed.), Heidelberg, Winter, Vol. II, pp 130-135.
ibid., Schol to Prop. XLIII; p 124.
op. cit., p 387.
To Mersenne fo- ***, July I64I; At III, p 392.
ibid., p 393.
ibid., p 395*
ibid. ,
ex.
CHAPTER XI
1. Cf. Hintikka, J., ” ’Cogito, Ergo Sum’: Inference or Performance,”,
Philosophical Review, 1962, pp 3—32; reprinted in Hintikka, Knowledge 
and the Known, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1974, pp 98-125. Hintikka maintains 
that the cogito is a special sort of performative: it is existentially 
self-verifying. Thus Descartes establishes his existence in the Second 
Meditation without drawing an inference, but by pointing out a pecul­
iarity of a speech act. (In these contexts, even while doubting 
whether he has a body, Descartes often uses locutions such as "profero" 
and ”tanquam dicerem”.) Hobbes* "Ambulo, ergo sum” is not parallel.
Hobbes suggested that one could as well establish sum res ambulans as 
Descartes' sum res cogitans Hintikka indeed feels that it is illicit 
to infer from the self-verifying performative to ’’sum res cogitans”. 
Still, what Descartes usually meant by "res" was not particularly 
capable of standing on its own and "substantia” referred to waht are 
more like concepts than separately operating things. Res cogitans 
sometimes resembles a bundle or sequence of speech acts and, as being 
conscious is like acknowledging one's own speech act, Descartes’ position
that we are conscious of all that is in the mind seems to exclude
anything tying the bundle together. Descartes, however, associates 
res cogitans with the traditional mind or rational soul, so he must 
think there is more to it; in which case, Hintikka is quite correct.
Hintikka maintains (pp 119-120) that the performative interpret­
ation ap lies to any "verb of intellection'' - e.g. "cogito”, but also 
"volo”, "dubito”, etc. - but that Descartes illicitly extends "cogitans" 
to cover sentiens, etc., and "sentio ergo sum", etc. do not support the 
performative interpretation. He cites (p 119) Koyre to the effect that 
"cogitare" was traditionally applied very widely, to cover will, 
feeling, judgment, perepetion, etc.
But "cogitare" and its derivatives were used very sparingly in
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the philosophical literature before Descartes. The most significant . 
example is the Scholastic ’’facultas cogitatrix", said to be an imago 
voluntatis and the highest material faculty. It was held to judge 
about what is good and bad in what is sensed. The close correspondence 
both to what happens in the body and the powers of the intellect are 
salient aspects of Descartes’ cogitatio as well. Furthermore, Descartes 
is very clear and definite that the essence of his nature (qua res 
cogitans) is reason and that cogitatio is a rational activity. Sensing, 
imagining, and the ’’passions” in general, on the other hand, while still 
in the mind, are due to its union with the body. This suggests that 
’’sentio", etc. are also verbs of intellection as used by Descartes, 
but require particular sorts of occasions,
Bernard Williams (Descartes, 1978, p 95-101) is concerned with 
’’the relation between the ’I think’ in the context of thought, and 
what is objectively involved in the state of affairs which constitute 
its being thought", (p 100) He considers the objection that the 
cogito with more justice would be called the cogitatus, and that one 
should speak of thought happenings. But "some concrete realization 
is needed, and even if it could fall short of requiring a subject who 
has the thoughts, it has to exist in the form of something outside 
pure thought itself’’. (p 100).
If we have no help from anything except the pure point of view of 
consciousness, the only coherent way of conceiving a thought 
happening it to conceive of thinking it. So, sticking solely to 
the point of view of consciousness, we are forced back to a 
position in which there is, in effect, only one such point: events 
either happen for it, or they do not happen, and there is no way
of conceiving of such events happening, but happening (so to speak)
cxii,
elsewhere. But this is what the objector, as much as Descartes, * 
must need. (pp 100-101).
A. Kenny (Descartes, New York, Random House, 1968, p 62), after 
mentioning Hintikka (op.cit.), adds: Is not Descartes rash in 
christening .. the substance in which the doubts of the Meditations inhere
’ego'?" But neither Kenny nor Hintikka mention the part played 
by consciousness, especially as this in effect attributes the agert with 
the responsibility. Of course, something more is needed to pick out 
the thing we hold responsible.
2. We have already mentioned that both Malebranche and the Coimbrians explain
error in terms of original sin; that Locke holds that persons are 
individuated by "the same consciousness" and that "person" is a forensic 
term; and that Leibniz holds that the level of moral responsibility 
is reached when and only when the level of consciousness is reached.
We can add that Suarez states that the root cause ("ratio radicalis”) 
of error is original sin.
The connection between consciousness and responsibility is 
established in Rodis-Lewis, G., Le probleme de 1’inconscient et le 
cartesianisme, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1950, Cf. 
also Gibson, A.B., The Philosophy of Descartes, London, Methuen, -
1932, pp 64ff. M.D. Wilson states (Descartes, London, Routledge and 
K. Paul, 1978, p 139) that Descartes exonerates God from our errors 
"in a way that follows ... the traditional Christian solution to the 
problem of evil".
3. This is somewhat of an anachronism; he actually speaks of assymptotes.
4. Descartes invoked divine simplicity in presenting his conservation laws 
in Le monde and the Principia. Malebranche questioned these in Book VI 
of the Recherche; he still saw it as a question about divine
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simplicity, but states that the question can be decided only by 
analysing particular cases. Later, Malebranche and Leibniz, in an
exchange in the 1690s in the Journal des Sqavans, disputed whether
the fundamental quantity conserved is mv (regarded as a scalar 
2
quantity) or (|)mv . It was agreed that the manifestation of divine 
simplicity was in question, but the arguments all concerned the 
analysis of dynamic situations.
5. This is seen to be so in the case of Descartes mostly in the Regulae, 
it is explicit throughout Malebranche, especially in the sixth book 
of the Recherche, and it was often insisted on by Leibniz.
5*. Cf. Trois Lettres, O.C. TT. VI-IX, p. 217, where he states that
Descartes held that ideas are modalities (modifications) of the soul, 
but only because "il ne prends pas comme moi le mot d1 idee, pour 
signifier uniquement la realite objective ..." Descartes took 
"id£e" "pour la perception, non entant simplement que modalite de 
1'Ame, mais entant que renfermant la realitdf. objective ..."
6. Cf. Robinet, A., Malebranche et Leibniz: Relations Personnelles, Paris, 
Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1955. Leibniz followed the Malebranche- 
Arnauld polemic during the years 1684-1686 (cf. the editor’s introduction 
to Leibniz’s interest in this polemic, pp. 133-136, and Leibniz's
notes and comments on it, pp. 194-224). This occasioned two thorough 
readings of Recherche, probably in 1685, following a superficial 
reading in 1675 (pp. 136-137). At this time, Leibniz lacked a 
precise understanding of the points involved (p. 137), but by this 
reading he became familiar with Malebranche's thought (ibid.), the 
originality of which he had first recognised in reading the Convers­
ations Chretiennes in 1679 (p. 77).
Leibniz's criticisms of Malebranche were above all directed
against his occasionalism in favour of his own system of pre-established 
harmony, resting on his fundamental notion of monad. But the initial
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formulation of his own system in the work given the title Discourse 
on Metaphysics by Gerhardt was composed with an eye on Malebranche's
Traite de la Nature et de la Grace. Four series of articles of the
Discourse followed step by step four series of the Traite (p. 139; 
cf. p. 140 for a table correlating these and p. 142, where it is 
stated that "la metaphysique de Malebranche, telle qu’elle se 
presente dans les articles du traite* est la canvas general, la cause 
informatrice qui permet a Leibniz d’edifier la premiere expression 
de son systeme ...”). With the publication of the "Systeme Nouveau 
de la Nature" (Journal des S^avans ,/695~) , Leibniz’s philosophy became 
public; it was expressly regarded as in competition with and an 
improvement on Malebranche’s system (pp. 309-311). The period from 
1700 to 1711 was characterised by systematic criticisms of occasionalism 
(p. 352). From then until his death (1716), occasionalism was 
regarded as the chief competitor with Leibniz's mature system because
of certain fundamental affinities.
7. The text of L.III, P.II of the Recherche can be divided into a number
of separate proofs, some against alternatives, some for his own 
position or parts of it. Chapters II-V are presented as one large 
proof, eliminating the alternatives, then arguing directly for his 
own position. I divide this into component arguments. I shall 
indicate the arguments or proofs by the chapters in which they 
occur, referred to with Roman numerals, and, if necessary, their 
sequence within the chapters, referred to with Arabic numerals. The 
proof in Eclaircissement X will be indicated by "E” and the summary 
at the beginning of Chapter VI will be referred to as "the resum£".
We thus distinguish the following
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rH (O.C. T.I, pp. 418-421) 
III (pp. 422-431)
IV-1 (pp. 429-431)
First proof IV-2 (p. 431)
Resume at the beginning
IV-3 (p. 432)
IV-4 (p. 433)
^V (pp. 433-436)
of Chapter VI (pp. 437-438)
Second proof VI-1 (pp. 438-439)
Third proof VI-2 (pp. 439-440)
Fourth proof VI-3 (pp. 440-441)
Fifth proof VI-4 (pp. 441-442)
Sixth proof VI-5 (p„ 442)
Seventh proof VI-6 (pp. 442-443)
Eighth proof E (T.III, pp. 144-151)
8. II.
9. III.
10. Cf. Meditation I, §13; O.C. T.X, p. 15. If there are corporeal
images, he states, they are not intelligible. "Agiras-tu sur ce
qui t’est inconnu? Mais qui t’avertira d’agir, qui reglera ton
action?"
1 1. ibid., S 14.
12. ibid., J 15.
13. ibid., f!6. These pretended powers, he writes, "ne sont point en
ton pouvoir, si elles agissent en toi malgre toi. Ce n’est point 
toi qui agis par elles, ... puis qu'elles agissent sans que tu y 
penses".
14. ibid., §12, pp. 14-15; cf. f 11, p. 14.
15. ibid., § 7, p. 13.
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16. III.
17. Examination, 5^5 cf. V 9.
18. ibid. ,H 14, 9.
19• ibid., § 9.
20. ibid., $10.
21. Both these premises are explicitly used in IV-1, IV-4 and E, and 
also in what he claims in. the sixth chapter to be his strongest 
proof for his thesis, viz. VI-3.
22. Establishing this premise alone is held to be sufficient for 
establishing his position in V.
23. This proof (VI-4, "de l'ide'e que nous avons de 1'inf ini"), he 
states, is "la plus belle, la plus relevee, la plus solide, et la 
premiere, ou celle qui suppose la moins de choses ...".
24. VI-3.
25. O.C. T.III, p. 129:
Les Philosophes metees les moins eclairez, demeurent d'accord 
que l’homme participe a une certaine Raison qu'ils ne 
determinent pas. C’est pourquoi ils le definissent animal 
RATIONIS particeps: car il n’y a personne qui ne scache du 
moins confusement, que la difference essentielle de l’homme 
consiste dans 1'union necessaire qu'il a avec La Raison
universelle ...
26. ibid., p. 130.
27• ibid., p. 129.
28. ibid., p. 130.
29. ibid., pp. 130, 133, 143.
30. op. cit., 51.
31. ibid. , 31.
32. "C’est ... par une idee claire que l'esprit voit les essences des
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choses, les nombres et I’etendue. C'est ... par sentiment, qu’il 
juge de 1'existence des creatures, et qu’il connoit la sienne 
propre" (O.C. T.III, p. 142). Furthermore, "il y a toujours idee 
pure et sentiment confus dans la connoissance que nous avons de 
1’existence des 'etres", except that of God, which is known by pure 
idea, and of our soul, known by sentiment interieur (ibid., p. 143).
33. Leibniz, commenting on he Examination (Robinet, op. cit., p. 399),
•»
wrote: "Je remarque que certains gens tachent d'eluder ce qu’on
leur dit par cette affection dTignorance The "certains gens"
replaces the suppressed "M. Lock et autres" in the manuscript.
34. op. cit. ,§51.
35. ibid.,5 52.
36. ibid., ? 45.
37. O.C. T.III, p. 130. In the Recherche, Malebranche simply states
(IV-1 and IV-4) or is satisfied to show merely that there is nothing 
in us which is infinite. The issue of the fourth alternative (which 
he attributes to the Scholastics, that the soul, being more noble 
than other things, contains them eminently) vis-a-vis his own 
position is said to be whether ideas (which represent something 
outside the soul) are only modifications of the soul. This is 
settled by stating that the soul is not infinite or capable of 
infinite modifications and cannot see in itself what is not there. 
(In VI-3 he speaks of modifications in general, rather than infinite 
modifications.)
38. In E, Malebranche immediately concludes (from the above) that Reason 
is God Himself, for only the universal and infinite being contains 
universal and infinite reason in Himself; furthermore, only He, as 
is this Reason, is universal. In VI-3 (the proof in the Recherche
most similar to E), he immediately concludes that these ideas must
cxviii
39.
40.
41 .
42.
43.
be in an infinite spiritual being; and this description fits God 
alone. And, in VI-4 (his version of Descartes' first proof for
the existence of God) he states that the mind has the idea of the 
infinite "before" those of finite things; so all particular ideas 
are only participations in the general idea of the infinite; thus, 
he concludes, the mind apperceives everything in the idea it has of 
the infinite, which idea is God Himself.
O.C. T.III, pp. 131-132.
op. cit., f23.
Cf. Eclaircissement X; O.C. T.III, p. 132:
Certainement si les veritez et les loix eternelles dependoient 
de Dieu, si elles avoient ete etablies par une volonte^ libre 
du Createur, en un mot si la Raison que nous consultons n'etait 
pas necessaire et independante: il me paroi't evident qu'il 
n’y auroit plus de science veritable, et qu'on pourroit bien 
se trompet si l'on assuroit que 1'Arithmetique ou la Geometrie 
des Chinois est semblable a la n£tre ... Y°it“°n clairement 
que Dieu n’a pas pu vouloir certaines choses pour un certain 
terns, pour on certain leu, pour certaines personnes, ou pour 
certains genres d'£tres; suppose, comme on le veut, qu'il
ait ete entierement libre et indifferent dans cette volonte?
Pour moi je ne puis concevoir de necessite dans 1’indifference, 
je ne puis accorder en.semble deux chose si opposees.
Resume (Chapter VI).
L'Qrdre includes what Malebranche calls the general laws according 
to which God rules the ordinary course of providence. In the 
Entretiens sur la Metaphysique (XIII, IX; O.C. T.XII-XII, pp. 
319-320) these are given as: I. the general laws of the communica­
tion of motions, where occasional or natural causes are the shock
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of bodies (”... c'est en obeissant a ses propres loix que Dieu fait 
tout ce que font les causes secondes"); II. the laws of the union 
of the soul and the body (by which one is integrated with one's 
environment and led to judge of the existence of things), "dont les 
modalitez sont reciproquement causes occasionelles de leurs 
changemens" ("C’est par ces loix que Dieu tfi’unit a tous ses 
ouvrages" ); III. the laws of the union of the soul with God ("la 
substance intelligible de la Raison universelle"), of which our 
attention is the occasional cause. (By these laws, "1’esprit a le 
pouvoir de penser a ce qu’il veut, et de decouvrir la verite", and 
so these are the laws which are involved directly in the vision in 
God as this involves knowing things.) Reason and experience, 
Malebranche continues, teach us only these three general (sorts of) 
laws, but the authority of Scripture (which for Malebranche fulfils 
the role of experience in matters of faith) shows us two others:
IV. the general laws (operative in the Old Testament) giving good 
and evil angels power over bodies, the occasional causes of which 
are their practical desires; V. the laws (superceding IV since the 
New Testament) by which Christ received the sovereign power in 
heaven and earth not only over bodies (to distribute temporal goods, 
as do angels), but also over minds (to extend to hearts internal 
grace, giving the right to eternal goods).
44. Cf. Chapter VII (of L.IIT, P.II), where he states that it is not 
difficult to conceive that particular beings could be represented 
by the infinite being who contains them in His substance; this 
substance is said to be, inter al., very efficacious.
45. ibid.
46. Resumd*. In Chapter VII this is seen to be a consequence of ii) . 
Malebranche here argues that only God is known by Himself; he states
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that God alone acts in the mind and can reveal to it Himself (i.e.
ideas or reason, as this is the vision in, not of God).
47. Cf. Furetiere, Antoine, Dictionaire Universel, The Hague and 
Rotterdam, Annout and Reiner Leers, 1690, whose only entry for 
"voir” states that "se dit figurement des choses spirituelles", 
giving a number of non-ocular examples, including the beatific
vision of God.
48. Malebranche generally uses the double-"p" spelling; the modern 
spelling had not yet become standard.
49. Cf. Furetiere, op. cit. The firstof two senses of "appercevoir"
given is "descouvrir de loin, reconnoistre". Cf. the entry for 
"appercevable": "Qui peut etre apperqu dans la veue".
50. Cf. Dubois, J. et Lagave, R., Dictionnaire de la langue francaise 
classique, Paris, Libraire Classique Eugene Belin, 1960. They say 
of "appercevoir": "Pouvait se construire avec une proposition 
infinitive, comme aujourd’hui encore le verbe ’voir’". As an 
example, they quote from Cyrano, Etats et empires de la lune:
"Il aper^ut entrer ... deux grands vieillards".
51. Cf. Furetiere, op. cit., second sense of "appercevoir": "Remarquer 
quelque chose par le moyen de quelque attention, reflexion ou 
examen; et se dit souvent avec le pronom personnel (i.e. reflex.:
"s’appercevoir")".
52. This is the sort of apperception for which "c’est une meme chose a 
l’ame d’appercevoir un objet, que de recevoir 1’idee qui le 
represente". (Recherche I, I; O.C. T.I, p. 43; cf. ibid., p. 41).
53. Cf. ibid., p. 43. The distinction between these sorts or ways of 
apperceiving is emphasised in the Recherche III, P.II, where he 
wishes to show that, unlike what is in the soul, what is outside
the soul could be apperceived only by ideas (Chapter I; p. 415) which
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are the immediate objects intimately united to or present to the 
soul (ibid., pp. 413-414).
54. Recherche VI,
pp. 49-50.
P.II, II; O.C. T.II, p. 249. cf. I, ii, si; t.i,
55. O.C. T.II, p. 250.
56. ibid., p. 249 . Cf. I, II, §1; T.I, pp. 49-50.
57. Cf. ibid,, p. 251 .
58. ibid., p. 250 •
59. For Malebranche, "apperceive" is, with some qualifications, opposed
to "perceive" as a success verb to a verb expressing an activity. 
He speaks of three ways ("manieres") by which the soul apperceives 
things; these are collectively called "perceptions", "manieres de 
penser", or "modifications de 1’ame" (Recherche I, III, I; O.C. 
T.I, p. 66).
60. IV-2.
61 . V.
62. See note 39.
63. To Mersenne, 5/6/1630; AT I, pp. 149-150.
64. Disp. Meta. XXXI, XII, 40.
65. Descartes repeated his position in three other letters to Mersenne, 
two in the same year (15/4/1630; AT I, pp. 145-146; and 27/5/1630(?) 
ibid., pp. 151-153) and one in 1638 (27/5/1638; AT II, p. 138).
But his position did not become public until, in the Fifth Replies 
(AT VII, p. 380), he corrected Gassendi, who attributed (Fifth 
Objections; ibid., p. 319) the opposing view to him. His statement 
was picked up by the theologian authors of the Sixth Objections 
(ibid., p. 417) whereupon he replied more fully (ibid. , pp. 432 and 
435-436), and part of this position was later incorporated into 
the Principia (I, XXIII; AT VIII, pp. 13-14).
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66. Sixth Replies; AT VII, pp. 435-436. If, for example (the passage 
continues), the foundation of what is good came before God, He 
would be determined to make what is best. The truth is, rather, 
that because He determined Himself to those things which are to be 
made, they are good.
67. Principia I, X; AT VIII, p. 14; to Mersenne, 27/5/1630(7); AT I, 
pp. 151-153.
68. To Mersenne, ibid.
69. ibid.
70. I, XXVI; AT VIII, pp. 14-15. Cf. also ibid, art. XXIV and XXV; 
ibid., p. 14.
71. AT X, p. 373.
72. AT VII, p. 436.
73. Cf. to Mersenne, ibid. ; AT I, p. 152: "c.es veritez eternelles,
lesquelles je ne convoy point emaner de Dieu, comme les rayons du 
Soleil ...”.
74. The issue, however, is complicated, since Descartes seems to suggest 
that God has the option of combining the same natures or objective
realities to create different eternal truths. There are two
passages in which he states that God could have allowed contradictories 
to go together, or (what is not the same, but he gives no examples 
of the first) contradictories of what is in fact necessarily true 
to be true (to Mesland, 2/5/1644; AT IV, pp. 118-119; and to Arnauld, 
29/7/1648; AT V, p. 224). In both passages we are held to conceive 
certain things or propositions as possible (hence, by implication, 
others as necessary) only because God made our minds as He did.
This has suggested to L. G. Miller ("Descartes, Mathematics and God", 
The Philosophical Review, Oct. 1957, p. 463; for an influential
seventeenth century version of this, cf. Huet, P.-D., Censura
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Philosophise Cartesianae, fourth edition, 1694 (first edition:
1689), pp. 74-75) that God, as portrayed by Descartes, must be a 
deceiver, for God can conceive alternatives to what I conceive as
necessary.
But in both passages it is not God’s reason and science, but His
power or immensity which is compared with our reason and science.
Descartes writes to Arnauld that we can only say that God gave
("indidisse") me such a mind that a mountain without a valley or
an aggregate of one thing and two things which is not three things
cannot be conceived by me: "... talia implicare contradictionem in
meo conceptu". What we dare not say, on the other hand, is thatnot
God could/make it that a mountain is without a valley or that one 
plus two do not equal three. Descartes writes to Mesland that our
mind is finite and created of such a nature that it cannot conceive
as possible what God could have made possible, but wanted to make 
impossible. Considering God’s power ("puissance"), he continues,
we see that God could not have been determined to make it true that
contradictories cannot go together; this he thinks is equivalent 
to saying that God could have made the contradictories of necessary 
truths true. For Descartes, the only reason or science there is, 
displayed both to God and to us, is that comprising the laws and 
rules God institutes in creating, since creating, willing, and 
understanding are not distinct for God. Even for God, these rules 
or necessary truths have some ontological import - that some creature 
exists; and this in turn depends on God.
75. See the discussion to Reg. XII (AT X, p. 421), where Descartes
writes that, if Socrates says he doubts of all, he thus knows that 
something can be true or false; truth and falsity are thus concep­
tually connected to the nature of doubt.
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76. Petites perceptions, of course, need not involve language.
77. Couturat, L. (ed.), Opuscules et Fragments In^dits de Leibniz, 1903, 
p. 176.
78. ibid., p. 338.
79. ibid., pp. 177, 340.
80. ibid., p. 343.
81. ibid., p. 339.
82. N.E., III, VII, 6.
83. Gerhardt, C. I. (ed.), Die Philosophischen Schriften, B.I, p. 56.
84. Couturat, op. cit., pp. 338-339.
85. ibid., pp. 36, 338.
86. ibid., p. 36.
87. Leibniz proposed to revise Alsted’s Encyclopaedia. This had been
organized for pedagogical expediency. The first volume ("Quatuor 
Praecognita Disciplinarum") contained pedagogical prolegomena; the 
second volume, the subjects of the trivium; the third, those of the 
quadrivium; and so on. Leibniz's proposed arrangement follows a 
different principle. The first subject (Couturat, op. cit., p. 35) 
is grammar "seu ars intelligendi"; one is to begin with "Grammatica 
rationalis" ("rationalis" substituted for "universalis" in the text) 
After grammar comes "Logica" (ibid., p. 36); next is "Mnemonica", 
simply a part of heuristics; then "Topica seu ars inveniendi", 
including the ars magna, but above all algebra as a source of more 
universal rules; from this point, the orientation becomes more 
mathematical. The movement (ignoring mnemonica) is from the 
logically most basic to the more specific. Grammatica rationalis 
explicates grammatical forms and words - inflexions and particles - 
by more simple and general particles, until one has arrived at what 
cannot be eliminated (ibid., p. 35). This is the analysis of the
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characters employed by all men in speaking and thinking; its task 
is primarily the accurate analysis of words, and only secondarily 
the teaching of languages (ibid. , p. 36).
88. Couturat, op. cit., p. 36.
89. How Leibniz proposes to arrive at the rules or principles lying 
behind ordinary usage and supposedly common to all mankind is 
indicated by his reply to the following view. (The text for this 
is in Couturat, op. cit., pp. 183-184 and was written no earlier 
than 1679.) All evidence is referred to authority, the view 
maintains. For if something is proved from what is evident, that 
which is evident demands a proof. To avoid an infinite regress, 
one must arrive at what is evident per se. But we know that some­
thing is evident per se only by the consensus of all men.
’’Consensus” here is taken as explicit agreement.
The problem is located by Leibniz as that of determining how we 
are certain of rules of inference (principia ”ex quibus demonstrationes 
ducuntur”). His answer is that demonstrations proceed not from what 
is (explicitly) assumed or asserted - ’’principia directa” - but 
from what is (implicitly) conceded (’’concessionibus”) - ’’principia 
reflexa seu indirecta”. Principia reflexa act as rules of inference 
and are "formalia”; principia directa act as premises and are
"materialia seu materiae demonstrationis". (Cf. N.E. IV, VII, 'j 11 
for a similar presentation.) The procedure is (explicitly) to 
assume the propositions (implicitly) conceded by one's adversary 
and to conclude in legitimate form the contradictory of one of the 
propositions he asserted. Thus Leibniz states that every demonstra­
tion is a reductio ad absurdum. There is a presumption that what 
has not been proven false is true. Hence Leibniz admits that most 
(if not all) men are led by authority in most cases and that common
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opinion is often the ultimate arbitor of our practical judgement. 
(Compare this with N.E. IV, XX,£ 17.) Thus in'some way all demon­
stration is ad hominem, because every step and the rules must be 
conceded. In brief, purported inferences are checked by formulating 
what is tacit in them. Likewise, a purported formulation of a 
tacitly followed rule is certified by its explicit inclusion in 
inferences in which the rule functions implicitly. Leibniz holds 
that the deeper rules are a common stock. .
90. Essay IV, XVII, $ 4
91 . ibid.
92. ibid. ,§ 6.
93. ibid. , IV, VII,55
94. ibid. 3.
95. ibid. , i2.
96. ibid. , f 9.
97. ibid. , IV, XII, J 3
98. ibid. , IV, VII, g 6
99. ibid. , .1 8.
00. The term "praecognitum" is attributed by Alsted (op. cit. , Lib. I, 
"Hexilogia", Cap. I, Reg. II, p. 50) to Vives, Zabarella, and 
Keckermann. He cites (ibid.) Aristotle where he states that every 
discursive discipline proceeds "ex anticipate . . . c.ognitione"
(Ethics VI, Chap. 4 and Posterior Analytics I). J. A. Quenstadt 
(Disputatio Philosophica de Virtutibus Dianoeticis seu Habitibus
Mentis, sub praesidio H. J. Scheurl: Helmstadt, H. Mullerus, 1640) 
again cites Aristotle (Posterior Analytics I, Chap. I and Ethics VI, 
Chap. 3) and states that all science is acquired by learning ("per 
doctrinam et disciplinam"), from some antecedent knowledge. Not 
that every part of the science must be known ("nota") (demonstration
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does this), but something of the subject ("de re ilia") must 
already be known, for every subject ("doctrina") which is taught 
and learned "fit ex praecognitis principiis". Alsted presents 
praecognita as having pedagogical and logical functions, and as 
especially important in settling what is given before an academic 
dispute ("disputatio" in the technical sense). (Cf. especially 
op. cit., "Praefatio in Quatuor Libros Praecognitorum" and Lib. I, 
"Hexilogia", Cap. I, Reg. II.)
However, some condition was seen to be required on the part of the 
individual to be able to learn sciences which are taught.
Quenstadt states (op. cit., art. xvii) that there is one habitus 
concerning first principles, which require no argumentation, viz. 
"voT/S" or "intellectus". Although such principles as "every whole 
is greater than its part" and "parents are to be honoured" are 
understood "ex ipsorum terminorum perceptione" such that the 
intellect must assent to them, there must be such a habitus to 
account for the increased facility with which this occurs, given 
previous exercise. This is still considering praecognita peda­
gogically. But it is only a few steps from the view that 
praecognita must be supposed on the part of the individual 
(although not articulated) for any learning whatsoever. These 
steps were taken by H. Wedemannus in a disputatio (Disputatio 
Philosophica de Primo Cognito ..., Giessen, Hampelius) sub praesidio 
of Scheibler in 1623, a year before the suspension of the academy
at Giessen and the end of Scheibler’s academic career.
101 • N.E. I» I» § 20­
102. ibid.
103. ibid., IV, XII, $j 1, 2.
104. ibid.
cxxviii
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
1 13.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.120.
121 .
122.123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
ibid. , IV, XI, $ £ 1-10.
ibid.
Couturat, op. cit. , p. 183.
N.E. IV, XVII,j 4.
ibid.
ibid.
ibid.
ibid., IV, XVII, § 4.
ibid.
ibid.
The texts in which Leibniz discusses this are in a letter to 
. 19Conring 2g-/3/1 678 (S&mtliche Schriften und Briefe, herausgegeben
von der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften ("Akademie" for short), 
te . terI Reihe, II Band, pp. 397-399) a later letter to the same 
(ibid., pp. 456-458) and the Nouveaux Essais IV, XII,§ 4 and IV,
XVII, $ 6.
N.E. IV, XII,$ 4.
ibid, and ibid., IV, XVII, § 6.
ibid. , IV, XII, 4 and Conring to Leibniz, ^y*/1678 (Akademie, 
loc. cit., p. 395).
Akademie, loc. cit., p. 398.
N.E. IV, XXI, J J 1-4.
Akademie, loc. cit.
N.E. IV, XII, H 4-5.
Akademie, loc. cit., p. 399; N.E. IV, VI, § 10.
ibid., p. 398.
ibid., p. 399.
ibid.
ibid.
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128- ibid., p. 457.
129. N.E. IV, XII, $ 4.
130. Couturat, op. cit., p. 341.
131. N.E. II, III, § 15 .
132. ibid.,§18.
133. IIe Partie,3214; Gerhardt, Philosophische Schriften B.VI, p. 246.
134. The work itself (Rostock and Hamburg, 1630 (n. pub.)) is divided 
into two sections, each introduced by a list of definitions, some 
illustrated by figures which can be folded over on the page, others 
illustrated by more conventional diagrams. These are followed by 
"problemata", in which one is given a problem (and the requisite 
information) and asked to construct a figure. These results are 
used to prove theorems (and corollaries). The work is concluded 
(pp. 57 ff. - the copy in the British Library stops in mid-sentence) 
by a denunciation of Ramus’ geometry in favour of Euclid.
135. It is tempting to construe Leibniz’s views on mathematical knowledge 
in terms of one of the "-isms" of contemporary philosophy of 
mathematics. (The validity of this is questionable, since Leibniz 
(despite the central part infinity played in both his mathematics 
and philosophy) had no suspicion of the problems introduced by 
infinite sets and transfinite numbers; indeed, he states that the
arithmetic of transfinite numbers is the same as the arithmetic of 
finite numbers. Yet the three predominant "-isms" arose largely 
in response to such problems.) Leibniz is generally regarded as 
a logicist because he talks about deducing mathematics from logic. 
But the seventeenth century sense of "deduce" is different from 
the contemporary sense, being more similar to the contemporary 
sense of "generate". Further, the aspect of "logic" which is 
generative is something like the ars combinatoria. In brief, a
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difference in conceptual divisions precludes reading Leibniz’s 
remarks in a logicist fashion.
With more justice, he has been seen as a formalist. Doing
mathematics for Leibniz is above all else working with "sensible 
signs". Furthermore, "scientific" disciplines, though infinite 
in detail, are held to be formulated by reflection; this is possible 
because reflection relies on "sensible signs", of which there need 
be only a finite number.
However, much of what Leibniz says (such as what we have just
considered) suggests an intuitionist approach (but without the 
mentalist aspects). For constructing a diagram can be a proof and 
Leibniz emphasises the need to certify our concepts with constructions 
But, in Leibniz’s case, there appears to be little difference between 
a formalist and an intuitionist position, for diagrams fall under 
"sensible sign", things are treated like diagrams, and he insists 
that all mathematical statements have non-private criteria.
(Leibniz is, of course, a Platonist of sorts; but this is because 
he reifies conventional rules. Indeed, it is questionable whether 
on Leibniz’s principles a person can be much more than a privileged 
concept in the divine mind.)
136. O.C. T.XII , p. 110.
137. ibid. P- 111.
138. ibid. P- 1 12.
139. ibid. PP- 112-113.
140. ibid. P- 114.
141. ibid. PP- 115-116.
142. ibid. P- 1 18.
143. ibid. P- 116.
144. ibid. P- 118.
145. ibid. P- 125.
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146* London, Routledge & K.Paul, 1963.
147. Oxford, Clarendon, second edition, 1953.
148. Cf. Ross, p.24, referring to the Phaedo 75 c 10 - d 3, 
76 d 7 - 9, 78 d 3 - 7, 100 h 5 - 7. These passages 
show that Plato has reached his generalized theory of 
Ideas. They also give a list of Ideas - moral and 
aesthetic values and mathematical qualities and 
relations - which remained much the same throughout 
his writings (although mathematical Ideas became more 
important later).
149. 454, 462-5, 501. Cf. Crombie, p. 35.
150. Crombie, pp. 13-14.
151 . ibid., p.51.
152. ibid., pp. 51-52.
153. ibid., p.82.
154. ibid., p.135.
155. Crombie (p.128), discussing the Seventh Letter,
distinguishes an inductive approach - e.g. picking out 
instances of beauty and saying what is beautiful about 
each - which is peculiar to and a counter-inductive
approach - grasping what beauty (or “the beautiful”) is 
(which also involves the ability to pick out instances) - . 
which is peculiar to . He adds that the
distinction Plato really wanted to draw between these 
two approaches
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is a matter of degree with regard to the use of 
the senses; it is not a question of whether you 
use them, but of the point at which you use them, 
how critically, and so on, .Perhaps .realising 
that the senses make a contribution to every 
degree of enlightenment, however lofty, (Plato) 
saw that old distinction between t 4 a
and $v £> was notahard and fast distinction, 
and that the mportant distinction depended 
simply on whether what existed in a man’s mind 
was the actual thing which he claimed to know, 
or merely a correct account of it in terms of 
propositions and the ability to produce 
instances.
Cf. Phaedo 74 b 4 - c 6. Ross, pp.22-24: This is 
-PRe ear/fest passage m wk/cA
Ideas are regarded, not as universals manifested in 
particulars, but "as ideals, standards, or limits to 
which individual things only approximate.” (He here 
speaks of sensible things - bits of wood, stones, etc., 
which remain the same, but appear equal to some and 
not equal to others - necessarily only approximating 
to equality.) ”Por the first time, the relation of 
sensible things to Ideas is thought of as imitation
• rather than as sharing ...” Ross claims (p.25) that 
Plato never' "made a complete bifurcation of the 
universe into Ideas and sensible things.”
156. Crombie, pp. 37-38.
157. Cf. Meno 97: one can believe or know a proposition. 
Theaetetus 201: an eye-witness may be the only one 
who can know the facts, but a court may be induced to 
believe them.
158. In the Teaetetus (208-9) Plato speaks of knowing who 
Theaetetus is as opposed to knowing only what sort of 
man he is (cf. Seventh letter 342-3).
159. Cf. Ross, pp.114-116.
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160. Sophistes 252 e 9 - 253 c 5; cf. Ross, p 113*
161. Sophistes 253 c 6 - 254 h 6; Ross, ibid. The notion of 
a system of Forms, or the participation of one Form in 
another, was already present in the Fhaedo. (Ross,
p. 37«) Plato here holds that the Form of three 
imports into particular groups of three the Form of 
oddness, because it shares in this Form itself.) In 
the Republic, Plato move's beyond the opposition between 
Forms and changing things; Ross sees the advance as a 
recognition of ”a hierarchy reaching from the narrowest 
of the Forms to the highest and widest of them.” (Ibid., 
p» 80; the hierarchy of Forms is also presented in the 
Philebus 16 c 5 - 17 a 5> after the Sophistes.)
162. p. 136.
163. Ross, p. 82.
164. Theaetetus 198; cf. Orombie, pp 41-42 for this and the 
remaindei' of the paragraph.
165. The third-man argument is presented in. the Parmenides, 
where the solution is tried, that each Idea is a thought 
found only in souls (132 b 3, cf. Ross pp. 88-89). But, 
then (holds the counter-reply), if things share in Forms, 
they share in thoughts, and so all things are composed 
of thoughts and either themselves think or there are 
thoughts which do not think (132 c 9 - 11). Plato 
never comes back to this interpretation, and accepts 
that the objective nature thought of, not the thought,
is the Form.
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166. Parmenides (153 a 5) objects to two Platonic 
formulations of a Form in general - as "the X itself" 
and the description of particulars as resembling it.
But he does not object to the formulation in terms of
• sharing, but states that we must find another account 
of sharing.
167. Ross maintains (p. 103) that Plato’s theory of Ideas 
"rests on the belief that there is a complete 
difference between sensation and knowledge, and that 
knowledge demands as its objects entities not 
perceived by sense, and it is in Theaetetus (151 d 7 - 
186 e 12) that he gives his final and most elaborate 
proof of the difference between sensation and know­
ledge." Ross adds (cf. Timaeus 51 d 3 - e 6) that it 
also rests on the complete difference between know­
ledge and true opinion and that the most elaborate 
proof of this is again in the Theaetetus (187 a 1 - 210
b 3). Again, in the Timaeus (27 d 5 - 28 a 4) (cf. Ross, 
pp. 120ff)5 Plato distinguishes between "that which is 
always real and has no becoming" and is "apprehensible 
by thought with a rational account" (Forms) and "that 
which is always becoming and never real” and is "the 
object of together with unreasoning sensation"
(sensible things).
168. pp. 49-50
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69. In the Republic, Plato states that Yo4/^w$ - roughly,
understanding, e t 7-7 from a faculty point of view 
- is concerned with (being) and with
yev6o-<5 (becoming). Crombie (p. 98) feels that Plato 
is not primarily concerned with a distinction in 
subject matter (e.g. justice versus empirical
observation), but rather with the point that ”in so far 
as we achieve any success in understanding abstract 
principles we do so by proceeding counter-inductively, 
and that in so far as our conceptions are formed 
inductively they count as , because they are
very indirect and inexplicit apprehensions ...” Plato 
adds that vo y is to as is to
a Crombie feels that this expresses the point
that
the principles which constitute are
changeless whereas the events which constitute 
yt-v 6- cr t g are changeable, and similarly v <? /?<?- < s 
is stable while mustfluetuate. ...
y6i/6<rcs is an image of ou-<r-t<A fn the sense 
that the course of nature reflects the principles 
whose imposition on chaos renders it nature.
(ibid).
At the end of the fifth book of the Republic (474-80), 
Socrates calls the thought of the philosopher, dealing 
with realities, and that of ordinary men,
dealing with images, ; he then offers proof that
the unphilosophical cannot be allowed to claim £ 77 / cr 7"^2 
(cf. Crombie, pp. 56-57). This argument tries to 
establish a logical chasm between er/c v?and §<?£,<*- 
by assuming that, since i-n c a~ t q is infallible and
So^ac is not, 6/71 2and<5^ must be different
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- ’'functions” ~ and so must have different
’’objects”. He also assumes that only what is fully tuv -
’’that which is” - is fully knowable and what is totally
/t? is totally unknowable. The object of is
j >placed between v' and ^7 - the object of
(nescience or ignorance); it cannot be yw? , for 
someone who belives must believe something. The final 
move considers the multifarious changing things the 
unphilosophical take to be the sole realities. Now for 
any predicate 3? and its opposite 1 (e.g. ’’beautiful” 
and ’’ugly"), what one has reason to call P could always 
be found to be P, and so is between and wv #
’’Therefore the multifarious conventional opinions of 
ordinary men about beauty and other such things roll 
about between and ”, so these must be the
objects of belief. .
For Plato (cf. Republic, 447 d) two functions 
are the same if they do the same thing to the same ob­
ject. But what of two functions - e.g. sight and smell ~ 
which do different things to the same objects ~ e.g. apples? 
It seems that the ’’object” of a function for Plato is an 
internal accusative, as ’’sights” is to ’’see”; so, by the 
(implicit) definition of “object”, there cannot be 
different functions with the same objects. This 
suggests to Crombie (p. 58) that what is between and
are mental correlates to ; likewise there
are mental correlates of G7T (<r-r 7/’? - realities. He
suggests (p. 60) that the verbal form of
is taken in the sense of ".represent something to oneself 
as". And to say that is between £ n i <?- u and
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that its object is between -jo and ~re? 
is simply to say that is not quite ignorance
and that its object is not quite non-existent (ibid,, 
p. 64)
Consider now the last and crucial step of the 
argument; in what sense do the multifarious conventional 
opinions of ordinary men about, e.g. beauty "roll 
about between co\/ and /«? Crombie suggests the
following (pp. 67-68) The plain man, asked (in G-reek 
construction) "What is the beautiful?", will say, e.g.9 
"Regency furniture". Asked for a reason, he will give, 
e.g., its delicacy, and perhaps hold that delicacy is
beautiful. The plain man grasps enough of "the beauti­
ful" for his answers to be at least not inapposite; so 
he is not ignorant of the beautiful. Yet the man who 
identifies P-hood with the various properties which 
make us attribute P-hood to things cannot be said to know 
P-hood, for a thing which is P can always be shown to be in 
some way P. This provides a link between the premise that 
every one of the multifarious beautifuls can seem ugly 
and the conclusion that the opinions of plain men about 
beauty fall, between knowledge and ignorance of it. This 
link is the way plain men form their ideas of general 
terms, viz. by identifying the multifarious beautifuls 
with beauty. But Plato uses a different link: from 
the premise he infers that each of the multifarious 
beautifuls is between being and not being (479 c 6), 
whence he draws the conclusion. This link has been
taken to show that Plato denied the real existence of the
physical world. But Crombie holds (p. 68) that, while
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he denied physical things the status of ov~r<^ , he
did not deny their real existence. For what is relevant is
that any given beautiful object is only a stable
pattern manifested in flux, ’’but that it is the
predicative and not the existential sense of ’to be’ 
which is uppermost when Plato says that physical things 
are between being and not being.” What they lack is 
simply existence-as-beautiful-things - they are and 
are not beautiful. Plato’s purpose here, Crombie concludes 
(p. 69) ”is to show that there are certain common 
states of mind which cannot be classed as knowledge”
(i.e. in lct -r
170. Crombie, p. 103.
171 . Ross, p. 48.
172. Republic 510 c 2; cf. Ross, p. 49.
173. p. 80.
174. ibid. Furthermore (p. 81), Plato recognises distinct
arithmetical and geometrical equalities and in the 
G-orgias (508 a) states that knowledge of mathmatics 
will help the politician distinguish the two kinds of 
equality in society. And in the Laws (897-8) he 
writes that the same principle of self-consistency 
which constitutes intelligence also expresses itself 
in spatial terms in the form of motion in a circle®
175. Crombie, p. 82.
176. p. 85.
177. Cf. Crombie, pp* 135-136.
178. Crombie, p. 138.
179. p. 139.
180. p. 140.
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181. The doctrine of recollection is also presented in the 
Phaedo (72-77) and in the Phaedrus (247-250). In the 
Phaedo (cf. Crombie, pp. 141-142), Plato argues as 
follows. Equality is different from equal physical 
things, for physical things can seem equal to one 
man and unequal to another, whereas ’’the equals 
themselves can never seem unequal, or equality in­
equality.” Our senses always tell us that physical 
instances of equality are imperfect; so we must have 
become aware of the standard before we received the 
use of our senses, i.e. before we were born. We have 
not retained &rr c equality, for we cannot
give an account of it. So we must have forgotten this 
qtt l (r Q on coming into the body. Yet we can be 
put in mind of - recollect - intelligible natures by 
experience.
(Crombie claims (p. 145) that "What ex­
perience does, strictly speaking, is to revive not 
our knowledge of equality, but the true belief which 
is all that we retain until it is converted into 
knowledge by philosophical methods.” But this 
supposes an answer to the question, how broadly 
" £ 77 & L * ” is to be taken; philosophical methods
are a continuation of the "question and answer 
technique of Socratic definition”. And is this 
technique not a controlled sort of ?)
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A prima facie difference between the Meno and the Phaedo is that in 
the former propositions are remembered, while universals are in the latter 
But Plato would say that to remember squareness is to remember the 
theorems flowing from it (cf. Crombie, ibid.). "Recollect” seems to 
be used in a more dispositional sense in the Phaedo, where experience 
activates our implicitly retained true beliefs, while in the Meno it 
is not the implicit retention, but the full understanding which counts 
as recollection; but this seems to make no substantial difference.
Again, the Phaedo insists that we have not regained C-rruntil we 
can’^ive account", while this condition is not mentioned in the Meno. 
Crombie states (p. 144) that this is only a difference in emphasis; the 
same difference in emphasis exists between the Meno and the Republic, 
and the chronological order is Meno, Phaedo, Republic.
The doctrine of recollection in the Phaedrus is simpler and 
bolder and perfunctory. From what is said about dialectic, one would 
expect common natures such as animality to be recollected as well.
Crombie holds (p. 145) that, while Plato is interested in terms such 
as beauty, he might have defended a connection between the powers to 
generalize and to recollect. He earlier construed Platonic recollection 
as interpreting the point
that the fundamental distinctions that common sense is inclined
to draw correspond to real differences which reason recognises 
between general terms. Bearing in mind what the Republic and the
Cratylus have to say about forms of artefacts one would expect
Plato to argue that even such a concept as that of a helmet is a 
complex function of such fundamental distinctions. For he who 
separates off helmets from hats is drawing on notions such as 
rigidity, protection, and so on. Obviously it would seem possible 
to produce a kind of scale of general terms putting at the top 
those like equality and justice which it would be plausible to
cxli
182.
183.
184.
say we "bring to experience" and at the bottom those like 
concepts of artefacts which it would be plausible to say we 
"get from experience"... (pp. 145-14Q.
There is no doubt that Leibniz had first-hand knowledge of Plato.
While in Paris in the 1670s, he translated from Greek to Latin the 
Phaedo (Foucher de Careil, L.A., Nouvelles Lettres et Opuscules, Paris, 
1857, pp. 44-97) and the Theaetetus (ibid,, pp. 98-145).
Cf. Crombie, p. 84.
We can perhaps capture some of Plato’s insight about goodness as 
follows. We cannot judge people, qualities, or instutions as 
good or bad - i.e. we cannot use the word "good" - unless we are 
capable of doing what is good or just. But if we are so capable,
then the abnormal cases are the cases in which we act otherwise.
The non-inductive nature of the insight into goodness was emphasised 
by Plato against the claims of the Sophists, that justice - acting 
justly - could be taught. Knowing what goodness is, or what justice 
is, is a cognitive feat; indeed, it is one of the highest cognitive 
feats and requires trained analytic powers, as are gained in doing 
mathematics. Conversely, having attained the feat, the sort of 
balance and proportion needed, not just to understand mathematics, 
but to be a (mathematically) good mathematician follow as a matter
of course.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
oxi H (5
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Schmidt, R. (Ed.), Hamburg, Meiner, 1956 
(after the edition of 1926), B137-8:
Urn aber irgend etwas im Raume zu erkennen, z.B. eine Linie, 
muss ich sie ziehen, und also eine bestimmte Verbindung des 
gegebenen Mannigfaltigen synthetisch zustande bringen, so, 
dass die Einheit dieser Handlung zugleich die Einheit des 
Bewusstseins (im Begriffe einer Linie) ist'5 und dadurch allererst 
ein Objekt (ein bestimmter Raum) erkannt wird.
In the corresponding passage in A (102) he speaks of drawing a line 
in thought, thinking a passage of time, and imagining ("vorstellen") 
a certain number; his point is that theinitial portion must be 
reproducible for one to have the whole representation ("Vorstellung"). 
Cf. Ktfrner, S., Kant, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1960, p. 26, where he
states that Kant "believes himself to have discovered all theabsolute
synthetic presuppositions of arithmetic and Euclidean geometry, of 
Newtonian physics, and, in a sense, of the traditional logic".
I rely heavily on this work in the following.
Bxvi-xviii.
Kant states, in concluding this passage, that thought of objects by 
the understanding and with necessity ("notwendig") which cannot be 
given in experience is a touchstone that our a priori cognition of 
things is restricted to what we place in them ("wir ... von den Dingen 
das a priori ekennen, was wir selbst in sie legen").
B137:
Verstand ist, allgemein zu reden, das Vermogen der Erkenntnisse. 
Diese bestehen in der bestimmten Beziehung gegebener Vorstellungen 
auf ein Objekt. Objekt aber ist das, in dessen Begriff das 
Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschauung vereinigt ist.
A78, B81.
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191. Cf. Korner, op.cit., p. 49
192. ibid., p. 31.
193. A79, B1O4-5. Korner, op.cit., p. 54, calls this doctrine "the corner­
stone of the Transcendental Analytic" and summarizes it as. "A 
Category refers to its bearer because in being apllied it produces it".
194. Korner, op.cit., p. 57.
195. B130.
196. The "I think", he states (B132),
must be capable of accompanying all my representations; otherwise 
... (a) representation would be either impossible or at least 
nothing to me ... Conseuqently every manifold of intuition has 
a necessary relation to the "I think", in the same subject in
which the manifold is found.
197. B139. Korner states in summary (p. 65), that
The unity of pure apperception, the applicability of the 
Categories, the possible experience of objects mutually imply 
each other: this, I believe, is the essence of the Transcend­
ental Deduction.
198. A146-7, B186.
199. A140-1, B179-8O.
200. A138, B177. For example (A142-3, B182), the schema of quantity is 
number, which "is the unity of the synthesis of themanifold of a 
homogenous intuition in general ..." And (A144, B183) the schema of 
causality is "succession of a manifold in so far as it is subject to
a rule".
201. B19.
202. B20.
203. B21-2.
204. B22-3.
205. Korner, op.cit., p. 49.
cxliv,
206. A80, B106 (cf. Korner, p. 51). The Categories with the corresponding
logical forms are as follows. (1) Categories of quantity: to 
universal judgments corresponds the Category of unity; to particular 
judgments, that of plurality; to singular judgments, that of totality 
(2) Categories of quality: to affirmative judgments corresponds the 
Category of reality; to negative judgements, that of negation; to 
limitative judgments, that of limitation. (3) Categories of relation 
to categorical judgments corresponds that Category of sub stance-and- 
accident; to hypothetical judgments that of causality and dependence; 
to disjunctive judgments that of community of interaction. (4) 
Categories of modality: to problematic judgments corresponds the 
Category of possibility-impossibility; to assertoric judgments, that 
of existence and non-existence; to apodictic judgments, that of 
necessity-contingency.
207. A82, B108.
208. A161, B200. The names of the four classes of the "principles of
pure understanding" are (corresponding to the order of Categories in 
note 206): (1) "Axioms of intuition", (2) "Anticipation of
perception (Wahrnehmung"), (3) "Analogies of experience", and (4)
"Postulates of empirical thought in general".
209. A25, B40.
210. A12, B25; cf. A56, B80.
211. Cf. Kroner, op.cit., p. 105:
The task of Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic is (1) to show 
that belief in such absolute metaphysical principles arises 
from the very nature of our thinking about matters of fact;
(2) to give a complete list of these principles and of the a_ 
priori notions which are involved in them; (3) to demonstrate
that their claim to give us knowledge of matters of fact is
cxlv
illegitimate; and lastly (4) to explain their proper and 
legitimate function in our theoretical endeavour.
212. A19, B33.
213. Cf. Korner, op.cit., p. 106.
214. ibid., p. 107.
215. A3O6, B363.
216. A3O6-7, B363-4.
217. I follow Korner, p. 108, in this difficult passage.
218. A3O7, B364: "... the conclusion given by reason ("Vernunftschluss")
is itself nothing other than a judgment mediated by the subsumption 
of its condition under a general rule (major premise ("Obersatz"))".
219. Cf. Korner, op.cit., pp. 108-10.9
220. A307-9, B364-6:
The logical maxim cannot become a fundamental principle of 
pure reason unless we assume that if the conditioned is given, 
the whole sequence of subordinate conditions, which consequently 
is itself unconditioned, is also given ... Whether this 
principle that the sequence of conditions ... reaches the 
unconditioned is or is not objectively valid, and what consequences 
follow from this for the empirical use of reason ... will be
our business in the Transcendental dialectic ...
221. In Rule XII of the Regulae, Descartes emphasises the synthetic function 
of imagination as it presents a number of natures together and shows 
their mutual possibility.
222. In a context of justification, concepts which are not instantiated in 
objects become explicitly involved with our statements about objects.
As Leibniz put it, truths of fact are justified or evaluated ("se 
justifient") by the truths of reason. The same point is behind
Malebranche’s demand in the first book of the Recherche that we check
our judgments of features in re by explicit mathematical methods and
cxlvi
Descartes’ distinction between experience while waking and while 
dreaming at the end of the Meditations.
223. Kant, in a context emphasising the fact that mathematics, unlike 
philosophy, can provide objects for its concepts because it constructs 
its concepts, states (A727, B755) that the thoroughness of mathematics 
is due to definitions, axioms, and demonstrations. But, he adds, 
these are inapplicable to philosophy in the sense they are used in 
mathematics; further more, "the mathematician, by employing his 
method in philosophy, can only produce so many houses of cards and 
the philosopher, by employing his method in mathematics, can but
stimulate idle talk".
224. Cf. Kroner, op.cit., p. 44.
225. Ibid., p. 107.
226. A323, B379-8O. The categorical form of syllogism leads to the 
unconditioned as "a subject which is not itself a predicate"; the 
hypothetical, to an ultimate "presupposition which itself presupposes 
nothing else"; and the disjunctive, to "an aggregate of the members 
of the (disjunctive) division, such as requires no more in order to 
complete the division of the concept".
227. The three Transcendental Ideas and the speculative disciplines concerned 
with them are (corresponding in order to the three sources of fallacy 
listed in note 226):
• • • fi-rst the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking 
subject, second the absolute unity of the sequence of the conditions 
of the appearance, third the absolute unity of the condition of 
objects of thought in general. The thinking subject is the 
subject matter ("Gegenstand") of (speculative) psychology, the 
totality of appearances (the world) that of (speculative) cosmology, 
and the entity which contains the highest condition of the
possibility of everything which can be thought (the entity of 
all entities), that of theology. (A334, B391)
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228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
It is held that a perfection is unlimited in the sense that it
cannot be incompatible with any other positive predicate; so no
empirical predicate can be a perfection - they are determinates
incompatible with other determinates under the same determinable. So,
Kant concludes, the perfections of God - the ens realissimum - can be 
grasped only by analogy (cf. Korner, op.cit., pp. 118-9). The notion 
of God involves not only the completion of an infinite aggregate of 
predicates, but also personality, so Kant calls it not only an Idea, 
but also an Ideal; as it contains no empirical element, Kant calls 
it the Ideal of pure reason or the transcendental Ideal (ibid., pp. 119-20) 
Cf. Korner, op.cit., p. 222. Cf. p. 119:
Since the completion of an infinite aggregate cannot be an 
object of experience, the assumption that there is such an 
object is logically impossible. The thesis (of speculative 
theology) that God can be an object of experience, in the sense 
in which objects which fall within the scope of natural science 
are, must therefore be rejected.
B668.
An exception must be made for God in the case of Descartes, Who is
not thus subject and knowable in so far as He is free to create this
science.
Cf. Prolegomena, 298 (quoted in Korner, op.cit., p. 48):
All our judgments are first of all perceptual judgments: they 
have validity solely for us, i.e. our subjectivity, and only 
afterwards do we give them a new reference, reference to an 
object, and want them also to be valid for us at all times and 
equally so for everybody else ...
Kant’s argument for this is (briefly) as follows (B275). I am
conscious of my existence as determined in time and every temporal
determination presupposes something perservering in perception which
233.
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cannot be something in me (for it determines my existence). So the 
perception of what perseveres is possible only because of an external 
thing, not its mere representation ("Vorstellung”).
Transcendental idealism is not concerned with introspective 
(’’empirical”) self-consciousness in relation to the existence of external 
objects (ibid.). As regards this relation, Kant distinguishes between 
’’material" or empirical idealism - that introspective self-consciousness 
"is the only immediate experience and that from it the existence of 
external things is only inferred" - from his own empirical realism - 
that "the experience of outer objects is truly immediate and that 
only by means of it ... inner experience is possible ..." (B276).
234. A28, B44.
235. Cf. the letter from his former pupil Beck, 20/6/1797.
236. Op.cit., p. 41.
237. A'19, B33:
By means of sense (or sensitivity: "Sinnlichkeit"), objects are 
given to us and sense alone provides us with intuitions; by 
means of the understanding, objects are thought and from it there 
arise concepts. )
Cf. Korner, p. 27.
238. A271, B327:
Leibniz intellectualized appearances ("Erscheinungen"), just as
Locke ... sensualized the concepts of the understanding ... Instead 
of looking for two disparate sources of representations in the 
undersanding and sense, which, however, judge of things with 
objective validity only in conjunction, each of these great men 
kept to only one of the two ...
239. A271, B327.
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240. A272, B328. Kant claims (A274, B33O) that the foundation of the
monadology is the fact that Leibniz represented the difference between 
internal and external as one of the understanding alone; that 
substance must have something internal, independent of every external 
relation; so what is simple is the foundation of what is internal 
to things in themselves. But, he continues, we can assign to 
substances only that internal accident by which we internally determine 
our sense itself, that is, the accident of representation. This, Kant 
claims (A274-5, B33O), leads straightaway to pre-established harmony, 
and the view that there can be no physical influence. (Kant’s term, 
translated ’’influence”, is "Einfluss”, a construction parallel to 
Leibniz’s Latin term ”influentia", referring to causality. The term 
is appropriate because, in the physics of late Scholasticism, causality 
was’ considered a process whereby accidents really distinct from 
their subjects flow from the cause (as subject) to the effect (another 
subject). This account is incompatible with a mechanical account (it 
would do for electric currents, however). Kant does not discuss this 
alternative, which Leibniz explicitly rejected. Rather, he is concerned 
with causality as it connects phenomenal events sequentially and makes 
experience intelligible. This is largely what Leibniz thought mechanical 
descriptions do.)
241.
242.
243.
244.
A275, B331.
A272, B328.
A24, B38-9.
Firstly, monads mirror the universe from their own point of view. 
Secondly, each monad has its own conatus, the expression of the 
physical quantity vis viva (kinetic energy). Finally, each monad is 
the instantiation of a unique individual concept (hence the identity 
of indiscernables).
cl
245. The noumenon which is the moral agent first appears in the Critique
of Pure Reason as the self of pure apperception. Concerning this self, 
Kant states (B157) that "I am conscious not of how I appear to myself, 
or of how 1 am in myself, but only that I am”. The distinction between 
this self and the empirical self, which we may sometimes know as an 
object, is a consequence of Kant’s fundamental assumptions (cf.
Korner, op.cit., p. 67). Only the former is the moral agent.
"Conscious” here is being used in a way different from the way it is 
used by rationalists, where it concerns occurrences as they are subject 
to our science and what can be explicitly formulated.
246. A444, B472.
247. A445, B473.
248. Cf. Korner, p. 118.
249• PP- 152-154.
250. Cf. I<8rner, op.cit., p. 154. He here quotes from the Critique of 
Practical Reason, 48:
The moral law shows its reality, in a manner which is sufficient 
even from the point of view of the critique of theoretical 
reason, in adding a positive characteristic to a causality ... 
the possibility of which ... theoretical reason (had to assume). 
This positive characteristic is the conception of reason as 
immediately determining the will (through the condition that a 
universal ft?rm can be given to its maxim as laws) .
251. An obvious situation in which this does not hold is when a person is 
learning a rule; his behaviour is evaluated according to the rule so 
that he might come to know the rule. Moral and legal cases are 
complicated by cases involving negligence and similar notions, cases 
in which we should have known a certain rule. (This also applies to 
circumstances.) We should have known the rule, because it is accessible 
to us; it is part of the general cultural stock. Moral (but not legal)
cli
considerations are further complicated by the universalizability of 
moral judgments, bu virtue of which we evaluate the actions of persons 
by rules which are not even accessible to them.
252. It is tempting to think of a particular (covert) sequence of moral
reasoning in silent deliberation as determining overt moral behaviour. 
But '’determine” here, if it is used correctly, could also be used for 
the relation between premises and conclusion, by which the conclusion 
can be drawn, given the premises. A (rule-governed) moral act can be 
considered the conclusion of a (rule-governed) deliberation. Now some 
of the premises relate to the circumstnces of the act, which are 
particular, and the "conclusion” itself is public. If the deliberation 
favours non-action, the agents failure to act in a certain way in the 
given circumstnces (the "conclusion") is also public. Other premises 
will relate to possible consequences and other relevant considerations. 
These presuppose the agent’s competence and relate to wh&t would be 
public. So the competence and other factors involved are commonly 
known or could be so known. Further, possible consequences and other 
considerations have a function in so far as they could be relevant
in a public justification of some act.
1.
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